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2
 The irony of the importance of coincidence in writing a statistical PhD is not lost on me. 
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General introduction 
 
“To the victor belong the spoils.” 
William L. Marcy, New York Senator, 1828 
 
“The Belgian public debt has automatically arisen and will automatically disappear.” (translated 
from French) 
Guy Mathot, Federal Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Budget in 1980-1981 for the 
Francophone Belgian party PS 
 
“We have to rid ourselves of the Walloon tendency to introduce federal taxes that fall on the 
Flemish.” (translated from Dutch) 
Didier Reynders, Federal Minister of Finance from 1999 until 2011 and Federal Vice Prime Minister 
since 2004 for the Francophone Belgian party MR, interviewed in the Flemish newspaper De Tijd of 
24 January 2014 
 
“After the closure of Ford Genk and the ensuing loss of 10,000 jobs, Jo Vandeurzen and Ingrid 
Lieten, the 2 ministers in the Flemish government hailing from Limburg, ‘call the shots’ within 
the newly established Taskforce Limburg for industrial reconversion. In their own words, they 
are the spokespersons of the province of Limburg in Brussels.” (translated from Dutch) 
De Standaard of 20 April 2013 
 
In what follows, we will analyse the political geography of fiscal transfers in Belgium. Although the 
empirical distributive politics and fiscal federalism literature has expanded considerably in recent 
years, our research is to the best of our knowledge the 1
st
 empirical analysis of the political economics 
of the geographic distribution of taxing and spending in Belgium, at least when considering the supra-
local level. Our central question is if the geographic distribution of the budget matches the geographic 
distribution of political power and/or of government popularity, given that taxes are raised centrally 
and politicians are elected locally. In this respect, the case of Belgium is not only under-researched 
but also remarkable, because of the stark political, cultural and economic heterogeneity of Belgium in 
spite of its relatively small size. Moreover, our focus on the supra-local government level seems 
particularly relevant, as the supra-local level comprises the more autonomous government levels of 
Belgium –in contrast to the municipal and the provincial levels- and as it comprises the government 
levels that account for the bulk of taxing and spending in Belgium. While local public expenditure in 
Belgium amounted to 6.3 and 7.1% of GDP in resp. 1995 and 2013
4
, supra-local public expenditure in 
Belgium amounted to 45.7 and 47.4% of GDP in resp. 1995 and 2013, with moreover considerably 
                                                          
4
 See OECD fiscal federalism network database: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/Federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm#C_3 
1995 and 2013 are resp. the first and the most recent year for which the OECD provides data. 
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more variation in the amount of supra-local public expenditure over this time period than in the 
amount of local public expenditure. 
The 1
st
 chapter analyses if net formula-based fiscal transfers from the Federal government to the 
citizen received at the level of the Belgian electoral districts are to be explained by the size of political 
representation “received” per district, i.e. by the number of Federal government ministers who have a 
particular district as their geographic constituency. It is the 1
st
 research we are aware of that 
establishes a causal relationship between political representation and formula-based fiscal transfers 
from the government to the citizen. It is also one of the 1
st
 researches we are aware of that establishes 
a causal relationship between the executive –which in many democracies is far more powerful than the 
legislative- and fiscal transfers.  
The 2
nd
 chapter stands out from the other chapters in that it simply develops a methodology for 
calculating implicit net fiscal transfers between the Belgian regions resulting from the Belgian federal 
debt. We calculate that over the 1970-2002 period the combination of persistent primary surpluses of 
the Flemish region and persistent primary deficits of the Walloon region –and to a lesser extent of the 
Brussels region-, all implicit in the Federal government budget of Belgium, increased net fiscal 
transfers due to the federal debt provided by Flanders to Francophone Belgium to no less than 5.6% of 
Belgian GDP or almost 100% of the total interest bill on the Belgian federal debt.  
The geographically very unevenly spread benefits from Belgian federal budget deficits –and hence the 
geographically strongly diverging incentives for federal budget deficits- may well explain to a 
considerable extent the large overall size of deficits and debt in Belgium since the 1970s. In other 
words, interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the federal debt may be important not just 
because of their distributional consequences, but even more because they may provide an explanation 
for the large overall size of deficits and debt that have particularly characterised Belgium since the 
1970s. The geographically apparently strongly diverging incentives for federal budget deficits in 
Belgium add a new dimension to traditional political economy motives for debt financing. Persson 
and Tabellini’s (2000) partisan dimension over time to political economy motives for debt financing 
takes the shape of a government party with more or less polarised preferences compared to the 
opposition’s, and of governments more or less quickly alternating over time. While such political 
instability may be viewed as polarisation that exists between governing and opposition parties, the 
additional phenomenon that seems to particularly apply to the Belgian federal level is fragmentation, 
to be viewed as polarisation within the governing coalition itself. In contrast to instability, 
fragmentation adds a simultaneous partisan dimension to political economy motives for debt 
financing in Belgium. The additional potential consequences of the Belgian simultaneous geographic 
dimension have hardly been investigated in the existing literature on the political economy of budget 
deficits.  
In a 3
rd
 chapter, we take up the challenge to empirically explain the overall size of Belgian federal 
deficits and debt by the geographically unevenly spread costs and benefits stemming from deficits 
and debt. While logically following the 2
nd
 chapter, also this chapter stands out from most of our other 
chapters. This is because it takes the taxing-and-spending variable as the independent variable of 
interest, rather than as the dependent variable. In this 3
rd
 chapter we investigate more in particular if 
an increase in net formula-based fiscal transfers from the Federal government to its citizens –the 
dependent variable of the 1
st
 chapter- increases the Federal government’s popularity at the 
administrative district level. This research stands out from the existing literature on the relationship 
between fiscal transfers and government popularity in that it uses (1) net (2) formula-based fiscal 
transfers received per district as the independent variable, which is argued to be a measure of a 
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particular district’s (3) contribution to the federal budget deficit, and therefore to the federal public 
debt.  
In contrast to the existing literature, in this 3
rd
 chapter we hypothesise that an increase in fiscal 
transfers will increase government popularity more in the part of a country for which the federal 
public debt has a relatively low cost -Francophone Belgium in the case of Belgium- than in the part of 
a country for which the federal public debt has a relatively high cost -Flanders in the case of Belgium. 
Such a different effect on government popularity could then be an explanation for the size of the 
public debt in Belgium, which has been large ever since the 1970s
5
. To the best of our knowledge, it 
is the 1
st
 empirical investigation of the effect of geographic fragmentation of a central government on 
taxing and spending. Previous research on the political economy causes of central government debt 
mainly investigated if fragmentation in terms of the number of parties represented in the government 
as such , as well as if government instability –in terms of the short-lived-ness of a government- would 
increase central government debt. To the best of our knowledge, it is also the 1
st
 empirical 
investigation of geographically differing preferences of taxing and spending within one and the same 
country. 
The 4
th
 chapter analyses if discretionary grants allocated by a Belgian subsidising supra-local 
government to a municipality that is part of the Brussels region are to be explained by the degree of 
partisan alignment of that municipality with the supra-local grant awarding governments. This 
research stands out from most of the existing literature on the relationship between partisan alignment 
and allocation of grants in that it investigates the effect of partisan alignment per individual party that 
is part of a government coalition –either at the subsidising level or at the grants-receiving level. Most 
of the existing literature -more crudely- only considers the alignment of entire governments –either 
single-party or coalition governments- without being able to identify the contribution of individual 
parties. For this reason, this literature is unable to model alignment –in a more refined way as we do- 
as an interaction variable. 
The 5
th
 chapter stands out from the other chapters in that it does not explain the geographic 
distribution of the government budget in Belgium, but its overall size. It analyses if an increase in the 
number of politicians governing at one of Belgium’s supra-local governments increases public 
spending and/or the budget deficit, an effect that is known as the Law of 1/n in the political economics 
literature. This research stands out from most of the existing literature on the relationship between the 
number of politicians and the size of government in that it also investigates the effect of the size of the 
executive (from various angles) on public spending, and not only the effect of the size of the 
legislative (from various angles). The size of the legislative is the traditional independent variable of 
interest in the –until now rather limited- existing literature on the Law of 1/n. 
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 Indeed, constitutionally Flanders and Francophone Belgium are guaranteed equal representation in the Federal 
government, and while cooperation of all coalition partners in a particular government may be needed to avoid a 
deficit, non-cooperation by one of them may suffice to cause a deficit.  
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Chapter 1: The effect of political representation on the geographic 
distribution of income: evidence using Belgian data
6
 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of political representation in explaining geographic variation in social 
security and income tax transfers. To quantify the causal link going from political representation to 
transfers, we identify 2 sets of exogenous changes in political representation and use an instrumental 
variable approach. Using Belgian data for the 1995-2010 period, we find that transfers to inhabitants 
of a particular electoral district increase significantly with every extra federal minister originating 
from that electoral district. Given that social security and income tax transfers appear to be largely 
formula-based this result is surprising.  
Keywords: 
distributive politics; income redistribution; fiscal transfers; political representation 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the role of political representation in explaining geographic variation in social 
security and income tax transfers. For many countries there exists scientific evidence of political 
manoeuvring in allocating discretionary expenditures geographically (see e.g. Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002) for Sweden and Knight (2008) for the US). However, in this paper we look at the 
geographic distribution of the income tax, social security contributions and social expenditures, which 
are firmly based on legislation, and therefore –presumably- formula-based. The social expenditures 
we consider comprise all major social transfer categories: pensions, unemployment benefits, child 
allowances, work disability allowances, allowances for the handicapped, and subsistence allowances. 
In 2010, income taxes on average amounted to 8.4% of GDP in OECD countries, while social security 
contributions on average amounted to 10.1% of gross wage earnings, and social expenditures on 
average amounted to 22.1% of GDP7. The fiscal transfers we consider are clearly economically very 
meaningful in size, but have nevertheless received little attention in previous research, perhaps 
because they are thought to be mainly formula based and therefore mostly immune to tactical 
manipulation.  
 
Tax and social security systems may be less formula-based than they appear at first sight, however. 
Firstly, politicians may cater for their constituency by introducing and changing legislation. One 
example would be the creation of target group measures in social security (e.g. employment schemes 
and rebates in social security contributions) and in the tax system (e.g. targeted tax rebates). These 
types of measures are an important element of social security and taxation systems in most countries. 
Secondly, even within apparently formula-based systems such as social security, some decisions 
remain discretionary. An example for Belgium is the fact that the agreement of the federal minister of 
employment is required to secure exceptional state-funded early retirement for employees of any firm 
that has gone out of business. Thirdly, the practical implementation of legislation might be influenced. 
Politicians may prod local branches of the tax and social security administrations towards lenient 
taxation and social security audits. In Belgium, considerable geographic disparity in the number of tax 
and social security audits has been found to exist (Deloitte 2010). Lastly, the practical organisation of 
the executive in most countries involves regular meetings between ministers, offering plenty of scope 
for negotiation and bargaining such that a minister with competencies unrelated to tax or social 
matters can nevertheless weigh on decisions related to these topics affecting his/her constituency. It is 
important to keep in mind that although we believe the above channels may be at work and could at 
least partially offer an explanation of the empirical regularities we observe, our results below do not 
constitute proof of any of these channels in particular to be operative. 
 
Motivated by the fact that in most countries the executive dominates the legislative, the focus of our 
attention will be on political representation within the executive power. This stands in contrast with 
the bulk of the distributive politics literature where the focus has been on parliamentary 
representation. To identify causal effects of political representation on transfers we perform an 
instrumental variable analysis using a Belgian dataset for the years 1995-2010. A first approach we 
use is to exploit the resignation of ministers following various events deemed orthogonal to transfers. 
In a 2nd and separate IV analysis, we exploit the unique opportunity offered by the changes in 
ministerial representation that occurred due to the redrawing of the Belgian electoral district borders 
in the reform of 2002.  
 
                                                          
7
 See www.oecd.org 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the distributive 
politics literature in the context of which our paper is to be situated. Section 3 describes the data we 
use in our analysis. Section 4 consists of the actual empirical analysis of social and fiscal transfers and 
the quantification of the effect of ministerial representation. Section 5 draws a number of conclusions. 
2. Related literature 
 
Our analysis differs from the mainstream distributive politics literature because of the combination of 
our choice of the independent variable of interest (political representation in the executive), the 
dependent variable we consider (formula based transfers), and our empirical strategy (using 
instrumental variables to control for reverse causality). In the following paragraphs we discuss these 3 
differences in detail. 
2.1. Political representation in the executive versus in the legislative 
  
The bulk of the literature on the effect of political representation on fiscal transfers has so far focused 
on districts’ representation within the legislative, rather than within the executive. Within this 
literature, most research has focused on representation within US Congress. Some of this literature 
looks at districts’ representation in Congress across-the-board, i.e. without distinguishing if a district 
is represented by a Congress member belonging to the majority or not. An example is the research by 
Ansolabehere e.a. (2002, 2003) on the effects of representation of districts compared to their 
population size. Examples for Canada are Evans (2005) and Jutras and Vaillancourt (2008). Dragu 
and Rodden (2011) perform a cross-country study on the effects of representation of districts 
compared to their population size in federations over the world.  
 
A number of studies explicitly considers the effect of whether a district voted in favour of the majority 
in US Congress on transfers received. Examples are Albouy (2013) and Young and Sobel (2013). 
Guccio and Mazza (2013) take a similar perspective for a region of a European country, i.e. Sicily. 
Studying different countries, Bickers and Stein (1996), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), and Helland 
and Sørensen (2009) focus on the narrowness of the vote margin by which the parliamentary majority 
“holds” a particular district. The latter studies find that so called “swing districts”, i.e. districts 
represented by vulnerable seats, receive more transfers.  
 
However, in many countries, the legislative is dominated by the executive –and in particular by 
cabinet ministers-, as well as by political parties and their presidents (see e.g. Timmermans 1994 and 
Dewachter 2001 for case studies of Belgium). The role of political parties in determining transfers is 
more closely investigated by a series of studies that analyse the effect of political alignment. More in 
particular, these studies investigate if more transfers result from similarity between the district’s lower 
level government and the transfer providing higher level government with respect to their party-
political composition. Examples of studies of such alignment effects are Brollo and Nannicini (2012) 
for Brazil and Migueis (2013) for Portugal.  
 
It is surprising that only 3 papers in the distributive politics literature investigate the effect of district 
representation by one or more individual members of the executive, i.e. by cabinet ministers on 
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transfers8. Crampton (2004) and Milligan and Smart (2005) do so for Canada. Both find that swing 
districts held by a minister receive more grants, and also –but to a lesser extent- that the governing 
party’s swing districts in general receive more grants. This extra support goes at the expense of the 
governing party’s core districts. Similarly, Golden and Picci (2008) find for Italy that ministers’ 
districts9 receive more grants at the expense of the governing parties’ core districts.  
 
Given the political predominance of the executive in many countries, we will focus on the geographic 
distribution of government ministers when looking for a political explanation of the geographic 
distribution of fiscal transfers in our empirical application to the case of Belgium. 
2.2. Net fiscal transfers versus discretionary spending 
 
In the overwhelming majority of the existing political economy research on the geographic 
distribution of grants, including in the majority of the studies cited above, the dependent variable is 
not formula based expenditures but rather discretionary expenditures. These concern mostly 
investment grants, i.e. grants for local public goods, sometimes labelled as earmarks or “pork barrel”. 
This is also the case for the 3 abovementioned studies that explain the effect of ministerial 
representation. This focus on discretionary spending is understandable, as this spending –almost by 
definition- can be steered towards specific geographic areas, and therefore would be more easy to 
manipulate by political agents. E.g. Crampton (2004 p. 5) reports that approval of the member of 
parliament elected for a particular Canadian district –who in some cases was a cabinet minister- was 
needed for effective disbursement of the expenditure category he studies, i.e. grants for SME 
development. 
 
An important problem with discretionary spending, however, is that this type of expenditure 
represents a relatively small share of total redistributive expenditure in most OECD countries. E.g. in 
Belgium public capital transfers and gross public investment taken together amounted to about 3.8% 
of GDP in 2010, compared to social expenditures amounting to 29.5% of GDP10. We therefore chose 
to rather focus on explaining social security and income tax transfers, which are likely harder to steer 
but economically more relevant.  
 
Few empirical studies explain the geographic distribution of these formula-based transfer 
expenditures or of taxation by political variables. There exist some studies, however, that substantiate 
the qualitative claim by Besley and Coate (2003 p. 2628) that “even when spending is allocated 
formulaically, it is possible for legislators to manipulate such formulas to favour their own districts”. 
E.g. Sorribas-Navarro (2011) finds evidence of a causal relationship running from the proportion of 
swing voters of a Spanish region with high budget deficits towards extra -a priori formula-based- 
intergovernmental grants. Sorribas-Navarro explains this causal relationship by the fact that the 
formula determining these grants is open for renegotiation between Spanish regions every 5 years. A 
2nd case in point is Litschig (2012), who finds evidence of manipulation of particular municipalities’ 
population estimates underpinning formula-based grants to municipalities by the main incumbent 
                                                          
8
 However, some US studies distinguish between political representation as such and representation by 
particularly powerful members of a political party. Examples are Knight (2005 and 2008), who investigate the 
effect of proposal power that some members of Congress have thanks to their membership of Congress 
committees whose expenditure impact is large.  
9
 As well as districts of other powerful party members, such as party presidents. 
10
 See www.oecd.org 
19 
 
party in Brazil during the early 90s. A final example is Banful (2011) who finds a similar 
manipulation of the formula that determines the distribution of intergovernmental grants in Ghana11.  
 
In contrast to these studies however, our dependent variable concerns grants between government and 
citizens and not intergovernmental grants. This makes our research more closely related to studies like 
the one by Atlas e.a. (1995), who find that US states that have a higher Senate representation per 
capita receive more federal spending per capita, including more so called entitlement spending –i.a. 
social security spending12. That the size and significance of the entitlement coefficient are the lowest 
of all expenditure categories considered does not surprise Atlas e.a. (1995 p. 628) as entitlements are 
less easy to control or target to a state.  
 
A 2nd closely related study is Evans (2005)13, who finds that personal income taxes paid per Canadian 
electoral district between 1961 and 1999 depend on representation in the House of Commons, in 
terms of seats share per capita. Evans (2005 p. 279) points at the existence of tax deductions favouring 
inhabitants in remote and sparsely populated districts, where the number of votes needed to win a seat 
is lower14.  
2.3. Empirical strategy 
 
A central weakness in most of the literature cited above is that it does not take into account the fact 
that the political variables of interest might be endogenous, i.a. subject to reverse causality.  
 
A study in distributive politics that does tackle the endogeneity issue is Albouy (2013), who makes 
use of a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify instances in which gaining power at the 
US state level is approximately random. Also Brollo and Nannicini (2012) make use of such an RDD 
to study the effect of political alignment on intergovernmental grants in Brazil. Another exception is 
Carozzi and Repetto (2013), who explain transfers to Italian members of parliament’s birth towns that 
lie outside these MPs’ electoral district, and hence cannot be subject to reverse causality.  
 
The 3 studies considering the effect of ministers’ origin on the distribution of expenditures that we 
discussed above (Crampton, 2004; Milligan and Smart, 2005; Golden and Picci, 2008) assume 
exogeneity of ministerial representation. Of the 3 studies only Milligan and Smart (2005 p. 14) 
motivate this assumption, by claiming that, because in a strong party system like Canada’s ministers 
are appointed by their prime minister, they are exogenous to transfers15. A similar reasoning could be 
applied to a strong party system like Belgium’s, where party presidents appoint ministers. However, 
                                                          
11 At first sight Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Padovano (2012) also explain formula-based transfers –social 
security expenditures to US citizens and intergovernmental equalisation transfers to Italian regions resp. - by 
political economy factors, but their coefficients turn insignificant when these authors add electoral district fixed 
effects. 
12
 Atlas e.a. (1995 p. 627) also find that these states do not pay less federal taxes per capita –which the authors 
explain by the fact that the tax code is infrequently overhauled and largely income-based. 
13
 Evans’s findings are confirmed by Jutras and Vaillancourt (2008). 
14
 Finally, there is the claim by Alesina (1994 p. 31) that invalidity pensions –which may be assumed to be non-
discretionary- have been used as “a transfer system from Northern to Southern Italy”. In 1984, the ratio of 
invalidity pensions over old age pensions in the whole of Italy would have been 40%, but it would have been 
250% in Southern Italy. 
15
 Instead Milligan and Smart (2005) develop an IV estimation strategy for vote share per district, their other 
major independent variable of interest.  
20 
 
we argue that political representation could nevertheless be endogenous due to reverse causality. It is 
likely that, even in a strong party system, when a candidate obtains many preferential votes16 during 
the preceding election, his party president will find it harder to deny this candidate a ministerial post17. 
Obtaining many votes could in turn be due to having channelled extra transfers to one’s district18, as 
e.g. demonstrated by Stratmann (2013) with respect to earmarks voted by US Congress. As a matter 
of fact, it is hard to imagine a mechanism where ministers would channel transfers towards certain 
districts, if not for attracting votes and either directly or indirectly affecting the probability of re-
election or re-appointment.  
 
For reasons of prudence, i.e. to be sure to isolate the causal effect of ministerial representation on 
transfers toward a district, we therefore will not assume that ministers are appointed exogenously. 
Instead we will instrument our ministers variable using changes in ministers that may be reasonably 
thought to be independent from transfers. We develop 2 alternatives to isolate such exogenous 
minister changes.  
3. Data 
 
This study considers cash transfers from and to households through social security contributions and 
social expenditures and personal income taxation. Social security benefits in kind, i.e. health care 
expenditures, are not included, due to lack of data. As we aim to make use of the exogenous variation 
in ministers due to the redrawing of electoral districts in 2002 in Belgium, our analysis will focus on 
this country. All data on transfers was obtained from the NBB website19 for the period 1995-2010 at 
the administrative “arrondissement” level of geographic disaggregation. The type of transfers we 
consider represent a large share of geographic fiscal transfers, and their budgetary impact is large. At 
the contribution side it comprises 2 of the 3 by far most important sources of funding of the Federal 
government, i.e. the personal income tax and social security contributions. Taken together, the 
transfers considered reduced interregional average household income differences by 33% in the year 
2005. (Persyn and Algoed, 2011) 
 
Graphs 1a (for the 10 Flemish electoral districts and the mixed Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde district) and 
1b (for the 9 Francophone electoral districts) show the evolution of cash transfers through social 
security contributions and expenditures and personal income taxes over time per electoral district,    
  
                                                          
16
 In Belgian elections, voters can either vote for a party in general, or for one or more candidates on the 
candidate list submitted by a particular party. The latter votes are called preferential votes. The number of 
preferential votes obtained by key party members such as outgoing ministers are compared to each other in the 
media, and are reportedly used within parties in the struggle for minister postings. Golden and Picci (2008 p. 
270) mention a similar mechanism within DC, the most powerful party in postwar Italy until its collapse in 
1993. 
17
 In Belgium little is known about the criteria party presidents use for the awarding of ministerial posts. 
Reportedly an intra-party balance would have to be struck between the various party factions, but not between 
electoral districts. (see e.g. Timmermans 1994 p. 110-111) As a result some districts provide more ministers 
than others. 
18
 But it is also true for Belgium that more preferential votes are obtained by candidates ranked high on the list, 
and that a candidate’s ranking is determined by the party (i.e. to a large extent by the party president). 
19
 www.nbb.be/doc/dq/n/dq3/NNR.pdf; this is the only source of geographically disaggregated Belgian federal 
revenue and expenditure data we are aware of. 
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Graphs 1a and 1b: The evolution of fiscal transfers per electoral district, in real 1000 euro per 
capita terms, for Flanders and Francophone Belgium resp. (1995-2010) 
 
 
Source: NBB 
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expressed in 1000 euros per capita terms, and deflated by the consumer price index for Belgium20. It 
is clear from the graphs that all electoral districts are net payers to the federal state. This is mainly due 
to the fact that our fiscal transfer data comprise the personal income tax and social security 
contributions at the revenue side, and only (part of) social benefits at the expenditure side. 
 
The graphs show large differences in net transfers between districts, but perhaps most striking is the 
overall persistence of the relative positions of the electoral districts over time, with a number of 
Francophone districts persistently contributing the least of all districts to the Federal government, and 
a number of Flemish districts persistently contributing among the most of all districts to the Federal 
government. These large and persistent differences are caused by the equally large and persistent 
income differences between the typical Francophone Belgian electoral district and the typical Flemish 
electoral district. The persistence of large between-district-differences in net transfers will pose a 
challenge to our attempt in the analysis below to explain the relatively small within-district-changes in 
fiscal and social transfers over time by political factors. Nevertheless, some electoral districts did fare 
better or worse than others over time, with some changes in relative positions as a consequence. 
 
As for our political variable of interest, graphs 2a and 2b show the evolution of the number of federal 
ministers per 100,000 inhabitants for the separate pre-2002 electoral districts. Data was obtained from 
the federal parliament of Belgium. For election years the distribution of ministers of the outgoing 
government was used. Federal elections were always held in May or June over our sample period21. 
However, in the analysis below, for the years after 2002, when the “provincial” districts reform was 
voted into law, we assume ministers distribute their attention among the smaller old districts 
contained in their new provincial district in proportion to the population contained in the smaller 
districts.22 Assuming instead that ministers continue only to cater for their old smaller district does not 
materially affect any of our results.  
 
Graphs 2a and 2b not only reveal considerable variation between electoral districts in terms of the 
number of ministers elected in a particular district per 100,000 inhabitants, but also –in contrast to the 
transfers shown in graphs 1a and 1b- considerable variation over time. In 62 of our 320 district-year 
observations, the absolute number of ministers per district changes. The graphs show that –
unsurprisingly- changes in (the provenance of) ministers occur mainly in the years following federal 
election years (i.e. in years 199623, 2000, 2004, and 2008). The red vertical bars in the graphs mark 
federal election years.  
 
But there also seem to be a lot of exceptions to this rule, i.e. 33 out of 62 minister changes did not 
occur in post-election years. This is because, as opposed to members of parliament, politicians are not 
elected to be a minister (nor re-elected) for an entire legislature, but appointed (and dismissed) for a 
non-predetermined time period. Formally appointments are made by the head of state, but de facto the 
positions are divided between parties after the elections during negotiations between party presidents.  
                                                          
20
 Taken from Statistics Belgium (http://statbel.fgov.be/). 
21
 Assignment of ministers in election years to the outgoing government has the advantage of taking into 
account the possible existence of a political business cycle, which could imply that ministers focus their 
redistribution efforts on the period preceding an election. 
22 For example, a smaller district with 100,000 inhabitants having one minister originating from that district, and 
which represents 1/3 of the total population of a newly instituted larger district, has a value of ministers (which 
is the number of ministers expressed per 100.000 inhabitants) of 1 when ignoring the reform, and a value of 
ministers of 1/3 after recalculating the variable to take into account the redrawing of constituencies. 
23
 As the result of the 1995 elections was the continuation of the outgoing Federal government coalition, 
minister changes were very limited in 1996. 
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Graphs 2a and 2b: The evolution of the number of ministers per electoral district, per 100,000 
inhabitants (1995-2010) 
 
 
Sources: Federal parliament of Belgium, own calculations 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
year
Aalst-Oudenaarde Antwerpen
Brugge Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde
Gent-Eeklo Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt
Leuven Limburg
Mechelen-Turnhout Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde
Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
year
Brabant Wallon Charleroi-Thuin
Huy-Waremme Liège
Luxembourg Mons-Soignies
Namur Tournai-Ath-Mouscron
Verviers
24 
 
When deemed necessary, party presidents replace a minister in between elections or a minister 
himself/herself chooses to resign. The large number of changes in political representation that happen 
between elections inspired us to consider a subset of them as exogenous to fiscal transfers and use 
them as instruments to identify a causal effect of political representation on transfers in section 4. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
 
Our estimation equation is given by  
 
transfersit
  = b0transfersit-1  + b1ministersit-1  + b2log(grossincome)it + b3dependantsit + eit. 
 
Here, transfersit denotes the fiscal transfers per electoral district i and year t, in real 1000 euro per 
capita terms. Our specification with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) allows to differentiate 
between the short and long run association between political representation and transfers, and 
conforms to the intuition that the amount of transfers towards a district might be slow to adjust and 
may be conditional on past levels even when taking into account the different covariates in our model. 
Our independent variable of interest is ministers, the number of ministers per 100,000 inhabitants. A 
single one-year lag of the ministers variable is used, as it is likely that ministers require some time in 
office before they may start to affect decision-making and transfers. We further control for gross 
income per capita in logarithms, log(grossincome), and the number of dependants (minors, retired, 
unemployed).  
 
We further specify the error term as eit = zi + qt + mi t + pit. The inclusion of a full set of district 
dummies zi removes any bias by omitted time-constant factors (e.g. those related to political and 
economic history) within electoral districts, which may be correlated with both the amount of 
transfers and our political variable of interest, i.e. ministers per district. This is equivalent to a "fixed 
effects within estimation" considering only variation in the data within electoral districts by 
subtracting the district-specific means for each variable. Moreover, we add year dummies qt to control 
for any effects common to all districts in a specific year, and district-specific year trend effects mi 
(interacted with the year t) to further control for any omitted trending variable that might be specific 
to a district24. All reported standard errors are grouped (clustered) on the district level, allowing for 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation between observations within each district.  
 
Our hypothesis is that ministers cater to their constituency in order to gain votes, and that the 
electorate in turn rewards ministers for their services. For the case of Belgium, this would work as 
explained above through preference votes, which in turn are conducive to ministerial (re-
)appointment. If such a mechanism of mutual causation is indeed at work, using OLS to estimate the 
above estimation equation will result in biased estimates, due to the fact that the ministers variable 
then is endogenous and correlated with the error term. 
  
We will first ignore such possible simultaneity bias and estimate equation (1) using OLS. These 
results do not have a causal interpretation, as they do not reflect the effect of an exogenous change in 
                                                          
24
 The estimation results for these dummies and district-level year trends are omitted from all tables.  
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the ministerial representation of a district on the incoming transfers. Nevertheless, we find it 
important to report these results, as finding a significant effect in the single equation setting suggests 
that some political-economy mechanism may be at work.  
4.2. Estimation results when ignoring the endogeneity of political 
representation 
 
Column (1) in table 1 presents the estimation results when ignoring the endogeneity of political 
representation and estimating equation (1) using OLS. Column (1) shows cash transfers to an electoral 
district to be 9 euros higher per capita and year, for every federal minister originating from that 
electoral district. As expected, a higher average gross income is associated with lower transfers to a 
district, and a higher share of dependent inhabitants is associated with more transfers. The gross 
income variable is highly correlated with many key socio-economic variables, making it difficult to 
separately estimate the relation between other important socio-economic variables and transfers after 
controlling for gross income. The share of dependants has a correlation coefficient of -0.85 with gross 
income, and in some specifications that we will discuss below both variables will not be jointly 
significant. The inclusion of 20 district dummies and 20 district-level year trends also implies that a 
lot of variation within districts is already accounted for in all specifications, making it hard to 
additionally estimate the effect of slowly changing variables such as income or the share of 
dependants (unlike the more erratically changing political representation).  
 
Table 1: Estimating the association between ministers and transfers  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Estimation method: 
transferst 
OLS 
transferst 
sys-GMM 
   
transferst-1 0.175
*
 0.912
***
 
 (0.0993) (0.0802) 
   
log(grossincome)t -4.112
***
 -0.983
**
 
 (0.448) (0.456) 
   
dependantst 5.722
**
 0.915 
 (2.322) (1.155) 
   
ministerst-1 0.0898
***
 0.125
***
 
 (0.0303) (0.0347) 
   
N 
Instruments 
AR(1) p-value 
AR(2) p-value 
Hansen p-value 
300 
- 
- 
- 
- 
300 
41 
0.08 
0.398 
0.488 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included in all 
specifications. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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It is well known that the coefficient on the LDV is downwardly biased when estimating using OLS in 
the presence of fixed effects. This bias might also affect the other coefficient estimates. The 
specification shown in column (2) takes first differences of the equation in levels to remove the fixed 
effects, and uses a GMM instrumentation approach to control for the endogeneity of the transformed 
LDV (but does not yet control for the endogeneity of our main variable of interest ministers). 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), the 2nd to 4th lag of the levels of the dependent variable are used 
as instruments for its lagged differences (difference GMM). Simultaneously, differences of the LDV 
are used as instruments for the equation in levels (system GMM) as in Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). All estimation was performed using the xtabond2 command in Stata. (see 
Roodman 2009b, for details)  
 
The results indeed suggest that the coefficient on the LDV was severely downward biased in the OLS 
estimation. The reported standard tests for autocorrelation allow to reject the presence of first order 
autocorrelation in the residuals, but not of 2nd order autocorrelation, which matches the assumptions of 
this estimator. The Hansen over-identification test does not allow to reject the validity of the over-
identifying assumptions, but given the large number of instruments, the power of this test is probably 
low. A robustness-check in section 4.3.3 shows that in specifications with a reduced instrument set, 
the main conclusions of our analysis remain to hold and the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions is upheld.  
 
The association between the one year lag of ministers and transfers in year t is given by 𝑏1 ∑ 𝑏0
𝑡−1
𝑡
, 
with b1 the effect of the one-year lag of ministers, and b0 the coefficient on the LDV. For large t, this 
effect converges to 𝑏1/(1 − 𝑏0). As it turns out, this estimated long run effect is not significantly 
different from 0 for the estimates reported in column (2). However, in the perhaps more relevant 
`medium run’, of –e.g.- 8 years, or 2 full terms for a minister, the estimated association is about 
74(33) euro per capita per year, is significantly different from 0 on the 5-percent level, and is both 
statistically and economically significantly larger than the estimated 12.5(3.5) euro after the first year. 
After a single term of 4 years, the estimated association is 44(15) euro.  
4.3. Estimation results when instrumenting changes in political 
representation 
 
Previous contributions (such as Milligan and Smart, 2005, e.g.) do not consider the possible 
endogeneity of political variables, in particular of provenance of ministers, when explaining 
geographic redistribution. Milligan and Smart (2005, p. 14) claim that, because in a strong party 
system like Canada’s ministers are appointed by their prime minister, they are exogenous to transfers. 
A similar reasoning could be applied to a strong party system like Belgium’s, where party presidents 
of the governing coalition appoint ministers. However, one might still argue that ministers are 
endogenous due to reverse causality. It is likely, even in a strong party system, that –as argued above- 
when a candidate obtains many preference votes during the preceding election, his party president will 
find it harder to deny this candidate a ministerial post. Obtaining many votes could in turn be due to 
having channelled extra transfers to one’s district. If this is the case, ministers would be driving 
transfers, but simultaneously transfers in a district would be driving ministers. As a matter of fact, it 
is hard to imagine a mechanism where ministers would channel transfers towards certain districts that 
cannot be explained by purely socio-economic factors, if not for attracting votes and either directly or 
indirectly affecting the probability of re-election or re-appointment. To isolate the causal effect of 
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ministerial representation on transfers toward a district, we therefore will not assume that ministers 
are appointed exogenously.  
 
As before we will use difference and system GMM estimation to address the bias introduced by the 
presence of a LDV; but we will now simultaneously instrument the differenced ministers variable 
using changes in ministers that may be reasonably thought to be independent from transfers. We 
develop 2 alternatives to isolate such exogenous minister changes. A first approach is to exploit the 
resignation of ministers following various events (2 examples are ministers resigning after the escape 
of a top-criminal and after a food scare), policy disagreements within the ruling coalition (such as a 
controversial arms deal and an intra-coalition row over airplane noise over Brussels), or appointments 
of ministers in international institutions. In a 2nd and separate IV analysis, we exploit the changes in 
political representation that occurred due to the redrawing of electoral district borders in the reform of 
2002.  
 
As a robustness-check we perform a 3rd IV analysis where we use the system and difference GMM 
approach not only for the LDV, but also use this approach for the political representation variable, 
instrumenting differenced changes in ministers with the lagged level, and vice versa.  
4.3.1. Instrumenting using exogenous changes in political representation25 
 
Table 7 in Annex 1 gives a detailed description of 12 decreases in ministers over our sample period 
(out of a total of number of 62 changes in ministers) that we argue to be exogenous to the transfers 
received in a region26. These 12 cases are due to ministers resigning (or being forced out of) their 
posts. Most of these 12 resignations correspond to another change in ministerial representation as in 
most cases the resigning ministers are replaced. However, a minister who enters office exogenously 
may well be able to start “playing the fiscal transfer game” with a view to obtaining votes during the 
next elections. We therefore excluded these corresponding positive changes from our analysis. Our 
results do not change much if we include these corresponding positive changes into the instrument set, 
however. 
 
None of the 12 considered resignations are prima facie related to federal elections, nor to sub-central 
or European elections. They mostly comprise hard to foresee cases where ministers have been forced 
to resign because of some scandal for which they had to take the political responsibility, or chose to 
step down due to some disagreement within the governing coalition. All 12 do not seem related to the 
“fiscal transfer game”27. Of course, one can never rule out completely that a fiscal-transfer related 
conflict underlied one or more of the 12 exits concerned, rather than the officially given reason for 
                                                          
25
 We are grateful to Liesbeth Colen for her suggestions regarding the implementation of this IV strategy. 
26
 Using a mere subset of the original and possibly endogenous independent variable as the IV is an IV strategy 
similar to the one implemented in Dahlberg et al. (2008) when investigating the flypaper effect for Swedish 
municipalities. They use a census-determined (i.e. partial) change in grants to instrument the actual (i.e. total) 
change in grants received by Swedish municipalities.  
27
 A resignation unrelated to the “fiscal transfer game” that we did not include in table 4 is the appointment of 
then prime minister Van Rompuy to the post of President of the EU Council of Ministers in 2009. Because of 
the government reshuffle that followed Van Rompuy’s resignation, Van Rompuy’s electoral district, Brussel-
Halle-Vilvoorde not only lost a minister, but also gained a minister (Vanackere). The net effect of Van 
Rompuy’s resignation on his district’s number of ministers hence was zero. Our estimation results are robust to 
including Van Rompuy’s resignation into our set of exogenous minister changes. 
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their resignation. To the extent that this is the case, our approach will be biased. However, we believe 
that a fiscal-transfer related conflict did not underlie any of the 12 exits we consider. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of our IV regressions. As before, all specifications use difference and 
system GMM, with the 2nd to 4th lag of the LDV as instruments in the differenced equation, and first 
differences values of the LDV as instruments in the level equation.  
 
Table 2: Effect of ministers on transfers, IV estimation.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
    
transferst-1 0.931
***
 0.864
***
 0.909
***
 
 (0.0844) (0.108) (0.0784) 
    
log(grossincome)t -1.011
*
 -1.609
***
 -1.049
**
 
 (0.501) (0.555) (0.467) 
    
dependantst 0.993 0.452 0.972 
 (1.418) (1.638) (1.261) 
    
ministerst-1 0.263
**
 0.273
***
 0.184
***
 
 (0.0938) (0.0855) (0.0471) 
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 41 39 44 
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.097 <0.00 0.081 
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.446 0.074 0.41 
Hansen p-value 0.997 1 1 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
The specification in column (1) uses the subset of decreases in ministers that are due to a limited set 
of assumed exogenous causes (reported in table 7 in Annex 1) as an instrument for the original 
ministers variable. This subset of changes is only used as an instrument for the equation in first 
differences in the GMM system. The resulting estimated causal effect of ministers on transfers in 
column (1) corresponds to a short run effect of 26(9) euro. Despite retaining only 12 out of 62 
changes in ministers as exogenous to the transfer game, this estimate is both large and significantly 
different from 0. As the within standard deviation of our ministers variable over sample period is 1.22, 
the typical variation in transfers per capita over the short term due to variations in our ministers 
variable over time therefore equals about 32 euro, with a p value of 0.01. The estimated long run 
effect using this specification is as large as 381(94) euro, and the effect after a single term of 4 years 
is 95(39) euro. Again, as the within standard deviation of our ministers variable over sample period is 
1.22, the typical variation in transfers per capita over the medium term due to variations in our 
ministers variable over time therefore equals about 116 euro, with a p value of 0.02. The long run and 
medium run effects are both significantly larger than 0, and significantly larger than the short run 
effect. These effects are also large when compared to the results obtained in table 1, ignoring the 
possible endogeneity of ministers. 
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4.3.2. Instrumenting using changes due to electoral districts merger28 
 
As a 2
nd
 IV strategy, we exploit changes in political representation caused by a major electoral district 
reform. As the maps in Annex 3 show, on the occasion of the 2002 reform the former 20 federal 
electoral districts were reduced to 11. The law concerned merged these 20 districts into 11 larger 
“provincial” electoral districts29. We now instrument ministers using as an instrument only the subset 
of changes in ministers that are due to this merger. This instrument is exogenous, if we are willing to 
assume that voters in the elections of 2003 did not vote with forward looking transfer-related 
expectations regarding ministers they could additionally vote for due to the electoral district merger, 
and that ministers did not anticipate the merger and did not steer transfers before the merger to their 
future new constituency. To the extent that these assumptions fail to hold, our estimate would in part 
still reflect a reverse causal effect.  
 
Additionally, we have to assume that the district border reform was not implemented for reasons 
related to fiscal transfers. The official reason given for the district merger is that it would eliminate 
the arbitrariness of the allocation of the “final” parliamentary seat per province. Under the old district 
borders, residual votes per district per party would be added up per province, after which some 
complex process with a rather unpredictable outcome determined which party would obtain the 
“final” seat. The more probable underlying motivation for the district merger was rather that the 
politicians –mostly federal ministers- dominating the then 2 largest Flemish governing parties –who 
masterminded the reform- wished to benefit from the fact that they were well known also beyond the 
borders of their old district after their parties had governed together since mid-1999. Hence the 
motivation for the merger was not related to the fiscal transfers that make up our dependent variable, 
but was rather implemented for reasons related to the country-wide actions of powerful politicians. In 
contrast, the then major Flemish opposition party heavily resisted the reform. In short, we believe that 
the underlying reason for the district border reform was unrelated to fiscal issues, or transfers. 
 
Annex 2 describes our instrument over the 2003-2007 period. We assume that our instrument takes 
values different from zero only over this period, assuming that ministers started at the earliest to steer 
transfers to their “new districts” in 2003. 2003 is the year of the first elections after the merger law 
was voted –in September 2002-, so we may assume that the “new” kind of transfers did not arrive in 
time to influence the election outcome of 2003
30
. We drop all observations after 2007 from the 
analysis, because 2007 was another federal election year after which ministers could have been 
appointed (or not) because they had been successful (or not) in steering transfers. Hence after 2007 we 
cannot safely assume anymore that our instrument is exogenous to transfers.  
 
                                                          
28
 We are grateful to Matz Dahlberg for suggesting this IV to us in the context of our analysis. More generally, 
the potential of using redistricting –being orthogonal to voters’ preferences- as a way of trying to deal with the 
endogeneity of political control is suggested by Besley and Case (2003 p. 34). 
29
 With the notable exceptions of the old electoral districts of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde and of Leuven, which 
were kept into existence. So after the 2002 reform, Belgium was left with 11 electoral districts, of which 9 truly 
provincial. 
30
 Our regression results reported below are hardly affected if we assume –as a robustness check- that ministers 
were already appointed in 2002, to reflect that they may already have started steering transfers to “their new 
districts” from 2002 onwards, anticipating the electoral boundary reform. (In this case, the coefficient on lagged 
ministers is 0.275(0.107), with a p value of 0.02.) Effectively, this reform was extensively debated in parliament 
and in the press before it was voted. But it was also quite heavily disputed before it was submitted to parliament, 
even within the governing coalition. After it was voted in parliament, opposition parties continued opposing it, 
including in court. 
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It is clear from Annex 2 that only a limited number of old districts obtained ministers because of the 
2002 district merger. These are the 12 old electoral districts belonging to the provinces of Hainaut, 
Liège, Oost-Vlaanderen and West-Vlaanderen. The boundaries of the other old electoral districts 
Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, Leuven, Limburg, Luxembourg and Namur were left unchanged. The old 
districts of the province of Antwerp were merged during the reform, but this does not affect our 
instrument as there was no federal minister originating from these districts during the 2003-2007 
period. The last column of Annex 2 gives an overview of the changes in ministers due to the border 
changes. Over the considered time period, the correlation between changes in the ministers variable 
and this subset of changes due to the redrawing of borders contained in the instrument is quite high, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.35.  
 
Column (2) of table 2 reports the results of the IV analysis using these changes due to the redrawing 
of electoral districts as an instrument. The coefficient of ministers in column (2) is 27 euros, which is 
significant at the 0.01 level. Although the specification is similar to the specification in column (1), 
apart from the shorter sample and the different instrument, the AR(2) test now rejects the absence of 
an AR(2) process in the residuals, which would invalidate the analysis. We therefore performed a 
regression where we use not the 2
nd
 to 4
th
 lag of the LDV as instruments, but rather the 3
rd
 to 4
th
; and 
also not the lagged changes in political representation but the 2
nd
 lag of those changes. These further 
lags of the instruments are valid even in the presence of autocorrelation of order 2, if we can exclude 
autocorrelation of order 3. Indeed, there is little proof of AR(3) in the differenced residuals, as the 
Arellano-Bond test with a null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation of order 3 has a p-value of 
0.83. We omit the results of this specification as they are very similar to the reported ones, with a 
coefficient on the LDV of 0.81(0.12), and a coefficient on ministers of 0.26(0.12).  
 
We next calculate the effects over time using the formula 𝑏1 ∑ 𝑏0
𝑡−1
𝑡 , with b1 the effect of the one-
year lag of ministers, and b0 the coefficient on the LDV. For large t, this effect converges to 𝑏1/(1 −
𝑏0). We obtain an estimated long run effect of 140(97) euro per capita and year; and an effect of 
79(36) euro per capita/year after a single term of 4 years. 
4.3.3. Extensions and robustness 
 
This section considers several alternative specifications which serve to gauge the robustness of our 
results. 
 
As a first robustness check, column (3) of table 2 shows the results when instrumenting lagged 
differenced ministers not with an external instrument, but rather using only the past information 
contained in its own 2nd to 4th lagged levels. The coefficient on ministers is significantly different 
from zero, and smaller than the estimate obtained when using the set of resignations or the border 
changes as an instrument. 
 
Secondly, as the Hansen IV-overidentification test loses power as the instrument set becomes larger, 
we re-estimated our main specifications using a restricted instrument set, as shown by table 3. More 
specifically, we drop the equation in levels, using only the equation in first differences (difference 
GMM). We drop dependants as an explanatory variable (as it is highly co-linear with income and 
quite often insignificant). We instrument the first-differenced LDV only with the 2nd and 3rd lagged 
levels (rather than including the 4th). Additionally, we do not include district-year trends but only the 
full set of year-dummies. This reduces the instrument count considerably in all specifications. The 
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year-dummies account for 14 of the remaining 18 instruments in the specification in column (1) of 
table 3. The results in table 3 show that our main results are qualitatively the same despite these many 
changes in the specification, and that the Hansen tests do not allow to reject the validity of the reduced 
instrument set. 
 
Table 3: Effect of political representation as measured by IV estimation, with a restricted 
instrument set 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: diff-GMM diff-GMM diff-GMM 
    
transferst-1 0.871
***
 0.826
***
 0.861
***
 
 (0.108) (0.137) (0.124) 
    
log(grossincome)t -1.326
**
 -1.700
*
 -1.350
*
 
 (0.623) (0.824) (0.700) 
    
ministerst-1 0.194
**
 0.271
***
 0.164
***
 
 (0.0683) (0.0891) (0.0562) 
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 18 16 19 
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.079 <0.000 0.067 
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.419 0.061 0.393 
Hansen p-value 0.273 0.919 0.221 
District dummies and year dummies included. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in 
parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Thirdly, as suggested by an anonymous referee, when not normalising ministers by the population in 
each electoral district, the levels of political representation are kept discrete so that the distribution is 
dominated by a limited set of values. About 47 percent of our district-year observations have 0 
ministers, and about 36 percent have 1 minister. To investigate whether the amount of political 
representation is non-linear, whether our results are driven by just a few outliers with a very high level 
of political representation, and to test in general whether our results are sensitive to re-defining the 
measure of political representation, table 4 below shows the result when not normalising ministers by 
population in each district, and when measuring instead the effect on transfers of the variable 
[ministers ≥ 1], which is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 when a district has one or more 
ministers and a value of 0 in case the district has no ministers at all, rather than a continuous measure. 
Comparing table 4 shown below with table 2 shows that the results are qualitatively unchanged, 
although size and significance of coefficients of interest are lower in table 4.  
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Table 4: Effect of political representation as measured by IV estimation, using a dummy 
variable for political representation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
    
transferst-1 0.977
***
 0.903
***
 0.912
***
 
 (0.127) (0.136) (0.0852) 
    
log(grossincome)t -0.953 -1.693
**
 -1.079
**
 
 (0.613) (0.672) (0.483) 
    
dependantst 0.194 -0.0126 0.565 
 (1.561) (1.913) (1.316) 
    
[ministers ≥ 1]t-1 0.0889
*
 0.110
**
 0.0447
**
 
 (0.0436) (0.0463) (0.0203) 
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 41 39 19 
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.102 <0.000 0.067 
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.437 0.065 0.393 
Hansen p-value 1 1 0.221 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
As a 4
th
 robustness check, we have included so called secretaries of state into our regression analysis 
below. Secretaries of state are junior members of the government who are in charge of policy areas 
considered less important. They are not allowed to participate in the weekly meetings of the “Council 
of Ministers”, i.e. the entire cabinet of ministers, which jointly takes the main government decisions. 
The only way for secretaries of state to influence the decisions of the Council of Ministers is by 
requesting the minister to whom they are “attached” to make their case. Also, the budget at the 
disposal of secretaries of state to hire personal advisors so as to staff their private “cabinets” appears 
considerably smaller than that of federal ministers. Over our sample period, there were on average 15 
federal ministers in any single year, and 2 federal secretaries of state.  
 
We created a new variable ministers and secretaries of state containing both the ministers and 
secretaries of state for each district (again normalised by 100,000 inhabitants). Column (1) in table 5 
reports the results for the IV analysis using the list of resignations as instruments. 3 additional 
resignations, by secretaries of state, were included (see table 8 in Annex 1). Column (2) reports the IV 
analysis using lagged information as instruments. The results reported in table 5 indicate that the 
association between ministers –including secretaries of state- and transfers becomes of considerably 
smaller size and significance compared to columns (1) and (3) in table 2, and even turns insignificant 
when using resignations as instruments. This finding is consistent with the findings of Golden and 
Picci (2008 p. 286) for Italy. 
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Table 5: Effect of political representation as measured by IV estimation, including secretaries of 
state 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: transferst transferst 
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM 
transferst-1 1.029
*
 0.846
***
 
 (0.516) (0.0881) 
   
log(grossincome)t -0.659 -1.378
**
 
 (2.467) (0.527) 
   
dependantst 0.728 0.992 
 (1.455) (1.269) 
   
ministers and 
secretaries of statet-1 
0.193 
(0.172) 
0.0915
* 
(0.0464) 
   
N 300 300 
Instruments 41 41 
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.079 0.256 
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.391 0.575 
Hansen p-value 0.646 0.386 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
As a last extension, we attempt to estimate a separate effect for predominantly French-speaking 
districts and Dutch speaking districts. We prefer to make this rather straightforward linguistic-
geographic distinction rather than a more complicated distinction, such as between the 3 Belgian 
regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels), or the 3 Belgian linguistic communities (the Flemish, the 
Francophone and the German speaking community). This is because at the Belgian federal level, 
which is the level at which we conduct our research, the relevant distinction does not seem to be 
between the 3 regions or between the 3 communities, but between the 2 language groups in the federal 
parliament. By law, every federally elected politician belongs to either the Dutch-speaking or to the 
French-speaking language group. The Dutch-speaking language group consists 100% of politicians 
elected on lists submitted by Flemish parties, and the French-speaking language group consists 100% 
of politicians elected on lists submitted by Francophone parties. In practice, this implies that over our 
sample period every single district only “supplied” members of parliament either to the Dutch-
speaking or to the French-speaking group in the federal parliament, with the exception of the district 
of BHV
31
.  
 
Hence, we opted to split only between the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers. To this 
effect, we created a dummy Francophone taking the value of 1 for a French-speaking district, and 
added this new variable as well as its interaction with the original ministers variable labeled 
                                                          
31
 However, we have considered the district of BHV as Francophone, as more voters in this district vote for 
Francophone parties than for Flemish parties. 
Apart from our belief that the language groups are the most relevant way to split our sample, we have to note 
that our sample size is limited. We would never be able to estimate, say, the effect of the single member of 
parliament originating from the very small German speaking community, with a population of around 76,000. It 
also would be hard to differentiate between languages and regions simultaneously, given the large overlap. 
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ministers*Francophone, as regressors to our analysis. Table 6 shows the results of such an inclusion. 
See Brambor et al. (2005) for the interpretation of the coefficients in such interaction models.  
 
The results of this exercise are rather inconclusive. The first IV in column (1) which uses the list of 
presumed exogenous resignations as an instrument, appears to indicate a high effect of representation 
in Dutch speaking districts, and an effect in French-speaking districts which may be somewhat lower. 
But the point estimate of the difference of the effect between the 2 types of districts of -0.0632 is 
estimated very imprecisely. As a result, the point estimate of the effect in a Francophone district of 
0.199(0.16) is not significantly different from 0. In the 2
nd
 IV analysis using the border change 
(column (2), both effects are estimated very imprecisely, and there is again very weak evidence for 
the effect in French speaking districts to be lower. The point estimate of an additional minister in a 
Francophone district is 0.053(0.082) in this specification which is insignificantly different from 0. In 
the last IV analysis using lagged information on political representation as an instrument, the effects 
are again very imprecisely estimated. But here, if anything, there is some weak evidence for the effect 
in French speaking districts to be higher (the interaction effect has a p-value of 0.164). The estimated 
effect of an additional minister in Francophone districts in this specification is 0.23(0.06) and highly 
significantly different from 0. In all, there does not seem to be strong evidence suggesting that the 
results we obtain in our main analysis are driven by just the electoral districts of one of both main 
language groups in the country. 
Table 6: Effect of political representation as measured by IV estimation, estimating separate 
effects for dominantly Dutch and French speaking districts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 transferst transferst transferst 
Estimation method: sys-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
transferst-1 0.929
***
 0.851
***
 0.888
***
 
 (0.0833) (0.121) (0.0733) 
    
log(grossincome)t -0.995
**
 -1.782
**
 -1.139
**
 
 (0.475) (0.662) (0.446) 
    
dependantst 1.195 0.750 0.545 
 (1.277) (2.052) (1.454) 
    
ministerst-1 0.262
***
 0.0807 0.101 
 (0.0866) (0.0530) (0.0613) 
    
ministers*Francophonet-1 -0.0632 -0.0272 0.128 
 (0.207) (0.117) (0.0888) 
    
N 300 240 300 
Instruments 43 40 48 
AB-AR(1) p-value 0.09 <0.000 0.072 
AB-AR(2) p-value 0.439 0.068 0.395 
Hansen p-value 0.280 1 1 
District dummies, year dummies, and district-year trends included. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the district level in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
In all our specifications, it is noticeable that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. This 
suggests a downward bias in OLS, rather than an upward bias, which runs counter to our intuition 
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about the effect of transfers on political representation (through improving re-election chances). The 
effect might be purely econometrical, however, if the IV estimates remove some measurement error in 
the original independent variable. Another possibility is that there would be a difference in how some 
types of political representation have a stronger effect on transfers. One can imagine e.g. that 
ministers who suddenly need to compete for votes within a substantially enlarged electoral district 
(see maps in Annex 3) have a stronger incentive to channel transfers towards their constituencies, in 
order to secure visibility with the local electorate before the next elections. These effects may 
dominate the removal of the bias through reverse causality, which might be small even in the OLS 
analysis as the variation over time in transfers is small compared to the variation in ministers. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Controlling for key socio-economic variables such as the local share of dependants in the population 
and average gross income, we find that after a single term of 4 years, per capita cash transfers to a 
Belgian electoral district are significantly higher for every federal minister originating from that 
electoral district. The observed correlation between ministerial representation and transfers might 
result from a mechanism where ministers cater for their constituency in the form of transfers and are 
in turn rewarded by voters.  
 
In this paper, we focussed on estimating the causal effect of exogenous changes in ministerial 
representation on transfers, using 2 IV strategies. The point estimates after a single term of 4 years of 
95(39) euro for the instrument based on resignations and of 79(36) euro for the instrument based on 
border changes –resp. derived from columns (1) and (2) in table 2- appear large when compared to the 
estimates assuming all changes in political representation are exogenous. Although the estimates 
differ considerably between different specifications and robustness checks, the results are broadly 
supportive of the hypothesis that ministers steer transfers to their constituency. 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature on distributive politics in several ways.  
 
Firstly, regarding the type of transfers we consider, virtually the entire empirical distributive politics 
literature appears to deal with “pork barrel”, not with -supposedly- formula-based fiscal transfers to 
citizens, which make up the core of income redistribution in most developed countries. Our setup and 
findings can be juxtaposed to the setup of Dixit and Londregan (1998 p. 512) who assume that income 
taxes would rather serve ideological purposes and targeted handouts would serve tactical purposes; or 
Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002 p. 647-648) who assume that public purchases of goods and services are 
easier to target geographically compared to transfers which are easier to target across social groups. 
By providing quantitative evidence of political influence in formula-based income redistribution, we 
provide support to qualitative claims such as by Besley and Coate (2003 p. 2628) who state that “even 
when spending is allocated formulaically, it is possible for legislators to manipulate such formulas to 
favour their own districts”.  
 
We only know of few studies that demonstrate Besley and Coate’s claim empirically. Moreover, our 
study is the only one of those that explains the distribution of formula-based expenditure and taxation 
directed at citizens –rather than directed at lower-level governments- over electoral districts by the 
provenance of cabinet ministers.  
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A number of questions remain unanswered. A first one is the role of political parties with respect to 
our minister effect. Political parties are considered to be strong in Belgium. Does our observed 
minister effect mean that Belgian political parties reward their ministers with extra transfers for their 
districts in return for services rendered by these ministers to their party while holding office32? Or 
does it mean that the non-re-election of a minister –or a poor election result of a minister- would bring 
reputational and/or other damage to the party as a whole? Crampton (2004 p. 6) finds higher grants 
for Canadian home districts of a Cabinet Minister compared to core districts of the governing party. 
Alternatively, the fact that ministers are able to steer transfers could point at tactical behaviour of 
ministers towards their party, i.e. at a principal-agent problem between political parties (the principal) 
and ministers (the agents) going on in Belgium. This would be a similar conclusion to the one drawn 
by Golden and Picci (2008 p. 286): a failure of the governing political parties to discipline their 
ministers. 
 
Another remaining question is whether the minister effect is present across the board, i.e. including 
for ministers not having social security nor income taxation under their remit. We argued that 
ministers might pressure their colleagues in the council of ministers, or within their party, as an 
explanation of this across the board effect. But our results do not offer any direct proof of such a 
mechanism and further research is required in this area. It would be interesting to consider whether 
some ministers have more influence compared to others, or whether ministers affect transfers more 
within their own domain.  
 
A final question that we left open is which channels ministers use to tilt taxing & spending in favour 
of their electoral district. Do they design specific rules or rather bend their implementation? While we 
suggested possible mechanisms in the introduction of this paper, our regression analysis does not 
provide evidence in favour of nor against one or the other. Moreover, at first sight Belgian federal 
cabinet ministers on average do not seem to remain in office long enough –only for 5 years in a row33- 
to be able to make their district benefit from changes that they would have initiated in the “formulae” 
that underlie the income taxation and the social security system. Another challenge for such a line of 
research is that one would be looking for mechanisms that are likely being kept hidden intentionally.  
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Annex 1: Districts having lost a minister / secretary of state over our 
sample period due to his/her resignation for a reason not related to “the 
fiscal transfer game”  
 
Table 7: Districts having lost a minister over our sample period due to his/her resignation for a 
reason not related to “the fiscal transfer game” 
Year Electoral district Minister Exogenous reason             
1996 Verviers Wathelet Sr Appointed judge at European Court of Justice           
1998 Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt Declerck Resigned after escape of serial murderer and child rapist 
    
1998 Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende Vandelanotte Resigned after escape of serial murderer and child rapist 
    
1999 Antwerpen Colla Resigned after outbreak of food scare           
1999 Limburg Pinxten Resigned after outbreak of food scare           
2003 Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde Durant Resigned after coalition conflict about airplane noise over Brussels 
   
2003 Leuven Aelvoet Resigned after coalition conflict about arms deal with Nepal 
   
2009 Aalst-Oudenaarde De Padt Demoted by his party to the position of "government commissioner" without a reason being known 
2009 Limburg Dewael Resigned after allegations of influencing a civil service appointment 
   
2009 Limburg Vandeurzen Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis) 
   
2009 Mechelen-Turnhout Vervotte Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis) 
   
2009 Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende Leterme Resigned after the collapse of a large Belgian bank (Fortis)       
Source: Wikipedia; Federal Parliament of Belgium 
        
 
Table 8: Districts having lost a secretary of state over our sample period due to his/her 
resignation for a reason not related to “the fiscal transfer game” 
 
Year Electoral district Secretary of state Exogenous reason         
2001 Brugge Chevalier Resigned after charges by a Swiss court with respect to a financial crime 
 
2003 Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde Deleuze Resigned after coalition conflict about airplane noise over Brussels 
  
2008 Mons-Soignies Donfut Resigned after having been paid for consultancy to a local government body    
Source: Federal Parliament of Belgium 
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Annex 2: Number of extra ministers per district due to district merger over 
our sample period 
 
Year 
New electoral 
district Old electoral district 
Extra ministers due to 
merger 
Population share of old 
in new district 
Weighted extra 
ministers due to 
merger 
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42 
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 3 0.30 0.90 
2003 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 4 0.28 1.10 
2003 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24 
2003 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 1 0.45 0.45 
2003 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 0 0.31 0.00 
2003 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 0 0.33 0.00 
2003 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 0 0.23 0.00 
2003 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 0 0.44 0.00 
2003 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57 
2003 Liège Huy-Waremme 2 0.17 0.34 
2003 Liège Verviers 3 0.26 0.79 
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 0 0.42 0.00 
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 3 0.30 0.90 
2004 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82 
2004 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24 
2004 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89 
2004 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 1 0.31 0.31 
2004 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66 
2004 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23 
2004 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44 
2004 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57 
2004 Liège Huy-Waremme 2 0.17 0.34 
2004 Liège Verviers 3 0.26 0.79 
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42 
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 2 0.30 0.60 
2005 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82 
2005 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 1 0.24 0.24 
2005 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89 
2005 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 1 0.31 0.31 
2005 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66 
2005 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23 
2005 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44 
2005 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57 
2005 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17 
2005 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.52 
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42 
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 2 0.30 0.60 
2006 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 3 0.27 0.82 
2006 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 0 0.24 0.00 
2006 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89 
2006 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 2 0.31 0.63 
2006 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66 
2006 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23 
2006 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44 
2006 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57 
2006 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17 
2006 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.53 
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Gent-Eeklo 1 0.42 0.42 
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Sint-Niklaas-Dendermonde 1 0.30 0.30 
2007 Oost-Vlaanderen Aalst-Oudenaarde 2 0.28 0.55 
2007 West-Vlaanderen Brugge 0 0.24 0.00 
2007 West-Vlaanderen Kortrijk-Roeselare-Tielt 2 0.45 0.89 
2007 West-Vlaanderen Veurne-Diksmuide-Ieper-Oostende 2 0.32 0.63 
2007 Hainaut Mons-Soignies 2 0.33 0.66 
2007 Hainaut Tournai-Ath-Mouscron 1 0.23 0.23 
2007 Hainaut Charleroi-Thuin 1 0.44 0.44 
2007 Liège Liège 1 0.57 0.57 
2007 Liège Huy-Waremme 1 0.17 0.17 
2007 Liège Verviers 2 0.26 0.52 
Source: Federal Parliament of Belgium  
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Annex 3: Federal electoral districts before and after the 2002 reform 
 
Source: Hooghe e.a. (2006) 
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Chapter 2: Interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the Belgian 
federal public debt: political economy and proposal for a calculation
34
 
Abstract 
 
We calculate that over the 1970-2002 period the combination of persistent primary surpluses of the 
Flemish region and persistent primary deficits of the Walloon region –and to a lesser extent of the 
Brussels region-, all implicit in the Federal government budget of Belgium, increased the net fiscal 
transfers due to the federal debt provided by Flanders to Francophone Belgium to no less than 5.6% of 
Belgian GDP or almost 100% of the total interest bill on the Belgian federal debt. This amount is 
considerably larger than the net transfers amount resulting from previous traditional interregional net 
transfers calculations, which implicitly assume a balanced federal budget. The geographically very 
unevenly spread benefits from Belgian federal budget deficits –and hence the geographically strongly 
diverging incentives for federal budget deficits- may well explain to a considerable extent the large 
overall size of deficits and debt in Belgium since the 1970s. In other words, interregional net fiscal 
transfers resulting from the federal debt may be important not just because of their distributional 
consequences, but even more because they may provide an explanation for the large overall size of 
deficits and debt that have particularly characterised Belgium since the 1970s.  
The geographically apparently strongly diverging incentives for federal budget deficits in Belgium 
add a new dimension to traditional political economy motives for debt financing. Persson and 
Tabellini’s (2000) partisan dimension over time to political economy motives for debt financing takes 
the shape of a government party with more or less polarised preferences compared to the opposition’s, 
and of governments more or less quickly alternating over time. While such political instability may be 
viewed as polarisation that exists between governing and opposition parties, the additional 
phenomenon that seems to particularly apply to the Belgian federal level is fragmentation, to be 
viewed as polarisation within the governing coalition itself. In contrast to instability, fragmentation 
adds a simultaneous partisan dimension to political economy motives for financing in Belgium. What 
is more, Belgian political parties are linguistically and hence largely geographically split. Such a split 
once again increases the number and probability of veto rights over fiscal policy. The additional 
potential consequences of the Belgian simultaneous geographic dimension have hardly been 
investigated in the existing literature on the political economy of budget deficits. A challenge for 
Belgium seems to be to explain the overall size of deficits and debt by the geographically unevenly 
spread costs and benefits stemming from deficits and debt.  
 
Keywords: distributive politics; income redistribution; fiscal transfers; public debt; elections; fiscal 
federalism; politicians; political institutions 
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 This paper is a substantially reworked and extended version of earlier papers on the same subject, in particular 
of “Transferten tussen de Belgische gewesten uit intrestlasten op de federale overheidsschuld” (2012). It is in 
the process of being published in Kyklos. It is to an important extent based on earlier work by Koen Algoed 
(2009) and Johan Van Gompel (2004). I also thank Thushyanthan Baskaran, Richard Bird, Erik Buyst, Stefaan 
Decramer, Herman Deweerdt, Danny Geerts, Joep Konings, Eric Ponette, Willem Sas, Klaas Staal, David 
Stadelmann, François Vaillancourt and Tom Van Puyenbroeck for comments on current and/or earlier versions 
of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, not many OECD countries combined a high debt burden and a large welfare 
state with sizeable interregional disparities in tax revenues and public spending (which in turn may be 
due to interregional disparities in gross income and/or political representation). Examples of such 
countries are Belgium and Italy, which over the past decades combined a high public debt with 
sizeable net fiscal transfers between their northern and southern regions.  
For the year 2005 –taken as an example-, and for those OECD countries only that suffered from a debt 
ratio that was higher than the OECD average, table 1 shows total government spending and total 
social spending as a % of GDP, as well as the Gini coefficient and the Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
of GDP per capita between regions. We suspect that countries combining a high debt ratio, high 
public spending –in particular social spending-, and high interregional income disparities also suffer 
from high interregional net transfers stemming from the servicing of the public debt. This is because 
we would expect high income disparities to generate large interregional net transfers due to social 
spending. Table 1 shows that among OECD-countries only Belgium, Greece, and Italy simultaneously 
score higher than average on total government spending, on total social spending, and on interregional 
income disparity
35
, while suffering –together with Japan- from the largest public debts among OECD-
countries. 
While we will find in what follows that the existing political economy literature on deficits and debt 
appears to explain the overall size of deficits and debt purely by non-geographic political economy 
factors, we will calculate that the net benefits from federal budget deficits in Belgium are 
geographically very unevenly spread. This geographic disparity may create geographically strongly 
diverging incentives for federal budget deficits, and hence may well explain to a considerable extent 
the large overall size of deficits and debt in Belgium since the 1970s. In other words, interregional net 
fiscal transfers resulting from the federal debt may be important not just because of their distributional 
consequences, but even more because they may provide an explanation for the large overall size of 
deficits and debt that have particularly characterised Belgium since the 1970s. The implications seem 
similar for politicians from other countries with a high central government debt and considerable 
disparities in the extent to which its resp. regions provide tax revenues to the central government, 
resp. benefit from central government spending, such as Italy and Greece.  
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows. First we will situate Belgium –a country that 
combines a high public debt with a large welfare state and high geographic income disparities- within 
the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the political economics of debt. Also we will adapt 
the existing theoretical literature to incorporate the geographic dimension to the political economics of 
debt that we suspect to exist in countries like Belgium. In a next chapter, we will propose a 
methodology for the calculation of interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the public debt, and 
apply this methodology to Belgium. A final chapter will conclude. 
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 Belgium, Greece and Italy also show the highest interregional disparity in terms of GDP per capita among 
EU15-member states (measured by the Gini coefficient and by the CV), except France (measured by CV) and 
Ireland (measured by Gini). 
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Table 1: Central government debt, size of government and social spending as a % of GDP, as 
well as Gini and CV coefficients for GDP per capita between regions for selected OECD 
countries (only those with a higher than average debt ratio) (2005) 
 
Central govt debt (% 
of GDP) 
General govt expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Social expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
Gini of GDP per 
capita* 
CV of GDP per 
capita* 
Austria 62.1 49.5 27.1 0.13 0.21 
Belgium 91.8 49.8 26.5 0.34 0.34 
France 53.3 53.3 30.1 0.07 0.31 
Greece 110.6 50.6 21.1 0.16 0.29 
Hungary 58.1 49.2 22.5 0.21 0.48 
Israel 92.1 43.1 16.3 
  
Italy 97.7 48.6 24.9 0.14 0.27 
Japan 164.5 36.9 18.6 0.07 0.11 
Poland 44.8 43.2 21.0 0.12 0.30 
Portugal 66.2 44.8 23.0 0.13 0.25 
Sweden 46.2 51.8 29.1 0.08 0.22 
Turkey 51.1 
 
9.9 0.24 0.45 
OECD 
average 44.2 40.9 19.7 0.15 0.25 
 
*between NUTS1 regions36 
Note: CV = coefficient of variation 
Source: OECD website; OECD 2009 p. 28 
2. The political economics of public debt and its application to Belgium 
 
First we will give an overview of the existing literature on the political economics of public debt. We 
will distinguish between the literature with respect to the debt game between successive governments 
and the literature with respect to the debt game within the same government. Next we will check the 
extent to which these 2 literatures hold for Belgium. At least, there will seem to be a dimension 
missing to the existing literature with a view to making a political economics analysis of the debt 
game in Belgium. Therefore we will conclude this section with an analysis of the Belgian debt game 
as a game between different regions represented in the same central government. 
2.1. The existing literature on the political economics of public debt 
2.1.1. The debt game between successive governments 
 
An established theoretical finding in political economics is that a political party in power benefits a 
priori from a budget deficit, along the line of reasoning of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-372), 
                                                          
36
 NUTS1 is the highest level of geographical disaggregation of EU member states for statistical purposes by 
Eurostat. 
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with additional reference to Lizzeri (1999 p. 909-912) and Besley (2006 p. 210-211). This is because 
in the current legislature, an incumbent political party should expect to benefit electorally from an 
expenditure increase. This is the traditional common pool problem: taxation is general while 
expenditures can be targeted. But this benefit is even larger if the incumbent political party avoids to 
finance the expenditure increase with a tax increase during the same legislature. This is another kind 
of common pool problem, i.e. not between different taxpayers during one and the same legislature, but 
between taxpayers in the current legislature and taxpayers in future legislatures.  
 
In Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345)’s wording: poor definition of property rights to both current 
and future tax revenues (or non-internalisation of the cost of borrowing in terms of future spending 
cuts or tax increases) gives the incumbent parties not only an incentive “to spend a lot” but also “to 
spend soon”. Otherwise stated: debt financing arises because an incumbent party is generally not 
certain to be part of the governing coalition during the next legislature
37
. This uncertainty –to be 
understood as the expectation that power alternates randomly between a party in power and its 
competitor(s)- not only gives the party in power an incentive for -re-election improving- deficit 
spending now, but it also means that it may be exempted from bearing the future costs of current 
deficit spending
38
.  
 
Being in power even without running a deficit already enables a party to favour its constituency with 
extra expenditures. But debt financing increases the room for such current extra expenditures to be 
targeted to a party’s constituency. Moreover, at the same time it limits the room for future extra 
expenditures to be targeted to a competitor party’s constituency (it “ties its hands”), in case a 
competitor party gets elected instead of the incumbent. (Alesina and Perotti 1994 p. 17) This 
asymmetry between the costs and benefits of deficits may be an additional reason why, within any 
coalition government, those coalition members wishing to prevent a budget deficit –which could be 
those coalition members that can be rather sure of being part of the next government- may face a more 
difficult task than those coalition members wishing to elicit a debt-funded expenditure increase – 
which could be those coalition members that are less sure of being part of the next government. 
 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) tests the theoretical finding of Persson and Tabellini (2000) for Swedish 
municipalities. He finds that a rightwing party that is certain of being voted out of a Swedish 
municipal government increases debt with 15% compared to when it is certain of being voted again 
into government, but that a leftwing party decreases debt with 11% in such a situation. Pettersson-
Lidbom does not explain this difference in behaviour between leftwing and rightwing parties, but in 
an earlier paper, Persson and Svensson (1989) had established the theoretical result that a rightwing 
party uncertain of re-election increases debt to prevent a leftwing successor to implement its spending 
priorities (“tying its hands”). 
2.1.2. The debt game within the same government 
 
Persson and Tabellini’s partisan dimension over time to political economy motives for debt financing 
takes the shape of a –typically single- government party with more or less polarised preferences 
compared to the opposition’s, and with governments more or less quickly alternating over time. This 
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 In fact, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) already came to this result. 
38
 Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 367) note that uncertainty of re-election is higher for (individual parties that 
are a member of) coalition governments than for single party governments. 
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dimension may be called political instability. However, there could also be a simultaneous partisan 
dimension to political economy motives for debt financing. This dimension typically takes the shape 
of more or less internally fragmented governments at any given point in time. This dimension may be 
called political fragmentation. While instability may be viewed as polarisation that exists between 
governing and opposition parties, fragmentation may be viewed as polarisation that exists within the 
governing coalition itself. 
 
This latter dimension is noted by Alesina and Tabellini (1992 p. 342), Alesina and Perotti (1994 p. 22-
26), and Persson and Tabellini (2000). Velasco (1997) establishes the theoretical result that the larger 
the degree of fragmentation in policymaking –i.e. the larger the number of interest groups represented 
within a single coalition-, the greater the deficit bias. Roubini and Sachs (1989) view avoiding deficits 
within one and the same government as a prisoner’s dilemma: all parties may prefer a balanced 
budget, but in the absence of strong coordination between them to achieve such a cooperative 
outcome, each party may have an incentive to protect and expand “its” part of the budget39. 
Additionally, while cooperation of all coalition partners may be needed to avoid a deficit, non-
cooperation by one of them may suffice to cause a deficit
40
.  
 
Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 909) are the first to empirically analyse political fragmentation. They in 
particular demonstrate that large, short-lived and uncohesive coalition governments lead to large 
deficits. While de Haan and Sturm (1997) replicate Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) research, and fail to 
find a relationship between government fragmentation and budget deficits, Spolaore’s (1993) research 
confirms Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) finding: the higher the number of parties in a coalition, the larger 
the deficit in response to a negative economic shock. Another confirmation is Ashworth e.a. (2005), 
who find for Flemish municipalities that governments comprised of more parties, as well as of 
ideologically more heterogeneous parties, lead to higher debts. For US states, Alt and Lowry (1994) 
find deficits more likely under divided government –i.e. with the governor, the House of 
Representatives’ majority, and the Senate’s majority not all 3 belonging to the same party. Volkerink 
and de Haan (2001) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) provide empirical evidence that the number 
of ministers cause the budget deficit to increase more strongly and significantly than the number of 
parties in a coalition
41
. 
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 Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 909) additionally point at the relationship between the 2 strands in the literature: 
the higher the uncertainty of re-election of a governing coalition, the higher polarisation and fragmentation 
within the governing coalition. They note from game theory that cooperation is easier to maintain if the expected 
time horizon over which agents interact is longer. 
40
 While Roubini and Sachs (1989) analyse the political economy drivers of debt financing by central 
governments, many more studies are available on the political economy drivers of debt financing of lower level 
governments. The prisoner’s dilemma that applies to parties that are member of one and the same central 
government coalition also seems to apply to states within federations. Rodden (2005 p. 181-221) finds for 
German states characterised by partisan alignment with CDU and/or SPD governing at the federal level over the 
1978-1996 period that they ran higher deficits, and expected to receive –explicit or implicit- bailout grants as a 
consequence of these deficits. Similarly, Khemani (2007) finds for Indian states characterised by partisan 
alignment with the leading party in the central government over the 1972-1998 period that they ran higher 
deficits. A more common and better known finding of empirical research than the effect of partisan alignment 
on lower level government deficits is that grants-based fiscal federalism –and more generally the availability of 
grants financing by the central government as such- leads to higher deficits of lower level governments, again 
anticipating –explicit or implicit- bailout grants. (see Pettersson-Lidbom 2010 for Sweden; Baskaran 2012 for 
Germany; and Sorribas-Navarro 2011 for Spain) 
41
 Likewise, Jennes (2015) finds for Belgian supra-local governments that their deficits increase in their number 
of ministers. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002 p. 213-214) find that the number of ministers and the number of 
parties are an even stronger determinant of the budget deficit in times of economic crisis (“difficult times”). 
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2.2. The existing literature on the political economics of public debt applied 
to Belgium 
2.2.1. The debt game between successive governments applied to Belgium 
 
Among those 6 parties that all but monopolised the holding of federal office amongst each other over 
our period studied -1970-2002, the parties that were least sure of being part of the next government 
were the Flemish and Francophone liberal-conservative parties. Hence the liberal-conservative parties 
seemed to have had the greatest interest in debt accumulation during their coalition participation. We 
measure uncertainty of being part of the next Belgian Federal government as the number of years 
during which a particular party was previously in opposition, divided by the total number of years 
during which a particular party was previously in opposition or in power
42. In terms of our “power 
uncertainty” measure, the liberal-conservatives were followed rather closely by the socialists, and 
followed at a large distance by the Christian-democrats. This ranking both holds when we take into 
account all Belgian central governments either from the introduction of the universal suffrage in 1918 
onwards, or from the end of WWII onwards, or from the start of our sample period onwards. (see 
Luykx 1985 and Res Publica) However, the uncertainty gap between the liberal-conservatives and the 
socialists widens over time, while the uncertainty gap between the socialists and the Christian-
democrats reduces over time. 
 
The seemingly strong interest in debt accumulation of liberal-conservative parties is a paradox as 
rather rightwing parties are mostly associated with fiscal discipline, but it is a result that –as said 
above- has been found theoretically by Persson and Svensson (1989) and by Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2001) empirically. Over our period studied -1970-2002- the liberal-conservative parties were only 
part of the federal coalition during the 1974-77, 1981-87, and 1999-2003 legislatures. Both Christian-
democratic parties were always part of the governing coalition except from 1999 onwards. Both 
socialist parties were always part of the governing coalition except during the 1974-77 and 1981-87 
legislatures.  
 
However, while the 1974-77 and 1999-2003 legislatures were characterised by rather loose fiscal 
policy, the 1981-87 legislatures were characterised by considerable fiscal consolidation efforts. This is 
another paradox given that according to our measure the liberal-conservatives were less certain of re-
election
43
. Interestingly, the fiscal loosening up after 1999 implemented by a coalition including the 
liberal-conservatives consisted to an important extent of a tax decrease voted in 2001. Hence we 
should understand “a debt funded expenditure increase” to possibly take the shape of a targeted tax 
decrease not compensated by a tax increase elsewhere. Between 1999 and 2011 Didier Reynders was 
without interruption the Francophone liberal-conservative finance minister of Belgium. The 
opposition and the press suspected him during his entire ministership not to care as much about a 
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 Similarly, in his empirical paper on the effect of uncertainty of re-election on Swedish municipal debt, 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) operationalises “expectation of losing an upcoming election” by “relative frequency 
of having lost previous elections”. 
43
 A possible explanation of this paradox is that the 1981-1987 coalition governed with the support of only a 
minority of the Francophone Belgian parliamentary seats. Precisely these seats represented (centre-right) 
Francophone Belgian voters who may have believed that they did have a stake in fiscal consolidation, i.e. that 
they were among the voters who disproportionately paid the price of debt accumulation. These coalitions are the 
only ones over our sample period not disposing of a majority in both language groups in the federal parliament, 
which could mean that such governments are hard to assemble or maintain. 
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balanced budget as about targeted tax reductions for his –liberal-conservative- constituency44. (see 
e.g. Knack 2009 and De Tijd 2009) During his reign there were few years with a budget surplus –
similarly to our entire period studied (1970-2002)-, and the primary surplus strongly decreased (not 
shown in table 8 below however, as our period studied ends in 2002). 
 
Hence Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-372)’s prediction that parties less certain of being in power 
run higher deficits seems only partly to apply to the track record of the Belgian liberal-conservative 
parties. It even seems to apply less to the Belgian socialist and Christian-democratic parties: while 
being highly certain of being in power, they have apparently not been able/willing to prevent high 
deficits either. This inability/unwillingness seems to have culminated in the 1979-1981 period, during 
which the primary deficit attained its maximum over our sample period, and which was governed by 
Christian-democratic – socialist coalitions almost without interruption. Perhaps even a reverse 
causality held: it might have been that precisely (their apparent commitment to) the running of large 
deficits assured Christian-democrats and socialists of remaining in power. This would be a 
considerable criticism to the theory of Persson and Tabellini. 
2.2.2. The debt game within the same government applied to Belgium 
 
The large Belgian federal public debt not only seems to be explained by political instability in terms 
of the changing party-political composition of successive Belgian Federal governments. An additional 
explanation seems to be the number of large, short-lived and uncohesive coalition governments –in 
the wording of Roubini and Sachs (1989). Most post-war central governments in Belgium were 
coalitions between Christian-democrats and socialists. Since the 1970s, a decade during which all 3 
major Belgian parties split into a Flemish and a Francophone wing, this has implied government 
coalitions of at least 4 parties, of which the Flemish parties and the Francophone Belgian parties 
collected their votes in completely different electoral districts
45
.  
 
While over our period studied (1970-2002) there were 10 federal elections –i.e. on average 1 election 
per 3 years while a full legislature in Belgium lasts 4 years-, there were no less than 20 governments –
i.e. on average 1 government per 1.5 year. Moreover, between 1970 and 1981 there were no less than 
5 elections –on average one every 2.4 years– and no less than 12 governments –i.e. on average 1 
government per year. The 1970-1981 subperiod corresponds to our 1
st
 subperiod in table 8 below, 
marked by a mounting primary deficit, a mounting budget deficit, a mounting public debt, a mounting 
interest bill, and a primary deficit even for Flanders
46
.  
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 Including of an indirect but substantial reduction in the corporate income tax for a number of large companies, 
and including of willingly overestimating tax revenues so as not having to increase taxes. 
45
 With the exception of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, where all parties represented in the 
federal parliament kept running for election. 
46
 The fiscal worsening over the 1970-1981 of course cannot be considered in isolation from the economic crisis 
that started in the early 1970s. Probably political factors and economic factors interacted during that period, with 
a severe worsening of fiscal outcomes as a result. This reminds of the “difficult times” concept of Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002 p. 197). 
However, remarkably there were only 2 elections and 2 government dissolutions that led to a change in coalition 
composition during the 1970-1981 period: in 1974 when the Christian-democrats exchanged the socialists for 
the liberals as coalition partners, and in 1977 when the reverse happened. The number of governments and 
elections during this period may indeed rather be a measure of political fragmentation than of political 
instability. 
50 
 
2.2.3. The Belgian exception: the debt game between different regions 
represented in the same government 
 
With respect to the simultaneous partisan dimension to political economy motives for central 
government debt financing in Belgium, it is important to stress that Belgian political parties are 
linguistically and hence largely geographically split
47
. This split seems to narrow political parties’ 
mandates -and to disperse their power over fiscal policy- even more than in other systems of coalition 
governments. In the wording of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345): such a split increases the number 
of veto rights over fiscal policy as well as their probability of being used. As a matter of fact, such 
veto rights were already established in Belgium by means of the 1970 “state reform”, i.e. 
decentralisation round:  
 the legislative was divided into a “Dutch-speaking group” and a “French-speaking group”48, 
and any 2/3 of members of parliament of any group are since then entitled to block any law 
from being approved;  
 the executive –which in Belgium decides by consensus- since then needs to consist of an 
equal number of ministers belonging to either parliamentary group 
 
It should be admitted that also in some other countries there is a strong correlation between geography 
and strength of a particular political party, such as in the UK (Tories over the last decades collecting 
mostly votes in the south, Labour over the last decades mostly collecting votes in the geographic 
centre and the north) and in India (perhaps resembling Belgium the most in this respect, as several 
parties represented in the Indian federal parliament only collect votes in one particular state). But 
what is typical of Belgium is that: 
 all of its parties are regional and  
 the constitution guarantees both main language communities equal representation within the 
Federal government 
 
As far as we know, the additional potential consequences of such a “Belgian” setting for debt 
accumulation –i.e. the Belgian simultaneous regional dimension- have not been investigated in the 
existing literature on the political economy of budget deficits. An exception are Lago-Peñas e.a. 
(2014), who find empirical cross-country evidence for the negative impact of the regionalisation of 
party systems on fiscal performance: the lower the “nationalisation” of a party system, the larger the 
common pool problem and the lower the primary fiscal balance. Lago-Peñas e.a. (2014) thereby 
characterise Belgium as one of the few cases of extreme party system regionalisation in the world
49
. 
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 As in Belgium geography and language overlap to a large extent. Flemish overwhelmingly live in the northern 
part of Belgium, Flanders, while Francophone Belgians overwhelmingly live in the southern part of Belgium, 
Wallonia, as well as in the Brussels region. 
48
 In practice, members of the Dutch-speaking group are almost all members of parliament elected in Flanders, 
and most members of the French-speaking group are elected in Wallonia. The electoral district of Brussel-Halle-
Vilvoorde, straddling the regions of Flanders and Brussels, is the only district “generating” French-speaking as 
well as Dutch-speaking members of parliament. 
49
 In contrast, in their study of political-economy drivers of the budget deficit Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 908) 
simply classify Belgium as another system of “multi-party coalitions with short tenure”, in the same category as 
e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands. However, elsewhere (p. 930) they put forward the case of Belgium “with 
weak coalition governments with parties that are divided along linguistic and geographic lines as well as 
ideological lines” as a case study meriting further research. 
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Another exception may be the research by Huber e.a. (2003), who find power dispersion within 
coalitions as measured by the Banzhaf voting power index to be a determinant of the size of budget 
deficits. The Banzhaf power index measures the number of feasible coalitions with a view to 
obtaining a majority in which a particular party is needed, as a share of the total number of feasible 
coalitions. In Banzhaf’s terminology, one could state that the power indices of the Flemish parties 
taken together and of the Francophone Belgian parties taken together are both 1, i.e. maximal. This is 
because –as said above- constitutionally ministers are to be proposed by Flemish and by Francophone 
Belgian parties in a 50-50% proportion, and because constitutionally both language groups have got 
de facto veto power in the federal parliament. Huber e.a. (2003) find that coalitions with equally 
strong partners –in terms of the Banzhaf power index- run significantly higher deficits than coalitions 
with 1 dominating party. Huber e.a. (2003 p. 342) hypothesise that this is because the absence of a 
dominant party makes possible a lasting “war of attrition”50 or stalemate between the coalition 
partners –in terms of damaging expenditure increases, in turn increasing the deficit. 
 
The uncertainty aspect that is important to the partisan dimension over time to political economy 
motives for debt financing is no longer present within the simultaneous regional dimension to 
political economy motives for debt financing typical of the Belgian setting. Indeed, by law a Belgian 
Federal government needs to consist of ministers proposed by Flemish and by Francophone Belgian 
parties in a 50-50% proportion (although about 60% of Belgian population is Flemish). Typically for 
Belgium, the uncertainty of regions to be represented in the Federal government is institutionally 
eliminated and replaced by regional polarisation within this same Federal government. This 
polarisation is rather high since the Flemish and Francophone Belgian parties’ resp. electoral districts 
–i.e. Flanders and Francophone Belgium51- are rather heterogeneous in expenditure preferences, 
largely due to their heterogeneous perception of socio-economic and demographic needs. Over our 
sample period (see below), this polarisation is witnessed by the fact that several of the 12 
governments that characterise our 1970-1981 subperiod were dissolved prematurely because of 
conflicts between Flemish and Francophone Belgian parties
52
.  
 
Similar to the reasoning of Alesina and Perotti (1994 p. 17) and Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 354), 
geographic polarisation within the executive seems to provide an additional incentive to parties only 
collecting votes in Francophone Belgium, i.e. in Wallonia and Brussels, to make the central 
government run a deficit. This is because our below calculations show that debt-financing is more 
profitable / less costly in fiscal terms for Wallonia and Brussels than for Flanders
53
. 
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 The war of attrition (see Rasmusen 2006 p. 76) is a timing game that is similar to but slightly different from 
the better known and earlier mentioned prisoner’s dilemma. 
51
 We consider the Brussels region as part of Francophone Belgium in our political economy analysis of the 
Belgian deficit. Over our period studied, the number of voters voting for Flemish parties in the Brussels Region 
has continually decreased. During the 2014 elections for the Brussels Parliament e.g., all Flemish parties 
together obtained merely 11.35% of the vote.  
52
 Although several of these conflicts were conflicts about decentralising the central government, not fiscal 
conflicts in their narrow meaning. 
53
 Therefore, a path of further research could be to test empirically for a panel of countries if large interregional 
fiscal and income disparities –possibly in combination with high political polarisation and fragmentation- lead 
to large deficits. Such a test could add important political-economy explanations of variation in deficits to the 
ones already found by Persson and Tabellini (2003 p. 179-183) in “The economic effects of constitutions”, an 
empirical follow-up to their 2000 classic. A potential problem with such a panel analysis is that our independent 
variables of interest are not expected to vary considerably over time. This is illustrated for Belgium by the rather 
stable regional expenditure and revenue shares over time that are visible from columns 1 and 2 of table 8 below. 
Additionally, such independent variables may be eliminated from our analysis when including country fixed 
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In Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345)’s wording one could describe the Belgian common pool 
problem between the Flemish and the Francophone Belgian parties as a poor definition of Flanders’ 
and Francophone Belgium’s property rights over federal tax revenue. In Belgium, different 
geographic consequences of debt financing overlap to a large extent with different intra-coalition 
consequences of debt financing. While the existing political economy literature on deficits and debt 
seems to explain the overall size of deficits and debt purely by non-geographic political economy 
factors, an extra challenge for Belgium seems to be to explain the overall size of deficits and debt by 
the geographically unevenly spread costs and benefits stemming from deficits and debt.  
Debt financing may be cheaper for Wallonia and Brussels not only in fiscal terms but also in broader 
economic terms: as the private sector is larger in Flanders than in Wallonia and Brussels combined –
both in absolute and in relative terms-, a worsening of the macro-economy due to mounting debt may 
be predominantly felt in Flanders. Moreover economic spill-overs between Flanders and Wallonia 
seem limited in important respects
54
.  
Finally, the relatively lower cost of deficit financing for Wallonia provides it with an incentive not 
only to let the Federal government accumulate debt but also to postpone fiscal consolidation, i.e. to 
postpone reducing the deficit. Alesina and Drazen (1989) model consolidation postponement –i.e. 
postponement of agreement on the burden sharing of consolidation- as another war of attrition. In this 
war of attrition the party that bears most of the cost of postponement (in our case Flanders, while 
Wallonia has an incentive to postpone consolidation) eventually gives in, in that it also eventually 
accepts to bear most of the cost of consolidation. From columns 3 of table 8 (see below) it may be 
derived that after the coming to power of a turnaround central government coalition in 1981 –which 
governed during 2 successive legislatures until 1987- the primary balance of Flanders improved more 
strongly than the primary balance of Wallonia. The Flemish primary balance improved from its lowest 
point of -4.5% of Belgian GDP in 1980 to 3.2% in 1987 (i.e. with 7.7%points), while the resp. 
numbers for Wallonia were -5.7 and -1.4% (i.e. an improvement of 4.3%points). 
However, an alternative reasoning could be that Wallonia and Brussels have an incentive to provoke a 
federal budget deficit exactly because they may anticipate to be largely exempted from fiscal 
consolidation. In this case Wallonia and Brussels would not have a particular incentive to postpone 
fiscal consolidation. This is because Wallonia and -since the 1990s- also Brussels are poorer than 
Flanders, due to which Francophone Belgian parties could anticipate that a tax increase would 
probably result in a relatively larger revenue increase originating in Flanders than originating in the 
rest of Belgium. This seems to hold in particular for the personal income tax, which is rather strongly 
progressive in Belgium, and for social security contributions, which are not paid by people living on 
an allowance. Moreover, over our sample period consolidation in Belgium seems to have had a higher 
chance of being revenue based than of being expenditure based. This may have been because both 
socialist parties have been part of all federal coalitions over our sample period, except between 1974 
and 1977 and between 1981 and 1987
55
. I.a. due to socialist coalition presence social expenditures –
                                                                                                                                                                                    
effects. The latter is appropriate in panel data analysis, while country fixed effects appear absent from the 
analysis of Persson and Tabellini (2003 p. 179-183).  
54
 A rather visible example is commuting: there is little commuting between Flanders and Wallonia, the 2 major 
regions of Belgium. (see e.g. Persyn and Torfs 2015) There is even less migration between those regions. A 
counterexample may however be interregional importing and exporting. 
55
 The 1981-87 consolidation effort seems to have been the only consolidation effort over our sample period that 
was predominantly expenditure based. 
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predominantly favouring Wallonia and Brussels- may have been largely exempted from consolidation 
efforts over our sample period
56
. 
3. Calculating interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the Belgian 
federal public debt 
 
In this section we first propose a methodology for calculating interregional net fiscal transfers 
resulting from central government debt, which we illustrate with a simple numerical example. Next 
we effectively calculate interregional transfers due to the interest bill on the Belgian federal public 
debt following our proposed methodology. We conclude with an attempt at a regional cost-benefit 
analysis of the Belgian federal public debt. 
3.1. A methodology for calculating interregional net fiscal transfers 
resulting from central government debt 
 
In this subsection we propose a methodology to calculate interregional net fiscal transfers resulting 
from the interest bill on the Belgian federal public debt
57
 (put more briefly: net fiscal transfers 
resulting from the federal public debt, or even more briefly: interest transfers), and derive some policy 
implications from this calculation. We do not know of attempts other than on Belgium to investigate 
the consequences of public debt for interregional net fiscal transfers. Examples are Algoed (2009), 
Van Rompuy and Bilsen (1988), Van Gompel (2004), and Meunier e.a. (2006). Algoed (2009) 
proposes a methodology for calculating interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the federal 
public debt. In the spirit of Algoed (2009), Van Rompuy and Bilsen (1988) and Van Gompel (2004) 
effectively calculate Belgian interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the federal public debt, 
finding that interest transfers amount to 55% of total interregional net fiscal transfers in 1985, resp. to 
37% of total interregional net fiscal transfers in 2003.  
Key is that the 3 latter studies define net transfers from the central government debt in a particular 
year as the difference between the part of the interest bill of a particular region corresponding to the 
part of the central government debt this region has “caused”, i.e. corresponding to the part of this 
region in the cumulative primary deficits of the past, and the part of the interest bill a particular region 
effectively pays.  
Compared to these earlier calculations of interregional net transfers resulting from the federal public 
debt, the current attempt covers more years –because of which the current attempt finds net transfers 
amounts that are even larger than the amounts found by Van Rompuy and Bilsen (1988) and Van 
Gompel (2004). The current attempt also situates the result of our calculations within the theoretical 
literature on the political economy of debt financing (see above). 
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 A 3
rd
 alternative reasoning is along the lines of Alesina and Drazen (1989 p. 2), who predict any anticipated 
polarised –i.e. uneven- geographic incidence of any future budget consolidation itself to postpone consolidation 
efforts. 
57
 We hence disregard in our analysis public debts of the lower level governments of Belgium, which besides are 
negligible compared to the Belgian federal public debt. 
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As said already, in Belgium in most years the federal budget is not balanced but shows a deficit. In 
any country, any central government budget deficit is to some extent unevenly spread over the regions 
that compose that country
58
. I.e. in any country when disaggregating the overall central government 
budget geographically it will appear that some regions “run” a bigger central government primary 
deficit than others, or even that some regions “run” a central government primary surplus while others 
“run” a central government primary deficit. Regional disaggregation of an overall central government 
budget boils down to calculating what expenditures and revenues of each individual region would 
have been if they would have been independent countries, however keeping policy constant
59
.  
This year’s –calculated, i.e. implicit- central government budget deficit of a particular region adds to 
the previous year’s –calculated, i.e. implicit- central government public debt of that same region, and 
impacts next year’s –calculated, i.e. implicit- central government interest bill caused by that region. 
Interest payments constitute an expenditure category which would not be part of the budget in the 
absence of previous budget deficits, and which hence –of course- would not cause interregional net 
fiscal transfers. Once the interest bill appears as a central government expenditure item, it is likely to 
result in interregional net fiscal transfers. I.e. interest payments are likely to result in some regions –
effectively but implicitly- paying a larger part of it than on the basis of their share in past central 
government primary deficits, and in some regions –effectively but implicitly- paying a smaller part of 
it. 
However, once budget surpluses are run and as a consequence the public debt starts to decrease, a 
final type of interregional net fiscal transfers emerges, i.e. interregional net fiscal transfers resulting 
from paying down the public debt. This is because:  
 a budget surplus effectively pays down part of the public debt thanks to tax revenue that is 
larger than public expenditure and that has been “provided” to a different extent by the 
different regions of the country concerned 
 however, the share of the public debt that a particular region would have paid down on the 
basis of its share in the central government public debt, i.e. on the basis of its share in past 
cumulative central government primary balances, may differ from the share of the central 
government public debt that a particular region has effectively paid down, i.e. considering its 
share in central government tax revenue 
We will also consider this final type of net fiscal transfers in our numerical example for a fictitious 
country (see below). However, in our calculation of real interregional net fiscal transfers resulting 
from the federal public debt in Belgium (see section 3.3), by far the largest part of them will consist of 
transfers caused by the interest bill. This is mainly because over our period considered (1970-2002) -
and also thereafter-, budget surpluses have been rare and small (see column 4 of table 8 below).  
As a result of the above reasoning we arrive at the following definition of interregional interest 
transfers:  
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 The same holds for any budget surplus. 
59
 In Belgium, as in most other countries, the central/federal government does not make regionally disaggregated 
data on federal taxing and spending in their entirety available, in particular with respect to taxation, and with 
respect to spending that runs from the government to the citizen, instead of with respect to spending in the form 
of intergovernmental grants. In Belgium, data on grants from the Federal government to the “states”, called 
Regions and Communities in Belgium, are readily available at 
http://financien.belgium.be/nl/binaries/B7._nl_tcm306-254445.pdf , but they constitute only a part of total 
Federal government spending, and they have become sizeable only from 1989 onwards. 
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Interregional transfers resulting from the interest bill on the central government debt  
EQUAL 
the part of the interest bill to pay by that particular region that corresponds to its part in the central 
government debt  
MINUS  
the part of the interest bill that a particular region effectively pays (i.e. corresponding to that particular 
region’s part in central government tax revenues) 60. 
Hence interregional interest transfers stem from the difference between: 
 on the one hand the part of the central government expenditures financed by borrowing 
that a particular region would have benefited from if it corresponded to the share of the 
interest bill this region bears through its contribution to central government tax revenues 
 and on the other hand the part of central government public expenditures financed by 
borrowing that has effectively benefited a particular region 
In what follows we will first apply the above definition to a fictitious numerical example, after which 
we will apply the hence explained methodology of interest transfers calculation to the case of the 
Belgian regions. We end with a number of conclusions. 
3.2. A simple numerical example for a country with only 2 regions 
 
Before proposing a calculation of interregional interest transfers in Belgium, we explain our 
methodology by means of a fictitious numerical example
61
, which will prove to be much more simple 
than the Belgian situation, but still to share important characteristics with the Belgian case (as will 
become clear in section 3.3).  
Table 2 describes the starting year T1 in a country with 2 regions A and B (and one central 
government), which run a different -central government- primary balance (row 4) because they 
contribute the same amount to –central government- tax revenues (row 2) but benefit to a different 
extent from –central government- public expenditures (row 3)62. However, both regions run a –central 
government- primary deficit. (This is a situation resembling the Belgian situation until the early 
1980s. See section 3.3 below.) We assume for the sake of simplicity that all interests to be paid on the 
debt that is caused by the primary deficit run in year T1, start becoming due only in year T2
63
. 
Therefore interests due in year T1 are zero (rows 5 and 6), and hence also net fiscal transfers caused 
by the interest bill (rows 7 and 8). Therefore at the end of year T1 the primary balance equals the 
budget balance (row 9).  
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 This is also the criterion used and explained in Algoed (2009). 
61
 Note that in what follows sums do not always add up exactly, due to rounding. We have decided to show only 
1 decimal number in tables 2 to 7. 
62
 It is the differing shares in the primary deficit that are essential to our reasoning. If these differing shares –as 
opposed to table 2- would be due to differing shares in tax revenue collected, rather than to differing shares in 
(primary) spending, or to both, our reasoning would fundamentally stay the same. 
63
 This assumption does not impact the size of the interregional interest transfers over our entire period 
considered. 
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Table 2: T1: Both regions run a primary deficit, but of a different size 
T1 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 Debt (at beginning of period) 0 0 0 
2 Tax revenue collected 45 45 90 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance -10 -15 -25 
5 Interests actually paid 0 0 0 
6 Interests to pay given share in debt 0 0 0 
7 Transfers due to interest burden 0 0 0 
8 PM: Interest transfers as share of interest burden 0% 0% 0% 
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance -10 -15 -25 
10 = e.g. for Region A 
(45/90)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending 
would be tax funded 57.5 57.5 115 
11 = 3-10 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -2.5 2.5 0 
12 = (11 as a share of last 
column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total 
(primary) spending -2% 2% 0% 
 
However, because of the different regional shares in spending compared to tax revenue (rows 2 and 
3), interregional fiscal transfers in year T1 are not zero when we calculate them the way they have 
traditionally been calculated for Belgium as well as for other countries
64
, as shown in row 11. In row 
11 tax revenue is increased proportionally for each region until total tax revenue equals total 
spending, under the –simplifying but unrealistic- assumption of a balanced budget. As a next step 
interregional net transfers are obtained in row 11 by subtracting row 10 from row 3
65
. 
Now suppose that in year T2, regional primary balances stay the same as in year T1, a situation shown 
in table 3. Hence the difference with year T1 is that now interest charges have to be paid, i.e. on the 
debt incurred in year T1 of our numerical example
66
. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
interest rate remains constant at 10% in every year. We also assume that the entire interest bill is paid 
with tax revenue, as the interest bill is evidently a priority public expenditure. The –plausible- 
assumption of payment of the interest bill with tax revenue has consequences for the calculation of 
interest transfers: as both regions again contribute the same amount to total tax revenue in year T2, 
they de facto pay an equal part of the interest bill (row 5). However, as the share of region B in the 
public debt is the higher one (row 1), region B would pay a larger share of the interest bill than region 
A if this share corresponded to region B’s share in the public debt (row 6)67. This difference leads to 
interregional interest transfers (row 7). 
Although we assume that the interest bill –as a priority expenditure- is paid with tax revenue, we 
assume that interest expenditure does not crowd out existing primary expenditures, but simply adds to 
it, i.e. the central government allows total expenditure to increase with the interest bill
68
. As a 
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 For an example for Belgium see Algoed (2008). For examples for other countries see Dubay (2006) for the 
US and Bird and Vaillancourt (2007) for Canada. 
65
 We present outgoing transfers as a negative amount and incoming transfers as a positive amount. 
66
 Of course another obvious difference is that the public debt at the start of year T2 is no longer zero. 
67
 I.e. if region B would be an independent country but with the same fiscal policy. 
68
 This accommodating stance implies that the central government allows the interest bill in turn to worsen the 
fiscal situation, opening the door to a so called interest snowball: deficits not only increasing the interest bill, but 
also the interest bill increasing the deficit. Such a snowballing effect risks in particular to occur if the interest 
rate is higher than economic growth and it can even occur in a situation of a primary surplus. Belgium 
effectively suffered from an interest snowball between 1977 and 1988, between 1991 and 1993, and from 2009 
onwards. (NBB 2010 p. 168) 
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consequence the budget deficit (row 9) increases with the interest bill (row 6) compared to year T1. 
As another consequence public debt at the beginning of year T3 (row 1 in table 4) of course not only 
increases with the primary deficit (i.e. with the opposite of row 4) but also with the interest bill (row 
6). 
Table 3: T2: Both regions run a primary deficit, but of a different size (bis) 
T2 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 = (1 in T1 - 4 in T1 + 6 in 
T1) Debt (at beginning of period) 10 15 25 
2 Tax revenue collected 45 45 90 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance -10 -15 -25 
5 = e.g. for Region A 
(45/95)*2.5  Interests actually paid 1.3 1.3 2.5 
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1 1.5 2.5 
7 = 6-5 Transfers due to interest bill -0.3 0.3 0 
8 = (7 as a share of last 
column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest bill -10% 10% 0% 
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) -11 -16.5 -27.5 
10 = e.g. for Region A 
(45/90)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would 
be tax funded 57.5 57.5 115 
11 = 3-10 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -2.5 2.5 0 
12 = (11 as a share of last 
column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total 
(primary) spending -2% 2% 0% 
 
Hence only from T3 onwards a region’s share in public debt is composed of all of its 3 possible 
components, as expressed in the below formula: 
𝐷𝑖
𝑡 =  𝐷𝑖
𝑡−1 −  𝑃𝐵𝑖
𝑡−1 +  𝐼𝑖
𝑡−1  
I.e. a region’s share of the public debt at the beginning of period t equals:  
 that region’s debt share at the beginning of period t-1,  
 minus that region’s share in the primary balance run during period t-1, 
 plus that region’s share in the interest bill to pay in period t-1 given its debt share 
The 3
rd
 term, i.e. a region’s share in the interest bill to pay in period t-1 given its debt share, equals the 
interest rate times that region’s share in the public debt at the beginning of period t-1, and is expressed 
in the below formula: 
𝐼𝑖
𝑡−1 =  𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑖
𝑡−1  
Additionally, as a side-note, rows 10 to 12 allow us to further understand the relationship between 
interest transfers and net fiscal transfers as they are traditionally calculated, i.e. while implicitly 
assuming that all expenditures are tax funded. Because in T2 the amounts of tax revenue collected in 
regions A and B as well as the amounts of (primary) spending they received are the same as in T1, 
transfers calculated the traditional way are the same in T1 and in T2. 
However, of course it would be more correct to explicitly take into account that –in Belgium as well 
as in our fictitious numerical example- (at least in most years) part of expenditure is debt financed. To 
show the consequences of this -more realistic but complicating- assumption is the aim of this section, 
with the cost of making net transfers calculations somewhat more complicated than previous 
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calculations of interregional net fiscal transfers in Belgium. While a traditional calculation of net 
fiscal transfers would have resulted in an amount of -2.5 for Region A in year T2, a more correct 
calculation results in only -0.3. I.e. at least in T2 interest transfers appear to be lower than net fiscal 
transfers according to their traditional calculation, which therefore are an overestimation of the true 
net fiscal transfers. One could say that the budget deficit of period T2 allows net fiscal transfers to be 
postponed into the future.  
Suppose now that in year T3 the previous situation changes. Suppose e.g. that a newly elected central 
government implements fiscal consolidation measures in the form of tax increases and/or expenditure 
cuts that only –or mainly- affect region A (e.g. because of region A’s economic characteristics being 
different from region B’s, or because region A being less represented in the newly elected 
government). (This is a situation resembling –at least in terms of fiscal outcomes- the Belgian 
situation from 1983 until 1985. See section 3.3 below.) This situation is shown in table 4: tax revenue 
contributed by region A strongly increases (row 2) (while public expenditure benefited from by region 
A stays constant (row 3)), resulting in a primary surplus rather than a primary deficit generated by 
region A (row 4)
69
.  
Table 4: T3: One region runs a primary surplus, the other region runs a primary deficit 
T3 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 = (1 in T2 - 4 in T2 + 6 
in T2) 
Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt 
in t-1) 21 31.5 52.5 
2 Tax revenue collected 60 45 105 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 -15 -10 
5 = e.g. for Region A 
(60/105)*5.3  Interests actually paid 3.0 2.3 5.3 
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 2.1 3.2 5.3 
7 = 6-5 Transfers due to interest bill -0.9 0.9 0 
8 = (7 as a share of last 
column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest bill -17% 17% 0% 
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 2.9 -18.2 -15.3 
10 = e.g. for Region A 
(45/90)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be 
tax funded 65.7 49.3 115.0 
11 = 3-10 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -10.7 10.7 0 
12 = (11 as a share of last 
column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total (primary) 
spending -9% 9% 0% 
 
Unsurprisingly, such a regional asymmetry with respect to tax revenue and expenditures increases net 
transfers calculated the traditional way considerably (row 11). However, the primary surplus of region 
A is not large enough to generate a country-wide primary surplus (last column of row 4). Because of 
the larger share of region A in tax revenue, the part of the interest bill actually paid by region A 
increases (row 5). In combination with the larger interest bill in general (compare last columns of 
rows 5 in tables 3 and 4), as well as with the increased part of the interest bill region B would pay if 
the part of the interest bill paid corresponded to the share in the public debt (compare rows 6 in tables 
3 and 4), this leads to larger interest transfers as well (row 7).  
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 It is the primary surplus that is essential for our reasoning, not the way it is achieved (either by tax increases 
or expenditure cuts). 
As an aside, it should be noted that we could also have opted for demonstrating the calculation of interregional 
interest transfers by taking regionally differing budget balances –rather than regionally differing primary 
balances- as our starting point. Our demonstration is however more clear when taking regionally differing 
primary balances as our starting point. 
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Once again a traditional calculation of net fiscal transfers overestimates the true net fiscal transfers. It 
results in an amount of no less than -10.7 for Region A, while a more correct calculation results in 
only -0.9.  
Now suppose that –for the sake of the argument- the situation described in table 4 continues for 
another year, as shown by table 5. As a result of the primary surplus of region A in year T3, the debt 
to be assigned to region A (compare rows 1 of tables 5 and 6) is lower at the start of T4 than at the 
start of T3. Overall however, debt has still increased. These 2 facts combined increase interest 
transfers (row 7) further. Also notice that the share of interest transfers in the total interest bill (row 8) 
has only kept on increasing until now.  
Because in T4 the amounts of tax revenue collected in regions A and B as well as the amounts of 
(primary) spending they received are the same as in T3, transfers calculated the traditional way are the 
same in T3 and in T4. 
Table 5: T4: One region runs a primary surplus, the other region runs a primary deficit (bis) 
T4 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 = (1 in T3 - 4 in T3 + 6 in 
T3) 
Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in 
debt in t-1) 18.1 49.7 67.8 
2 Tax revenue collected 60 45 105 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 -15 -10 
5 = e.g. for Region A 
(60/105)*6.8  Interests actually paid 3.9 2.9 6.8 
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1.8 5.0 6.8 
7 = 6-5 Transfers due to interest bill -2.1 2.1 0 
8 = (7 as a share of last 
column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest bill -30% 30% 0% 
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 3.2 -20.0 -16.8 
10 = e.g. for Region A 
(45/90)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would 
be tax funded 65.7 49.3 115 
11 = 3-10 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -10.7 10.7 0 
12 = (11 as a share of last 
column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total 
(primary) spending -9% 9% 0% 
 
Next, table 6 describes year T5, in which both the primary surplus of region A and the primary deficit 
of region B improve sufficiently to achieve an overall primary surplus, but without region B 
achieving a primary surplus. (This is a situation resembling the Belgian situation from 1986 onwards. 
See section 3.3 below.) Because both regions now contribute a less unequal amount of tax revenue 
than in previous years (row 2), the new increase in interest transfers is entirely due to the increase in 
the debt of region B due to events in the previous year. Table 6 shows that interest transfers can be 
large and can even increase in years of an overall primary surplus. Notice however that in year T5 
there still is an overall budget deficit.  
Of course, because of the narrowed difference in regional primary balances, net transfers calculated 
the traditional way (row 11) decrease considerably between years T4 and T5. In contrast, interest 
transfers keep on increasing in spite of the improved overall fiscal situation. 
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Table 6: T5: The primary surplus of the surplus region improves, and also the primary deficit 
of the deficit region improves 
T5 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 = (1 in T4 - 4 in T4 + 6 
in T4) 
Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in 
debt in t-1) 14.9 69.6 84.5 
2 Tax revenue collected 65 55 120 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 10 -5 5 
5 = e.g. for Region A 
(65/120)*8.5  Interests actually paid 4.6 3.9 8.5 
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1.5 7.0 8.5 
7 = 6-5 Transfers due to interest bill -3.1 3.1 0 
8 = (7 as a share of last 
column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest bill -37% 37% 0% 
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 8.5 -12.0 -3.5 
10 = e.g. for Region A 
(65/120)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would 
be tax funded 62.3 52.7 115 
11 = 3-10 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -7.3 7.3 0 
12 = (11 as a share of last 
column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total (primary) 
spending -6% 6% 0% 
 
Finally, table 7 describes year T6, in which also the primary deficit of region B turns into a primary 
surplus, which remains however smaller than the surplus of region A. (This is a situation resembling 
the Belgian situation from 1993 onwards. See section 3.3 below.) Remarkably, interest transfers keep 
increasing (row 7), and now even overtake net transfers calculated the traditional way (row 11).  
An additional feature we added to year T6 is that it is not only the first year during which region B 
achieved a primary surplus (row 4), but also the first year during which an overall budget surplus 
(row 9) is achieved. (This is a situation resembling the Belgian situation in a limited number of years 
from 1995 onwards. See section 3.3 below.) Because of this budget surplus, in year T6 a de facto start 
is made with paying off the debt. Total debt decreases from 88 at the beginning of year T6 (row 1) to 
81.8 (= 88-6.2) at the beginning of year T7 (not shown). As said above, as soon as a start is made with 
paying down the debt, a new kind of net transfers emerges (while net transfers due to the interest bill 
possibly keep increasing -due to events in the previous year- as effectively shown by the evolution 
from row 7 in table 6 to row 7 in table 7). This new kind of net transfers -the net transfers due to 
paying down the debt- is shown in row 12. It is calculated similarly to the net transfers due to the 
interest bill, i.e. as the difference between the part that a region would take in paying down the debt on 
the basis of that region’s share in total debt (row 11) and the part that a region actually takes in paying 
down the debt –i.e. simply its part in the overall budget balance minus its part in interests actually 
paid in year T6 (row 10)
70
.  
So paradoxically, once a start is made with paying down the debt, net transfers resulting from the 
public debt increase rather than decrease (in our example with 5.1 in year T6, plus with 0.6 due to 
increased interest transfers that are in turn due to events in the previous year). The increase with 5.1 is 
due to the fact that region A actually pays down a larger part of the debt than the part it would pay 
down on the basis of its share in the total debt
71
. 
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 Also this kind of transfer can be considered a postponement of traditionally calculated fiscal transfers. 
71
 Because table 8 (see below) shows that Belgian federal budget surpluses have been rare and small over our 
entire period considered, in table 8 we do not separately calculate the additional transfers caused by the debt 
paid down thanks to those budget surpluses. 
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Of course, because of the once again narrowed difference in regional primary balances, net transfers 
calculated the traditional way (row 11) again decrease considerably between years T5 and T6. In 
contrast, interest transfers keep on increasing in spite of the improved overall fiscal situation. 
To sum up, common threads running from T1 to T6 are the following: 
 the constantly worse fiscal situation of region B –in combination with continuing overall 
budget deficits and hence an ever increasing overall debt burden- leads from T2 onwards both 
to net transfers resulting from the interest bill and to net transfers calculated the traditional 
way,  
 but the former transfers show a snowballing behaviour, steadily increasing year after year, 
and even increasing when the overall fiscal situation starts to improve, while the latter do not 
at all show such an effect; this snowballing behaviour is essentially due to a situation of non-
decreasing debt, composed of past primary deficits in which the 2 regions have unequal 
shares, and on which each year interests have to be paid 
 the constantly worse fiscal situation of region B –in combination with continuing overall 
budget deficits and hence an ever increasing overall debt burden- leads after a while to a 
situation in which net transfers calculated the traditional way are an underestimation of real 
net transfers, i.e. including net transfers resulting from the interest bill 
 there does not seem to be an upper limit to interest transfers: if debt keeps increasing, and 
shares in the primary deficit remain unequal, interest transfers will keep increasing as well (in 
our calculation of interest transfers for Belgium over the 1970-2002 period, we will show that 
interest transfers can become even larger than the total interest bill; see section 3.3 below) 
Table 7: T6: Both regions run a primary surplus, but of a different size, and an overall budget 
surplus is achieved 
T6 
 
Region 
A 
Region 
B 
Whole 
country 
1 = (1 in T5 - 4 in T5 
+ 6 in T5) 
Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt in 
t-1) 6.4 81.6 88.0 
2 Tax revenue collected 65 65 130 
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115 
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 10 5 15 
5 = e.g. for Region A 
(65/130)*8.8 Interests actually paid 4.4 4.4 8.8 
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 0.6 8.2 8.8 
7 = 6-5 Transfers due to interest bill -3.8 3.8 0 
8 = (7 as a share of 
last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest bill -43% 43% 0% 
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 9.4 -3.2 6.2 
10 = 4-5  Debt actually paid down 5.6 0.6 6.2 
11 = e.g. for Region 
A (6.4/88)*6.2  Debt to pay down given share in debt 0.5 5.7 6.2 
12 = 11-10 Transfers due to paying down the debt -5.1 5.1 0 
13 = 7+12 Total transfers due to the public debt -8.9 8.9 0 
14 = e.g. for Region 
A (65/130)*115 
PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be 
tax funded 57.5 57.5 115 
15 = 3-14 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way -2.5 2.5 0 
16 = (15 as a share of 
last column of 3) 
PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way as share of total (primary) 
spending -2% 2% 0% 
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3.3. Calculating interregional net transfers due to the interest bill on the 
Belgian federal public debt 
 
Because we only have the necessary data from 1970 onwards, we can only calculate interest transfers 
from 1970 onwards. We only consider the federal budget –including social security-, as only the 
federal budget is able to generate net fiscal transfers between the 3 Belgian regions. Our data source 
for regional shares in federal expenditures and revenues is Van Gompel (2004), which is in turn based 
on Van Rompuy and Bilsen (1988) and Dottermans (1997). These sources have calculated the 
regional distribution of all federal revenues and expenditures through approximation of these 
distributions by: 
 relevant regional population shares (e.g. share of the young with respect to regional 
disaggregation of school grants and child benefits, share of over 60 years old with respect to 
regional disaggregation of retirement benefits)  
 gross regional product (corrected for gross incomes of commuters to other regions so as to 
avoid an overestimation of the share of Brussels, the Belgian region with by far the largest 
share of employees living in another region) (gross regional product is used for e.g. regional 
disaggregation of government purchases of goods and services and for regional 
disaggregation of VAT) 
 gross regional value added (for the corporate income tax)  
 number of employees weighted by gross wage bill and number of self-employed weighted by 
their value added (both for regional disaggregation of social security contributions).  
It should be noted that the Federal government does not publish regionally disaggregated data on 
federal expenditures and revenues. Recent exceptions are data on the region of residence of federal 
civil servants (allowing to distribute the federal public wage bill over the Belgian regions), regional 
shares in the personal income tax, regional shares in the number of unemployed, regional shares in 
health spending and –published since Belgium became fiscally speaking to a considerable extent a 
decentralised country in 1989- regional shares in the federal grants to the Belgian Regions and 
Communities. Another exception are the so called “Regional accounts” of the NBB, which 
disaggregate geographically since 1995 only income tax revenue, social security contributions, and 
social expenditures, and which would enable us to approximate regional primary balances with 
regional differences between social security contributions and social expenditures. However, we 
prefer to use the data of Van Gompel because Van Gompel provides a regional disaggregation of 
federal revenues and expenditures as a whole for every single year between 1970 and 2002, a period 
crucially encompassing the years of build-up of the large Belgian federal debt.  
We could have extended our sample period until 2010, as CERPE (2011) calculates regional primary 
balances for the 2006-2010 period
72
, but because of possibly different methodologies for the 
calculation of these primary balances, we have chosen not to. CERPE (2011) obtains smaller primary 
surpluses for Flanders over its period considered compared to the last years of our period, while 
obtaining larger primary deficits for Wallonia. Extension of our sample period until 2010 would only 
have made the result of our calculations more dramatic (see below). 
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 Likewise, Jennes (2014a) calculates interregional transfers the traditional way for the 2007-2011 period. 
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Assumptions made for our net transfers calculation: 
1) For the starting year 1970 we assume –due to lack of data for preceding years- that regional 
shares in the public debt equal regional shares in tax revenue, i.e. we assume that the more a 
region contributed to tax revenue, the more it benefited from spending financed by borrowing, 
thereby avoiding interest transfers
73
. This is a conservative/prudent assumption, as 
Dottermans (1997) finds transfers from Flanders to Wallonia –calculated the traditional way- 
already from 1964 onwards. Combined with the fact that the build-up of the Belgian public 
debt already started before 1970 (though rather slowly compared to the years after 1970), 
these pre-1970 net transfers calculated the traditional way imply a share of Flanders in the 
public debt that is lower than its share in tax revenue.  
However, as an extra robustness check, we have even more prudently assumed that in 1970 
the share of Flanders in the public debt was 100%. While this assumption of course reduces 
the interest transfers provided by Flanders since 1970, they remain very large, e.g. when 
compared to interregional net fiscal transfers in Belgium according to previous traditional 
calculations. E.g. while interest transfers out of Flanders amount to 5.6% of GDP (i.e. 14.6 
billion euros) in 2002 –equalling 92% of the interest bill- when assuming that in 1970 
regional shares in the public debt equal regional shares in tax revenue, the resp. numbers are 
3.6% of GDP (i.e. 9.4 billion nominal euros) and 59% of the interest bill when assuming that 
in 1970 the share of Flanders in the public debt was 100%. As a final robustness check, we 
have assumed that in 1970 total Belgian public debt was zero, i.e. that the build-up of the 
Belgian public debt only started in the first year for which we have data available on regional 
primary balances. Under this assumption the interest transfers out of Flanders are hardly 
lower than under our baseline assumption (regional shares in the public debt equalling 
regional shares in tax revenue): 5.1% of GDP (i.e. 13.3 billion euros) in 2002 –equalling 84% 
of the interest bill. 
 
2) We assume that the Belgian regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels were already relevant 
political actors in 1970. Indeed, it makes less sense to assign tax revenues and expenditures to 
geographic areas if those geographic areas do not simultaneously correspond to political 
institutions with responsibilities that potentially impact those revenues and expenditures
74
. 
We see 2 arguments to treat our 3 regions already as key political actors from 1970 onwards.  
Firstly, the 2 of the 3 major political parties in the history of Belgium (the Christian-
democrats and the liberals) split up into a Flemish and a Francophone Belgian political party, 
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 Assuming regional shares in tax revenue before 1970 were the same as in 1970. 
74
 Some object to calculating net fiscal transfers between Belgian regions with the argument that e.g. Belgian 
provinces would be an equally relevant geographic division (or equally irrelevant, depending on one’s view on 
calculating geographic net fiscal transfers). However, as opposed to Belgian regions, Belgian provinces hardly 
have competencies, let alone economic competencies. Hence, the possibly large net fiscal transfers between 
Belgian provinces are not able to have large consequences in terms of changed political behaviour, nor to be 
their result. 
The above does however not imply that from a political economy perspective it would only make sense to 
calculate net fiscal transfers between politically relevant geographic entities. E.g. Decoster and Verwerft (2009) 
calculate net fiscal transfers (the traditional way) between social groups that can be argued to be politically 
organised, albeit possibly in a less clearcut way. I.e. Decoster and Verwerft (2009) calculate net fiscal transfers 
between income quintiles, between employed and unemployed, between home owners and tenants, and between 
the young and the old. That is, they calculate net fiscal transfers across Belgian regions and they find that 
transfers between the abovementioned social groups are much larger than transfers between Belgian regions. 
Therefore also interest transfers between those non-geographic entities are probably (even) much larger than 
interest transfers between Belgian regions. 
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resp. in 1971 and 1972. The 3
rd
 major party, the socialist party, suffered from internal 
conflicts between Flemish and Francophone Belgian members throughout the 1970s, before 
also splitting up in 1978. This implied that from 1978s onwards, no single party represented 
in the federal parliament obtained votes nor even ran for elections both in Flanders and 
Wallonia
75
. Hence, we may broadly assume that from the start of our period, all Belgian 
political parties had an incentive to skew taxation and expenditure in favour of their region, 
exception made for the then still largely bilingual capital of Brussels.  
Secondly, in 1970 a change of the constitution took place which had 2 major consequences: 
 confederal organisation of the Federal government (as already explained above): 
o the legislative was divided into a “Dutch-speaking group” and a “French-
speaking group”, and any 2/3 of members of parliament of any group are since 
then entitled to block any law from being approved;  
o the executive –which decides by consensus- since then needs to consist of an 
equal number of ministers belonging to the either of both parliamentary groups  
 start of the decentralisation process of the central government, i.e. start of process that 
would result in Belgium becoming a federal country: the 2 largest of the current 3 Belgian 
regions (Flanders and Wallonia) were established, while Brussels obtained special status 
as the capital of Belgium; also the current 3 Belgian communities were established (the 
Flemish, the Francophone and the German speaking communities) 
But in 1970 only the communities acquired responsibilities, moreover only with respect to 
culture, due to which the Belgian central government kept control over the bulk of revenue 
and expenditure
76
. The 3 regions only obtained substantial expenditure responsibilities at the 
occasion of the 1980 constitutional change, including economic competencies.  
Therefore, as a robustness check, we have only started calculating interest transfers in 1980, 
assigning the public debt at the end of 1979 to the regions according to regional shares in tax 
revenue. This change of starting date for our calculations reduces the interest transfers 
provided by Flanders at the end of our period, but they remain very large, e.g. when compared 
to interregional net fiscal transfers in Belgium according to previous traditional calculations. 
E.g. while interest transfers out of Flanders amount to 5.6% of GDP (equalling 14.6 billion 
euros) in 2002 –equalling 92% of the total interest bill- when starting to assign the public debt 
according to regional shares in tax revenue in 1970, the resp. numbers are 4.4% of GDP 
(equalling 11.5 billion nominal euros) and 72% when starting to assign the public debt 
according to regional shares in tax revenue in 1980.  
 
3) As we only have data on regional shares in total tax revenue at our availability, we need to 
make the –minor- error to assume that the interest bill is paid out of total tax revenues, i.e. 
including social security contributions. In fact, as social security contributions are earmarked 
to social security expenditures, the interest bill is paid out of tax revenues minus social 
security contributions. We may however assume that this additional assumption does not have 
a major impact on our results, as over the 1970-2002 period regional shares in social security 
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 With the exception of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, where all parties represented in the 
federal parliament kept running for election (as said above). We know only of India as another democracy and 
federal country in which a number of federal government coalitions have consisted to an important extent of 
parties that run for election only in one or a limited number of states. (see also Lago-Peñas e.a. 2014) However, 
in India the limited geographic and cultural basis of political parties supporting the federal government does not 
hold for the largest parties, and also is a more recent phenomenon, having come into existence only in the 
1990s. 
76
 With the exception of municipal taxation and expenditure. 
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contributions (residence basis) probably do not differ sufficiently from regional shares in tax 
revenues other than social security contributions, to considerably change our results. E.g. 
Denkgroep “In de Warande” (2005 p. 143 and 147) -one of the few existing calculations of 
interregional net fiscal transfers in Belgium over a considerable time period instead of over 
one single year- finds the share of Flanders in total federal tax revenues without social 
security contributions to be rather similar to the share of Flanders in social security 
contributions considered in isolation over the 1990-2002 period
77
. 
Table 8 summarises the method and the results of our calculations. As a first step, we have to 
calculate regional primary balances (expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 3), i.e. the 
differences between regional contributions to tax revenue (columns 1) and regionalised primary 
spending (columns 2) (after expressing columns 1 and 2 as a % of Belgian GDP). We notice that over 
our sample period, Flanders increases its share in tax revenue (columns 1) much more strongly than 
that it increases its share in primary spending (columns 2). In contrast, the (negative) gap between 
Wallonia’s share in tax revenue and its share in primary spending remains about constant over our 
sample period. Still different is Brussels, which evolves from a share in tax revenue that is larger than 
its share in primary spending to the inverse situation. 
These contrasting evolutions of columns 1 and 2 (expressed as shares of totals) result in even more 
contrasting primary balances (expressed as shares of GDP) (columns 3), precisely because total 
primary spending was considerably larger than total tax revenue during several years of our period 
considered. E.g. while the Flemish share in tax revenue was higher than its share in primary 
expenditures in any single year of our sample period, Flanders still ran a primary deficit in every 
single year before 1983. Conversely, while the Walloon share in tax revenue was lower than its share 
in primary expenditures in any single year of our sample period, Wallonia still ran a primary surplus 
from 1993 until and including 1997. This was because total primary spending was considerably 
smaller than total tax revenue during that latter period. 
The Flemish primary balance is negative during the 1
st
 subperiod that we are able to distinguish, 
1970-1982
78
, but turns positive during the next 2 subperiods we are able to distinguish, 1983-1994
79
 
and 1995-2002
80
. From 1986 onwards the Flemish surpluses are large enough to make the overall 
primary balance turn positive. But in particular the 3
rd
 subperiod –which we distinguish because from 
1995 onwards
81
 also the overall budget balance (column 4) turns slightly positive in several years- is 
marked by very large Flemish primary surpluses. In contrast, except for the years 1993-1997 the 
Walloon primary balance remains negative over our entire period (and becomes very negative towards 
the end of the 1
st
 subperiod). Brussels evolves broadly from primary surpluses in the 1
st
 subperiod, 
over primary deficits in the 2
nd
 subperiod, back to primary surpluses in the 3
rd
 subperiod. 
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 Moreover, as we will find out in table 8 below, interregional net interest transfers in Belgium are to a far 
larger extent explained by diverging regional shares in the interest bill caused than by diverging regional shares 
in the interest bill paid. 
78
 This 1
st
 subperiod broadly corresponds to years T1 and T2 of our numerical example (tables 2 and 3). 
79
 The 1983-1994 subperiod was preceded by the December 1981 elections, which resulted in a coalition 
change, resulting in turn in a prolonged fiscal consolidation effort until 1987. This 2
nd
 subperiod broadly 
corresponds to years T3 and T4 of our numerical example (tables 4 and 5). 
80
 This 3
rd
 subperiod broadly corresponds to years T5 and T6 of our numerical example (tables 6 and 7). 
81
 In 1992 a new government took office, which was the start of a prolonged budget consolidation until 1999 
with a view to acceding to the euro zone. The 1992 government was re-elected in 1995. In contrast to the 1981-
1987 coalitions, the 1992-1999 coalitions did have a majority of Francophone Belgian parliamentary seats at 
their disposal. Also in contrast to the 1981-1987 governments, the fiscal consolidation efforts of the 1992-1999 
governments relied somewhat more on tax increases than on expenditure cuts. 
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As a next step, we calculate regional –“caused”- shares in the total public debt (at the beginning of 
each year) (expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 6)
82. Crucially, in each year, a region’s debt 
share is calculated as the sum of its debt share at the beginning of the previous year, its primary deficit 
run over the previous year (or the opposite of its primary surplus in case of a primary surplus), and its 
–“caused”- share in the interests that are due in the previous year. The latter simply corresponds to its 
debt share in the previous period (expressed in % of total debt) multiplied by the total interest bill 
(columns 7)
83
. Hence, when having calculated –“caused”- regional debt shares for a particular year, 
we can easily calculate –“caused”- regional interest bill shares for that same year. In other words the 
regional “caused” debt shares are the debts the resp. regions would have accumulated under the 
assumption that the 3 regions would have been independent countries from the start of our period 
considered but keeping policy constant. Note that from 1987 onwards the Flemish share in total debt 
(expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 6) starts to decrease (while total debt continues to 
increase until 1993), as a consequence of the ever growing Flemish primary surplus. Also note that 
from 1986 onwards the Flemish “caused” share in the interest bill (expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) 
(columns 7) starts to decrease (while the total interest bill continues to increase until 1990), as a 
consequence of the decreasing Flemish debt share.  
The last but one step is then to calculate regional interest shares not on a “caused” but on a de facto 
“paid” basis (columns 8), i.e. simply according to regional shares in tax revenue (columns 1). Note 
that the Flemish interest bill –on a “paid” basis”- starts to decrease later than the Flemish “caused” 
interest bill, and that it also decreases more slowly.  
The difference between the “caused” and “paid” interest shares then equals interregional interest 
transfers (columns 9). Columns 10 simply express columns 9 as a share of the total annual interest 
bill. Columns 9 and 10 show that the interest transfers from Flanders -to Wallonia over our entire 
period, and to Brussels from 1990 onwards- are positive and increasing. At the end of our period, 
interest transfers from Flanders almost equal the entire interest bill. In nominal euros (not shown in 
table 8) interest transfers out of Flanders have increased from 9.2 billion in 1995 to 14.6 billion euros 
in 2002, compared to a total interest bill of 15.9 billion euros in 2002. Note that Brussels is a far 
smaller region than Wallonia, which partly explains why interest transfers to Brussels are far smaller 
than those to Wallonia. The large interest transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels are the 
combined effect of the rather small part of the interest bill effectively paid by Wallonia and Brussels 
(columns 8), which is due to their rather small (and decreasing) share in total tax revenue (columns 1), 
and –much more importantly- the very large part of the interest bill Wallonia and Brussels would have 
paid (columns 7) on the basis of their shares in total debt (columns 6).  
At the end of our period interest transfers from Flanders are more than double the amount of net 
transfers calculated the traditional way in a number of studies undertaken during the previous decade. 
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 In columns 6 we also show total Belgian debt as a share of Belgian GDP. Remarkably, from 1970 until 1976 
the share of debt in GDP steadily decreases despite the steadily worsening primary balance in columns 3. This 
paradox is explained by the on average relatively strong nominal economic growth and the on average relatively 
low nominal interest rates over this period. Conversely, columns 6 show that the debt share continued to 
increase from 1985 until 1993 despite a positive and increasing primary balance (columns 3). This next paradox 
is explained by the relatively weak nominal economic growth and relatively high nominal interest rates over this 
period. A final paradox is that from 1994 onwards, the debt share keeps decreasing even though in several years 
an overall budget deficit was run. This was possible because economic growth made debt as a share of GDP 
decrease more than that it increased due to successive budget deficits. However, in nominal euros (not shown) 
total Belgian public debt increased steadily over our entire period considered. 
83
 Hence a region’s “caused” interest amount in year t-1 in columns 6 returns as a component of a region’s 
“caused” debt amount in year t in columns 5. 
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(see e.g. Algoed 2008) These studies assumed that all expenditures were tax funded, i.e. that there was 
a total primary balance of zero (as correctly pointed out by Algoed (2009 p. 8)). In a nutshell, the 
difference between interest transfers calculations and traditional transfers calculations is large because 
regions –at least in Belgium- differ much more in terms of their primary balances as a % of GDP than 
in terms of the difference between their shares in total expenditure and their shares in total tax 
revenue. (see columns 1 until 3 of table 8) 
Columns 6 of table 8 show that from 2001 onwards, and due to the successive primary deficits of 
Wallonia over our entire period –i.e. due to its persistent debt accumulation-, Wallonia’s regionalised 
debt is even larger than total Belgian debt. As a consequence, columns 7 show that the interest bill 
Wallonia would pay on the basis of its share in total Belgian debt is even larger than the total interest 
bill. These facts are precisely explained by the facts that at the same end of our period the Flemish 
share in the public debt has become negative, and hence also the part of the interest bill it would pay 
on the basis of its share in the total Belgian debt. In other words, the successive primary surpluses of 
Flanders since 1983 have enabled it to pay down “its” entire debt accumulated before 1983, and have 
even enabled Flanders to accumulate –intra-Belgian- savings from 1998 onwards. These savings have 
generated –intra-Belgian- interest income to the benefit of Flanders rather than an interest bill to be 
paid by Flanders. Still otherwise stated: the savings of Flanders on the one hand and the Walloon debt 
which is even larger than the total Belgian debt on the other hand are 2 sides of the same coin. The 
Walloon “surplus debt” is precisely made possible by the Flemish savings. As a consequence, we 
estimate that shortly after the end of our period, interest transfers have increased to more than 100% 
of the total interest bill
84
. 
The sizeable interest transfers we calculate in table 8 may even be an underestimation of real interest 
transfers. As said above, regional disaggregation of an overall budget boils down to calculating what 
expenditures and revenues of each individual region would have been if they would have been 
independent countries, however keeping policy constant. Now if Wallonia and Brussels would have 
become independent countries in 1970 without changing their –unitary Belgian- policy, they would 
probably have been charged a higher interest rate on their resp. debts than the interest rate Belgium 
has effectively been charged (and conversely, Flanders may have been charged a lower interest rate 
on its debt than the interest rate Belgium effectively has been charged). 
Finally it is striking from table 8 that absolute and relative interest transfers strongly increase even: 
 after 1983; 1983 was at the start of the 2nd subperiod we distinguish, marked by an improving 
overall primary balance (columns 3), which was the result of the taking effect of the fiscal 
consolidation measures of the turnaround government that came to power at the end of 1981 
 after 1991, the year in which the interest bill (expressed as a % of GDP) starts to decrease 
(columns 5),  
 after 1993, the year in which the combined primary balance of Wallonia and Brussels turns 
positive (columns 3),  
 after 1995, the year in which the total budget balance turns positive in several years (columns 
4), which causes the public debt to decrease, at least as a share of GDP (columns 6).  
The effects of the 3 latter evolutions are more than compensated by the divergent evolution of 
regional primary balances (columns 3) that continues after 1991.  
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 As well as that interest transfers have kept on increasing in each year following our sample period, in spite of 
the steady decrease of the interest bill as a share of GDP in the period that followed our sample period. 
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Table 8: Calculation of interregional interest transfers in Belgium (1970-2002) (as a share of Belgian GDP (%), unless stated otherwise)  
Year Share in tax revenue (1) 
 
Share in public spending (2) Primary balance (3) 
 
BB* (4) IIR** (5) Public debt (caused) (6) 
 
Interest bill (caused) (7) Interest bill (paid) (8) 
 
Interest transfers (9) 
 
As a share of interest bill (10) 
 
BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE BE BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR 
70 100 57 31 13 100 54 35 11 -1.7 -0.1 -2.0 0.4 -5.3 7.4 65.0 36.7 20.0 8.3 3.6 2.0 1.1 0.5 3.6 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 
71 100 57 31 13 100 54 35 11 -3.7 -1.2 -2.7 0.2 -7.4 6.2 64.2 35.6 21.1 7.6 3.7 2.1 1.2 0.4 3.7 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0 -1 2 -1 
72 100 57 31 13 100 54 35 11 -2.5 -0.5 -2.4 0.4 -6.2 6.4 63.9 34.6 22.3 6.9 3.7 2.0 1.3 0.4 3.7 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0 -2 4 -2 
73 100 57 31 13 100 54 35 11 -2.2 -0.3 -2.4 0.6 -5.9 6.7 61.7 32.7 22.9 6.1 3.7 2.0 1.4 0.4 3.7 2.1 1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0 -4 6 -3 
74 100 57 31 12 100 54 35 10 -4.1 -1.3 -3.2 0.4 -8.0 7.3 57.6 29.8 22.7 5.0 3.8 2.0 1.5 0.3 3.8 2.2 1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0 -5 9 -4 
75 100 57 31 12 100 54 35 10 -4.7 -1.4 -3.6 0.3 -8.8 7.9 59.3 30.0 24.8 4.5 4.1 2.1 1.7 0.3 4.1 2.4 1.3 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 0 -7 11 -5 
76 100 57 30 12 100 54 35 10 -4.4 -1.2 -3.4 0.2 -8.6 8.0 59.9 29.4 26.4 4.0 4.2 2.1 1.8 0.3 4.2 2.4 1.3 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 0 -8 14 -5 
77 100 58 30 12 100 54 35 11 -3.8 -0.7 -3.3 0.2 -8.5 8.6 63.4 30.2 29.4 3.8 4.8 2.3 2.2 0.3 4.8 2.7 1.4 0.6 0.0 -0.5 0.8 -0.3 0 -10 16 -6 
78 100 58 30 12 100 55 35 11 -2.9 -0.1 -3.0 0.1 -8.0 8.6 67.0 30.9 32.4 3.7 5.1 2.3 2.4 0.3 5.1 2.9 1.5 0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.9 -0.3 0 -12 18 -6 
79 100 58 30 12 100 55 35 11 -9.3 -3.5 -5.2 -0.7 -15.0 9.2 70.1 31.2 35.4 3.6 5.8 2.6 2.9 0.3 5.8 3.4 1.7 0.7 0.0 -0.8 1.2 -0.4 0 -14 20 -6 
80 100 59 30 11 100 55 34 11 -11.2 -4.5 -5.7 -1.0 -17.8 10.2 78.3 34.2 40.0 4.2 6.6 2.9 3.4 0.4 6.6 3.9 2.0 0.7 0.0 -1.0 1.4 -0.4 0 -15 21 -6 
81 100 59 30 11 100 55 34 11 -10.3 -3.9 -5.4 -1.1 -18.7 11.2 91.6 39.6 46.7 5.3 8.3 3.6 4.3 0.5 8.3 4.9 2.5 0.9 0.0 -1.3 1.8 -0.4 0 -16 21 -5 
82 100 59 30 11 100 55 34 11 -8.1 -2.5 -4.6 -0.9 -17.5 11.2 101.9 43.5 52.1 6.3 9.5 4.0 4.8 0.6 9.5 5.6 2.8 1.0 0.0 -1.6 2.0 -0.4 0 -17 21 -5 
83 100 60 30 11 100 55 34 11 -3.6 0.1 -3.1 -0.6 -13.5 10.3 112.8 47.3 58.1 7.4 9.9 4.1 5.1 0.7 9.9 5.9 2.9 1.1 0.0 -1.8 2.2 -0.4 0 -18 22 -4 
84 100 60 29 10 100 55 34 11 -2.6 0.7 -2.7 -0.6 -12.7 9.6 116.9 47.6 61.3 8.0 10.1 4.1 5.3 0.7 10.1 6.0 3.0 1.1 0.0 -2.0 2.3 -0.4 0 -19 23 -4 
85 100 60 29 10 100 55 33 11 -0.3 2.1 -1.9 -0.5 -11.3 10.1 121.8 47.9 65.2 8.8 11.1 4.4 5.9 0.8 11.1 6.7 3.2 1.1 0.0 -2.3 2.7 -0.3 0 -21 24 -3 
86 100 61 29 10 100 55 33 11 1.4 3.2 -1.3 -0.4 -10.0 9.8 127.2 47.9 69.8 9.6 11.4 4.3 6.2 0.9 11.4 6.9 3.3 1.1 0.0 -2.6 2.9 -0.3 0 -23 26 -3 
87 100 61 29 10 100 55 33 11 1.3 3.2 -1.4 -0.6 -9.3 8.7 131.6 47.0 74.2 10.4 10.6 3.8 6.0 0.8 10.6 6.5 3.1 1.1 0.0 -2.7 2.9 -0.2 0 -25 27 -2 
88 100 61 29 10 100 56 33 12 2.7 4.1 -0.8 -0.5 -7.6 8.4 131.6 44.4 76.2 11.1 10.3 3.5 6.0 0.9 10.3 6.3 3.0 1.0 0.0 -2.9 3.0 -0.1 0 -28 29 -1 
89 100 62 29 9 100 56 33 12 3.5 4.5 -0.5 -0.5 -7.7 9.3 127.6 40.2 76.1 11.4 11.3 3.5 6.7 1.0 11.3 7.0 3.2 1.1 0.0 -3.4 3.5 -0.1 0 -30 31 -1 
90 100 62 29 9 100 56 32 12 3.8 4.8 -0.4 -0.6 -8.0 9.8 127.7 37.0 78.6 12.2 11.8 3.4 7.3 1.1 11.8 7.4 3.4 1.1 0.0 -3.9 3.9 -0.0 0 -33 33 0 
91 100 62 29 9 100 56 33 11 3.0 4.3 -0.7 -0.6 -8.3 9.2 129.8 34.1 82.5 13.3 11.3 3.0 7.2 1.2 11.3 7.0 3.2 1.0 0.0 -4.1 3.9 0.1 0 -36 35 1 
92 100 63 29 9 100 56 33 11 1.3 3.4 -1.2 -0.9 -9.8 9.0 131.2 31.2 85.8 14.3 11.1 2.6 7.3 1.2 11.1 7.0 3.2 1.0 0.0 -4.3 4.1 0.3 0 -39 37 2 
93 100 63 29 9 100 56 33 11 6.4 6.4 0.3 -0.3 -4.7 8.6 138.0 29.8 92.2 16.1 11.1 2.4 7.4 1.3 11.1 7.0 3.2 0.9 0.0 -4.6 4.2 0.3 0 -41 38 3 
94 100 63 28 8 100 57 33 10 6.8 6.6 0.3 -0.1 -2.9 7.3 136.4 24.7 95.0 16.8 9.7 1.7 6.7 1.2 9.7 6.1 2.7 0.8 0.0 -4.4 4.0 0.4 0 -45 41 4 
95 100 63 28 8 100 57 33 10 9.4 8.2 1.1 0.1 0.1 7.1 133.4 19.0 97.1 17.4 9.2 1.3 6.7 1.2 9.2 5.9 2.6 0.8 0.0 -4.5 4.1 0.4 0 -49 45 5 
96 100 63 28 8 100 57 33 10 8.1 7.5 0.6 0.0 -0.7 6.8 130.1 11.8 100.4 18.0 8.8 0.8 6.8 1.2 8.8 5.6 2.5 0.7 0.0 -4.8 4.3 0.5 0 -54 49 6 
97 100 64 28 8 100 57 33 10 8.7 8.0 0.6 0.2 0.7 6.4 124.7 4.9 101.6 18.3 8.0 0.3 6.5 1.2 8.0 5.1 2.2 0.7 0.0 -4.8 4.3 0.5 0 -60 53 6 
98 100 64 28 8 100 57 33 10 7.1 7.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 6.3 119.3 -2.7 103.5 18.6 7.5 -0.2 6.5 1.2 7.5 4.8 2.1 0.6 0.0 -5.0 4.4 0.5 0 -66 59 7 
99 100 64 28 8 100 57 33 10 6.7 6.7 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 6.1 115.0 -9.5 105.7 18.9 7.0 -0.6 6.5 1.2 7.0 4.5 2.0 0.6 0.0 -5.1 4.5 0.6 0 -72 64 8 
00 100 64 28 8 100 57 33 10 5.0 5.8 -0.8 0.0 -1.8 6.3 109.5 -16.0 106.6 19.0 6.8 -1.0 6.7 1.2 6.8 4.4 1.9 0.6 0.0 -5.4 4.8 0.6 0 -78 69 9 
01 100 64 28 9 100 57 33 10 6.6 6.8 -0.4 0.2 0.0 6.2 108.7 -22.2 111.3 19.7 6.6 -1.3 6.8 1.2 6.6 4.2 1.8 0.6 0.0 -5.6 4.9 0.6 0 -84 75 10 
02 100 64 28 8 100 57 33 9 7.7 7.5 0.0 0.2 1.6 5.7 106.1 -29.7 115.6 20.2 6.1 -1.7 6.6 1.2 6.1 3.9 1.7 0.5 0.0 -5.6 5.0 0.7 0 -92 81 11 
 
* Belgian federal budget balance (% of GDP) 
** Implicit interest rate, i.e. interest bill in year t as a share of Belgian federal public debt in year t-1 (%) 
Source: Van Gompel (2004). 
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Graphs 1 and 2 present the major numbers of table 6, for Flanders and Wallonia resp. We do not show 
the situation of Brussels graphically, because of its smaller fiscal impact
85
. In graphs 1 and 2, interest 
transfers are represented by the difference between the dashed line –showing the interest bill caused- 
and the dashed/dotted line –showing the interest bill paid. As can be seen both in graphs 1 and 2, the 
gap between both lines widens over time. Graphs 1 and 2 also show increasing interest transfers out of 
Flanders mirroring increasing interest transfers to Wallonia. 
Graph 1: Interest transfers from Flanders compared to the total interest bill (% of Belgian 
GDP) 
 
Graph 2: Interest transfers to Wallonia compared to the total interest bill (% of Belgian GDP) 
 
Source of graphs 1 and 2: Table 8. 
                                                          
85
 However, relatively speaking, the fiscal situation of Brussels may be considered worse than the fiscal 
situation of Wallonia. Apart from Berlin, Brussels is the only capital city of the EU15 countries not generating 
net fiscal transfers –calculated the traditional way- towards the rest of the country. Such net fiscal transfers can 
be calculated using Eurostat data on income taxes and social security contributions paid and social expenditures 
in cash received. (see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database) On the contrary, the rest of 
Belgium –Flanders, to be precise- generates net fiscal transfers to Brussels, which also translate into interest 
transfers to Brussels in columns 8 of table 6. 
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3.4. A concluding attempt at a regional cost-benefit analysis of the Belgian 
federal public debt 
 
A question that we are left with after calculating interregional interest transfers in table 8 is whether 
the interest bill that comes with deficit-financed expenditures would render those expenditures more 
expensive than tax funded expenditures also for Wallonia and Brussels -hereafter denoted as FR 
(Francophone Belgium)- even if to a lesser extent than for Flanders -hereafter denoted as FL. (As 
Francophone Belgian parties not only collect almost all the votes in Wallonia but also collect many 
votes in the Brussels region, the 2 relevant regions from a political economics point of view seem FL 
on the one hand and FR on the other hand.) Are debt-funded expenditures still “cheap” for Wallonia 
and Brussels when considered in isolation, i.e. when they are not compared to their cost for Flanders? 
Receiving considerable net fiscal transfers resulting from the public debt may still not be sufficient to 
prevent FR from ending up as a net loser from debt accumulation. In other words: is FR, while 
benefiting the most on a gross basis from debt financing, similar to FL a net payer with respect to debt 
financing? The answer to the latter question could be positive because also FR -each year- pays 
federal taxes out of which -each year- the interest bill is paid. I.e. all Belgian regions may lose on a 
net basis from debt financing
86
. These questions may be all the more justified because the Belgian 
debt has been incurred over the previous decades largely to finance social security –i.e. consumptive- 
expenditures
87
.  
 
In table 9 we answer the question if all Belgian regions lose from the Belgian debt. In sum, table 9 
shows that FR also benefits on a net basis from the Belgian debt over our sample period, even if the 
net costs for FL are much higher than the net benefits for FR. Take table 9a as an example. In table 9a 
we take as the discount rate the implicit interest rate that held at the end of our sample period, i.e. 
5.7% (2002). This is also the lowest implicit interest rate that held over our sample period (see column 
(5) in table 8). In column (1) of table 9a we calculate the joint present value –more precisely the joint 
value in 2002- of the consecutive primary balances (expressed as a share of Belgian GDP) enjoyed by 
each of the 3 Belgian regions over our 1970-2002 period (see columns (3) of table 8). Because a 
primary deficit counts as a benefit for a particular region –as it enables this region to receive more 
expenditures or to pay less taxes-, we show an accumulated primary deficit for a particular region with 
a positive sign in column (1), and vice versa. In column (2) of table 9a we calculate the joint present 
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 At least when we disregard possibly differing time preferences between Belgian regions. 
87
 At first sight, Belgian debt accumulation hence looks comparable to 2 ex-classmates who take a loan of 100 
together from a bank –that comes say with a constant annual interest rate of 10% (for the sake of simplicity)- to 
pay for their annual get-together in a restaurant. Suppose the poorer one of the 2 could spend 60 of it on his 
dinner and the richer one 40. Suppose the friends would agree that each of the next 50 years to come the richer 
one would pay an interest amount of 6 and the poorer one only 4. Even the behaviour of the poorer friend could 
hardly be considered rational. The irrationality of the couple of friends –and of its individual members- would 
only increase if during each of these 50 years they would continue to take a new loan of 100 together to pay for 
their annual restaurant get-together, as their interest bill would increase each year. The major victim of the 
accumulated get-togethers would probably be the poorer friend, because he can possibly much less afford to 
borrow with a view to funding restaurant visits, even if he enjoys more than half of the benefits and shoulders 
less than half of the costs. 
However, in case debt-financed expenditures that benefited FR would have been invested “productively”, i.e. 
would have generated a higher rate of return than the implicit interest rate paid on the debt by FR, the above 
reasoning would not hold anymore. (Also “wise” social security –i.e. “consumptive”- spending could have 
generated such a rate of return.) A high enough rate of return for FR could even have made FL a net beneficiary 
of the Belgian debt, as high economic growth in Francophone Belgium evidently means also higher economic 
growth in FL (or at least lower transfers from FL to FR). In sum, public debt may be economic growth 
enhancing, while in our calculations above we have disregarded the “benefit side” of public debt. 
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value –more precisely the joint value in 2002- of the consecutive interest payments shouldered by 
each of the 3 Belgian regions over our 1970-2002 time period
88
 (see columns (8) of table 8). Because 
an interest payment obviously counts as a cost for a particular region, we show accumulated interest 
payments for a particular region with a negative sign in column (2). The addition of column (1) to 
column (2) then gives the net cost of debt funding (column (3)). We notice that the gross costs of debt 
outweigh its gross benefits for each region, except for Wallonia. That the net benefits of debt for 
Wallonia are higher than the net costs for Brussels make that FR taken together incurs a net benefit of 
the Belgian debt, despite the net cost of Belgian debt for Brussels. However, the net benefits of FR are 
far smaller than the net costs for Flanders. 
 
Table 9: 2002 present values of net benefits (in % of Belgian GDP) of the Belgian public debt per Belgian region 
a) Taking the lowest implicit interest rate over our sample period as the discount rate: 5.7% (2002) 
 
 
PV of primary 
balances (1) 
PV of interests 
paid (2) 
(3) = 
(1)+(2) 
Debt stock 
to repay (4) 
(5) = 
(3)+(4) 
FL -75% -294% -370% -63% -433% 
WA 224% -141% 83% -27% 56% 
BR 11% -49% -38% -8% -46% 
FR 235% -190% 45% -35% 10% 
BE 160% -485% -324% -98% -423% 
 
b) Taking the average implicit interest rate over our sample period as the discount rate: 8.2% 
 
 
PV of primary 
balances (1) 
PV of interests 
 paid (2) 
(3) = 
 (1)+(2) 
Debt stock 
 to repay (4) 
(5) = 
 (3)+(4) 
FL -49% -422% -471% -63% -534% 
WA 393% -204% 189% -27% 162% 
BR 11% -71% -60% -8% -68% 
FR 405% -276% 129% -35% 94% 
BE 355% -697% -342% -98% -440% 
 
c) Taking the highest implicit interest rate over our sample period as the discount rate: 11.2% (1981 and 1982) 
 
 
PV of primary 
balances (1) 
PV of interests 
 paid (2) 
(3) = 
(1)+(2) 
Debt stock 
 to repay (4) 
(5) = 
(3)+(4) 
FL 31% -668% -637% -63% -700% 
WA 781% -327% 454% -27% 427% 
BR 4% -116% -112% -8% -120% 
FR 785% -443% 342% -35% 306% 
BE 816% -1111% -295% -98% -393% 
 
The positive number for FR in column (3) of table 9a can be interpreted as follows: an annual rate of 
return of only 5.7% -i.e. equalling the historically low implicit interest rate of 2002 on the Belgian 
debt- generated by the extra expenditures made possible by the successive primary deficits of FR 
would have been sufficient to make it profitable for FR to strive for these successive primary 
                                                          
88
 We are aware that interest payments at the beginning of our period predominantly stem from debt –and hence 
primary deficits- incurred before the 1970-2002 period. Therefore, we only consider interest payments on public 
debt newly incurred since 1970, i.e. we assume that public debt was zero in 1970. 
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deficits
89
. We can easily calculate that at a discount rate of 3.0% the present value of net benefits of 
the Belgian public debt for FR becomes zero, i.e. at a discount rate of 3.0% it would no longer have 
been profitable for FR to strive for primary deficits. 
 
Table 9a shows that it is rational for FR to push for extra expenditures, even when they are debt 
financed, and even if the net benefit of Belgian deficit financing for FR is relatively limited while 
generating a very heavy bill to be shouldered by FL, which is by far the largest region of Belgium, 
and which has veto power over any federal policy
90
. What is even more: precisely because they are 
debt-financed –and because their costs are therefore politically less visible-, FR politicians may find 
that generating debt-financed extra expenditures is more feasible than generating tax-funded extra 
expenditures. 
 
To obtain the net cost of the Belgian public debt per region, it could be argued that we should add to 
column (2) the part of the total debt stock in 2002 that would have to be repaid per region if this debt 
stock would be fully repaid in 2002 (column (4))
91
. Similar to the interest payments of column (2), we 
use a region’s share in tax revenues as the criterion to distribute the debt stock across Belgian regions, 
and we give a negative sign to debt stock repayments as these should be considered as costs to be 
compared to the benefits of running a primary deficit (column (1)). The sum of columns (3) and (4) is 
shown in column (5). We notice from column (5) that FR just keeps benefiting from the Belgian debt 
when also considering the fact that the Belgian debt itself eventually may have to be repaid (and that -
obviously- the cost of Belgian debt for FL is even higher when considering this fact).  
 
For Belgium as a whole, additionally taking into account debt stock repayment only makes the 
outcome of our cost-benefit analysis change from considerably negative to even more negative. One 
may be puzzled by this overall heavily negative outcome, as one may have expected that a net loss 
from Belgian debt incurred by one region may have more or less corresponded to a net benefit 
incurred by the other regions. The cause of the large overall net loss is that we only consider primary 
balances at the benefits side, rather than overall budget balances. E.g. for FR, the overall budget 
deficit has always been larger than the primary budget deficit. Considering overall budget deficits 
rather than primary budget deficits at the benefits side would lead to an even more positive outcome 
for FR and a less negative outcome for FL. But arguably, it would have been a mistake to consider the 
regionalised interest payments –which distinguish the overall budget deficit from the primary deficit- 
as a benefit of the Belgian public debt. Another explanation of the overall net loss may be provided by 
the high to very high implicit interest rates that held with respect to the Belgian public debt in many 
years of our sample period. (see column (5) in table 8) 
 
With respect to the question of including debt stock repayment or not, we could as well argue that a 
rational politician’s horizon may not be long enough to bring into consideration debt stock repayment, 
as a rational politician may have an incentive to postpone debt stock repayment eternally
92
. The 1
st
 
column of columns (6) in table 8 shows that as a share of GDP Belgian debt started steadily to 
                                                          
89
 As most of these expenditures consisted of social security expenditures, i.e. “consumptive” expenditures, one 
may wonder if such a rate of return has been obtained. 
90
 Velasco (1997 p. 15) theoretically comes to a result that is overall even worse than our outcome: groups 
borrow, purely for strategic reasons, and this results in lower utility for all players. 
91
 Similarly to interest payments in column (2), we only take into account in column (4) the public debt incurred 
after 1970. For this reason, the total debt stock in tables 9 is slightly smaller than the total debt stock in column 
(6) of table 8. 
92
 Long enough postponement of repayment would make the present value of debt stock repayment equal to 
zero. 
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decrease from 1994 onwards, when Belgium needed to start qualifying for Eurozone accession. 
However, in nominal euros Belgian debt has always kept increasing. Shortly after Eurozone accession 
the overall primary surplus –shown in the 1st column of columns (3) of table 8- started decreasing (not 
shown in the 1
st
 column of columns (3), as our dataset ends in 2002). Since the outbreak of the 
economic crisis in 2008, Belgium is back in a situation of an overall primary deficit (not shown in the 
1
st
 column of columns (3) either). Another argument to disregard the impact of debt stock repayment 
is that in recent years it has been argued that FL should take over the entire Belgian debt stock in case 
of a breakup of Belgium, as it is only in FL that such a breakup is being advocated by some 
stakeholders. The latter arguments are reasons to stop our calculations after column (3), i.e. not to take 
into account the debt stock. 
 
As a sensitivity analysis, tables 9b and c repeat the calculations of table 9a using a higher discount 
rate, resp. the average implicit interest rate over our sample period and the highest implicit interest 
rate over our sample period. The conclusion of this sensitivity analysis is not fundamentally different 
from our analysis in table 9a: the benefits of Belgian debt for FR -and –consequently- the costs of 
Belgian debt for FL- only increase with an increasing discount rate. This increase of costs and 
benefits is due to the fact that a higher discount rate attaches more weight to the very large primary 
deficits –mainly having benefited Wallonia- of the end of our 1st subperiod, as well as to the very 
large interest payments –mainly having been shouldered by FL- of our 2nd subperiod. 
4. Conclusion 
 
Our calculations above suggest that there is a geographic dimension to the political economy of debt 
financing in Belgium, next to other political economics causes of Belgian debt accumulation, and next 
to purely economic causes of Belgian debt accumulation
93
. The diverging shares of the Belgian 
regions in federal tax revenues and in federal public expenditures make Flanders pay 
disproportionately for tax funded public expenditures and pay even more disproportionately the 
interest bill that is the consequence of the considerable debt financing of federal public expenditures 
since 1970. Hence calculating interregional net transfers in Belgium is less futile than it seems: the 
differing regional costs of federal debt accumulation in Belgium may be an explanation of the Belgian 
history of high deficits and high debts since the beginning of the 1970s. We do not know of any other 
research on any other country that explores this possibility. 
The implications of our calculations strongly differ for politicians elected in Flanders and for 
politicians elected in Wallonia and Brussels. Given the resp. shares of the Belgian regions in federal 
tax revenues and public expenditures, politicians elected in the Walloon and the Brussels region seem 
to have an interest in keeping on “expanding the federal budget constraint” -i.e. in eliciting extra 
expenditures- in particular if the extra expenditures are funded by borrowing rather than by tax 
revenue
94
. Hence, politicians from these regions should maximise the federal deficit (at least as long 
as the size of the federal deficit does not cause visible macroeconomic damage to their region).  
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 It has e.g. been empirically demonstrated that small open economies are characterised by a larger public 
sector, which in turn increases the risk of a higher public debt. 
94
 This interest should be understood here from a political-economy perspective, i.e. it should be understood as 
the “career interest” of politicians representing net expenditure receiving jurisdictions in the federal 
government, as those politicians would be able to claim the credit for the extra expenditures. The welfare effects 
of these extra expenditures are a different matter altogether. In theory, a budget deficit may be counter-cyclical 
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For Flemish politicians the incentives seem to be the exact opposite of the incentives of Walloon and 
Brussels politicians. Flemish politicians should even favour the policy option of closing the federal 
budget deficit with extra federal tax revenue exclusively generated in Flanders over keeping on 
running a federal budget deficit. Federal expenditures disproportionately benefiting Wallonia and 
Brussels are far “cheaper” for Flanders if tax funded than if debt funded.  
The implications seem similar for politicians from other countries with a high central government 
debt and considerable disparities in the extent to which its resp. regions provide tax revenues to the 
central government, resp. benefit from central government spending, such as Italy. However, as in 
Italy political parties are not geographically split, unlike in Belgium, geographically differing deficit 
incentives seem to apply less to Italy as an explanation of the size of the central government debt.  
A concluding question then is why –given their veto power within the setting of the Belgian Federal 
government- Flemish politicians have not prevented (or been able to prevent) repeatedly large deficits 
over our period studied. A first reason may have been that coalition members having an interest in 
preventing a budget deficit may generally face a more difficult task anyhow than coalition members 
having an interest in eliciting a debt-funded expenditure increase (or tax decrease). A 2
nd
 reason may 
have been that the Belgian federal debt game may not be a –symmetric and simultaneous- “prisoner’s 
dilemma”, but rather a –asymmetric and sequential- game with a first mover advantage, such as the 
also rather well-known “entry deterrence game”. (Rasmusen 2006 p. 14-16 and 112) If Francophone 
Belgian politicians thought themselves entitled to generate a budget deficit –e.g. because over our 
sample period Francophone Belgium was poorer, more unemployed, and smaller (“too small to fail”; 
see also Inman 2003 p. 47 and Rodden 2005 p. 194)-, they may have “filled up the room for a budget 
deficit” during their first move. In the wording of the “entry deterrence game”, the new firm 
(Francophone Belgian politicians) enters, and subsequently stays in the business (Francophone 
Belgian politicians’ constant relative indiscipline). This may have happened because the new firm 
(Francophone Belgian politicians) may have known that the incumbent firm (Flemish politicians) 
would always collude/cooperate (Flemish politicians’ constant relative discipline). Indeed, its threat to 
fight the new entrant –by being indisciplined as well- may have been non-credible, because fighting 
would have damaged not only the new entrant but also the incumbent (Flanders “too big to be 
prevented from failing”)95. 
A 3
rd
 reason for the behaviour of Flemish politicians could be that the part of taxation generated in 
Flanders to pay the interest bill may generally have been spread over the entire Flemish population, 
while individual governing politicians elected in Flanders may have been able to target to their 
constituents part of the extra expenditures (or targeted tax decreases) in Flanders made possible by 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and investment expenditures are suited to be financed by borrowing. However, the extra transfers generated by 
past Belgian deficits may also be welfare-reducing. E.g. Algoed and Persyn (2009) find an economic growth 
reducing and inequality increasing effect of interregional net fiscal transfers in European countries. Knight 
(2004) finds with respect to pork-barrel spending in US districts that it is inefficient and that it generates a large 
deadweight loss. 
95
 A natural question to ask then is if Francophone Belgian politicians also knew that Francophone Belgium 
would disproportionately benefit from the extra expenditures generated by means of running a budget deficit. As 
Flanders and Francophone Belgium considerably differ in terms of demographic, social and economic 
characteristics, there indeed seems some scope for Francophone Belgian resp. Flemish politicians who are part 
of the same central government coalition to be fiscally indisciplined “in one’s own interest”, i.e. so that extra 
expenditures or tax cuts predominantly benefit Francophone Belgian resp. Flemish voters. An example is the 
finding of “Hoge Raad voor Financiën”, a federal fiscal policy watchdog, that the major 2001 income tax cut –
overseen by the Francophone Belgian liberal-conservative minister of finance Didier Reynders- mainly 
benefited inhabitants of the Walloon region. (HRF 2010) 
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debt financing
96
. These constituents mostly belong to a particular social group and/or only live in a 
particular geographic part of Flanders. Most politicians elected for the federal parliament over our 
period studied were able only to collect votes within an electoral district that was considerably smaller 
than the region this district was part of
97
. For Belgian examples of political economy motivated 
distribution of public expenditures to particular electoral districts only, see Jennes and Persyn (2015) 
and Jennes (2014b). 
 
A 4
th
 intra-Flemish explanation of a Flemish deficit incentive even given that Flanders incurs an 
aggregate cost –instead of a benefit- from the Belgian federal debt may be that some Flemish parties –
in particular the Flemish liberal-conservatives- may have felt less sure of remaining in power than 
other parties, which would have given them an incentive to run a deficit. A 5
th
 explanation may be the 
prisoner’s dilemma type of setting suggested by Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 924): perhaps each 
individual Flemish party prefers a balanced budget, but in the absence of strong coordination among 
Flemish parties, each of them may have had an incentive to protect and expand “its” part of the 
budget. A final possible explanation is that Flemish parties may have used their collective veto power 
to trade a worsening of the budget balance –as would have been requested by the Francophone 
Belgian parties- for a concession made by the Francophone Belgian parties in another policy area
98
. 
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Chapter 3: The geography of incentives to run a federal budget deficit in 
Belgium
99
 
 
Abstract 
 
Political parties in Belgium are split along Flemish-Francophone lines, and Flanders enjoys relatively 
less federal expenditures and pays relatively more federal taxes than Francophone Belgium. Also, as 
the federal debt is serviced out of federal tax revenues, Flanders bears most of the cost of debt 
servicing. We test for any resulting geographically differing budget deficit incentives by investigating 
the difference between the effect of an increase in net formula-based transfers on Flemish resp. 
Francophone Belgian Federal government parties’ vote share.  
We do not find a consistently significantly positive effect of transfers on votes in Francophone 
Belgium, and we find weak evidence of a significantly smaller effect of transfers on votes in Flanders. 
These findings may imply that Francophone Belgian voters overestimate the cost of extra transfers, 
and that the opposite holds for Flemish voters. Alternatively, Francophone Belgian parties possibly 
overestimate the electoral rewards that extra net transfers bring them, while Flemish parties possibly 
correctly estimate the –lack of- relative electoral punishment that extra transfers bring them. This may 
explain the continuous federal budget deficits and the high federal public debt in Belgium. 
Keywords: distributive politics; income redistribution; fiscal transfers; public debt; elections; political 
representation; fiscal federalism 
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1. Introduction 
 
In what follows we will empirically investigate the possibly geographically divergent incentives of 
politicians to run a federal budget deficit in Belgium, which are suggested by our geographic 
attribution of the interest payments on the federal debt. Table 1 below shows differences between the 
interest bill on the Belgian federal debt that annually falls due according to in which Belgian region 
this federal debt originated and the interest bill that falls due according to which Belgian region 
generated the federal tax revenue to pay this interest bill over the 1970-2002 period, as well as for the 
final year of this period. The 1970-2002 period is the period for which we found data that enabled us 
to allocate Belgian federal public expenditures and federal tax revenues –and hence also the (primary) 
deficit- regionally.  
Because since the 1970s political parties in Belgium are split along French-speaking/Flemish lines
100
, 
we only consider 2 regions in table 1: Flanders and Francophone Belgium, thereby lumping the 
predominantly French-speaking regions of Wallonia and Brussels together
101
. A 2
nd
 motivation to only 
consider 2 regions is that in 1970 a change of the constitution took place which organised the Federal 
government in a confederal way: 
1) the legislative was divided into a “Dutch-speaking group” and a “French-speaking group”, 
and any 2/3 of members of parliament of any group are since then entitled to block any law 
from being approved;  
2) the executive –which decides by consensus- since then needs to consist of an equal number of 
ministers belonging to either of both parliamentary groups  
 
Table 1: Differences between annual interest bill on the federal debt caused and paid, and resulting 
annual fiscal transfers per Belgian region (in % of Belgian GDP) (1970-2002) 
 
   
Belgium 
 
Flanders 
Francophone  
Belgium  
Average interest bill caused 7.8% 2.1% 5.6% 
Interest bill caused (2002) 6.1% -1.7% 7.8% 
Average interest bill paid 7.8% 4.8% 3.0% 
Interest bill paid (2002) 6.1% 3.9% 2.2% 
Average fiscal transfers due to the interest bill 0.0% -2.6% 2.6% 
Fiscal transfers due to the interest bill (2002) 0.0% -5.6% 5.6% 
Average federal budget balance -7.3% 
  Average federal public debt 102.5% 
   
Source: Jennes 2014a 
 
                                                          
100
 From a worldwide perspective, such a split seems rather unique. E.g. in their study of the impact of the 
regionalisation of party systems on fiscal performance, Lago-Peñas e.a. (2014) characterise Belgium as a case of 
extreme party system regionalisation, together with Switzerland, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Thailand and 
Colombia. 
101
 Voters of the Brussels Capital Region overwhelmingly voted for Francophone Belgian parties over our 
sample period. E.g. in the 2007 federal elections the Flemish parties that won seats in the federal parliament 
obtained 8.9% of the total vote in the Brussels Region, while the Francophone parties that won seats in the 
federal parliament obtained 68.9% of the total vote in the Brussels Region. 
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Table 1 shows that Flanders on average has shouldered a considerably larger share of the interest bill 
(= “interest bill paid”) than warranted by its share in the extra federal expenditures made possible by 
the consecutive federal budget deficits (= “interest bill caused”) over our sample period. This 
difference has caused an average annual implicit net fiscal transfer through the federal budget process 
from Flanders to Francophone Belgium of 2.6% of Belgian GDP. Moreover, this transfer has steadily 
increased over our sample period, up to no less than 5.6% of Belgian GDP in 2002 –i.e. up to no less 
than 92% of the total federal interest bill in 2002
102
. This steady increase has mainly been caused by a 
number of federal budget consolidation efforts since the 1981 federal elections, efforts that have 
improved the implicit federal primary balance of Flanders more than the implicit federal primary 
balance of Francophone Belgium. (for more details, see Jennes 2014a) More in particular, successive 
implicit federal primary surpluses of Flanders since 1981 contrast with continuing implicit federal 
primary deficits in Francophone Belgium. These successive Flemish implicit federal primary 
surpluses have rendered the interest bill caused by Flanders even negative from 1998 onwards 
according to our calculations (resulting in a negative figure for Flanders in the 3
rd
 row of table 1). I.e. 
from 1998 onwards Flanders implicitly generated interest revenue instead of causing an interest bill. 
The resulting increasing annual fiscal transfer from Flanders to Francophone Belgium may have 
provided Francophone Belgian politicians with an incentive to make the federal budget run a deficit, 
in contrast to Flemish politicians, who seem to have had an incentive in running a budget surplus, so 
as to be able to start reimbursing the public debt
103
. 
We will investigate the geography of budget deficit incentives in Belgium by estimating if the effect 
of net fiscal transfers –i.e. federal expenditures received minus federal taxes paid-104 on popularity of 
the Federal government differs between Flanders and Francophone Belgium, as net taxes paid and 
expenditures received per geographic area measure this area’s contribution to the federal budget 
balance
105
. In contrast to the existing political economy literature on debt, our investigation concerns 
an empirical test of (1) the central government’s debt game (2) between different regions (3) 
represented within one and the same central government. Moreover, in contrast to the existing 
distributive politics literature, we hypothesise that voters from the Belgian region that de facto pays 
most of the debt service burden, i.e. Flanders, punish –at least relatively speaking, i.e. compared to 
Francophone Belgian voters- the incumbent parties with less votes for increasing transfers. The 
transfers we investigate are formula-based
106
 and occurring between the Federal government and its 
                                                          
102
 It is sometimes argued that since Flanders is the richest region of Belgium, interest payments on the Belgian 
federal public debt would disproportionately benefit inhabitants of Flanders, as the latter would 
disproportionately hold Belgian federal government bonds. However, it could well be that only a minority of 
inhabitants of Flanders hold Belgian Federal government bonds. Moreover, those inhabitants would have looked 
for an at least as profitable investment should they not have invested in Belgian federal bonds.  
The federal Ministry of Finance did not respond to our request for data on the distribution of Belgian federal 
bonds over Belgian citizens according to region. 
103
 In fact, a sufficient condition for such an incentive already seems the fact that federal taxes are 
disproportionately paid by Flemish citizens, (unrealistically) assuming that all Belgian regions would have 
benefited from the extra expenditures made possible by a budget deficit in proportion to their share in Belgian 
population. I.e. we even do not need the rather spectacular figures of table 1 to assume that Francophone 
Belgian politicians have more of an incentive to run a federal deficit than Flemish politicians. 
104
 Note that the –explicit- transfers concept we define here differs from the –implicit- transfers concept we use 
in table 1 above. 
105
 Of course we cannot estimate the possibly geographically differing impact of the aggregate federal budget 
balance itself on popularity of the Federal government, because of course the aggregate federal budget balance 
does not vary between geographic areas of Belgium. 
106
 In contrast to “discretionary”, “formula-based” needs to be understood as treating each citizen according to 
the same formula, i.e. benefiting or costing those citizens to exactly the same extent provided that those citizens 
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citizens. Therefore, such relative punishment could be due to Flemish voters fearing that an increase 
of transfers to Flemish citizens would not only go hand in hand with an increase of transfers to 
Francophone Belgian citizens –an increase that is possibly even larger, as the formulas behind the 
transfers we consider favour poorer citizens-, but would also go hand in hand with an increase in the 
public debt as a result of these increases.  
Unfortunately, a geographic disaggregation of the entire Belgian federal budget (revenues + 
expenditures) does not exist107, let alone over a sufficient number of years. However, in its annually 
updated “Regional accounts”108, the Belgian central bank NBB provides for every year over the 1995-
2011 period109 a geographic disaggregation down to the level of the 43 Belgian “administrative 
arrondissements” (or districts)110 with respect to following important federal revenue and expenditure 
categories: income taxes paid111 (-), -mandatory- social security contributions paid (-), and social 
transfers received112 (+). Hence these “Regional Accounts” have 2 important advantages with respect 
to our research question: (1) they are the only existing disaggregation of (part of) federal taxing and 
spending down to the Belgian district level; (2) they disaggregate an important part of government 
taxing and spending that is directly happening between the government and the citizen. 
 
The social transfers variable included in the “Regional accounts” comprises all major social transfer 
categories in Belgium: pensions, unemployment benefits, child allowances, work disability 
allowances, allowances for the handicapped, and subsistence allowances113. The 3 transfers categories 
we consider –i.e. social spending in cash, social security contributions, and income tax payments- are 
generally very important in OECD countries. E.g. in 2010, income taxes on average amounted to 
8.4% of GDP in OECD countries, while social security contributions on average amounted to 10.1% 
of gross wage earnings and social expenditures on average amounted to 22.1% of GDP (see 
www.oecd.org). In Belgium social expenditures even amounted to 29.5% of GDP in 2010. These 3 
transfer categories arguably constitute the core of the Belgian “welfare state”, and can be argued to be 
visible tax and expenditure categories, as they constitute direct and sizeable transfers from and to 
individual citizens.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are in the same economic or demographic situation. “Formula-based” should not be understood as “impossible 
for politicians to change”. 
107
 In contrast to e.g. the US situation, as witnessed by Dubay (2006). 
108
 http://www.nbb.be/doc/dq/n/dq3/NNR.pdf 
109
 Note that the “Regional accounts” data cover a different period than the period on which our calculations 
resulting in table 1 are based. We regret the lack of overlap between these 2 periods, while maintaining that the 
finding in table 1 is a relevant motivation for our regression analysis below concerning the 1995-2011 period. 
110
 In Belgium, the “arrondissement” or district level is a level that lost its policy meaning decades ago, as 
opposed to the regional and the community subcentral government levels. However, several of these districts 
were in effect federal electoral districts during part of our sample period, i.e. before the electoral districts 
merger of 2002. This meant that members of the federal House of Representatives could only collect votes in 
their district of official residence. Annex 1 shows a map of the 43 “arrondissements” (or districts) of Belgium.  
111
 Over our sample period, a small part of the authority to levy income taxes was devolved to the 3 Belgian 
regions. Mainly the Flemish region made use of this authority, by cutting income taxes slightly for inhabitants 
of the Flemish region in the 2007-2009 period only. We assume that these tax cuts have a negligible influence 
on our regression results below. 
112
 Only social transfers in cash are included in our data, excluding social expenditures in kind, such as 
education and health care, for which the “Regional accounts” do not collect data. 
113
 The latter 2 subcategories are not formally part of the Belgian social security system. 
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We label the sum of these 3 important and geographically disaggregated fiscal categories “(net) 
transfers”. Expressed by means of a simple formula:  
 
(𝑛𝑒𝑡) 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−)  
=  𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡  (+) + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−) + 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 (−) 
with i denoting a particular district and t denoting a particular year. 
 
While most of the distributive politics literature investigates the political economy causes and effects 
of (1) discretionary (2) intergovernmental grants or investment spending, our transfers variable is (1) 
formula-based and (2) between the government and its citizens, which is crucial to the research 
hypothesis we have formulated114. Moreover, similar to the federal budget balance, our net transfers 
variable may be considered a balance of revenues and expenditures. Ceteris paribus those net 
transfers may be assumed to be –negatively- correlated with the overall federal budget balance: the 
more transfers citizens receive, the more negative the federal budget balance will be (ceteris paribus). 
Hence our net transfers variable may be considered as –however imperfectly- measuring a district’s 
inhabitants’ average tangible contribution to the federal budget balance115. Unsurprisingly, over our 
sample period our transfers variable has been negative for every individual district and year, as it 
comprises the 2 major federal revenue categories, and only 1 major federal expenditure category116.  
 
However, graph 1 shows that transfers per capita are on average more negative for the (22) Flemish 
districts than for the (21) Francophone Belgian districts117, which is evidently mainly due to the on 
average higher gross income per capita of Flemish districts (17,636 euros, versus 15,128 euros for 
Francophone Belgium). Transfers (in euros) to only 7 out of 22 Flemish districts (Diksmuide -2,308; 
Eeklo -3,090; Ieper -2,692; Oostende -2,810; Maaseik -3,040; Tongeren -3,021; Veurne -2,769) are 
less negative than the average (-3,120 euros per capita). Transfers to only 5 out of 21 Francophone 
Belgian districts (Arlon -3,696; Brussels -3,195; Namur -3,465; Nivelles -5,081; Waremme -3,868) 
are more negative than the average. Transfers to only 5 out of 22 Flemish districts (Diksmuide -2,308; 
                                                          
114
 In fact it is hard to think of transfers in cash between the Belgian Federal government and its citizens (as well 
as of transfers in cash between the Belgian Federal government and other Belgian governments) that are not 
formula-based. 
115
 A contribution that of course varies between districts, as opposed to the federal budget balance itself. 
116
 Hence while the transfer concept generally implies an amount received by citizens and provided by the 
government, their negative overall sign implies that our transfers variable captures a net transfer paid to the 
government. 
117
 We consider all districts located within the Flemish region as Flemish districts and we consider all districts 
located within the Walloon region as Francophone Belgian districts.  
As said above, because voters of the Brussels district overwhelmingly voted for Francophone Belgian parties 
over our sample period, we also consider the Brussels district as a Francophone Belgian district. Our regression 
results reported below hardly change if we drop the Brussels district from our sample.  
They neither change if we drop the Halle-Vilvoorde district from our sample. The Halle-Vilvoorde district was 
the only Flemish district in which Francophone Belgian parties obtained parliamentary seats over our sample 
period, as a non-negligible minority of the inhabitants of this Flemish district surrounding Brussels is 
Francophone. Voters of the Halle-Vilvoorde district non-negligibly voted for Francophone Belgian parties over 
our sample period. E.g. in the 2007 federal elections the Flemish parties that won seats in the federal parliament 
obtained 64.1% of the total vote in the Halle-Vilvoorde district, while the Francophone parties that won seats in 
the federal parliament obtained 18.5% of the total vote in the Halle-Vilvoorde district.  
Finally, our regression results reported below hardly change if we drop the Verviers district from our sample. 
The Walloon district of Verviers comprises the German speaking Community of Belgium, which also has its 
separate party system. In 2011, 76,128 of the 282,981 inhabitants of the district of Verviers were German 
speaking. 
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Ieper -2,692; Oostende -2,810; Tongeren -3,021; Veurne -2,769) are less negative than the median 
(Maaseik -3,140 euros per capita). Transfers to only 5 out of 21 Francophone Belgian districts (Arlon 
-3,696; Brussels -3,195; Namur -3,465; Nivelles -5,081; Waremme -3,868) are more negative than the 
median. 
 
Graph 1: Transfers per capita (in real 100 euros of 2011) 
 
Note: bars indicate federal election years 
Showing separate curves for Francophone Belgian and –Dutch-speaking- Flemish districts in graph 1 
makes sense. This is basically because in Belgium no single party that obtained representation in the 
federal parliament over our sample period obtained a considerable number of votes both in Flanders 
and in Francophone Belgium
118. Such split representation may affect individual parties’ policy with 
respect to fiscal transfers, even if they are formula-based
119
. Didier Reynders, a Francophone vice 
prime minister in the 2010-2014 Federal government -as quoted in Flemish newspapers- explained a 
more strict income tax treatment of private use of company cars with the fact that “there are more 
                                                          
118
 As said above, exceptions are Flemish parties in the district of Brussels and Francophone Belgian parties in 
the district of Halle-Vilvoorde. 
119
 I.e. the twin facts that Flanders, the region that disproportionately pays for federal deficits on a net basis, is 
characterised by its own party system, and that also Francophone Belgium, the region that disproportionately 
“fails to pay” for federal deficits on a net basis, is characterised by its own party system, could increase the 
effect of the federal deficit on voting behaviour. In other countries that are characterised by a high central 
government debt and large geographic differences in central tax collection, but that are not split geographically 
according to language, media and/or party system, such as Italy, a district that disproportionately contributes to 
central government tax revenue may in fiscal matters be expected to rather identify with other districts that 
disproportionately contribute, irrespective of geographic and cultural distance to that district. I.e. graph 1 for 
Italy would rather simply compare average transfers per capita to districts disproportionately paying for central 
government deficits with average transfers per capita to districts disproportionately “failing to pay” for central 
government deficits. 
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company cars in the Flemish province of Antwerp alone than in the entire Walloon region” (De 
Standaard 2014). A more important example is the finding of “Hoge Raad voor Financiën”, a federal 
fiscal policy watchdog, that the major 2001 income tax cut –while worsening the federal budget 
balance- mainly benefited inhabitants of the Walloon region (HRF 2010). 
A 2
nd
 feature of graph 1 is that for both regions, transfers have become more negative over our entire 
sample period, with the 2009 economic crisis as the major exception. However, we should not attach 
too much importance to this feature as this general decrease in transfers could merely be the result of 
economic growth, which unsurprisingly makes income tax revenue and social security contributions 
increase in real terms
120
. What is finally noteworthy from graph 1 is that Flemish and Francophone 
Belgian transfers broadly move in tandem, which is an illustration of the formula-based nature of our 
transfers variable. 
 
In what follows, we will perform a regression analysis of the joint vote share per district of the 
political parties that are part of the Federal government coalition on transfers per district
121
. As said 
above, our hypothesis is that the impact of transfers on vote share will be less positive for Flemish 
districts than for Francophone Belgian districts. This would be because Flemish voters may suspect an 
increase in transfers to result into a more negative federal budget balance. In turn, this suspicion 
would be due to Flemish voters being aware of the decades’ long weak track record of the Belgian 
Federal government in terms of budget discipline. The bottom row of table 1 shows that the average 
federal budget deficit was no less than 7.3% of GDP over the 1970-2002 period. Successive deficits 
have resulted into a federal public debt of 106.1% of GDP in 2002. In 2011, this ratio still amounted 
to 96.0%. Ever since the 1980s until the end of our sample period, Belgium has been burdened with 
one of the highest public debt ratios among OECD countries. An additional assumption on which our 
                                                          
120
 Economic growth may either have decreased or increased social expenditures in cash in real terms over our 
sample period. On the one hand the need for unemployment benefits decreases if economic growth is stronger 
and on the other hand Federal governments may have increased social transfers not only with inflation but also 
with economic growth over our sample period. Because, as said above, social transfers constitute the only 
expenditure category comprised in our net transfers variable, which also comprises 2 revenue categories, the 
revenue effect may have dominated the expenditure effect. 
121
 Of course we prefer to benefit from the fact that we have transfers data available down to the level of the 43 
districts, as e.g. merely analysing votes and transfers at the aggregate levels of Francophone Belgium and 
Flanders would provide us with far too little variation with a view to deriving conclusions as to impact of 
transfers on votes.  
This goes with the disadvantage that -since Belgian districts are a mere product of history- they vary enormously 
in terms of population. Mean population of our 43 districts is 242,982 –with a standard deviation of no less than 
221,059-, while the largest district –Brussels- on average counted 1,007,531 inhabitants over our sample period 
and the smallest district –Bastogne- on average counted 42,122 inhabitants over our sample period. Hence, our 
regression results below could be driven disproportionately by a number of small districts.  
When we consider instead the administrative level right above the district level as the unit of observation, i.e. 
the provincial level, regression results below turn insignificant once adding the interaction of our legislature 
dummies with the Flanders dummy. (see below) This should not entirely surprise as the shift from the district to 
the provincial level makes our number of observations decrease from 215 to a mere 55, rendering moreover an 
IV regression analysis impossible.  
Also when we do not weight our right hand side variables for population –effectively giving more weight to the 
largest districts-, regression results below turn insignificant once we add the interaction of our legislature 
dummies with the Flanders dummy. 
However, when we leave out those districts with an average population below 100,000, regression results are 
very similar to regression results over the full sample, including those after adding the interaction of our 
legislature dummies with the Flanders dummy. No less than 13 districts are characterised by an average 
population below 100,000, of which 4 Flemish (Diksmuide, Eeklo, Tielt, and Veurne) and 9 Francophone 
(Arlon, Ath, Bastogne, Marche, Mouscron, Neufchâteau, Philippeville, Virton, and Waremme). Leaving them 
out reduces our number of observations from 215 to 150. 
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hypothesis is based is that Flemish voters are aware that the interest payments to service a hence 
increased federal debt disproportionately weight on Flemish taxpayers
122
.  
 
Last but not least, this reasoning assumes that Flemish voters are aware of the formula-based nature of 
our transfers category. By law the incidence of the 3 components of our (net) transfers variable 
largely
123
 depends on ability to pay (income tax and social security contributions) resp. on needs 
(social transfers). Therefore, Flemish voters may suspect an increase in transfers per capita to their 
district to go hand in hand with a -possibly even larger- increase in transfers per capita to the average 
Francophone district
124
, as the latter is needier and less able to pay than the average Flemish 
district
125. Moreover, Flemish voters may be aware of the “entitlement” nature of our transfers 
variable, i.e. they are not only formula-based, but –unlike say investment expenditures- increases in 
our transfers considered in year t tend to be followed by similar increases compared to year t-1 during 
years t+1 and following, i.e. they tend to have fiscal consequences for many years to come.  
 
As a result of all the above, voters of a Flemish district may fear the interest burden consequences of 
their –current and future- share of transfers received, but they may fear even more the interest burden 
consequences of the Francophone –current and future- share126. Therefore Flemish voters may 
punish
127
 the Flemish parties that are part of the Federal government at the next elections, for 
presumably having “given in” to the Francophone Belgian government parties’ request to increase –
formula-based- transfers
128
. We are aware that our research hypothesis spelled out above is rather 
ambitious in comparison to the existing literature that hypothesises a positive effect of gross transfers 
on government popularity (see below). Our hypothesis assumes a more informed and forward looking 
voter than the existing literature, which in contrast implicitly assumes that the average voter mainly 
cares about gross transfers to his district
129
. In what follows, we will find weak evidence of an effect 
                                                          
122
 See e.g. Jennes (2014b) for a calculation of the shares of the Belgian regions in federal tax revenue. We 
assume that Flemish voters assume this gap to persist in the future, when interest payments on the newly 
accumulated public debt will come due. 
Compared to Francophone Belgian voters, Flemish voters may also more strongly pay heed to the possible 
damage of a large federal public debt to the Belgian macro-economy, as the private sector makes up a larger part 
of the Flemish economy than of the Francophone Belgian economy. 
123
 Jennes and Persyn (2015) demonstrate that the transfers category we use as our independent variable of 
interest is to some extent discretionarily determined however. 
124
 For the average Flemish voter, the size of transfers to his/her own district seems to be the only plausible 
indicator of transfers to Francophone Belgian districts available, as the average voter arguably does not have 
any knowledge of statistical sources such as the “Regional accounts”, which besides is one of the only publicly 
available sources of geographically disaggregated data on public expenditures and revenues in Belgium. 
125
 In contrast, it is the essence of the discretionary transfers investigated in most of the empirical distributive 
politics literature, that more transfers to one geographic area do not lead to more transfers to another geographic 
area, even on the contrary. The effect of discretionary transfers on government popularity could hence be rather 
different from the effect of formula-based transfers on government popularity. 
126
 Alternatively stated, a Flemish district may fear the interest burden consequences of the share of transfers 
received by districts that are poorer than their own one in general, but these poorer districts are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in Francophone Belgium. (see also graph 1) 
127
 Again, relatively speaking, i.e. compared to Francophone Belgian voters. 
128
 Alternatively to taking the point of view of Flemish voters, our research hypothesis could as well have been 
spelt out taking the point of view of Francophone Belgian voters. Of course such an alternative hypothesis 
would not have changed the interpretation of our regression results below. 
129
 Our hypothesis reminds of the well-known hypothesis of Barro (1974) that consumers save in anticipation of 
a tax increase to follow the build-up of government debt. This so-called Ricardian equivalence theorem however 
has not been fully validated empirically. In contrast, Lyytikäinen and Tukiainen (2013) find the rational voter 
hypothesis confirmed in Finland, in the sense that Finnish voters base their decision to go and cast their vote on 
its expected impact on the election outcome. 
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of transfers on votes in Flanders that is significantly smaller than the effect of transfers on votes in 
Francophone Belgium. 
 
In what follows, we will first briefly overview the related literature. Next, we will discuss the data in 
more detail. Thirdly, we will outline our empirical strategy, before moving on to a presentation and a 
discussion of the regression results. We will end with a conclusion. 
2. Situation of our study within the literature 
 
As said above, to our knowledge (1) the central government’s debt game (2) between different regions 
(3) represented within one and the same central government has never been tested empirically. 
Moreover, to our knowledge, all theoretical and empirical studies thus far on the political economy of 
central government debt took debt/deficits as the dependent variable. (see e.g. Alesina and Tabellini 
1992, Alesina and Perotti 1994, Persson and Tabellini 2000, Roubini and Sachs 1989, de Haan and 
Sturm 1997, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, and Huber e.a. 2003)  
In contrast, we will include a debt/deficit component into our independent variable of interest. (see 
below) As stated already above, we will test if Belgian regions have different incentives to make the 
central government run a deficit by empirically verifying if net fiscal transfers are appreciated 
differently by voters from the 2 major Belgian language communities. These language communities 
are also different political communities, each represented by a different set of political parties within 
the Federal government and each effectively wielding veto power over Federal government policy. 
We will verify differing voters’ appreciation by regressing the vote share of the governing coalition 
on previous transfers to Belgian districts. Therefore, our investigation is rather related to the extensive 
empirical political economics literature on “pork barrel”, investigating if distributive politics practised 
by the incumbent party (parties) buys votes during the next elections. However, to our knowledge this 
“pork barrel” literature does not at all pay attention to possible geographic differences in popularity of 
the same kind of transfers
130
.  
Veiga and Veiga (2013) find that election year increases in transfers by the central government to 
Portuguese municipalities secure additional votes in favour of the party in power at the central level. 
Stratmann (2013) demonstrates that earmarks voted by US Congress in favour of particular electoral 
districts buy more votes in these districts. A more recent literature makes use of a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) –which identifies the effect of transfers on votes by focussing on 
electoral districts in which an election was barely won or barely lost- to assess if extra transfers buy 
more votes. This RDD literature first investigates if having gained power leads to more transfers to 
districts that have voted in favour of the incumbent, and it next investigates if the incumbent wins 
extra votes during the next elections thanks to these extra transfers. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for 
Brazil, Bracco e.a. (2012) for Italy, Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) for Spain, and Migueis (2012) for Portugal 
all find that extra transfers buy extra votes in favour of the incumbent party (parties) during the next 
elections, either at the central, at the local or at both levels. 
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 At least as vast is the related literature on the reverse effect, i.e. investigating if incumbent governments steer 
extra transfers to particular districts precisely with a view to obtaining extra votes, as well as the related 
literature investigating if incumbency as such buys extra votes, i.e. investigating if being in power leads to 
remaining in power. For examples of the former literature, see Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) for Sweden, 
Knight (2008) for the US, and Jennes and Persyn (2015) for Belgium. For examples of the latter literature, see 
Lee (2001) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) on the US. 
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What makes our study stand out from the “pork barrel” literature is (1) that our transfers variable is a 
net transfers variable, (2) that we will use it as an indicator to citizens for debt accumulation, since an 
increase in net transfers to citizens ceteris paribus means an increase in debt, and (3) that we would 
expect the Belgian region that de facto pays most of the debt service burden, i.e. Flanders, to reward 
the incumbent parties to a lesser extent with extra votes –i.e. to punish them relatively speaking- for 
steering transfers to this region. 
3. Data 
 
As said already, graph 1 above summarises the evolution of our independent variable of interest over 
time and between Flanders and Francophone Belgium (in real 100 euros per capita). The evolution is 
remarkably parallel for Flanders and Francophone Belgium, and the difference in transfers per capita 
between Flanders and Francophone Belgium remains relatively stable over our sample period. 
However, the standard deviation of transfers to Flemish districts (880 euros per capita) is smaller than 
the standard deviation of transfers to Francophone Belgian districts (1016 euros per capita), despite 
the average transfers amount of Flemish districts (-3645 euros per capita) being considerably more 
negative than the average transfers amount for Francophone Belgian districts (-2619 euros per capita). 
Vertical bars mark federal election years in graphs 1 and following. The 1
st
 full legislature of our 
sample period (1995-99) is characterised both for Flanders and Francophone Belgium by an overall 
steep decrease in transfers received. This is because the then Federal government had embarked upon 
a program of strong budget deficit reduction with a view to being allowed into the Euro currency 
zone. Another remarkable legislature is the 2007-10 legislature
131
: the sudden outbreak of the 2009 
economic crisis resulted into an equally sudden surge in net fiscal transfers received. 
Graph 2 shows the evolution of our dependent variable “difference in government vote share” over 
time and between Flemish and Francophone Belgian districts
132
. However, we cannot simply calculate 
our dependent variable as the difference between total votes obtained per district by the incumbent 
Federal government coalition and total votes obtained per district by its predecessor. This would be 
like comparing apples and oranges, as most federal elections over our sample period resulted into a 
change in the composition of the Federal government coalition
133
. Therefore we have constructed our 
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 This legislature was the only one over our sample period that did not last its full 4 years, as the then 
government was brought down in 2010 by an institutional conflict between Flemish and Francophone Belgian 
coalition parties. 
132
 Data on votes were kindly provided by Jo Buelens and Kris Deschouwer (VUB). Additional data on votes 
was obtained from the website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior: 
http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html 
In contrast to Belgian practice of allocating parliamentary seats to parties, we have calculated vote shares as the 
ratio of votes obtained by a particular party to total eligible voters, i.e. including voters who cast non-valid 
votes, who cast “blank” votes, and who did not cast their vote (despite voting being mandatory in Belgium). The 
Belgian real world allocation of parliamentary seats disregards non-valid votes, “blank” votes, and votes not 
cast, although these votes may well be an expression of voters’ disapproval of the governing parties. We 
calculate vote shares somewhat differently from the Belgian real world allocation of parliamentary seats because 
we will use non-valid votes, “blank” votes, and votes not cast to construct an alternative dependent variable later 
on. Our different calculation decreases the size of our dependent variable somewhat, both in levels and in 
differences, compared to standard Belgian practice, as non-valid votes, “blank” votes, and votes not cast taken 
together on average amounted to 20.4% of the total eligible vote over our sample period (17.5% for Flanders 
and 23.5% for Francophone Belgium). 
133
 Such a change implied a change in the identity of the governing parties, a change in their number, or a 
change in both. 
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dependent variable as the difference between the joint vote share (per district) obtained by the parties 
that were part of the governing coalition during federal elections t and the joint vote share (per 
district) obtained by those same parties during federal elections t-1, when one or more of these parties 
may not have been part of the outgoing governing coalition. Our dependent variable hence measures 
the joint increase/decrease in popularity of governing parties after having governed during one federal 
legislature
134
. As our dependent variable is hence expressed as a difference
135
, we will also express 
our independent variables in differences (and not in levels as shown in graph 1).  
Graph 2: Difference in vote share (%points) obtained by the governing coalition between 2 
federal elections 
 
Note: bars indicate federal election years 
Source: Jo Buelens and Kris Deschouwer (VUB); http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html 
(Federal Ministry of the Interior); own calculations. 
 
We will test in our regression analysis below if transfers in legislature t affect the result of the election 
at the end of that same legislature t. I.e. we will only consider mean transfers per legislature, as by 
definition elections are only held once per legislature. Therefore, we have allocated in graph 2 the 
average vote share difference for Flemish resp. Francophone Belgian districts between 2 federal 
elections to every single year of the legislature concerned. Such “retroactive” allocation of vote share 
differences should reflect the possibility that transfers occurring in any year of a particular legislature 
                                                          
134
 We of course cannot and should not take into account the –possibly non-negligible- effect of a governing 
coalition governing for a 2
nd
 legislature in a row –like e.g. during the 2003-07 legislature- on government 
popularity (see also Stratmann 2013), as there is obviously no variation over our 43 districts with respect to time 
in office of the Federal government coalition. 
135
 For Flanders, graph 2 shows the average vote difference for all 22 Flemish districts. For Francophone 
Belgium, graph 2 shows the average vote difference for all 21 Francophone Belgian districts. 
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may affect voting behaviour at the end of that legislature. However, our presentation of a particular 
vote share difference in graph 2 as a horizontal line spanning an entire legislature comes with the cost 
of possibly giving the wrong impression that government parties already knew their election result 
before the end of the legislature. 
Graph 2 shows that most incumbent Federal governments over our sample period see their vote share 
decrease at the end of the legislature during which they governed, as both the curves for Flanders and 
for Francophone Belgium are below the 0% line for most years of our sample period
136
. E.g. during 
the 1999 elections the parties governing between 1995 and 1999 saw their joint vote share decrease by 
about 7.5%points
137
. In contrast, the 1999-2003 government as well as the 2010-2014 government 
saw their vote shares increase, although by considerably less percentage points than the 7.5%points 
decrease suffered by the 1995-1999 government
138
.  
Most remarkable from graph 2 is the divergence in vote difference between Flanders and 
Francophone Belgium over our sample period. More in particular, the 2 legislatures between 2003 and 
2010 are characterised by a large loss of vote share for Flemish governing parties, while the 
Francophone Belgian vote losses were much smaller. As a result, the total average as well as the total 
standard deviation of the Flemish government parties’ votes difference (-5.26 resp. 7.35%points) are 
much larger than the total average and the total standard deviation of the Francophone Belgian 
government parties’ votes difference (-1.96 resp. 3.94%points)139. Participation to a Belgian Federal 
government seems much more risky –in terms of vote share- for Flemish parties than for Francophone 
Belgian parties. Also, the Flemish evolution from a loss of vote share to a gain in vote share between 
the 2007-10 and the 2010-14 legislatures is less remarkable than it seems from graph 2. This is 
because 2 of the 3 Flemish parties governing between 2010 and 2014 already governed during the 
2007-10 period and saw their vote share –slightly- increase in 2014 from a historically very low 
starting point in 2010
140
.  
As shown by graph 2, our sample period only comprises 5 federal elections and 6 legislatures, which 
will somewhat constrain our empirical analysis below. As also shown by graph 2, election years 
themselves are assigned vote differences concerning the previous legislature, although elections 
always took place as early as in May or June over our sample period. Such assignment takes into 
account the possibility of a political business cycle, according to which governing political parties 
would concentrate transfers right before a federal election to try and increase their vote share during 
that election. 
                                                          
136
 Again, showing separate curves for Flemish and Francophone Belgian districts in graph 2 makes sense as in 
Belgium no single party that obtained representation in the federal parliament over our sample period obtained a 
considerable number of votes both in Flanders and in Francophone Belgium. 
137
 The mostly negative average vote differences stand somewhat in contrast to the literature on the positive 
effect of incumbency on vote share and on being re-elected into office. (see e.g. for the US Lee (2001) and 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)) 
138
 Only one year of the 1991-1995 legislature and only one year of the 2010-14 legislature have been included 
into our sample, as we were only able to collect transfers data from 1995 onwards and until and including the 
year 2011.  
139
 These “different differences” may partly explain why in a number of cases we will find a statistically 
significant association between difference in transfers and government parties’ vote difference for Flanders, but 
not for Francophone Belgium. (see below)  
140
 With respect to the 1995 federal elections, the vote share difference with the previous elections –the 1991 
elections- was of course not zero, in contrast to what graph 2 suggests. Graph 2 shows a zero for the 1991-1995 
legislature, simply because we do not consider the 1995 vote share difference, in turn because we only have 
transfers data at our availability from 1995 onwards. Because our regression analysis will be in first differences 
(see below), it will drop the year 1995. 
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4. Empirical strategy: first differences (FD) and instrumental variables 
(IV) 
 
Our regression equation estimated in the regression tables below can be summarised as follows: 
𝐷. 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 
=  𝛼1 𝐷. (𝑛𝑒𝑡) 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 𝐷. (𝑛𝑒𝑡) 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐿 
+ 𝛼3𝐷. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
With FL a dummy variable taking the value of 1 in case of a Flemish district, with 𝑋𝑖𝑡  a set of 
demographic, economic and political control variables, and with 𝛼𝑡 a legislature fixed effect. 
The legislature fixed effect 𝛼𝑡 controls for unobserved legislature-specific shocks that may be 
correlated both with transfers and government popularity
141
. It ensures i.a. that our coefficients of 
interest 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 measure the association between transfers and government popularity after having 
filtered out country-wide but legislature-specific shocks. An example of such shocks are “tide” effects 
in party popularity, such as a country-wide surge in the popularity of a protest party
142
, or a particular 
political issue made salient by the media during a particular pre-election period. 
The combination of the first difference (FD) transformator D. with the use of legislature dummies in 
our above regression equation makes that identification of the association between the government’s 
vote share and transfers is only based on changes in both variables that simultaneously differ over 
time and between districts. As our variables are expressed in differences, district fixed effects are 
eliminated
143
. The FL dummy itself is not included as a separate regressor, as its value does not 
change over time. It would therefore also be eliminated by the FD transformation. 
                                                          
141
 In this respect, Flemish media hold the view that “every Belgian election holds its surprise”. An example was 
the 2010 federal election, which was a “snap election”. I.e. while the federal parliament is elected for 4 years, 
the 2010 election took place one year earlier already because of the fall of the Federal government in 2010.  
142
 Or a sudden country-wide surge in the popularity of a non-protest party. See e.g. Allers and Merkus (2013) 
for the “tide effect” of national party preferences on municipal election results in the Netherlands. 
Legislature fixed effects should also take care of possible manipulation of election dates by politicians, e.g. to 
try and take advantage of favourable popularity polls, as such manipulation may be assumed to have the same 
impact on all Belgian districts. Manipulation of election dates is a problem raised by e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2006 p. 11). Over our sample period, only the federal elections of 1995 and of 2010 were held considerably 
earlier –i.e. about 6 months resp. about 1 year earlier- than their due date –i.e. earlier than after 4 years after the 
previous elections. 
Additionally including a trend variable –next to a set of legislature dummies- does not appear to affect our 
regression results. In contrast to legislature dummies, a legislature trend variable assumes the passing of time to 
be smoothly related to our dependent variable. This seems rather less probable given the political nature of our 
dependent variable, and given the fact that our dependent variable is expressed in differences. Including a trend 
variable –though “asking less” from our limited data set- would thus be less general than including a set of 
legislature dummies. 
143
 Moreover, because of the need to express our dependent variable as the difference between the joint vote 
share of governing parties during the next election and their joint vote share during the previous elections, a 
fixed effects within regression strategy would not be feasible. 
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Additionally we cluster our standard errors at the district level, because error terms may be correlated 
within districts over time
144
. 
In a next step, we will aim at making possible a causal interpretation of the association between the 
government’s vote share and transfers by using instrumental variables (IV) estimation145. 
Results of our empirical strategy are shown in a stepwise way in the tables below.  
5. Results of the regression analysis 
5.1. First differences (FD) regression results 
5.1.1. Regression results without legislature*FL dummies added as extra 
controls 
 
Table 2 shows the results of a simple FD regression of the government’s vote share on transfers. All 
variables are means taken per district and legislature
146
. For this reason, we remain with only 215 
                                                          
144
 However, error terms may alternatively be correlated across districts within legislatures. But when we 
cluster our standard errors at the legislature level instead of at the district level, standard errors reported below 
together with our successive regression results, as well as the significance of our coefficients of interest, hardly 
change. 
In contrast, when clustering standard errors at the region level (Flanders and Francophone Belgium) instead of at 
the district levels, the below reported standard errors are unsurprisingly considerably smaller and the below 
reported coefficients are considerable more significant (and even very significant in many specifications). This 
implies that we should cluster standard errors at the district level instead of at the region level. 
145
 A method to isolate random changes in our independent variable of interest that would be preferable to IV 
estimation would be a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), but we failed to identify discontinuities in 
transfers between districts over our sample period. 
146
 We opted not to exploit the fact that we have annual transfers data at our disposal, because federal elections 
of course are not held annually. 
Because we have at our disposal only one year of transfers data concerning the 1991-1995 legislature –i.e. 1995 
transfers- and only one year of transfers data of the 2010-14 legislature –i.e. 2011 transfers-, our regression 
results could be biased in case transfers in these 2 years would not be representative for average transfers over 
the entire legislature concerned. 1995 may be unrepresentative because it is an election year. 2011 may be 
unrepresentative as in 2011 a caretaker Federal government –in the shape of the outgoing Federal government- 
was in place due to the most protracted government negotiations in Belgian history then taking place (from June 
2010 until December 2011).  
However, regression results below are similar when alternatingly dropping the years 1995 and 2011 from our 
sample period, despite the considerable loss of observations –one entire legislature- involved and except for the 
regression specifications including the lagged dependent variable (LDV). (see below) The latter is 
understandable, as simultaneously including the LDV and dropping either the 1991-1995 legislature or the 
2010-14 legislature reduces the number of observations to only 86 (= 2*43). 
Another way in which we verified the sensitivity of our choice to consider simple means of transfers per 
legislature, is by explicitly taking into account the possibility of a political business cycle. To this effect, we 
calculated mean transfers per legislature by only taking the mean of transfers during the final 2 calendar years 
of each legislature. As said above, federal elections always took place in May or June over our sample period. 
The exception to our way to calculate transfers when accounting for a political business cycle is the 2007-2010 
legislature. Because the 2010 elections were unexpected, as they were the consequence of the fall of the Federal 
government, and as only 3 years of the legislature concerned had elapsed at that time, we “calculated” mean 
transfers over the 2007-2010 legislature as transfers in the year 2010 only.  
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observations (= 5 legislatures * 43 districts), out of an original total of 731 observations (= 17 years * 
43 districts). 1 legislature –the 1991-1995 one- is lost because of the FD transformation. 
Column (1) –at first sight surprisingly- shows a significantly negative association between transfers 
and votes. In column (2) we additionally interact the transfers variable with a dummy taking the value 
of 1 for Flemish districts. The resulting interaction variable is our actual major independent variable 
of interest as it measures the difference in association between transfers received and governing 
coalition’s vote share between the average Francophone Belgian and the average Flemish district. The 
coefficients in column (2) are to be interpreted as follows: while there does not appear any association 
between transfers received and vote share obtained in Francophone Belgium, Flemish coalition 
parties’ joint vote share significantly decreases with an increase in per capita transfers. 
Table 2: FD regression of the government’s vote share on transfers  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60   -4.090*** -4.324*** 
   (1.208) (1.056) 
     
D.unemployed   0.754 2.021** 
   (0.736) (0.768) 
     
D.under 18   -4.312** -3.408* 
   (1.817) (1.811) 
     
D.gross income   -0.0232 -0.157 
   (0.175) (0.137) 
     
D.ministers   -0.218 -0.517 
   (0.667) (0.509) 
     
D.transfers -0.417** -0.181   -0.258 -0.00492 
 (0.187) (0.163) (0.273) (0.155) 
     
D.transfers*FL  -0.880***    -1.565*** 
   (0 .248)  (0.298) 
     
N 215 215 215 215 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies included. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
However, column (3) shows that the association found in column (1) becomes insignificant once a 
number of demographic and economic controls that may both affect transfers and government 
popularity are included: the shares of over 60 years’ old, under 18 years’ old, and unemployed, as 
well as gross income per capita. The shares of over 60 years’ old and of under 18 years’ old are meant 
to capture the possibly differing popularity of governing parties across age groups, age groups that are 
also treated differently in terms of transfers. In contrast, unemployment share and gross income per 
capita are meant to capture i.a. the possibly geographically heterogeneous impact of the economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Regression results are broadly similar when explicitly taking into account the possibility of a political business 
cycle, suggesting that such a cycle was indeed at play over our sample period. However, as 2011 is the only year 
of the 2010-2014 legislature for which we have transfers data, we need to drop that legislature from our 
observations with a view to checking for a political business cycle. The latter reduces our –from the start already 
limited- number of observations even more. An additional disadvantage of the strategy taking into account the 
possible occurence of a political business cycle is that by dropping 2011 we are left with observations for one of 
our IVs -i.e. crisis-related temporary unemployment benefits- concerning only 1 legislature (the 2007-2010 
legislature). This seems to undermine the validity of our “crisis-related temporary unemployment benefits” 
instrument within the context of an IV approach (see below). 
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cycle on the government’s popularity: transfers may –indirectly- affect government popularity 
negatively, through an increase in the number of unemployed or –more generally- through a decrease 
in gross income, both of which may be distributed unequally over Belgian districts
147
.  
Additionally, a political control that may both affect transfers and government popularity is included, 
measuring the number of federal ministers –weighted by a district’s population share- in whose 
electoral district a particular district is situated. Indeed, Jennes and Persyn (2015) show that a Belgian 
federal minister manages to increase those same formula-based net transfers that we use as the 
independent variable of interest, to his/her electoral district
148
.  
A priori, the sign of these controls could be positive or negative
149
, except for the ministers variable, 
which is expected to show a positive coefficient. Surprisingly the minister variable however appears 
to be negatively associated with government popularity, though this association is statistically 
insignificant
150
.  
As such, column (3) already presents a remarkable result from the perspective of the existing 
literature on distributive politics: in Belgium taken as a whole an increase in transfers does not seem 
to be associated with an increase in government popularity, in contrast to the existing literature. 
In column (4) we again additionally interact the transfers variable with a dummy taking the value of 1 
for Flemish districts. As our transfers variable is expressed in 100 euros per capita, the –once again 
strongly significant- coefficient on the interacted variable in column (4) is to be interpreted as follows: 
while there does not appear any association between transfers received and vote share obtained in 
Francophone Belgium, Flemish coalition parties’ joint vote share decreases with no less than 
1.6%point151 for every increase of per capita transfers amounting to 100 euros. As the within standard 
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 By including the shares of unemployed, over 60 years’ old and under 18 years’ old as control variables, pure 
changes in demography and in the economic cycle are filtered out of the transfers variable. Therefore from 
column (3) onwards the transfers variable only measures changes in the individual benefit amounts themselves 
received by the unemployed, the over 60 years’ old and (the parents of) the under 18 years’ old, rather than the 
changes in the number of unemployment benefits, retirement benefits and child allowances. 
148
 Our inclusion of the number of federal ministers as a political control is inspired on Stratmann (2013), who 
controls for the presence of a senior member of Congress in a district when regressing re-election on “pork 
barrel” spending. An alternative for this political variable may have been the number of federal members of 
parliament weighted by population. However, the executive is considered more powerful in Belgium than the 
legislative. 
149
 At first sight it is surprising that the coefficient on the share of unemployed is positive in column (3), and 
even significantly positive in column (4). It could be interpreted as unemployed who do not blame the 
government for their unemployment, but instead vote for one of the government parties in the hope of them 
increasing unemployment benefits, as over our entire sample period, Federal governments consisted of at least 1 
left or centre left party per language group. Alternatively, the positive sign could be interpreted as a relative 
disregard of the economy –with an increase in unemployment as a consequence- by a Federal government once 
this government becomes more popular. 
The –sometimes significantly- positive sign of the unemployment control persists in most of our other 
regression results reported below. However, it appears to hardly affect our coefficients of interest, as the latter 
hardly change whenever we omit the unemployment control from each of our regression specifications reported 
in this paper. 
At first sight it is also surprising that the coefficient on gross income per capita is negative in table 2 (although 
insignificantly negative). However, this may be due to multicollinearity with the variable measuring the share of 
unemployed. The correlation between our (differenced) share of unemployed variable and our (differenced) 
gross income variable is strong (-0.4). 
150
 Again, this result runs counter to the rather extensive literature on the positive effect of incumbency on vote 
share and on being re-elected to office. (see e.g. for the US Lee (2001) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002)) 
151
 This decrease would be somewhat larger if we had not measured the government’s vote share in relation to 
total eligible votes but to total votes validly cast. 
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deviation of transfers per Flemish district over our 6 legislatures is 239 euros per capita, the typical 
variation in government vote share due to variations in transfers –expressed in 100 euros per capita- 
over time equals about -3.7%points (i.e. -1.6%point times 2.39), with a p value of 0.000. 
 
This result is surprising, as we had expected -on the basis of table 1 above and on the basis of the 
abovementioned distributive politics literature on the positive effects of transfers on incumbency- a 
negative coefficient for the interacted transfers variable to go hand in hand with a significantly 
positive non-interacted transfers coefficient. A statistically significant interacted transfers coefficient 
would then have provided tentative support to our hypothesis. Otherwise stated, it is not so much the 
significantly negative interaction coefficient that surprises
152
, but rather the insignificant and small 
non-interacted coefficient.  
One could argue that it would be the fact that a district’s transfers are below the mean (or below the 
median) that is associated with a lower share of the votes of government parties, rather than the fact 
that a district is situated in Flanders. I.e. in those few Francophone Belgian districts that are 
characterised by transfers that are below the mean (or below the median), the association between 
transfers and the government’s vote share could be as small as in Flanders. However, when we 
replace the FL dummy with a dummy “below mean” (or with a dummy “below median”) taking the 
value of 1 in all districts –Flemish or Francophone Belgian- that are characterised by transfers that are 
below the mean (or below the median), the association becomes smaller and less significant. The 
coefficient concerned is only -0.548, with a p value of 0.12. (When replacing the FL dummy with the 
“below median” dummy: a coefficient of only -0.811 and a p value of 0.02). The association becomes 
even insignificant when we simply replace the FL dummy with the continuous variable gross income, 
based on the hypothesis that extra transfers would in particular be associated with less votes for the 
government in cases in which also gross income increases.  
The fact that in no Flemish district voters are able to vote for (or against) Francophone Belgian 
government parties, and vice versa
153
, as well as the fact that Flanders and Francophone Belgium 
hardly share any geography, language or media, constitute additional arguments to distinguish 
between Flemish and Francophone Belgian districts
154
. This is preferable to distinguishing between 
relatively speaking “transfers receiving” and “transfers providing” districts, or between districts that 
see their gross income decrease and districts that see their gross income increase. Spolaore (2008) 
demonstrates theoretically that richer regions are reluctant to redistribute income to poorer regions 
within the same country, in particular if these regions are culturally heterogeneous. 
We have also re-constructed our independent variable of interest so that it becomes a better measure 
of the Federal government’s budget deficit. To this effect, we have weighted the transfers variable 
                                                          
152
 As the correlation between our (differenced) transfers variable of interest and (differenced) gross income is 
strong (-0.5), one may at first sight worry about multicollinearity between transfers and gross income. However, 
as the coefficient on our variable of interest is significant, such a worry does not seem justified. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the interacted variable remains as significantly negative and of the same size when omitting gross 
income as a control. 
153
 As stated above: over our sample period with the exceptions of Brussels and Halle-Vilvoorde. 
154
 Political parties being split along linguistic-geographic lines is not even a necessary condition for focusing 
our regression analysis on the Flemish / Francophone Belgian distinction: also if parties were not split along 
linguistic-geographic lines, finding a different association between transfers and Federal government popularity 
in Flanders and in Francophone Belgium would be interesting. However, political parties being split along 
linguistic-geographic lines adds an extra dimension, as such a split increases the likelihood of differing 
associations between transfers and Federal government popularity in Flanders and in Francophone Belgium 
having differing impacts on individual parties’ policies with respect to transfers. 
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with the federal budget balance, assuming that voters may react more favourably to transfers received 
in years in which the budget deficit is low compared to years in which the budget deficit is higher. 
Again, this may be the case because voters –in particular Flemish voters- may fear a deficit increase 
to result into an increased interest bill, to be financed with higher taxes in the future. Moreover, over 
our entire sample period, the federal budget balance was to some extent a political issue, also given 
the chronically large federal budget deficits of the past decades and the large federal debt that has 
resulted from these. By adding an extra interaction with the federal deficit to our variable of interest, 
more importance is attached to transfers in years with a worse budget balance.  
However, as a result (not shown), the size of our coefficient of interest decreases compared to column 
(4), while we had expected it to increase
155
. Perhaps this result means that citizens are less aware of 
the overall federal fiscal situation than of transfers to their district in particular. Indeed, transfers 
show up “inside the wallet” of voters in the same year as the year to which they are allocated in the 
“Regional accounts” statistics of the central bank. In contrast, the federal fiscal balance becomes 
known to voters –sometimes much- later –if at all- than during the year to which it is “allocated” in 
the “Government accounts” statistics of the central bank156. Or perhaps this result means that Flemish 
voters would be averse to an increase in net fiscal transfers as such, i.e. averse to redistribution 
towards Francophone Belgium even when the budget would be balanced, rather than averse to 
redistribution in the shape of future interest payments. In particular, Flemish voters may fear that such 
a redistribution would –either currently or in the future- be funded with less federal expenditures in 
Flanders or more taxes raised out of Flanders that are not included in our independent formula-based 
net transfers variable (such as federal investment expenditures or VAT revenue). If the latter held, our 
regression analysis would be about measuring the effect of net fiscal transfers as such on government 
popularity, rather than on the effect of federal budget deficits on government popularity. 
5.1.2. Regression results with legislature*FL dummies added as extra 
controls 
 
However, the regression results reported in table 2 change considerably once we add as extra controls 
the interaction of the legislature dummies with the FL dummy
157
. Hence next to interacting our 
variable of interest with the FL dummy, we also interact our legislature dummies with the FL dummy. 
Although such an addition seems demanding
158
, it also seems warranted, because the unobserved 
legislature-specific shocks for which the legislature fixed effects control may well differ between 
Flanders and Francophone Belgium. This is because –at least over our sample period- these 2 
language communities were not only lacking a common geography and language, but also common 
media and political parties, and because the constitution guarantees both language communities a 
                                                          
155
 The reduced size of the association between government popularity and transfers when weighting transfers 
for the size of the deficit remains when lagging the deficit variable with 1 period. A lag seems justified as voters 
of course are aware of the size of the deficit of a particular fiscal year at best during the next year. 
156
 A notorious case in point is the sudden and sizeable budget deficit of 2005. The then government had to 
revise its original accounting for the 2005 budget balance considerably downwardly after the European 
Commission obliged the government to include its takeover of debt from the public railways in 2005 into the 
government budget. The government disputed this decision of the European Commission in court, but –as it 
appeared years later- to no avail. 
157
 See Levitt (1997) for the only previous study we are aware of that includes region-time dummies into a 
regression specification where the actual unit of observation is below the regional level. 
158
 As the addition of the interaction of the legislature dummies with the FL dummy –i.e. of 5 extra control 
variables- increases the risk of saturating our model, given that we only have 215 data points at our disposal. 
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fixed share of cabinet ministers regardless of the election result. These features lead some observers to 
talk about “2 separate democracies in one country” and about “2 separate elections taking place on 
federal election day”.  
In Belgium, a legislature-specific and transfer-related shake-up of the party landscape
159
 due to the 
surge of a protest party in the opinion polls or due to an outbreak of a political scandal in the run-up to 
a particular federal election
160
 in one of the 2 language communities may hardly cause ripples in the 
other language community. An example –though not clearly related to the formula-based transfers 
under study- was the diverging behaviour of both Green parties by the end of the single legislature -
1999-2003- in which they were part of the governing coalition. The leading minister of the Flemish 
Green party resigned (and was replaced by another member of the Flemish Green party) in August 
2002 after the government had approved an arms export deal with Nepal, while no minister of the 
Francophone Green party resigned. In contrast, all ministers of the Francophone Greens resigned in 
May 2003 after the government had approved new flight routes over the -mainly Francophone- city of 
Brussels for airplanes departing from or bound for Belgium’s main airport, while no minister of the 
Flemish Greens resigned.  
Another example of heterogeneity between Flanders and Francophone Belgium at the federal level 
over our sample period is that the composition of the Federal government was “asymmetrical” during 
the 1999-2003 and 2007-2010 legislatures. During the former it included the party VU at the Flemish 
side, and therefore one more party (4) at the Flemish side than at the Francophone Belgian side (3); 
during the latter it did not include the Flemish socialists while it did include the Francophone Belgian 
socialists, resulting in the Federal government consisting of 2 Flemish parties and 3 Francophone 
Belgian parties.  
Another case of heterogeneity between Flanders and Francophone Belgium with respect to 
composition of the Federal government coalition is that from 1999 onwards the share of the total –
valid- Francophone Belgian vote that was represented in the Federal government has been 
considerably larger than the total –valid- Flemish vote share represented in the Federal government. 
This was because since 1999 Francophone Belgian governing parties have been far larger (in terms of 
Francophone Belgian vote share) than Flemish governing parties (in terms of Flemish vote share). 
During the 2010-2014 legislature the 3 Flemish governing parties were not even supported by half of 
the –valid- Flemish vote cast161.  
As a final illustration of the potential usefulness of adding an interaction of the legislature dummies 
with the FL dummy, graph 2 above shows the divergence of changes in government popularity 
between Flanders and Francophone Belgium over our sample period. In general, graph 2 illustrates 
the larger size of the shocks to the “party landscape” in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium over 
our sample period. In particular, one perceived cause of the heavier loss of Flemish government 
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 In the entire Belgian history, party strength has differed between Flanders and Francophone Belgium, with 
Christian-democrats collecting more votes in Flanders and socialists collecting more votes in Francophone 
Belgium. In recent decades, an additional major difference has been the far larger fragmentation of the party 
landscape in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium, mainly due to the varying success of rightwing and/or 
independentist protest parties in Flanders. 
160
 Although it is hard to see an immediate relationship between transfers and such legislature-specific events. 
161
 The average vote share obtained by the governing coalition at the start of a legislature over our sample period 
is 44.2%. The average Flemish vote share obtained by the governing coalition is 36.9%, while the average 
Francophone Belgian vote share obtained by the governing coalition is 51.8%. (Because we measure the average 
vote share obtained by the governing coalition as the share in total eligible voters, rather than in total valid 
votes cast, it is well possible that this share is below 50%.)  
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parties in 2007 and 2010 was that they had repeatedly failed to implement measures perceived as 
leading towards more autonomy of the Flemish region. In contrast, the general Francophone Belgian 
perception was that Francophone Belgian governing parties had successfully resisted such measures. 
Flemish voters’ resentment of Francophone Belgium and of the Federal government –including of the 
fiscal transfers implicit in the federal budget from Flanders to Francophone Belgium- has arguably 
increased considerably over our sample period, as measured by the vote share of Flemish 
independentist and protest parties
162
.  
Table 3 shows the regression output. Again, column (3) presents an interesting result as such from the 
perspective of the existing literature on distributive politics. In contrast to column (3) in table 2 above, 
we now find that in Belgium taken as a whole an increase in transfers is associated with an increase in 
government popularity. More in particular, coalition parties’ joint vote share increases with 0.5%point 
for every increase of per capita transfers of 100 euros. This result is more in line with the existing 
literature, in contrast to our finding in column (3) of table 2 above. 
Column (4) in table 3 shows the same sign for the coefficients of our 2 variables of interest as column 
(4) in table 2: a positive sign for the non-interacted transfers variable and a negative sign for the 
interacted transfers variable. But the significance switches: now the coefficient of the non-interacted 
coefficient of interest is significant while the coefficient of the interacted coefficient of interest is 
insignificant
163
. Also the joint size of our 2 coefficients of interest is considerably smaller when 
adding the interacted legislature dummies
164
. Overall we now obtain regression results that are more 
in line with the existing literature: the government’s popularity is positively associated with transfers 
–increasing with 0.5%point of the vote share for every increase in transfers per capita of 100 euros-, 
both in Francophone Belgium and in Flanders
165
. This seems less so in Flanders, but the difference 
between Flanders and Francophone Belgium is insignificant
166
. 
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 While Francophone voters seem rather to show disagreement with the political system by not casting their 
vote or by casting a blank or an invalid vote. 
Independence of Flanders would reduce fiscal transfers from Flanders to Francophone Belgium to zero. 
163
 Also, several of the coefficients of the -interacted and non-interacted- legislature dummies –not shown- are 
significant in table 3, similarly to the high significance of most of the –non-interacted- legislature dummies –not 
shown- in table 2. 
164
 The joint size of our 2 coefficients of interest would be somewhat larger if we had not measured the 
government’s vote share in relation to total eligible votes but to total votes validly cast. 
Also the size and significance of the coefficients of our control variables decreases. 
165
 Similarly to table 2, replacing the FL dummy with a “below mean” dummy, a “below median” dummy, or a 
continuous “gross income” variable equally results in smaller coefficients and lower significance also when 
adding legislature dummies interacted with resp. the “below mean” dummy, the “below median” dummy, or the 
continuous “gross income” variable. 
166
 A criticism of our approach in table 3 could be that once we interact one variable with the FL dummy, we 
should interact all variables with the FL dummy, as e.g. Brooks e.a. (2011 p. 9) do with their variable of interest. 
Although this is a demanding specification, interacting all variables with the FL dummy (regression output not 
shown) does not considerably affect our coefficients of interest throughout this paper.  
However, a split sample approach produces rather different results, at the cost of more or less halving our 
number of observations. When running the regression behind column (4) for Flemish districts only, the 
coefficient on transfers is positive but small and insignificant, while when running the regression behind column 
(4) for Francophone districts only, the coefficient on transfers is positive, larger and very significant (p value of 
0.000). The split sample approach however produces similar IV regression results (see below), but evidently the 
reduced number of observations poses an even bigger handicap to an IV regression than to a simple FD 
regression. The split sample approach again produces similar results when regressing our dependent variable 
directly on our IVs (again see below). 
99 
 
Table 3: FD regression of the government’s vote share on transfers, with the interaction of the 
legislature dummies with the FL dummy added as extra controls  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60   -1.129* -1.089* 
   (0.643) (0.643) 
     
D.unemployed   0.561 0.629 
   (0.607) (0.600) 
     
D.under 18   0.00680 -0.0270 
   (0.806) (0.796) 
     
D.gross income   0.219*** 0.214*** 
   (0.0793) (0.0789) 
     
D.ministers   -0.338 -0.357 
   (0.315) (0.304) 
     
D.transfers 0.204** 0.249** 0.488*** 0.505*** 
 (0.0928) (0.110) (0.0993) (0.114) 
     
D.transfers*FL  -0.299  -0.174 
  (0.325)  (0.345) 
     
Legislature*FL dummies included as extra controls in all 4 columns 
     
N 215 215 215 215 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies as well as legislature*FL dummies 
included. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5.2. Instrumental variables (IV) regression results 
 
Of course transfers may be endogenous to popularity of the government, as well as to other time 
variant factors that we would have failed to include as control variables
167
. In particular we could 
think of reverse causality between government popularity and transfers. E.g. the Federal governments 
over our sample period included both the Francophone Belgian and Flemish socialist parties
168
, which 
are assumed to be in favour of an expansion of the “welfare state”. Hence transfers may have 
increased (decreased) whenever governing parties increased (decreased) their vote share, as the latter 
may have meant an increase (decrease) in the socialist vote
169
, and hence an increase (decrease) in 
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 It should be noted that the formula-based nature of our transfers variable as such already mitigates its 
endogeneity, as formula-based transfers may be assumed to be less easily targetable to particular geographic 
areas. Virtually the entire distributive politics literature is about discretionary transfers and investment spending, 
rather than about formula-based transfers.  
Another mitigation of endogeneity of our independent variable of interest with respect to government popularity 
is that it largely consists of social security contributions and expenditures. The latter may be labelled 
entitlements, as they are hard to scale back after approval, and even could be considered “to start leading a life 
of their own” (as argued already above). Moreover, in Belgium, as in several other countries, political parties 
have to an important extent ceded control over the social security system to labour unions and employers’ 
organisations. 
168
 Exception made for the 2007-10 coalition, which excluded the Flemish socialists. 
169
 Over our entire sample period, an increase (decrease) in the joint vote share of the governing parties implied 
an increase (decrease) in the vote share of the governing parties taken separately. The only exceptions are the 
following: decrease in the vote share of both Green parties in 2003; increase in the vote share of the 
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socialist intra-coalition power. However, if the latter causality chain held true, we would expect the 
coefficient of our endogenous variable of interest to be positive, while in table 2 its sign is negative.  
But we could also think of examples of reverse causality implying a negative relationship running 
from government popularity to transfers. E.g. with the vote losses of previous Federal government 
parties in mind, current Federal government parties may increase transfers as an attempt to avoid or 
limit their vote loss during the next federal election
170
. Furthermore, current Federal government 
parties may –correctly- expect vote losses in certain districts during the next elections, and therefore 
increase transfers to these districts. Also, Flemish parties that became part of the Federal government 
over our sample period may have been less pro-transfers in the first place compared to Francophone 
Belgian parties that became part of the Federal government over our sample period
171
. For this reason, 
any increase in the vote share of Flemish government parties may have been associated with a 
decrease in transfers to Flemish districts
172
.  
If the associations of interest in tables 2 and 3 were plagued by reverse causality issues –as seems well 
possible-, the statistically significant associations between government popularity and fiscal transfers 
uncovered in tables 2 and 3 would remain interesting and relevant from a political economics point of 
view. However, in this investigation we are only interested in the one-way –and geographically 
disaggregated- effect of fiscal transfers on government popularity, and not in the reverse effect. 
Therefore we need to solve potential endogeneity problems. 
To this effect, we resort to an IV approach. We propose 2 different IVs for transfers, thereby hoping 
to reduce the chance that none of our IVs is fully exogenous to our dependent variable, or to other 
time variant factors correlated with transfers that we would have failed to include as control variables. 
Both IVs proposed are subsets of overall transfers considered
173
: 
1) Joint early retirement due to downsizing 2007-11: The upper 2 curves in graph 3 show 
retirement benefits received per capita in Flanders resp. in Francophone Belgium due to joint 
early retirement following the downsizing of a firm. Belgian law foresees the possibility of 
granting retirement benefits at a younger age than the statutory retirement age in a number of 
circumstances, among which the downsizing (or closure) of a firm. Such downsizing (or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Francophone Belgian liberals in 2007; increase in the vote share of the Francophone Belgian socialists in 2010; 
decrease in the vote share of the Francophone Belgian socialists in 2014. 
170
 Although the current Federal government parties may precisely be those parties that benefited from the losses 
of the previous government parties, due to which the current Federal government may not be worried so much 
about its popularity in districts in which the previous Federal government suffered a vote loss. 
171
 In Belgium, it is rather widely accepted that Francophone Belgian parties are more pro-government and more 
pro-transfers (both in terms of high expenditures and high taxes) than Flemish parties, even when comparing 
parties of the same “family”. E.g. the Francophone Belgian Christian-democrats are believed to be more pro-
government and more pro-transfers than the Flemish Christian-democrats. 
172
 However, the formula-based nature of our transfers variable renders this reasoning unlikely, as this nature 
seems to make it rather hard to increase or cut transfers to one of the 2 main language communities only, though 
there exist some examples to the contrary, as given above. Another problem with this reasoning is that the vote 
share of Flemish government parties decreased at the end of most of the legislatures comprised by our sample 
period. 
173
 Moreover they are subsets of only one of the 3 components of our transfers variable, i.e. of the social 
expenditures component.  
For examples of other IV regressions using subsets of the original endogenous variable as an IV, see Dahlberg 
e.a. (2008) and Allers and Vermeulen (2013). Dahlberg e.a. (2008) use grants received by a Swedish 
municipality due to outmigration out of that municipality as an IV for total grants received by that Swedish 
municipality. Allers and Vermeulen (2013) instrument general grants received by Dutch municipalities with the 
change in grants that is induced by a reform of the general grant allocation. 
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closure) can be argued to be exogenous to popularity of the then government, as well as to 
other time variant factors correlated with transfers that we would have failed to include as 
control variables
174
. The Ministry of Employment has started collecting data per district with 
respect to joint early retirement due to downsizing only from 2007 onwards
175
. Graph 3 shows 
that –at least since 2007- Flanders has benefited relatively more from this early retirement 
possibility than Francophone Belgium. This may have been because the private sector 
accounts for a larger share of the economy in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium, or 
because the share of the employed is larger in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium in the 
first place. A comparison of graph 1 and graph 3 also makes clear that benefits from joint 
early retirement due to downsizing make up only a small fraction of total transfers (as graph 3 
is expressed in euros per capita while graph 1 is expressed in 100 euros per capita). 
 
Graph 3: Joint early retirement benefits due to downsizing 2007-11 and temporary 
unemployment benefits due to the economic crisis 2009-11 (in real euros of 2011 per capita) 
 
Note: bars indicate federal election years 
Source: Federal Ministry of Employment 
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 A criticism of the use of the early retirement benefits due to downsizing as an IV could be that an increase in 
vote share –and the consequent coming to power or strengthening of their position within the government- of 
particular –e.g. business unfriendly- parties could encourage firms to downsize. Additionally, certain –e.g. 
workers friendly- parties may be more lenient than other parties in granting early retirement –both in terms of 
eligibility and in terms of the financial amounts concerned- on the occasion of a firm’s downsizing. However, 
judged by their party political composition, all Federal government coalitions over our sample period were more 
or less as worker friendly. Another criticism is that in Belgium, the early retirement age on the occasion of a 
firm’s downsizing is negotiated with the Federal government on a case by case basis. Therefore this age may 
vary from firm to firm. There are anecdotes that some government ministers have become personally involved 
in the settlement of closures occurring in their electoral district. 
175
 This is why the related curves in graph 3 show a continuous increase: the joint early retirement benefits that 
were granted before 2007 are not shown but some of them may have expired since 2007. 
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2) Temporary unemployment due to the 2009 economic crisis 2009-11: The lower 2 curves in 
graph 3 show unemployment benefits received per capita in Flanders and in Francophone 
Belgium due to temporary unemployment caused by the 2009 economic crisis. Because of the 
2009 economic crisis, Belgian law –similar to measures taken in other EU countries- offered 
employers the possibility to postpone laying off redundant workers and instead to grant them 
government funded temporary unemployment benefits. Such temporary unemployment can 
be argued to be exogenous to popularity of the then government, as well as to other time 
variant factors correlated with transfers that we would have failed to include as control 
variables, as arguably the 2009 economic crisis was a worldwide phenomenon
176
. Graph 3 
shows that Flanders benefited relatively more also from this early retirement possibility than 
Francophone Belgium. This may once again have been because the private sector accounts for 
a larger share of the economy in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium or because the share 
of the employed is larger in Flanders than in Francophone Belgium. Graph 3 also makes clear 
that also benefits from temporary unemployment make up only a small fraction of total 
transfers. 
 
Table 4 shows our IV regression results. Following Dahlberg e.a. (2008 p. 2324), we make sure to 
keep controlling for the share of unemployed also in our IV regression, as our instruments may also 
directly affect government popularity –i.e. not via our transfers variable-, because an increase in early 
retirement and an increase in temporary unemployment imply an increase in the overall number of 
unemployed, which we assume to directly affect government popularity
177
. Columns (1) to (4) show 
the results when instrumenting transfers with benefits due to early retirement following downsizing, 
in columns (1) and (2) without the interaction of our transfers variable with the FL dummy, and in 
columns (3) and (4) with the interaction of our transfers variable with the FL dummy
178
. The 
associations between transfers in general and transfers to Flemish districts in particular on the one 
hand and the government’s vote share on the other hand are broadly similar in sign and significance to 
the associations in columns (3) and (4) of table 2. However, the size of the associations is 
considerably larger than their size in table 2, as their size is generally considerably larger in all other 
IV regressions below. This larger size may be due to the fact that IV estimation removes the 
downward bias of OLS estimates due to measurement error.  
Columns (1) and (2) confirm the absence of any association between transfers in general and 
government popularity. The difference between columns (1) and (2) is that column (2) adds the 
lagged dependent variable (LDV) as a regressor. This inclusion is inspired by the correlation between 
                                                          
176
 A criticism of the use of temporary unemployment benefits due to the economic crisis as an IV could be that 
an increase in vote share –and the consequent coming to power- of particular –e.g. worker friendly- parties 
could increase the probability of a temporary unemployment benefits scheme being established, as well as of the 
related benefit amounts granted being more generous. Indeed, the then Federal government coalition expanded 
the decades’ old Belgian temporary unemployment benefits scheme in 2009 on the occasion of the then 
economic crisis, to enable not only blue-collar workers but also white-collar workers to benefit from it. 
However, arguably the then government coalition was more or less as worker friendly as the previous coalition, 
judged by its party political composition. 
177
 An increase in early retirement and an increase in temporary unemployment imply an increase in the overall 
number of unemployed, either because the early retired and the temporary unemployed are simply a subset of 
the overall unemployed, or because it is well possible that whenever in a particular district the number of early 
retired or the number of temporary unemployed increase, also “ordinary” unemployment increases, e.g. because 
not all workers laid off may be eligible for early retirement or temporary unemployment. (This point was made 
clear to me by Filip Bossier and Hilde Geeraers of the Ministry of Employment.) 
178
 Regression results in columns (1) to (4) are similar when using the number of beneficiaries rather than the 
amount of benefits due to early retirement following downsizing as an IV. 
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successive differences in government parties’ joint vote share suggested by graph 2. We instrument 
the LDV with the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 lag of the dependent variable expressed in levels
179
. The larger size of 
our coefficients of interest compared to table 2 is even less surprising in column (2), because when 
including an LDV, the coefficient on transfers only measures the short-term effect of a change in 
transfers on government popularity, which may reasonably be assumed to be higher than the 
“average” effect. In column (3) of table 4 the coefficient on our interacted transfers variable turns 
insignificant compared to column (4) of table 2, and additionally the F-test of joint significance points 
at a relevance of 1 of our IVs that is problematic. However, when we add the LDV as a regressor, as 
done in column (4), our coefficient of interest almost turns significant again (p value of 0.16). A 
disadvantage of including the LDV as a regressor is that it makes us lose 2 more legislatures of 
observations. This is because we need to instrument the LDV -as said by making use of the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
lag of the dependent variable expressed in levels-, which reduces our number of legislatures to a mere 
3, and our number of observations to a mere 129. 
Columns (5) to (8) show the IV regression results when using benefits due to temporary 
unemployment following the 2009 economic crisis as an IV, in columns (5) and (6) without the 
interaction of our transfers variable with the FL dummy, and in columns (7) and (8) with the 
interaction of our transfers variable with the FL dummy180. Once again, the associations between 
transfers on the one hand and the government’s vote share on the other hand are broadly similar in 
sign and significance to the associations in columns (3) and (4) of table 2. Again, columns (5) and (6) 
confirm the absence of any association between transfers in general and government popularity. 
 
The difference between the regressions using early retirement due to downsizing as an IV and the 
regressions using benefits due to temporary unemployment following the 2009 economic crisis as an 
IV is that in the latter regressions the coefficient on the interacted transfers variable is much more 
significant (columns (7) and (8)), similar to column (4) in table 2. Moreover, in column (8) we can 
additionally conduct the Hansen J test, as we now have available one more excluded instrument than 
instrumented variables, thanks to instrumenting the LDV with the 2nd and 3rd lag of the dependent 
variable expressed in levels. The Hansen J test shows us that we cannot exclude validity of the IV. 
Moreover, the F-test of joint significance shows that our IV is relevant.  
 
Therefore we can now claim the association between transfers to a Flemish district and government 
popularity to consist of a causal effect. Thus an increase in transfers to Flemish voters makes the 
latter vote less for government parties rather than more. This result could be interpreted as supportive 
of our hypothesis that Flemish parties have less of an incentive to run a federal deficit –conducive to 
an increase in transfers- than Francophone Belgian parties. Flemish voters may be aware that an 
increase in transfers to them may come at a high cost, keeping in mind 1) the track record of fiscal 
indiscipline of the Belgian Federal government, as well as 2) the formula-based –i.e. Belgium-wide- 
and government-to-citizen nature of the transfers considered. 
 
                                                          
179
 With the risk of comparing apples and oranges: the 2
nd
 as well as the 3
rd
 lag of government popularity may 
concern different governing parties as well as a different number of governing parties compared to the 
contemporaneous government popularity variable.  
An advantage of increasing our number of IVs is that this is expected to reduce our standard errors. 
180
 Regression results in columns (5) to (8) are similar when using the number of beneficiaries rather than the 
amount of benefits due to temporary unemployment following the 2009 economic crisis as an IV. 
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Table 4: IV regression of the government’s vote share difference on difference in transfers 
 IV: D.downsizing retirement benefits IV: D.crisis unemployment benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60 -9.522 -3.856 6.198 1.466 -4.248** -7.268*** -4.343* -1.368 
 (13.01) (4.223) (54.04) (2.271) (1.784) (2.225) (2.536) (2.398) 
         
D.unemployed -0.852 -1.880 24.72 7.215 0.707 -4.258 6.220*** 10.69** 
 (3.872) (3.809) (37.42) (5.772) (0.910) (3.867) (1.739) (4.729) 
         
D.under 18 -7.886 -3.940 19.02 0.629 -4.416** -6.509** -0.0925 -0.861 
 (8.738) (4.108) (50.30) (2.804) (1.778) (3.144) (2.854) (3.264) 
         
D.gross income 1.549 -1.355 -6.155 -1.239 0.0227 -0.738 -0.785 0.368 
 (3.814) (1.003) (18.61) (0.960) (0.524) (0.512) (0.510) (0.615) 
         
D.ministers -0.990 0.157 -2.926 0.706 -0.240 0.261 -1.358 1.136 
 (2.124) (1.528) (6.630) (1.733) (0.675) (1.663) (1.131) (1.891) 
         
D.transfers 3.663 -2.128 -6.365 -2.019 -0.143 -0.767 0.274 1.295 
 (9.448) (1.895) (38.66) (2.018) (1.326) (0.978) (1.143) (1.035) 
         
D.transfers*FL   -24.51 -4.302   -6.490*** -7.881*** 
   (28.51) (3.068)   (0.831) (1.309) 
         
L.D.govt vote  -0.0836  0.348***  -0.432***  0.0348 
  (0.287)  (0.123)  (0.160)  (0.163) 
         
N 215 129 215 129 215 129 215 129 
Hansen J (p value) - 0.18 - 0.04 - 0.63 - 0.22 
F-test of joint significance of IVs 
in 1st stage (p value) 
0.41 0.08 0.37 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of IVs 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Again, with respect to our IV regressions, one could argue that a lower vote share obtained by the 
governing parties is caused by a district’s transfers being below the mean (or below the median), 
rather than by a district being situated in Flanders. I.e. in those few Francophone Belgian districts that 
are characterised by transfers that are below the mean (or below the median), an increase in transfers 
could well cause the government’s vote share to decrease as much as in Flanders. Likewise, in those 
few Flemish districts that are characterised by transfers that are above the mean (or above the 
median), an increase in transfers could well cause the government’s vote share to remain as stable as 
in Francophone Belgium. However, when we replace the FL dummy with a dummy “below mean” (or 
with a dummy “below median”) taking the value of 1 in all districts –Flemish or Francophone 
Belgian- that are characterised by transfers that are below the mean (or below the median), the 
coefficients of interest in table 4 become smaller and less significant, often even insignificant, 
similarly to table 2
181
. This suggests that –while being characterised by transfers that are below the 
mean or the median may cause a district to worry about an increase in transfers- even Flemish districts 
with transfers above the mean (or above the “median”) are –rightly or wrongly- more worried about 
transfers than Francophone Belgian districts. Similarly, this suggests that even Francophone Belgian 
districts with transfers below the mean (or below the median) are –rightly or wrongly- less worried 
about transfers than Flemish districts
182
. 
Regression results in table 4 broadly remain unchanged when including the 2004 and 2009 regional 
election results into our dependent variable. Taking into account the results of the 2004 and 2009 
regional elections may be warranted because considering federal legislatures as time periods rather 
than individual years goes with the disadvantage of losing a lot of observations. A way to increase our 
number of time periods available again is to take into account the Federal government parties’ vote 
share during non-concurrent regional elections. Indeed, regional elections in Belgium may well have 
been a test of the popularity of the Federal government coalition as well
183
. Regression results in table 
4 also broadly remain unchanged when using the –differed- “non-system vote” as the dependent 
variable. We define the “non-system” vote as the difference between 100% and the vote share 
obtained by parties that participated in at least 1 Federal government over our sample period. The 
“non-system vote” may be a better measure of voters’ dislike of transfers –and of debt increases that 
may follow from it- than votes for the governing coalition. This is because votes for opposition parties 
that are “system parties”, i.e. that did govern during at least one legislature over our sample period, 
may not so much express dislike of transfers as such, rather than dislike of the current distribution of 
transfers
184
. 
All in all, our IV regression results of table 4 confirm our finding of a negative association between 
transfers to Flemish districts and popularity of Flemish government parties in column (4) of table 2. 
The results using temporary unemployment benefits additionally show a negative causal effect of 
transfers to Flanders on Flemish governing parties’ vote share.  
                                                          
181
 The association also becomes smaller and less significant when we replace the FL dummy with the 
continuous “gross income” variable. 
182
 Replacing the FL dummy with a “below mean” (or “below median”) dummy or with the continuous “gross 
income” variable equally results in smaller coefficients and lower significance when adding legislature dummies 
interacted with the FL dummy (see below). 
183
 Adding the election results of the 2004 and 2009 regional elections equally results in smaller coefficients and 
lower significance compared to the FD regression results when adding legislature dummies interacted with the 
FL dummy. 
184
 Using the “non-system vote” as the dependent variable equally results in smaller coefficients and lower 
significance compared to the FD regression results when adding legislature dummies interacted with the FL 
dummy. 
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However, adding the interaction of the legislature dummies with the FL dummy as extra control 
variables -as done in table 5- again changes our regression outputs considerably. Columns (1), (2), (5) 
and (6) of table 5 show that the significantly positive association between transfers in general and 
government popularity as found in column (3) of table 3 disappears. Additionally, as a result of the 
specifications behind columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), hardly any of our 2 coefficients of interest is 
significant anymore. Columns (4) and (8) even show an unexpected positive sign for the interacted 
variable (but it should be added that these columns show the results of a regression merely using 129 
observations due to the inclusion of an LDV). Also the F-test now points at one or more weak IVs in 
most specifications
185
. 
 
                                                          
185
 Similarly, when replacing net transfers with its 3 constitutive components –social transfers, social security 
contributions, and income tax payments- as the dependent variable both in a simple FD and in an IV regression, 
we find a significantly negative association between transfers to Flanders and government popularity, while this 
effect disappears once we include legislature dummies interacted with the FL dummy. Indeed, a criticism of 
using a composite net transfers variable as our independent variable could be that its social security 
contributions component may be less visible to the citizen, as it is directly paid by his employer to the 
government –i.e. a citizen’s salary received is net of social security contributions. Moreover, the pay slip of an 
employee does not even mention the so-called “employer’s contribution” to social security that an employer 
makes per employee, while this “employer’s contribution” is well included into the social security contribution 
component of our net transfers variable. 
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Table 5: IV regression of the government’s vote share difference on difference in transfers, with the interaction of the legislature dummies with the FL dummy 
added as extra controls 
 IV: D.downsizing retirement benefits IV:D.crisis unemployment benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60 -6.774 -1.413 -1.951 -2.124 -0.697 -0.756 0.326 -1.159 
 (9.351) (1.470) (1.707) (2.392) (0.735) (1.043) (2.055) (1.290) 
         
D.unemployed -2.230 3.111 0.916 1.565 0.774 0.143 2.328 -0.231 
 (4.897) (2.135) (1.632) (3.167) (0.618) (1.854) (2.288) (1.984) 
         
D.under 18 -3.146 0.0798 -1.334 0.149 0.248 0.626 -0.394 0.529 
 (5.095) (1.876) (1.058) (2.852) (0.853) (1.611) (1.206) (2.149) 
         
D.gross income 2.763 1.090 0.791 1.119 0.0241 -0.00379 -0.160 0.144 
 (4.276) (0.730) (0.496) (0.928) (0.196) (0.188) (0.467) (0.222) 
         
D.ministers -1.239 -1.416* -0.862 -2.585 -0.269 -0.000231 -0.647 -0.863 
 (1.793) (0.821) (0.566) (1.714) (0.290) (0.940) (0.587) (1.399) 
         
D.transfers 6.651 2.067 2.335** 1.756 0.0166 0.202 0.206 0.255 
 (10.25) (1.429) (0.994) (1.686) (0.417) (0.292) (0.462) (0.380) 
         
D.transfers*FL   -2.741 3.645   -3.773 1.910 
   (3.449) (4.035)   (4.536) (2.347) 
         
L.D.govt vote  8.145**  8.909*  0.00148  1.559 
  (4.110)  (5.111)  (2.589)  (2.904) 
         
Legislature*FL dummies included as extra controls in all 8 columns 
         
N 215 129 215 129 215 129 215 129 
Hansen J (p value) - 0.31 - 0.91 - 0.06 - 0.05 
F-test of joint significance of IVs 
in 1st stage (p value) 
0.56 0.33 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.59 0.29 0.60 
Number of IVs 1 .3 2 4 1 3 2 4 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies as well as legislature*FL dummies included; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.3. Direct FD regression of the government’s vote share on our IVs 
 
Because our 2 IVs are simply subsets of our overall variables of interest, we would expect the 
coefficients on our IVs (as opposed to most other IVs) to be significant with the expected sign and to 
be ready for interpretation in a simple direct FD regression of the dependent variable (in our case the 
governing coalition’s vote share) on our IVs. Of course in such a regression we again should take care 
to control for the number of unemployed, as we wish to estimate the effect of the transfers that follow 
from early retirement due to downsizing and temporary unemployment due to the 2008-9 economic 
crisis, and not the effect of the unemployment as such these 2 events cause
186
. Such a direct regression 
can be considered as an alternative to our IV regression for which we presented the results in table 4 
above
187
. Table 6 presents the results of directly regressing the government’s popularity on our 2 IVs –
transfers ascribed to resp. the downsizing of firms and the impact of the 2009 worldwide economic 
crisis on Belgium- consecutively.  
The direct regressions on transfers now confirm our results obtained in table 4: no effect of transfers in 
general and a significantly smaller –and even negative- effect of transfers to Flanders separately. 
Moreover in the specification with an interacted transfers variable also the coefficients of the non-
interacted transfers variable now become significant (with the expected sign), implying a positive 
effect of transfers to Francophone Belgium on government popularity. While the coefficients of 
interest in table 6 are much larger, the typical effect is of the same order of magnitude as the typical 
association of the simple FD regression in table 2 above. We calculate the typical effect by means of 
example for the interacted variable of interest in column (2). The within standard deviation of early 
retirement benefits per Flemish district over our 6 legislatures is 2.5 euros per capita. Therefore, the 
typical variation in the difference in government vote share between a Francophone and a Flemish 
district due to variations in early retirement benefits – (a bit unrealistically) expressed in 100 euros per 
capita- over time equals about -3.6%points (-142.0%points times 0.025), with a p value of 0.000 
(compared to -3.7%points in table 2).  
 
  
                                                          
186
 However, the unemployment control hardly seems to affect our coefficients of interest reported in tables 6 
and 7, as the latter hardly change when we omit the unemployment control from each of the regression 
specifications reported in tables 6 and 7. 
187
 A problem with respect to our first instrument –early retirement benefits due to downsizing- could be that –as 
graph 3 implies- its value is zero for most of our observations, as the Ministry of Employment only started 
collecting data for our first instrument from 2007 onwards. In reality however, early retirement benefits due to 
downsizing were always strictly positive in each year of our sample period. However, if we would consider early 
retirement benefits per district pre-2007 as missing observations, this would drastically reduce our sample size. 
This problem evidently does not apply to our 2
nd
 instrument: the extra unemployment benefits granted because 
of the 2009 economic crisis are of course effectively zero pre-2009. 
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Table 6: Direct FD regression of the government’s vote share on our IVs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60 -4.363*** -3.654*** -4.433*** -3.686*** 
 (1.168) (1.078) (1.085) (0.971) 
     
D.unemployed 0.610 1.465** 0.647 1.238* 
 (0.765) (0.645) (0.763) (0.682) 
     
D.under 18 -4.383** -3.443* -4.521** -3.282** 
 (1.929) (1.766) (1.758) (1.533) 
     
D.gross income 0.0785 0.0759 0.0803 0.160* 
 (0.110) (0.0991) (0.109) (0.0839) 
     
D.ministers -0.253 -0.116 -0.276 -0.333 
 (0.660) (0.546) (0.688) (0.539) 
     
D.downsizing -11.78 90.62***   
retirement 
benefits 
(26.36) (28.06)   
     
D.downsizing  -142.0***   
retirement 
benefits*FL 
 (20.62)   
     
D.crisis    -17.77 520.7*** 
unemployment 
benefits 
  (171.4) (176.2) 
     
D.crisis    -1114.2*** 
unemployment 
benefits*FL 
   (137.0) 
     
N 215 215 215 215 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies included. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Adding the interaction of the legislature dummies with the FL dummy as extra control variables -as 
done in table 7- weakens the evidence provided by our regression outputs in favour of our hypothesis, 
but less so than in the IV analysis shown in table 5. Compared to table 6, the specifications in table 7 
broadly show the same sign for the coefficients of our 2 variables of interest. But compared to 
columns (2) and (4) in table 6, the coefficients of the non-interacted variable of interest are no longer 
significant, and in column (4) also the coefficient of the interacted variable of interest fails to be 
significant with a p value of 0.15. Additionally, the sizes of the coefficients on the interacted variables 
in table 7 are small. E.g. the coefficient of -5.33 on the interacted variable in column (2) implies a 
typical difference in effect of a 100 euros increase in early retirement benefits in Flanders on 
government popularity amounting to -0.14%points only (with a p value of 0.000). 
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Table 7: Direct FD regression of the government’s vote share on our IVs, with the interaction of 
the legislature dummies with the FL dummy added as extra controls  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote D.govt vote 
D.over 60 -0.589 -0.685 -0.683 -0.756 
 (0.702) (0.705) (0.693) (0.700) 
     
D.unemployed 0.720 0.885 0.782 0.804 
 (0.642) (0.646) (0.633) (0.634) 
     
D.under 18 0.440 0.414 0.254 0.193 
 (0.931) (0.929) (0.880) (0.890) 
     
D.gross income 0.0143 0.00566 0.0173 0.0240 
 (0.0784) (0.0772) (0.0765) (0.0779) 
     
D.ministers -0.248 -0.183 -0.266 -0.281 
 (0.303) (0.313) (0.306) (0.308) 
     
D.downsizing -1.397 1.971   
retirement 
benefits 
(1.148) (1.514)   
     
D.downsizing  -5.332***   
retirement 
benefits*FL 
 (1.860)   
     
D.crisis    0.204 7.959 
unemployment 
benefits 
  (5.399) (7.231) 
     
D.crisis    -16.77 
unemployment 
benefits*FL 
   (11.33) 
     
Legislature*FL dummies included as extra controls in all 4 columns 
     
N 215 215 215 215 
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; legislature dummies as well as legislature*FL dummies 
included. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As an extra check we repeated the regressions for which the results are shown in tables 6 and 7 after 
adding our original endogenous transfers variable as well as our original endogenous transfers variable 
interacted with the FL dummy as extra controls. This is to conduct an extra check if it is the transfers 
due to early retirement because of downsizing as well as the transfers due to temporary unemployment 
because of the economic crisis that have the direct effect on government popularity apparent from 
tables 6 and 7, rather than the events causing these transfers. The regression results (not shown) then 
still show the same coefficients on our –presumably exogenous- variables of interest to be significant 
as in tables 6 and 7. These results confirm our fear that it could well be the events behind our IVs, 
rather than the transfers captured by our IVs, that directly impact our dependent variable government 
popularity. These results suggest that voters –rightly or wrongly- ascribed the downsizing of firms 
and/or the size of the impact of the 2009 worldwide economic crisis on Belgium to the Federal 
government in office at those times. It could therefore well be voters’ increased disappointment with a 
government possibly held responsible for the investors climate and/or the economic cycle
188
 rather 
than the –related- increase in transfers that explains the decreased government popularity189. 
                                                          
188
 Notwithstanding the fact that we control for the share of unemployed.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
As political parties in Belgium are split along Flemish-Francophone linguistic lines, and as Flanders 
enjoys relatively less federal expenditures and pays relatively more federal taxes than Francophone 
Belgium, the incentives for Flemish parties to run a budget deficit when governing at the federal level 
seem smaller than for Francophone parties. As the federal debt is serviced out of federal tax revenues, 
Flanders bears most of the cost of debt servicing, while having benefited relatively less from the 
additional expenditures that had been made possible by a federal budget deficit. 
The geographically unevenly spread benefits of Belgian federal budget deficits –and the 
geographically diverging incentives for federal budget deficits this disparity seems to create- may well 
explain to some extent the large overall size of the federal debt since the 1970s. Therefore, 
interregional fiscal transfers resulting from the federal debt may be important not just because of their 
distributional consequences, but even more because they may provide an explanation for the large 
overall size of deficits and debt that have characterised Belgium since the 1970s
190
. 
We have tested for these differing federal budget deficit incentives empirically by investigating the 
effect of an increase in net fiscal transfers to inhabitants of the 22 Flemish districts on the popularity of 
Flemish parties that govern at the federal level, compared to the effect of an increase in net fiscal 
transfers to inhabitants of the 21 Francophone Belgian districts on the popularity of Francophone 
parties that govern at the federal level, over the 1995-2011 period. Our net fiscal transfers variable is 
formula-based and is defined as social transfers received by citizens minus social security 
contributions and income taxes paid by citizens. We consider our net fiscal transfers variable as an –
imperfect- indicator to citizens of their district’s contribution to the federal budget balance.  
In contrast to the existing distributive politics literature, we have found that an increase in net fiscal 
transfers to Flemish districts causes Flemish parties governing at the federal level to lose votes during 
the next federal election, while the effect is insignificant for Francophone Belgian parties as well as 
for Belgium as a whole. This negative effect of net transfers on votes in Flanders is remarkable, all the 
more so because our net transfers variable consists more of transfers paid by citizens to the Federal 
government (social security contributions and income taxes) than of transfers received by citizens 
(social transfers). The negative effect may be suggestive of Flemish voters being aware of the facts (1) 
that increases in formula-based and government-to-citizen net transfers to Flanders may go hand in 
hand with –possibly even larger- increases in the same net transfers to Francophone Belgium, (2) that 
increases in these transfers may increase the public debt, and (3) that the public debt is serviced 
disproportionately with federal taxes collected in Flanders. Our findings seem consistent with our 
earlier calculations that Flanders bears a far larger share of the tax cost of Belgian budget deficit 
accumulation than Francophone Belgium. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Such disappointment could well have been shared by voters who did not lose their job, as these may have feared 
that they would be “next in line”. 
189
 Alternatively, decreased government popularity could simply have been caused by the possibly changed 
perception of interests of the newly retired and/or the newly unemployed. This latter explanation seems 
somewhat improbable however, as the interests of both workers and beneficiaries of retirement and 
unemployment benefits seem to be best defended by socialist and Christian-democratic parties, which were part 
of the Federal government coalition over most of our sample period. 
190
 Indeed, while cooperation of all coalition partners may be needed to avoid a deficit, non-cooperation by one 
of them may suffice to cause a deficit. See Roubini and Sachs (1989). 
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Could the difference in the effect of transfers on government popularity between Flanders and 
Francophone Belgium be due to a simple difference in their preferences for government spending
191
? 
This does not seem likely, as those preferences probably did not substantially change over our sample 
period, and as the bulk of our transfers variable consists of government revenues, not spending. Could 
the difference in the effect of transfers on government popularity between Flanders and Francophone 
Belgium be due to the considerable and widening difference in their gross incomes per capita
192
, 
and/or in their other demographic-economic characteristics? This does not seem likely either, as we 
control for gross income per capita, as well as for other demographic-economic characteristics. 
The negative effect is however smaller and less significant when weighting our net transfers variable 
for the size of the federal budget deficit. A possible explanation is that for the individual citizen net 
fiscal transfers received at the district level may be a more visible indicator of the sustainability of 
federal public finances than the aggregate federal budget balance. Another explanation would be that 
Flemish voters dislike extra formula-based transfers to Flanders even if the federal budget would be 
balanced. Indeed, Flemish voters may fear that the concomitant extra formula-based transfers to 
Francophone Belgium would be even larger or would be funded with less federal expenditures to or 
more taxes raised from Flanders that are not included in our independent formula-based net transfers 
variable. In this case, our regression analysis would be about measuring the effect of net fiscal 
transfers as such on government popularity, rather than on the effect of federal budget deficits on 
government popularity. 
The Flemish negative effect of transfers received on government popularity even turns insignificant in 
a number of specifications when adding Flanders-specific legislature fixed effects as control variables, 
while this addition preserves the insignificantly positive Francophone Belgian as well as Belgium-
wide effect in most regression specifications. Adding Flanders-specific legislature fixed effects as 
control variables may be justified because federal elections in Belgium are held in parallel in Flanders 
and in Francophone Belgium, with the 2 communities hardly having any geography, media, language 
or political parties in common.  
Therefore, while -fiscally speaking- Francophone Belgian parties would have an incentive to run a 
deficit while the reverse holds for Flemish parties, we only find weak evidence that these incentives 
would be reflected into the behaviour of Francophone Belgian or of Flemish voters. We therefore 
cannot conclusively state that Francophone Belgian voters would particularly reward extra net 
transfers received with more votes, nor that Flemish voters would reward extra net transfers received 
with significantly less votes. Perhaps our inconclusiveness means that Francophone Belgian voters 
                                                          
191
 In Belgium it is widely accepted that Francophone Belgian voters are more pro public expenditures than 
Flemish voters. E.g. over our sample period a much larger share of Francophone Belgian voters voted for 
leftwing parties compared to Flanders. Of the Francophone Belgian parties that obtained parliamentary seats 
over our sample period, PS, Ecolo, and cdH are considered leftwing. (cdH is only being considered leftwing –
instead of centre- after 1999, the year in which cdH was expelled from the Federal government for the 1
st
 time 
since WWII.) In the parliament of the French Community, these 3 parties combined have held between 66 and 
73% of the seats since 1999. This is a far higher share than the combined share of the Flemish parties that are 
considered leftwing, i.e. sp.a and Groen. The Francophone Belgian leftwing vote share remains higher if we also 
count votes for CD&V, the Flemish centre party, as leftwing votes. 
192
 The difference between the average annual gross income per capita in Flanders and in Francophone Belgium 
increased from 2123 to 2775 real euros between 1995 and 2011. 
Dixit and Londregan (1998) hypothesize that the votes of lower-income groups can more easily be “bought” 
with transfers. 
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overestimate the future cost of extra transfers they will bear
193
, and that Flemish voters underestimate 
the future cost of extra transfers they will bear. Alternatively, our inconclusiveness may mean that 
Francophone Belgian parties overestimate the rewards -in terms of voters’ gratitude- of steering extra 
transfers to Francophone Belgium, and that Flemish parties correctly estimate the –lack of- relative 
punishment of steering extra transfers to Flanders. This lack of punishment may explain the 
continuous federal budget deficits and the high federal public debt in Belgium. 
From the perspective of the existing literature on the impact of transfers on government popularity, the 
weak evidence found regarding a positive Francophone Belgian and Belgium-wide effect seems more 
puzzling than the weak evidence found regarding a less positive Flemish effect. 
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Annex 1: “Arrondissements” (districts) of Belgium 
 
Flemish districts are districts to the north of the Belgian language border, i.e. to the north of the quasi-
horizontal line running from west to east through the middle of Belgium. The exception is the Brussels 
district, which we consider to be a Francophone Belgian district. 
Francophone Belgian districts are districts to the south of the Belgian language border, plus Brussels. 
District names are indicated in bold. Names of provinces are indicated in non-bold. Names of districts 
that are also the names of provincial capitals are in capital letters. 
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Chapter 4: Partisan allocation of grants to Brussels municipalities: does it 
pay to be small and new in power?
194
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the politicisation of intergovernmental grants per individual party in a coalition at the 
municipal level of the Brussels Capital Region of Belgium. We find that municipal coalitions 
comprising Ecolo, a small party that is moreover relatively new in power, receive significantly more 
discretionary grants when that party is also in power at one of the subsidising levels. However, we find 
that these extra grants are not sufficient to compensate for the decrease in grants that municipalities 
experience when they are governed by this same party Ecolo, if Ecolo is not also in power at one or 
more subsidising levels. Our results are obtained by instrumenting being in power at the municipal 
level with cases of being in power as part of a coalition from which a dominant party has been 
excluded, and with cases of 1
st
 ever coalition participation. 
Keywords: distributive politics; fiscal federalism; discretionary grants; partisan alignment 
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1. Introduction 
 
Belgium is a federal country with 3 important layers of government, the Federal government, the 
Regional and Community governments, and the Municipal governments
195
. Moreover, the Belgian 
system of fiscal federalism is heavily grants-based, when compared internationally. (see e.g. Jennes 
2014) 
Grants financing of lower level governments has advantages over its alternative, i.e. tax autonomy for 
the governments receiving the grants. The most important ones seem that grants from government to 
government avoid the negative tax externalities that tax autonomy may generate, and that they enable 
the same level of public goods provision in all jurisdictions. However, intergovernmental grants also 
have major drawbacks, such as the flypaper effect (i.e. their tendency to increase public spending), the 
soft budget effect (i.e. their tendency to increase government debts), and politicisation. The recent 
literature –see e.g. Bordignon e.a. (2013) for Italy and Brollo e.a. (2013) for Brazil- has added 2 more 
possible disadvantages of intergovernmental grants compared to tax autonomy, i.e. an increase in 
corruption and a decrease in the quality of politicians –i.e. in their professional other than political 
skills. 
This paper is the first one to our knowledge to investigate the politicisation of intergovernmental 
grants in Belgium. So far evidence was only anecdotal (for the Brussels municipality level see e.g. Le 
Vif/L’Express 2011). The paper’s attempt is to be part of the 2nd generation papers in fiscal federalism 
investigating politicisation of grants, i.e. to find a way around the problem of endogeneity of being in 
power. Grants may not so much be determined by politics, rather it may be that grants determine 
political outcomes. Alternatively, grants may be determined by unobserved factors also determining 
political outcomes. Our strategy will be to instrument being in power
196
 in a municipality –deemed 
potentially endogenous- with cases of being in power after the formation of an anti-coalition and with 
cases of 1
st
 ever being in power of a particular political party in a particular municipality. We define an 
anti-coalition as a coalition from which either the largest or 2
nd
 largest party –in terms of vote and seat 
share- has been excluded, even though these 2 parties taken together have a majority of seats at their 
disposal so that these 2 parties could form a municipal coalition already by themselves.  
We will operationalise politicisation as partisan –i.e. party-political- alignment. We will try to answer 
the question if municipalities that are party-politically aligned with the subsidising government 
level(s) receive more grants. The “partisan alignment hypothesis” differs from –and is more 
sophisticated than- the so called “standard partisan hypothesis”. (see Migueis 2013 p. 2) The latter 
assumes that parties do not per se favour aligned lower governments with intergovernmental grants but 
that they simply favour lower government levels where they obtain many votes, whether those lower 
governments are aligned or not. The standard partisan hypothesis with respect to intergovernmental 
grants may rather be simplistic and naïve as trying to favour voters directly by means of 
intergovernmental grants may be inefficient for any given political party in power at the subsidising 
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 The Belgian Regions and Communities are the equivalent of the “states” in other federal countries. The 3 
Belgian Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) have geographic borders and are mainly in charge of 
infrastructure, economic policy, and local government. The 2 major Belgian Communities do not have clear 
borders as both the Flemish and the French Community are active within the –officially bilingual- Brussels 
Region. The Flemish and the French Communities are mainly in charge of education and care for the young and 
the elderly, resp. benefiting the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking Belgians. 
196
 By “being in power” we mean either being the largest party in power or being a junior partner within the 
governing coalition. 
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level if one or more other parties are in power within some of the lower level governments. With a 
view to getting re-elected as a subsidising government, the literature allows us to distinguish at least 3 
reasons for the relative efficiency of trying to favour aligned lower level governments rather than 
sympathetic voters:  
1) If intergovernmental grants are allocated to unaligned governments, the party in power at the 
lower level instead of the party in power at the higher level could claim the credit towards the 
favoured voters for the public goods provided thanks to the extra grants
197
. The party in power 
at the higher level would rather like to see “its own” local politicians claim the credit for the 
extra grants. This is because the former expects that the latter’s obtaining extra grants would 
signal its high ability to voters, and hence increase the probability of the latter’s re-election. In 
turn, re-election of a party at the lower level could reflect favourably on the party as a whole, 
including at the subsidising level. (Bracco e.a. 2012 p. 5) Indeed, there is empirical evidence 
that lower level governments benefit electorally from being aligned. Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) 
find that aligned municipal incumbents in Spain gain 10% more votes in municipal elections, 
which may be thanks to the fact that aligned municipalities receive more grants. Bracco e.a. 
(2014) find that aligned municipal incumbents in Italy have a 20 to 35% higher chance to get 
re-elected.  
2) Baskaran and Hessami (2014 p. 7) hypothesise that the strength of a party at the lower 
government level would be one of the determinants of the strength of that party at the higher 
government level(s) for still another reason: the more lower level governments are aligned, the 
easier a party in power at the subsidising levels may be able to implement its policies at the 
lower level(s). The less resistance to its policies a party governing at the higher level may 
experience, the more successful that party may be at the next elections at the subsidising level.  
3) Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Migueis (2013 p.2) put forward an explanation completely 
different from credit claiming and ability signalling towards voters in favour of partisan 
allocation: extra grants would be meant to increase the gratitude of local politicians towards 
their party. Hence the extra grants could help to to ensure that local politicians will mobilise 
more voters to support the party at the next elections at the subsidising level. Larcinese e.a. 
(2006 p. 453) give the example of US state governors who are aligned with the party of the 
President, and their presumed ability to “deliver” the vote of their state in presidential 
elections
198
. 
 
Remarkably, the existing literature allows us also to distinguish a reason for the relative efficiency of 
trying to favour non-aligned lower level governments rather than aligned lower level governments. In 
their study of the effect of partisan alignment on intergovernmental grants to municipalities in the 
German state of Hesse, Baskaran and Hessami (2014) find that rightwing state governments favour 
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 This is because, as Bracco e.a. (2012 p. 5) point out, an essential feature of intergovernmental grants is that 
they prevent the local voters to distinguish between the resp. lower level government’s and higher level 
government’s contributions to public good provision. Using the wording of Arulampalam e.a. (2009 p. 104): the 
grants receiving government stands “between” the grants providing government and the voters at the grants 
receiving government level. Or using the wording of Dasgupta e.a. (2004): when the electoral returns from 
spending are shared between the state government and the central government, then transferring funds to a 
government of the opponent party generates a “leakage” effect whereby the central government loses part of the 
electoral benefit from spending. 
198
 However, Erikson e.a. (2014) find that a presidential candidate’s vote share is reduced by 3 to 4 percentage 
points in states with a governor from the same party. They suggest as an explanation that voters may wish to 
balance their state government with the federal government. Their finding is similar to the one by Schelker 
(2011). 
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unaligned municipalities at the expense of aligned municipalities, i.e. they find a significantly negative 
effect of alignment with a rightwing state government on grants received. Their explanation is that in 
their panel only few municipalities are aligned with rightwing state governments, due to which these 
state governments would have been compelled to “buy off” the support of unaligned municipalities 
with more discretionary grants (possibly reserving other kinds of benefits than discretionary grants for 
aligned municipalities).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First we motivate the municipalities of the 
Brussels Region of Belgium as an interesting sample for investigating the partisan grants allocation 
hypothesis. Next we give a description of our dependent variable, i.e. discretionary grants to Brussels 
municipalities, and of our independent variable of interest, i.e. partisan alignment of Brussels 
municipalities. Thereafter we situate our investigation of party-politically aligned allocation of grants 
to Brussels municipalities into the existing empirical literature. In the key part of our paper we then 
develop and test our empirical strategy, i.e. an IV estimation strategy based on partisan alignment as a 
result of the formation of an anti-coalition and as a result of 1
st
 ever municipal coalition participation 
of Ecolo, one of our 4 major Brussels parties. In a final section we draw a number of conclusions and 
sum up remaining puzzles. 
The main finding of our investigation will be that -rather surprisingly- municipalities of the Brussels 
Region that are party-politically aligned with a smaller and moreover relatively new party –Ecolo- in 
power at one or more of the Brussels municipalities’ subsidising levels receive more discretionary 
grants than municipalities that are aligned with larger parties. However, these extra grants are not 
sufficient to compensate for the decrease in grants municipalities experience when they are governed 
by this same party Ecolo, if Ecolo is not also in power at one or more subsidising levels. 
2. Motivation of the Brussels Region as a case study for the partisan 
allocation of intergovernmental grants 
 
The partisan alignment hypothesis –as presented above- implicitly assumes that the subsidising levels 
rather than the subsidy receiving levels are the “acting” levels within “the game of aligned allocation 
of grants”. However, of course the subsidy receiving levels themselves, rather than the subsidising 
governments could be the major player within the aligned allocation of grants, as they could be 
particularly able/motivated to lobby a subsidising government for extra grants in case they are aligned 
with this government. This is a possibility that seems to have been neglected in papers related to ours 
(Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), and Curto-Grau e.a. (2012)). An exception is 
Migueis (2013 p. 20), who finds a partisan alignment effect on grants to Portuguese municipalities that 
is entirely attributable to one of the 2 major parties in Portugal, i.e. to the centre-right PSD and not to 
the centre-left PS. Migueis (2013 p. 20) hypothesises that his finding could be due to the larger power 
of PSD local politicians over PSD leadership compared to PS. Another exception is Sørensen (2003), 
who empirically explains part of the disparities in grants allocated to municipalities by the Norwegian 
central government with lobbying by municipal council members. Final exceptions are Khemani 
(2007 p. 707-708) and Biswas e.a. (2010), who analyse the lobbying of the Indian central government 
by the states.  
The possibility that the subsidy receiving levels themselves, rather than the subsidising governments 
could be the major player within the aligned allocation of grants particularly seems to apply to the 
Brussels Region, as its municipalities and their mayors are reported to be powerful compared to the 
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Brussels Regional government. Over our sample period several ministers at the Regional level have 
apparently even preferred to give up their position to become mayor of a –in some cases even small- 
Brussels municipality
199
. In this respect, Cattoir e.a. (2009 p. 32) criticise discretionary grants to 
Brussels municipalities for the reason that in Brussels a relatively large number of municipal 
politicians are simultaneously a member of the parliament and/or of the government of the Brussels 
Region
200
, thus increasing their influence over the allocation of discretionary grants to their own 
municipality. This is also due to the combination of Brussels’ small size –consisting of 19 
municipalities only- and it being a full-fledged Region of Belgium. The Brussels Region has 
competencies and institutions very similar to the 2 larger Regions of Belgium (Flanders and 
Wallonia). Some observers describe the level of the Brussels Region as a mere level for “dispensing 
cash” to the Brussels municipalities. Moreover, as opposed to e.g. Norwegian municipal politicians 
lobbying the central government as analysed by Sørensen (2003), Brussels municipal politicians are 
geographically very close to all their subsidising governments. Indeed, the Brussels Region hosts the 
governments of –evidently- the Brussels Region, and also of the Belgian Federation as well as of the 
French (and of the Flemish) Community. 
Another reason why in a multi-level government setting such as the Brussels one the partisan 
alignment question seems particularly interesting is that the Brussels municipalities are not only 
subsidised by the Brussels Regional government and the French Community government, but also by 
the Federal government. Hence, Brussels municipalities can be fully aligned, partially aligned or fully 
non-aligned, depending on their alignment with 3, 2, one or none of the subsidising levels.  
 
Moreover, while the above characteristic applies to all Belgian municipalities and not only to the 
Brussels ones, this paper focuses on the effect of partisan alignment on the intergovernmental grants to 
the 19 municipalities of the Brussels Capital Region only. With 1,119,088 inhabitants in 2011, the 
Brussels Region is the smallest of the 3 Regions of Belgium (the other 2 Regions being Flanders and 
Wallonia). We focus on the municipalities of the Brussels Region for the following reasons:  
1) As illustrated by table 1 for the year 2009, the Brussels Region appears to be a Belgian Region 
in which municipalities receive a large amount of special purpose grants from higher-level 
governments as a share of total grants to municipalities. In line with Belfius (2010), we 
consider these special purpose grants (labelled “toelagen” by Belfius) as discretionary, i.e. 
distributed not according to a pre-agreed formula voted into a law. The Brussels Region’s high 
share of special purpose grants implies that it scores rather low compared to other Belgian 
Regions as for the share of general purpose grants (labelled “fondsen” by Belfius) in the total 
budget
201
. These general purpose grants are considered formula-based by Belfius, and mainly 
comprise grants out of the resp. Regions’ Municipality Funds202 and grants distributed 
according to these Funds’ criteria203. 
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 A peculiar illustration of the power of the Brussels municipal level relative to the Brussels Regional level is 
the case of François-Xavier de Donnéa, a leading MR politician in the Brussels Region over our sample period 
and mayor of the City of Brussels from 1994 until 2000. Newspapers reported that de Donnéa was “consolated” 
with the post of Prime Minister of the Brussels Region after having lost the post of mayor of the City of Brussels 
due to an anti-coalition formed by PS in 2000. (see e.g. De Morgen 2000) 
200
 This is also due to the combination of Brussels’ small size –consisting of 19 municipalities only- and it being 
a full-fledged Region of Belgium. It has Regional –as well as municipal- competencies and institutions very 
similar to the 2 larger Regions of Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia). 
201
 The rather low share of total grants in the total budget of Brussels municipalities is mainly to be explained by 
the high revenues out of municipal real estate taxes in the Brussels Region. The latter explain the high share of 
tax revenues in the total budget of the average Brussels municipality. 
202
 In particular, grants out of the Brussels Region Municipality Fund are allocated according to a municipality’s 
population size and density, surface, tax revenues, number of pupils, number of unemployed and number of 
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Table 1: Importance of formula-based and discretionary grants within municipal budgets, 
compared between Belgian Regions (2009) 
  Total grants (% of budget) Formula-based grants (% of total) Discretionary grants (% of total) 
Flemish Region 36 72 28 
Walloon Region 41 59 41 
Brussels Region 35 57 43 
 
Source: Belfius (2010) 
2) The Brussels Region as a whole (i.e. its municipalities and the Brussels Regional Government 
taken together) is the best funded region of Belgium on a per capita basis (considering grants 
and own tax revenues taken together). (see Algoed 2009) Moreover, the Brussels Region 
receives substantial extra grants from the Federal government following the fiscal federalism 
reform that was voted in 2013, amounting to an extra 461 million real euros in 2013 terms per 
year. As a consequence of this reform, the extent to which the Brussels Region is grants-
funded will increase considerably. 
 
3) The Brussels Region is a political battleground, i.e. for the 4 major political parties of the 
Brussels Region –MR, PS, CDH and Ecolo- several Brussels municipalities are “swing” 
municipalities. In several municipalities, being in power, once gained, is often expected to be 
at risk during the next municipal election, as has been illustrated by newspaper articles over 
our sample period (1995-2011) (see e.g. Le Vif/L’Express 2006), and as is shown by table 2 
below. In particular the 2 smaller parties, CDH and Ecolo, have witnessed changes in being in 
power in on average about half of the 19 municipalities during each of the 2 municipal 
elections included in our sample period.  
 
Table 2: Number of municipalities (out of a total of 19) in which being in power changed after 
the 2000 and the 2006 municipal elections, per individual party (4 major Brussels parties only) 
  MR PS CDH Ecolo Total 
2000 6 6 11 9 32 
2006 8 6 6 11 31 
 
Sources: Lentzen and Mabille (1994), Arcq e.a. (2001) and de Coorebyter (2007).  
Municipalities of the Brussels Region have traditionally been dominated politically by MR. 
MR is the alliance that existed from 1992 until 2011 between the 2 Francophone Belgian 
parties PRL and FDF, including at the municipal level (though the name MR dates only from 
2002)
204
. Within the Brussels Region, MR has over the last 20 years steadily lost electoral 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
poor. These criteria are confirmed annually by means of the voting of a law by the parliament of the Brussels 
Region. (see e.g. Belgisch Staatsblad 1998). These criteria are changed rather infrequently. The most recent 
changes to the criteria date from 1994 and 1998. 
203
 Since the lowest level of disaggregation of our grants data is between special purpose and general purpose 
grants, we will simply equal special purpose grants to discretionary grants and general purpose grants to 
formula-based grants in what follows. 
204
 Moreover, the 2 parties ran on 1 single list from the 1999 Federal, Regional and Community elections 
onwards, and –with some exceptions- from the 2006 municipal elections onwards. Where PRL and FDF ran on 
separate lists in the 1994, the 2000, and even the 2006 municipal elections, this was not necessarily to be 
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ground to PS, both in municipal and in Brussels Regional elections. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate 
the municipal case of growing power of PS relative to MR in terms of vote share and coalition 
participation resp. Both within the Brussels Region and in Francophone Belgium as a 
whole
205
, PS and MR are the 2 largest parties
206
. Moreover, Brussels is the Region of Belgium 
where Ecolo, the Francophone Belgian Green party and one of the largest Green parties of 
Europe, is the strongest. Finally, CDH, which was until 2002 known as PSC
207
, and which is 
the Francophone Belgian party that has been most often in power at the various subsidising 
levels during Belgian history, has had to defend its –rather limited- power base within 
Brussels municipalities over our sample period. In spite of the steady decline of the income 
per capita position of the Brussels Region compared to the 2 other regions of Belgium over 
our sample period
208
, parties covet being in power in the capital region of Belgium, as this 
brings extra visibility at the Federal level.  
 
Table 3: Average vote shares of the 4 largest political parties (%) in the Brussels municipalities 
in the 1994, 2000, and 2006 municipal elections 
Election MRmunvote PSmunvote CDHmunvote ECOLOmunvote 
1994 34.2 18.8 14.6 8.4 
2000 35.6 20.6 11.1 17.7 
2006 34.7 25.4 13.1 13.3 
Total average 34.8 21.6 12.9 13.1 
 
Sources: http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html, http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ, own calculations. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interpreted as if the alliance did not function, as in several occasions running on 2 separate lists had to serve a 
tactical purpose. In most occasions over our sample period where both PRL and FDF won seats, PRL and FDF 
were either both part of a municipal government or were both in opposition. 
Also earlier in Belgian political history, PRL and FDF had formed alliances. 
205
 By Francophone Belgium we mean the Walloon and the Brussels Region, though the Brussels Region is 
administratively bilingual. 
206
 Political parties in Belgium are split along linguistic and therefore largely along geographic lines. No single 
party in Belgium wins seats both in the Dutch-speaking Flemish Region and in Francophone Belgium. 
Exceptions are the few seats Flemish parties have (until 2010) won in the Brussels Region and the few seats 
Francophone parties have (until 2010) won in Halle-Vilvoorde. Halle-Vilvoorde is the Flemish part of the 
Federal electoral district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde is the only Federal electoral district 
that has ever straddled 2 Regions, i.e. until and including the elections of 2010, after which the district was split 
into Brussels and Halle-Vilvoorde. 
207
 For the sake of simplicity we will refer to PSC with CDH also with respect to the period before PSC changed 
its name into CDH. 
208
 In real 2011 terms, income per capita in the Brussels Region only increased from 12,459 to 13,612 euros over 
our 1995-2011 sample period. 
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Table 4: Number of Brussels municipal coalition participations of the 4 largest political parties 
in the Brussels municipalities, after the 1994, 2000, and 2006 municipal elections (out of a 
maximum of 57)
209
 
Election MR PS CDH Ecolo 
1994 16 12 9 2 
2000 14 11 7 11 
2006 15 13 9 6 
Total 45 36 25 19 
Maximum 57 57 57 57 
 
Sources: Arcq e.a. (2001) and de Coorebyter (2007). 
Table 5 provides the full names of the 4 major Brussels parties and situates them on a left-
right axis. The difference in ideology between the 4 parties can be considered relatively small, 
with even MR having a more leftwing profile than e.g. its Flemish liberal-conservative 
counterpart. 
Table 5: Full name and ideological position of the 4 major Brussels parties 
Acronym Full name Ideology 
PS Parti Socialiste Left 
Ecolo Ecolo Left 
CDH Centre Démocrate Humaniste Centre-left 
MR Mouvement Réformateur Centre-right 
 
4) There also exist some anecdotes concerning the Brussels municipalities that are suggestive of 
party-political steering of particular discretionary grants categories comprised in our data. An 
example for the Brussels Regional level are the “contrats de quartier” (urban renewal 
contracts), a municipal subsidy category established in 1994, cumulatively amounting to 408 
million nominal euros for all beneficiary municipalities taken together over our sample period. 
In 2012 a leading Francophone Belgian weekly, “Le Vif/L’Express” (2012), reported 
extensively on a complaint of an MR member of the Brussels Regional parliament and 
councillor in the municipality of Ukkel that since the establishment of the Brussels Region in 
1989
210
 the distribution of several grants categories to Brussels municipalities would have 
become skewed against the –traditionally MR dominated- south-eastern municipalities. These 
mainly include some prominent special purpose subsidies allocated by the Brussels Regional 
government, such as the “contrats de quartier”. Anecdotal evidence of party-political steering 
of particular discretionary grants categories comprised in our data also exists at the federal 
level, i.e. with respect to the federal Fund for Large Cities. We have not found any anecdotes 
suggestive of possible party-politically aligned allocation of the grants of the French 
Community level to Brussels municipalities. Our data suggest that these concern mostly –
large- education and childcare grants. Strikingly, when conducting our below regression 
analysis while leaving the French Community level out of the composition of our partisan 
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 For MR the number is 16 from 2010 onwards, as it entered the coalition in Jette halfway the legislature. For 
PS the number is 12 from 2010 onwards, as it left the coalition in Jette halfway the legislature.  
210
 Since its establishment in 1989 the main political party in power at the level of the Brussels Regional 
government has always been PS, with the exception of MR from 1999 until 2004.  
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alignment variables of interest, our regression results stay the same. Regression results do 
change if we leave out the Federal level or the Brussels Regional level
211
. 
 
5) We have not found data readily available on the party-political composition of all Belgian 
municipal governments over our sample period. In cases in which such data do exist, the 
party-political affiliation of several parties governing at the municipal level is not clear as 
several of these parties take a local name that hides their affiliation with a party that is 
politically represented at one or more of the governments that subsidise Belgian 
municipalities. As the Brussels Region consists of only 19 municipalities, the several 
publications of CRISP (Lentzen and Mabille (1994), Arcq e.a. (2001) and de Coorebyter 
(2007)) enabled us to determine the party-political composition of the Brussels municipal 
governments over our sample period, and hence their partisan alignment status. 
3. The dependent variable: discretionary grants to Brussels municipalities 
 
Discretionary grants to Brussels municipalities is our dependent variable. We focus on discretionary 
special purpose grants rather than on formula-based general purpose grants, as the empirical political 
economics literature demonstrates that the former are more prone to steering for (party-)political 
reasons. Our sample period is the 1995-2011 period, which are the years for which we have obtained 
data on grants to Brussels municipalities. The source of our grants data is Belfius, formerly known as 
Dexia, which is a bank specialising in lending to local governments
212
. 
Table 6 shows discretionary grants per capita received by individual municipal governments. The 
considerable variation both between municipalities –as is clear from comparing the means- and over 
our sample period –as shown by the standard deviations and by the coefficients of variation213- is 
striking. However, standard deviations and coefficients of variation are much higher for some 
municipalities than for other. Note that the municipality receiving on average the most grants per 
capita is the City of Brussels, which is the largest of the 19 municipalities of the Brussels Region.  
Unfortunately the Belfius data do not enable us –nor for municipalities of the Brussels Region nor for 
Belgian municipalities in general- to distinguish between total discretionary grants per individual 
subsidising government. We hence have no information of the relative magnitudes of Federal, 
Regional, resp. Community government subsidies to Brussels municipalities. As in Belgium 
”oversight of and support to municipalities” as an expenditure responsibility was largely decentralised 
to the Regions in 1988, we would expect Federal subsidies to municipalities to be rather limited 
compared to Regional subsidies over our sample period. This aggregate nature of our grants data 
makes the fact that we consider grants provided by 3 different levels of government less innovative 
compared to the existing literature, as this aggregate nature makes it harder to find out which kind of 
partisan alignment –Federal, Regional, or Community government alignment- potentially drives grants 
allocation to municipalities.  
                                                          
211
 The regression results of these changes to our sample are not reported below. 
212
 Belgian municipalities report about their finances to Belfius on a voluntary basis. Our requests for data 
directed at the Brussels Regional government and at the individual Brussels municipalities have not generated 
more detailed grant data than those kindly provided by Belfius. 
213
 The coefficient of variation equals the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics of discretionary grants (in euro per capita) received by individual 
municipal governments 
Municipality Mean Standard deviation Coefficient of variation 
Anderlecht 214.9 65.0 0.30 
Brussel 437.1 75.2 0.17 
Elsene 229.7 71.5 0.31 
Etterbeek 259.7 64.5 0.25 
Evere 264.6 77.9 0.29 
Ganshoren 109.5 36.1 0.33 
Jette 210.5 82.4 0.39 
Koekelberg 194.1 38.2 0.20 
Molenbeek 203.9 44.6 0.22 
Oudergem 125.9 49.2 0.39 
Schaarbeek 190.2 50.5 0.27 
Sint-Agatha-Berchem 150.0 43.3 0.29 
Sint-Gillis 317.4 106.4 0.34 
Sint-Joost-ten-Node 394.8 108.6 0.28 
Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe 107.7 18.8 0.17 
Sint-Pieters-Woluwe 175.4 40.6 0.23 
Ukkel 112.6 37.2 0.33 
Vorst 278.6 68.8 0.25 
Watermaal-Bosvoorde 163.2 48.4 0.30 
 
Source: Belfius 
4. The independent variable of interest: alignment of Brussels 
municipalities with respect to individual political parties 
 
We limit our analysis to the partisan alignment effect with respect to the 4 major parties active at the 
level of the Brussels municipalities –which are all Francophone-: MR, PS, CDH, and Ecolo. Together 
these parties obtained on average 82.5 % of the total vote in the Brussels municipal elections of 1994, 
2000, and 2006, with MR obtaining on average 34.8% of the vote, PS 21.6%, CDH 12.9% and Ecolo 
13.1% (see table 3 above). Part of the coalition participations of these 4 largest parties were however a 
consequence of having campaigned on a joint list with another major Francophone party, except for 
Ecolo, which always campaigned on a separate list over our sample period
214
.  
The remainder of the municipal vote was obtained by local Brussels parties, far right parties –fully 
excluded from power over our entire sample period-, and the 5 Flemish parties that both participated 
in some of the municipal coalitions and in some of the coalitions at the subsidising levels over our 
sample period. These residual vote shares are in general small, as well as decreasing over our sample 
period. The same holds for the number of separate lists submitted by Flemish parties. E.g. in the 2006 
municipal elections those Flemish parties that submitted a separate list, together obtained less than 
10% of all votes. (de Coorebyter 2007 p. 20) When we also include the 5 Flemish parties that both 
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 Our regression results below are very similar if we do not count as coalition participations those by junior 
coalition partners that ran on a joint list with a senior coalition partner. 
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participated in some of the municipal coalitions and in some of the coalitions at the subsidising levels 
into the regression analysis reported below
215
, none of the 5 extra coefficients of interest is significant, 
and their inclusion does not appear to change the size and the significance of the coefficients of 
interest for the Francophone parties.  
For the sake of simplicity, we will use the coalition compositions of the outgoing municipal 
government in the municipal election years of our sample period. Municipal elections always took 
place in October over our sample period. Likewise, for the sake of simplicity we will also use the 
coalition composition of the outgoing government in the election years of our sample period at the 
subsidising levels. At the subsidising levels, elections always took place in May or June over our 
sample period. Using the coalition composition of the outgoing government in election years has the 
following additional advantages: 
1) it takes into account the possibility of a political “business cycle”, i.e. the possibility that 
parties in power may concentrate their aligned allocation of grants right before an election 
2) it takes into account that subsidising levels decide on their budgets –including discretionary 
grants- for year t already in year t-1 (and more generally, that subsidising levels may need 
some “lag time” to make discretionary grants arrive at the intended municipal level) 
 
Table 7 shows the number of simultaneous participations of each of the 4 major Brussels parties in 
coalitions at the various subsidising levels (i.e. at the Federal, Regional, and Community government 
levels). Changes in these numbers were caused by the various Federal, Regional, and Community 
elections over the 1995-2011 period.  
Table 7: Number of simultaneous coalition participations of the 4 major Brussels parties at the 
subsidising levels after the various Federal and Regional elections over our sample period 
Election PS MR CDH Ecolo 
1995 Federal, Regional, and Community elections 3 1 2 0 
1999 Federal, Regional, and Community elections 3 3 0 1 
2003 Federal elections 3 3 0 0 
2004 Regional and Community elections 3 1 2 1 
2007 Federal elections 3 1 3 1 
2009 Regional and Community elections 3 1 3 2 
2010 Federal elections 3 1 3 2 
Average per single year 3 1.6 1.7 0.8 
 
Source: Websites of the Federal, Brussels Regional, and French Community parliaments 
Table 7 shows that PS was in power at every subsidising level over our entire sample period (as a 
matter of fact ever since 1988). From the bottom row of table 7 it appears that overall power 
participation of CDH at subsidising levels has on average been slightly higher than that of MR, with 
Ecolo showing the lowest power participation.  
Our independent variables of interest then are the interaction variables “MRmungovt*subsgovt” for 
MR, “CDHmungovt*subsgovt” for CDH, “ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt” for Ecolo, and 
“PSmungovt*3” for PS. The resp. “mungovt” variables are dummies taking value 1 if the party in 
question is part the municipal coalition. The resp. “subsgovt” variables are count variables -counting 
in how many subsidising governments the party simultaneously participated-, hence taking a value 
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 Regression results of this inclusion are not shown below. 
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between 0 and 3
216
. Taking MR as an example: while after the 2004 Regional and Community 
elections MR kept on being part of the Federal governing coalition, it was excluded from the Brussel 
Regional governing coalition as well as from the French Community governing coalition. Therefore 
between 2004 and 2005 the “MRsubsgovt” count variable decreases from 3 to 1 (see table 7).  
Our interaction variable in question hence measures per individual party the degree of partisan 
alignment between a municipality and the subsidising government levels. Construction of the 
alignment variable as a count variable rather than as a dummy is a novelty within the literature on 
partisan alignment (see e.g. Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), Curto-Grau e.a. (2012), 
and Migueis (2013)). There is no need to interact “PSmungovt” with a count variable measuring the 
number of subsidising governments that PS is taking part in, because PS was over our entire sample 
period simultaneously in power at every subsidising government. Therefore we simply multiply our 
original “PSmungovt” dummy by 3, so as to make regression coefficients comparable between parties. 
Hence our PS interaction variable only takes values 0 and 3. 
Graph 1 below shows descriptive statistics for our 4 constructed interaction variables of interest, i.e. 
for their means over time. Obviously, these means take maximum values of 3 and minimum values of 
0. Years in which these alignment variables are able to change are years following an election year. 
Election years are indicated with a vertical bar. As expected, average alignment is highest for PS 
(because of its high coalition participation at the subsidising level), 2
nd
 highest for MR (because of its 
high coalition participation at the municipal level), 3
rd
 highest for CDH and lowest for Ecolo.  
 
We also note considerable variation over time in mean alignment for each individual party, except for 
PS
217
. Unsurprisingly, the years after the 2 municipal elections show large overall changes in mean 
alignment. This also holds for the year 2000, as it is the year after the concurrent Federal, Community, 
and Regional elections of 1999. As a result of these elections PS exchanged CDH for MR and Ecolo 
as coalition partners in the Federal government and CDH for MR in the Brussels Regional 
government. Also the year 2005 -the year after the Community and Regional elections of 2004- shows 
large changes. After these elections, PS exchanged MR for CDH and Ecolo in the Brussels Regional 
government, and MR for CDH in the French Community government. 
Note that –for reasons of simplicity- graph 1 shows mean alignment per party, even though our 
interest lies in the alignment of individual municipalities per party. Many municipalities experience 
more variation over time in their alignment than that the variation of the mean shows.  
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 As we do not know the resp. shares of the 3 subsidising levels in total discretionary grants, we simply 
increase our count variable by 1 for each extra subsidising level at which a particular party is in power. 
217
 This rather stable mean PS alignment is due to its constant coalition participation at the subsidising levels. In 
contrast, there has been considerable variation in PS coalition participation at the municipal level over our 
sample period. 
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Graph 1: Means of partisan alignment of Brussels municipalities for the 4 largest political 
parties 
 
Sources: Wikipedia, Arcq e.a. (2001) and de Coorebyter (2007) 
Legend of graph 1: Red vertical bars: 1995, 1999: concurrent Federal, Regional and Community elections 
Green vertical bars: 2000, 2006: municipal elections only 
Blue vertical bars: 2003, 2007, 2010: Federal elections only 
Black vertical bars: 2004, 2009: concurrent Regional and Community elections 
 
After the construction of our interaction variables “MRmungovt*subsgovt”, 
“CDHmungovt*subsgovt”, “ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt”, and “PSmungovt*3” we can easily check 
how grants are distributed over Brussels municipalities according to alignment status. Table 8 shows 
that the more aligned an Ecolo and a PS municipality is, the more grants it obtains. Strangely, the 
reverse holds for MR, while there is no clear pattern for CDH. However, the differences in grants 
obtained according to alignment status are not significant. 
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Table 8: Summary statistics of discretionary grants distribution (in euro per capita) according 
to alignment of Brussels municipalities with the 4 largest Brussels political parties 
Alignment variable Alignment value Mean Standard deviation Observations 
MRmungovt*subsgovt 0 251.8 127.7 77 
MRmungovt*subsgovt 1 212.7 94.2 170 
MRmungovt*subsgovt 2 . . 0 
MRmungovt*subsgovt 3 188.5 106.2 71 
CDHmungovt*subsgovt 0 214.0 111.0 216 
CDHmungovt*subsgovt 1 . . 0 
CDHmungovt*subsgovt 2 201.6 102.5 57 
CDHmungovt*subsgovt 3 249.3 93.2 45 
ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt 0 213.1 108.1 231 
ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt 1 222.4 113.3 75 
ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt 2 251.1 51.0 12 
ECOLOmungovt*subsgovt 3 . . 0 
PSmungovt*3 0 169.4 66.3 121 
PSmungovt*3 3 245.9 117.7 197 
Total 
 
216.7 107.8 318 
 
Source: own calculations 
5. Situating our study within the literature 
5.1. Methodologically situating our study within the literature 
 
In what follows we will investigate if the fact of a Brussels municipality becoming better aligned 
politically with one of the subsidising levels, brings more grants to this Brussels municipality. Hence 
our study is related to the many studies that have found that the distribution of grants to lower-level 
governments is determined by the latter’s partisan alignment status, such as Larcinese e.a. (2006) for 
US states; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for Spanish municipalities; Veiga and Veiga (2013) 
for Portuguese municipalities; Rodden and Wilkinson (2004), Khemani (2007), Arulampalam e.a. 
(2009), and Biswas e.a. (2010) for Indian states; and Rodden (2005 p. 181-221) for German states. 
Rodden (2005) and Khemani (2007) investigate the effect of partisan alignment on states’ budget 
deficits rather than on grants received, but find a –positive- correlation between deficits and extra 
grants received.  
However, none of the abovementioned –“1st generation”- studies of partisan alignment takes into 
account possible endogeneity of being in power. Partisan alignment –and more in particular a party’s 
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being in power at a lower government level as a pre-condition for partisan alignment
218
- could be 
endogenous to grants received. Being in power at a lower government level could e.g. be fostered by 
past grants received –or even by a lack of past grants received, as argued by Fiva and Halse (2014 p. 
12)-, e.g. via an increased share of the vote. Also, there could be –observable or unobservable- time-
variant determinants both of municipal coalition participation of a particular party and of grants 
received that have been omitted from our regression specification
219
. Therefore, our study is even more 
related to the increasing number of –“2nd generation”- papers that attempt to control for endogeneity of 
being in power by means of using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with respect to election 
results and being in power as independent variables (see e.g. Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini 
(2012), Curto-Grau e.a. (2012), Migueis (2013), and Baskaran and Hessami (2014)). This is because 
also in our study we will make an attempt to find a way around the problem of the endogeneity of 
being in power.  
Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) refine the abovementioned Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) paper by 
focusing on vote margin within an RDD. Using a “fuzzy” RDD they find an even stronger positive 
effect of party-political alignment on grants received by municipal governments than in their 2008 
study, which uses a Fixed Effects approach. Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) define their vote margin variable 
as the vote share that the block of the incumbent party at the subsidising level has to win (lose) to 
obtain (lose) the majority of the votes at the municipal level. This approach is suited to the political 
situation of Spain as investigated by Curto-Grau e.a. (2012), because over their sample period only 
30% of Spanish municipal governments were coalition governments, which moreover were coalitions 
along the ideological left-right axis.  
The Portuguese situation seems even more straightforward than the Spanish one. The Portuguese 
blocks constructed by Migueis are a block dominated by the centre-right PSD and a block dominated 
by the centre-left PS. Towards the end of Migueis’ sample period, the governments of 269 out of 305 
Portuguese municipalities were either dominated by PSD or by PS. PSD and PS appear never to be in 
a coalition together, neither at the central government level, nor at the municipal level. In contrast to 
Spain moreover, the Portuguese party winning the most votes, always gains power, so Migueis is able 
to make use of the “sharp” RDD, which is more straightforward than the “fuzzy” RDD. 
With respect to results, Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) find that newly aligned municipalities that have been 
won by a narrow margin are particularly rewarded with more grants, while previously aligned 
municipalities that have been lost by a narrow margin are particularly punished with less grants. 
Similarly using an RDD for Brazil, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) come to the same finding with respect 
to less grants to narrowly lost aligned municipalities. Migueis (2013) comes to the same finding with 
respect to grants to aligned and non-aligned municipalities in Portugal, but irrespective of the vote 
margin. The paper by Bracco e.a. (2012) on Italian municipalities mostly resembles the one by Brollo 
and Nannicini (2012) as for research question and empirical strategy. Bracco e.a. (2012) not only find 
a positive effect of alignment on grants received, but also a negative effect on local tax revenue. 
Similarly to the studies on Spain and Portugal, both the study on Brazil and the study on Italy manage 
to make use of an RDD as both manage to assign each individual party to either a leftwing or a 
rightwing block. 
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 Evidently, for a municipality to be aligned with a particular political party in power at one of the subsidising 
levels, this particular political party needs to be in power at the level of the municipality. 
219
 Moreover, Folke (2013 p. 7) explains that the direction of the –downward or upward- endogeneity bias in 
OLS regressions of a policy outcome variable on a political variable is hard to predict, because of the complexity 
of the entanglement of political variables and factors correlated with these variables, while both types of 
variables may have policy effects.  
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Because the papers by Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), Curto-Grau e.a. (2012), and 
Migueis (2013), as well as the already earlier discussed paper by Baskaran and Hessami (2014), all 
explain grants to municipalities by partisan alignment while making use of an RDD to find a way 
around the problem of the endogeneity of alignment, these papers are from a methodological 
viewpoint the ones that are most closely related to our paper. 
5.2. Situating our study within the literature from a contents perspective 
 
From a contents-wise viewpoint, the studies by Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) and Khemani (2007) are 
most similar to ours. This is because Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) and Khemani (2007) investigate 
for the case of India the partisan alignment effect per individual party, i.e. distinguishing between 
large and small coalition members. Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) find that Indian parties that are 
small but pivotal at the central level –i.e. parties that are needed in every coalition that commands the 
support of a majority of seats- obtain more grants for their “home state” in case of partisan alignment 
than the 2 dominant parties in India (Congress and BJP) over their sample period. Together with 
Arulampalam e.a. (2009 p. 117), Rodden and Wilkinson (2004 p. 10 and 17) suggest that small Indian 
parties in power at the central level not only secure more grants to their “home state”, but also more 
public sector appointments, subsidised borrowing and regulation favouring those small parties. 
However, in contrast to Rodden and Wilkinson (2004)’s finding, Khemani (2007) finds that it is 
partisan alignment of an Indian state with the dominant party in power –and not with junior coalition 
members- at the central level that is associated with higher deficits, and hence with the extra grants 
that the latter manage to generate.  
These findings with respect to the association between party size and extra grants secured thanks to 
partisan alignment relate to a tradition in political science investigating the effect of party size on 
resources secured in general –i.e. not only on the amount of grants- within a context of coalition 
formation bargaining –i.e. not necessarily in a context of partisan alignment. More in particular, 
Ansolabehere e.a. (2005) find empirically that it is mostly the larger coalition party, i.e. the formateur 
party, rather than the smaller coalition party that is able to secure disproportionally more resources
220
. 
Ansolabehere e.a. (2005) hence find empirical support for the well-known legislative bargaining 
framework developed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in which the formateur is able to obtain more 
resources thanks to his proposal power.  
However, the findings of Ansolabehere e.a. (2005) seem to contradict those of another related political 
science literature, which studies the consequences of intra-coalition power relations in particular for 
the distribution of ministerial posts, such as Browne and Franklin (1973), Schofield and Laver (1985), 
and Laver and Shepsle (2000). Browne and Franklin (1973) and Schofield and Laver (1985) find 
empirical evidence that sheer smallness of coalition parties increases their “spoils of office”, in 
particular their ministerial posts in central governments, at the expense of large coalition parties. 
Browne and Franklin (1973) find that large parties on average contribute 6% more parliamentary or 
council seats to a coalition that that they receive ministerial posts. Browne and Franklin (1973 p. 461) 
suggest that smallness may provide extra payoffs not because small coalition partners would be more 
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 Relatedly, there exists a large literature finding that rather than dominant political parties, dominant 
individual politicians manage to secure more resources, in particular more grants for their electoral district. 
Examples are Milligan and Smart (2005) and Jennes and Persyn (2015) with respect to individual ministers, 
Golden and Picci (2008) with respect to powerful politicians within Italian political parties, and Knight (2005 
and 2008) with respect to powerful members of the US Congress. 
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likely to be pivotal
221
, but because they are less likely than large coalition partners to be able to inhibit 
the activity of the dominant coalition party. Complementarily, because the major coalition party often 
controls more than the absolute majority of all ministerial postings as well as public policy itself
222
, it 
could well afford to surrender one or 2 “bonus” ministerial postings. However, another way of looking 
at the above is that the lack of control over public policy that a junior coalition partner may experience 
could provide it with an extra motivation to bargain for extra ministerial postings as a compensation 
(Browne and Franklin 1973 p. 461).  
Conversely, a larger party may derive other –perhaps more important but less visible- benefits than 
more postings or extra discretionary grants from holding office, such as a more exclusive control over 
public policy in general. This possibility reminds of the statement by Folke (2013 p. 4) –made within 
the context of Swedish municipal coalition politics- that “larger parties focusing on primary policies 
{such as taxing and spending} could win the support of small parties by supporting them on secondary 
policies {such as environment and immigration}”. At the same time, Folke (2013 p. 31) admits that 
such trading of support is hard to measure. 
The political economics literature points at yet another reason why small parties may be associated 
more strongly than large parties with the partisan allocation of grants. It is the uncertainty argument of 
Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-351): the more a governing party is uncertain that it will still be in 
power after the next elections, the more it will overspend in the current legislature by means of 
running a budget deficit. Applied to the subject of the partisan alignment effect on grants, we could 
hypothesise that governing parties at the subsidising level that are less certain of remaining in power 
will try to increase spending in terms of increasing the allocation of grants to friendly governments, 
and that governing parties at the municipal level that are less certain of remaining in power will try to 
increase spending in terms of lobbying for an increase in grants allocated by friendly governments
223
.  
6. IV regression as an alternative empirical strategy to an RDD 
 
There seem to be a number of major handicaps that the context of our study -the political system of the 
Brussels municipalities- poses to the use of an RDD, compared to the context of the related studies 
overviewed above -the political systems of the Brazilian, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish 
municipalities.  
A first handicap is our limited sample size (312 observations = 19 municipalities * 17 years, minus 11 
observations missing due to missing financial control data for a number of municipalities and years). It 
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 This is in contrast to what Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) find for India. Moreover, Browne and Franklin 
(1973 p. 461) –as well as Folke (2013 p. 4)- correctly argue that a large party has a higher probability to be 
pivotal –i.e. indispensable for coalition formation- than a small party, and more generally that the coalition 
formation power of a large party is on average larger than the coalition formation power of a small party. (see 
below) 
222
 Both the dominant coalition party and the junior coalition party may hence obtain “spoils of office”. Only, 
their resp. advantages of holding office may be of a different nature. The findings by Browne and Franklin (1973 
p. 461) therefore do not necessarily contradict those of Ansolabehere e.a. (2005). 
223
 Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) tests the theoretical finding of Persson and Tabellini (2000) for Swedish 
municipalities. He finds mixed support for the hypothesis of Persson and Tabellini (2000), as he finds that a 
rightwing party that is certain of being voted out of a Swedish municipal government increases debt with 15% 
compared to when it is certain of being voted again into government, but that –even more remarkably- a leftwing 
party decreases debt with 11% in such a situation. 
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implies that there are few observations around any “being in power” kink/threshold, while an RDD 
particularly makes use of these observations.  
A 2
nd
 handicap is that assigning parties active at the Brussels municipality level to either a left-wing or 
a right-wing block with a view to verifying which block took the hurdle of the 50% seat share 
threshold -as Bracco e.a., Brollo and Nannicini, Curto-Grau e.a., and Migueis did- seems impossible. 
Over our sample period we did not find any preference pattern for ideological composition of 
municipal coalitions in the Brussels Region, as demonstrated by the behaviour of the 4 largest political 
parties at the Brussels municipal level over our sample period
224
.  
This should be obvious from table 9 below. It shows the number of municipalities in which a 
particular party was selected as a junior coalition partner by the major coalition party, as a share of 
total municipalities in which the latter was the major coalition party
225
. Table 9 shows e.g. that 
although MR is usually thought of as rather right-wing and PS and Ecolo are usually thought of as 
rather left-wing (see also table 5 above), e.g. MR-PS and MR-Ecolo coalitions are rather frequent. In 
general, it shows the absence of coalition preferences between the 4 major Brussels parties.  
Table 9: Number of municipalities in which a particular party was selected as a junior coalition 
partner by the major coalition party (as a share of municipalities dominated by the latter)  
Major party MR PS CDH 
Junior partner PS CDH Ecolo MR CDH Ecolo MR PS Ecolo 
1994 6/10 3/10 1/10 4/5 1/5 0/5 1/3 1/3 0/3 
2000 4/11 1/11 4/11 2/5 3/5 3/5 1/2 1/2 2/2 
2006 4/9 3/9 4/9 3/8 3/8 1/8 2/2 1/2 1/2 
 
Sources: Lentzen, E. and X. Mabille (1994), Arcq e.a. (2001) and de Coorebyter (2007) 
Because of the limitations of analysing partisan alignment of grants to Brussels municipalities with an 
RDD, we develop an alternative empirical strategy. It consists of an IV regression set-up with 
alignment after the formation of an anti-coalition and after 1
st
 ever municipal coalition participation as 
IVs for overall alignment
226
. 
6.1. IV for MR, PS, and CDH alignment: alignment after the formation of 
an anti-coalition  
 
Rather than to find a way around the problem of endogeneity of alignment by means of an RDD, we 
resort to a -more traditional- IV regression set-up. The instrument we will use is the coming to power 
–and the expulsion from power- of a political party within a Brussels municipality after the formation 
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 We would not claim that such lack of preferences would be typical for the Brussels municipalities in 
Belgium. Ideology-based coalition preferences also became weaker at the subsidising levels over our sample 
period. This is in contrast to most of the preceding 20
th
 century, when there were hardly any coalitions of which 
both the socialists and the liberals were a member, with both of them instead preferring the Christian-democrats 
as a coalition partner, while the Greens participated for the 1
st
 time in a coalition at the subsidising level in 1999. 
225
 For the major party, the sum of all shares may be larger than 1 because in several municipalities coalitions 
consisted of more than 2 parties. 
226
 Hence we use mere subsets of the original and possibly endogenous independent variables as the IVs. This is 
an IV strategy similar to the one implemented by Dahlberg et al. (2008) when investigating the flypaper effect 
for Swedish municipalities. They use a census-determined (i.e. partial) change in grants to instrument their 
endogenous independent variable, i.e. the actual (i.e. total) change in grants received by Swedish municipalities.  
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of an anti-coalition. We will use the latter as an instrument for the coming to power of a political party 
in a Brussels municipality in general.  
We argue that (being prevented from) coming to power by means of an anti-coalition is rather a 
“coincidence”, i.e. not related to past grants received by the municipality in question. In other words: 
grants received by municipalities after the formation of an anti-coalition by a particular party should 
and can be compared to grants received by (other) municipalities after the formation of an anti-
coalition from which that same party was excluded, and the difference between them can be attributed 
to being in power.  
Table 10 gives an overview of all anti-coalitions we identify over our sample period. The vote shares 
of the largest party participating in the anti-coalition –labelled the “perpetrator”- as well as of the 
largest party that was excluded from the anti-coalition –labelled the “victim”- are indicated in columns 
(3) till (6), with the vote share of the “perpetrator” of the anti-coalition indicated in bold. We 
characterise 8 coalitions as anti-coalitions, out of a total of 57 coalitions (= 19 municipalities * 3 
municipal election years). 
Compared to column (7) “Motivation/effect” of table 10, we provide the following more quantitative 
definition of an anti-coalition: an anti-coalition is a coalition from which either the largest or 2
nd
 
largest party –in terms of vote and seat share- has been excluded, even though these 2 parties taken 
together have a majority of seats at their disposal so that these 2 parties could have formed a 
municipal coalition already by themselves. The latter should be clear from the final column of table 
10. As a result of the formation of the anti-coalition the governing coalition consists of more parties –
i.e. on average of 3.3 parties as shown by column (8) of table 10- compared to the case in which the 
2
nd
 largest party would not have been excluded –i.e. 2 parties227. As a consequence the party that “falls 
victim” to an anti-coalition is large in terms of vote share. Table 10 shows that the smallest “victim” 
of an anti-coalition obtained 23% of the vote
228
. 
We argue that anti-coalitions are “coincidence”, i.e. hard to foresee or anticipate. We assume them to 
happen rather unexpectedly to a traditionally dominant party, possibly in spite of having secured extra 
grants to its municipality in the legislature preceding the election after which the anti-coalition was 
formed. We also assume them to happen rather unexpectedly to the party that –instead of the excluded 
party- becomes the dominant coalition party thanks to assembling the anti-coalition, because an anti-
coalition seems rather hard to assemble, as it typically requires the agreement of more parties than the 
average municipal coalition (see column (8) of table 10). As a consequence, we assume that before the 
elections in question the traditionally dominant party did not anticipate that it would become excluded 
from the coalition and that before the elections in question the newly dominant party did not anticipate 
that it would become the newly dominant party of the coalition. 
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 The exception is the anti-MR coalition in Vorst, which consisted only of 2 parties, but also this coalition has 
far less seats at its disposal –only 1 seat more than required for a majority- than a coalition between the 2 largest 
parties in terms of seats would have had. 
228
 When comparing this share to the average vote shares of the 4 major Brussels parties over our sample period, 
we notice that only the average vote share of MR is higher than 23%. 
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Table 10: Anti-coalitions formed after the 1994, 2000, and 2006 municipal elections
229
 
(1) 
election 
(2) 
municipality 
(3) 
MR (%) 
(4) 
PS (%) 
(5) 
CDH (%) 
(6) 
Ecolo (%) 
(7) 
Motivation / effect 
(8) 
Coalition parties (#) 
(9) 
Coalition seats (%) 
(10) 
Seats "perpetrator" + "victim" (%) 
1994 Brussel 28   23   Dispose of Demaret + Vanden Boeynants (CDH) 4 62 74 
1994 Jette 24 
 
28 
 
Continue CDH led "progressive" coalition, despite Thys' forced resignation as Brussels Regional minister 4 58 64 
2000 Anderlecht 30 28 
  
Break with 50 years' PS dominance 3 53 67 
2000 Brussel 28 23 
  
Revenge for Anderlecht anti-PS coalition formed in 2000 4 57 62 
2000 Elsene 40 
  
29 Wish of local PS and CDH to break with past and to form “progressive” coalition with Ecolo 3 51 78 
2000 Ganshoren 33 
 
29 
 
Break with 40 years' CDH dominance + Beauthier mayorship, after his death (1999) 3 64 68 
2000 Jette 23 
 
27 
 
Continue CDH led "progressive" coalition, despite death of Thys, 1977-99 mayor 3 64 61 
2006 Vorst 40 31     Revenge for exclusion of PS after 2000 elections? 2 54 80 
  Averages           3.3 57.9 69.2 
 
Note on columns (3) to (6): vote shares of individual parties that gained power shown in bold 
Sources: CRISP (2001 and 2007), http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html, http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ 
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 Municipal elections were always held in October of the election year in question. 
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Using the terminology of Banzhaf (1968), a large party is hard to exclude from a coalition, because the 
larger the party the higher its coalition formation power, i.e. the higher the number of coalitions for 
which its vote share is needed
230. In the wording of Laver and Shepsle (1996 p. 186): “(…) large 
parties figure more conspicuously in the decisive structure of the government formation game. They 
participate more frequently in winning coalitions -an “opportunities” advantage-, and if other parties 
try to assemble a winning coalition that excludes a large party, negotiations are more prolonged and 
difficult -a “transaction cost” advantage”. The transaction cost advantage is empirically investigated 
by Martin and Vanberg (2003 p. 330), who find a significantly positive effect of an increase in the 
number of coalition parties on coalition bargaining duration. Browne and Franklin (1973 p. 462) add 
as another disadvantage of an anti-coalition that the more coalition parties there are, the larger the 
extent becomes to which the dominant coalition party will have to cede control over public policy. 
We only consider as exogenous the power statuses of the major excluded party and the major included 
party in our IV regression analysis based on anti-coalitions. We therefore assume that a “grand 
coalition” of these 2 largest parties would not have been feasible in our anti-coalition cases, i.e. that 
each of these 2 largest parties wanted to avoid the other large party as a coalition partner. Also, the 
major excluded party and the major included party are both the most vital parties to an anti-coalition: 
an anti-coalition is an anti-coalition precisely because a large party has been excluded and another 
large party has delivered the vote share that is indispensable (though not sufficient) for a majority 
without the excluded large party. A final reason to neglect the junior partners of an anti-coalition is 
that we assume that these smaller parties would have stood an equally good chance of being included 
into a coalition by the excluded dominant party, in case a “reverse anti-coalition” would have been 
formed
231
.    
 
The 8 anti-coalitions described above are the only coalitions over our sample period that we are able to 
consider as anti-coalitions on the basis of our above criteria. All 4 major political parties at the 
Brussels municipality level experienced anti-coalitions, either as a “perpetrator” or as a “victim”. 
Remarkably, MR was involved in all of these. Also, being excluded from power resp. being the largest 
party in power due to an anti-coalition appears a valid and relevant instrument in our IV regressions 
below including a LDV (table 5), based on the result of the Hansen J test and based on the p values 
and the F-test of our first stage regressions. This sheer fact should suffice as a motivation for our IV 
strategy. 
 
Moreover, per individual party the number of anti-coalitions involved in are few -except for MR-, and 
the number of anti-coalitions “perpetrated” resp. “suffered” of course even fewer. The apparently 
exceptional nature of an anti-coalition seems to suggest that they are hard to create. However, the 
limited amount of information these few anti-coalitions contain may put a limit on the precision of our 
estimates below. Also, if we drop either one of the 3 anti-coalitions PS was involved in from our 
regression analysis below, the significance of the PS coefficient in our preferred regression 
specifications behind columns (1) and (3) in table 12 below considerably diminishes232.  
                                                          
230
 Or as Browne and Franklin (1973 p. 461) and Folke (2013 p. 4) state: a large party is more likely to be 
pivotal, and hence more likely to be part of a governing coalition. 
231
 If we however assume that coming to power as part of an anti-coalition is not only exogenous for its largest 
party but also for its other members, the partisan alignment coefficients with respect to MR, PS and CDH in the 
IV regressions of table 12 below are insignificant.  
232
 However, the significantly positive Ecolo alignment effect that we find below is robust against only 
instrumenting Ecolo municipal power participation (while not instrumenting municipal power participation of 
the other 3 major parties). These Ecolo effects are found by means of an IV for Ecolo municipal coalition 
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6.2. IV for Ecolo alignment: alignment after 1
st
 ever municipal coalition 
participation 
 
Ecolo was the “perpetrator” of an anti-coalition or its “victim” in only 1 instance over our sample 
period, which seems too few to construct an IV. However, we can arguably not afford to leave Ecolo 
out of our analysis of partisan alignment, as Ecolo is one of the 4 major parties at the Brussels 
municipal level
233
. Partisan alignment with respect to Ecolo may be correlated not only with grants 
received but also with alignment with respect to one or more of the other main political parties, as 
municipal power participation of Ecolo can be expected to reduce the probability of municipal power 
participation of the other 3 major parties. Therefore, we consider it more prudent to develop a different 
instrument for alignment with respect to Ecolo, which is moreover based on more observations.  
Ecolo is the only one of the 4 major parties that gained power in several Brussels municipalities for the 
1
st
 time in its history over our sample period. After the 1994 elections it joined municipal coalitions for 
the first time ever within the Brussels Region, as it acquired power in the City of Brussels and in 
Schaarbeek. After the 2000 municipal elections, it managed to remain in office in the City of Brussels 
and in Schaarbeek, and moreover entered into 9 more municipal governments (Anderlecht, Elsene, 
Ganshoren, Jette, Molenbeek, Sint-Agatha-Berchem, Ukkel, Vorst, and Watermaal-Bosvoorde).  
We argue that these 11 new coalition participations –as well as the several considerable vote share 
increases that preceded and facilitated these coalition participations- are exogenous to previous grants 
received by the municipalities concerned, for 2 reasons: 
1) The new Ecolo municipal coalition participations either preceded or more or less coincided 
with 1
st
 ever Ecolo coalition participations at the subsidising levels. Hence they could hardly 
have been fostered by grants steered to municipalities by subsidising governments in which 
Ecolo was in power. One could argue that the 9 extra coalition participations gained in 2000 
could have been fostered by extra grants obtained by these municipalities thanks to Ecolo 
entering the Federal government coalition for the 1
st
 time in history after the 1999 Federal 
elections. This was the 1
st
 time in history that Ecolo entered a government that subsidises the 
Brussels municipalities
234
. But it seems hard to believe that Ecolo already managed during the 
1
st
 year of its 1
st
 ever Federal coalition participation to favour certain Brussels municipalities 
with sufficient extra grants so as to “buy” considerably more votes for Ecolo during the 2000 
municipal elections. Firstly, as argued above, the parties in power pre-2000 in those 
municipalities instead of Ecolo at the subsidising level could have succeeded in claiming the 
credit for (the public goods provided with) such grants. Secondly, as “local government” 
mainly belongs to the competencies of the Brussels Regional government, we suspect that the 
possibilities to steer Federal grants to particular Brussels municipalities are rather limited
235
. 
Thirdly, while Jennes and Persyn (2015 p. 185) do find that Belgian federal ministers are able 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
participation that consists of substantially more observations –i.e. 11 new Ecolo coalition participations- than the 
anti-coalition IVs considered per individual party. (see below) 
233
 Moreover, regression coefficients reported below change considerably when leaving Ecolo out of the 
analysis. 
234
 Only in 2004 Ecolo entered for the 1
st
 time the government of the Brussels Region and only in 2009 it entered 
for the 1
st
 time the government of the French Community. 
235
 Column (8) of table 12 (see below) shows that Ecolo participation in the Brussels Regional government –
from 2004 onwards- rather than to the Federal government –from 1999 onwards- explains the Ecolo alignment 
effect. 
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to steer extra transfers to (citizens living in) their electoral districts with a time lag of one year 
only, they also find that the medium and long-term effects of such ministerial efforts are much 
larger.  
However, possible endogeneity of municipal coalition participation with respect to previous 
grants is the reason that we do leave out of our instrument the 3 1
st
 ever coalitions 
participations of Ecolo as a result of the 2006 municipal elections, as they could well have 
been endogenous to previous grants steered by subsidising governments in which Ecolo was 
in power. 
 
2) The steep increases in vote share that facilitated the 9 new Ecolo municipal coalition 
participations in 2000 (see table 11) can be argued to be a case in point of previous research 
findings that local elections are decided on the basis of national or federal preferences for 
certain political parties. Such a “tide effect” or “trend effect” is e.g. found for municipalities in 
the Netherlands by Allers and Merkus (2013). In such cases municipal coalition participation 
would be exogenous to previous municipal grants received. Table 11 shows that this 2000 
Ecolo “tide effect” could be more likely than any “tide effects” for other parties236. While 
Ecolo more or less doubled its share of the Francophone vote between 1995 and 1999 both at 
the Federal and the Brussels Regional level, Ecolo also more or less doubled its average share 
of the vote between 1994 and 2000 at the Brussels municipal level. Hence the Ecolo 2000 
municipal result seems to have benefited from the Ecolo 1999 country-wide results
237
. 
 
Table 11: The tide-effect on the Ecolo and CDH 2000 municipal election results in terms of vote 
shares (%) 
 1991 Federal 1994 municipal 1995 Federal 1995 Regional 1999 Federal 1999 Regional 2000 municipal 
MR 25.9 34.2 28.5 42.6 29.0 42.7 35.6 
PS 36.5 18.8 32.9 26.1 29.0 19.9 20.6 
CDH 20.8 14.6 21.3 11.3 16.8 9.8 11.1 
Ecolo 13.8 8.4 11.0 11.0 21.0 22.7 17.7 
 
Sources: http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html, http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ, own calculations. 
Therefore we will instrument the total of 19 Ecolo municipal coalition participations over our sample 
period with the 11 Ecolo municipal coalition participations that were the 1
st
 ever per municipality in its 
history. Our Ecolo instrument is reminiscent of the instrument used in Knight’s (2005 p. 1649-1650) 
study of the effect of representation on the US Congress Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure on transportation grants received. Knight instruments a US electoral district’s 
representation on this Committee with the presence of newly elected members of Congress on that 
same Committee, as this Committee substantially expanded in terms of number of members between 
1991 and 1998, and as districts represented on the Committee in 1991 “may have chosen to transfer 
                                                          
236
 Except possibly for CDH, which may have experienced a decrease in vote share at the 2000 municipal 
elections because of the loss in vote share at the preceding 1999 Federal and Brussels Regional elections. 
237
 In turn, the very favourable Ecolo 1999 Francophone-Belgium-wide election results may have benefited from 
the Belgium-wide food scare that dominated the final months of the 1999 election campaign. Both the Flemish 
Green party and Ecolo managed to claim the issue of “safe food” as theirs in the run-up to the 1999 elections. 
140 
 
off of the Committee” in 1998238. In other words, Committee representation of existing members may 
have been endogenous to grants, rather than or together with the other way around.  
Our instrument for Ecolo looks somewhat more solid than our anti-coalition instruments for the other 
3 main parties, as the Ecolo instrument is based on more observations. 
6.3. Construction of the regression equation 
 
As a next step we construct our regression equation. Our IV regression equation estimated in table 12 
below can be summarised as follows: 
𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 =  
𝛼𝑖  +  𝛼𝑡  +  𝛼1 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛼2  (
𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
+ 𝛼3  (
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
=   𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
) 
+ 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   
With: 
𝛼𝑖 a municipality fixed effect, 
𝛼𝑡 a year fixed effect 
With 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 the count variable measuring being in power in subsidising governments, taking 
integer values between 0 and 3, resp. for MR, CDH and Ecolo
239
 
  
                                                          
238
 This may have been the case because the pork barrel those districts received in 1991 may have caused them to 
experience diminished marginal utility from transportation projects in 1998. 
239
 We do not develop an IV strategy to take into account possible endogeneity of the “subsgovt” variables. We 
hence implicitly assume that the “subsgovt” variables are exogenous with respect to past grants received at the 
municipal level, as opposed to the “mungovt” variables.  
This assumption seems reasonable for the Federal government and the French Community government. Indeed, 
parties may gain power at the Federal and French Community government level only to a limited extent because 
a number of Brussels municipalities received more grants, due to which subsidising parties would increase their 
vote share during subsequent Federal and French Community elections. E.g. in the 1999 Federal election only 11 
of the 59 Francophone seats in the Federal House of Representatives were provided by the electoral district 
including the Brussels Region. This reasoning is in line with the reasoning e.g. Albouy (2013 p. 127) develops 
for the US. 
But this reasoning of course does not hold for the Brussels Region elections. One can easily imagine that grants 
steered to Brussels municipalities by the Brussels Regional government could considerably affect the outcome of 
Brussels Regional elections. This is a weakness of our empirical strategy because the partisan alignment effects 
we find below seem to be driven by the Brussels Regional level. 
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With: 
 (
𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
= 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
) 
being a sum including as terms: 
1) the “party in municipal power” dummy instrumented by the “party in municipal power after 
the formation of an anti-coalition” interaction variable, resp. for MR, CDH and PS 
2) the interaction variable of interest, i.e. the “aligned party in municipal power” interaction 
variable instrumented by the “aligned party in municipal power after the formation of an anti-
coalition” triple interaction variable, resp. for MR and CDH; for PS the variable of interest is 
just the PS “party in municipal power” dummy multiplied by 3 
 
With: 
 (
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
=   𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡
) 
being a sum including as terms: 
1) the “Ecolo in municipal power” dummy instrumented by the “Ecolo new in municipal 
power” interaction variable 
2) the “Ecolo aligned party in municipal power” interaction variable instrumented by the 
“Ecolo aligned party new in municipal power” interaction variable 
 
And with 𝑋𝑖𝑡  a set of financial, demographic and political control variables 
Our empirical approach contrasts with the bulk of both the “1st generation” and the “2nd generation” 
literature on partisan alignment –discussed above- in 3 ways: 
1) We include alignment variables for multiple individual parties into one single regression, 
rather than regressing grants on a general alignment variable, as is common in the partisan 
alignment literature. In this respect, our research set-up is as far as we know only similar 
to the research of Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) and Khemani (2007) on India, Rodden 
(2005) on Germany, Migueis (2013 p. 20) on Portugal, and of Fiva and Halse (2014) on 
Norway, as these studies also investigate individual party effects.
 
Investigating individual 
party effects seems interesting, as Folke (2013 p. 2) writes: “Despite the prominence of 
the assumption that parties matter there is no systematic evidence on how the 
representation of individual parties affects policy outcomes in proportional representation 
systems.” E.g. Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), and Curto-Grau e.a. 
(2012) not only differ from our study in that they investigate the effect of alignment of a 
lower level government with respect to a party block rather than with individual political 
parties, but also in that they do not distinguish between the alignment effects according to 
a leftwing block and the alignment effects according to a rightwing block. 
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2) We take care to explicitly construct our alignment variables as interaction variables240, 
again in contrast to e.g. Bracco e.a. (2012), Brollo and Nannicini (2012), and Curto-Grau 
e.a. (2012). These latter studies hence do not construct their alignment variable as the 
interaction of a dummy measuring being in power of a particular –i.e. either leftwing or 
rightwing- block at the lower government level with another single dummy measuring 
being in power of a particular –i.e. either leftwing or rightwing- block at the higher 
government level. We believe that it is an important contribution of our analysis to the 
literature that we construct alignment as an interaction, hence additionally including the 
factors that compose the interaction as separate regressors. When not including these 
separate regressors, a significant coefficient of our interaction variable may even represent 
a spurious correlation. (see e.g. Brambor e.a. 2005 p. 66-71) Alternatively, without 
including the separate regressors an insignificant coefficient of the interacted variable may 
as well erroneously point at the absence of any correlation
241
. One could e.g. argue that 
our dataset of only 312 observations would rather warrant a more parsimonious 
specification, i.e. a specification that does not include the factors of which the interaction 
is composed as separate regressors. Remarkably, such a specification makes all 
coefficients of interest in our regression analysis below turn insignificant (see below). 
This is in line with the finding of Brambor e.a. (2005 p. 79) that omitting constitutive 
factors of the interaction variable as separate regressors may either overestimate or 
underestimate the coefficient of the interaction variable.  
What is more, in what follows it will appear that we will be able to give the coefficient on 
one of the constitutive factors of our interaction variable of interest, i.e. the respective 
“mungovt” variables, a rather important interpretation from a partisan alignment 
perspective. This coefficient measures the effect of a municipality “including a particular 
party into its coalition” on grants received whenever this party is not part of one of the 
coalitions at the subsidising levels, i.e. it measures a kind of “reverse alignment effect” (or 
“punishment effect for not being aligned”). 
3) Our resp. “subsgovt” variables are count variables rather than simple dummy variables, as 
they count the number of subsidising governments in which a party in question 
simultaneously participated-, hence taking a value between 0 and 3
242
. Therefore, our 
interaction variable in question measures per individual party the degree of partisan 
alignment between a municipality and the subsidising government levels.  
  
                                                          
240
 Except for PS, for which this is impossible due to the constant coalition participation of PS at the 3 
subsidising levels over our sample period. 
241
 Admittedly, a spurious correlation would be worse than the erroneous suggestion of absence of any 
correlation. 
242
 As said above, because we do not know the resp. shares of the 3 subsidising levels in total discretionary 
grants, we simply increase our count variable by 1 for each extra subsidising level at which a particular party is 
in power. The aggregate nature of our grants data –not distinguishing between the 3 governments that subsidise 
the Brussels municipalities- makes the use of our “subsgovt” count variables less innovative compared to the 
existing literature than that it otherwise could have been. 
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7. Regression results 
 
Regression results are shown in table 12 below.  
Column (1): FE regression, with the alignment variables of interest as simple dummies 
As a start, column (1) of table 12 presents the simple OLS Fixed Effects (FE) regression result of 
grants on alignment, with the alignment interaction variables of interest modelled as simple dummies, 
which take the value of 1 in case of a municipality characterised by the party in question being at the 
same time in power at the municipal level and at one or more subsidising levels. As said above, all 
coefficients of interest are insignificant in this specification. 
We also include municipality and year dummies, the estimates of which we do not report, for reasons 
of space. We additionally include a number of rather standard financial and economic-demographic 
controls at the municipal level, similarly to the controls used by e.g. Bracco e.a. (2012 p. 18). In all 
regressions reported in table 12, the 3 economic-demographic variables included are the number of 
unemployed, young, and elderly expressed per 100 inhabitants, and the 3 financial variables are 
private income, municipal debt and municipal tax revenues expressed in 2011 euros per capita
243
.     
Remarkably, hardly any of the added financial and demographic controls appears significant. This 
could be due to the discretionary nature of the grants considered, i.e. the special purposes for which 
they are meant –e.g. urban renewal- could make their attribution rather unrelated to our control 
variables. Alternatively, it could mean that political and tactical considerations dominate needs 
considerations with respect to the allocation of discretionary grants, similar to the conclusion drawn 
with respect to discretionary grants to Italian municipalities by Bracco and Brugnoli (2014 p. 12). The 
low significance of our control variables, also compared to our variables of interest, persists in our IV 
analysis (see below). 
We also control for the resp. municipal vote shares
244
. Effectively, partisan alignment could be 
endogenous with respect to vote share: a particular party could have gained power at the municipal 
level thanks to the popularity of its local candidates, who provided their party with a high vote share, 
possibly because they managed to attract many grants, possibly for other reasons. Additionally, we 
include interactions of municipal vote shares with the dummy measuring at how many subsidising 
levels a party is in power. These are meant to check if extra grants are allocated by incumbents at the 
subsidising levels to municipalities where these incumbents’ parties obtain high vote shares during 
municipal elections (the standard partisan hypothesis) rather than to politically aligned municipalities. 
Hardly any of the political control variables appears significant, in particular as we refine our 
regression specification moving from left to right in table 12.  
 
                                                          
243
 Unemployment data have been obtained from the Federal Ministry of Employment; demographic and income 
data have been obtained from Statistics Belgium (www.statbel.fgov.be); debt and tax revenue data have been 
obtained from Belfius. 
244
 In what follows, data on vote shares have been obtained from http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html 
and http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ. 
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Table 12: Regression of discretionary grants (in euro per capita) on alignment
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Grantspc 
FE 
Alignment as a simple 
dummy 
Grantspc 
FE 
Alignment as a simple 
count variable 
Grantspc 
FE 
Alignment as an 
interaction 
Grantspc 
IV regression (anti-
coalitions and 1st Ecolo 
coalitions) 
D.grantspc 
IV again, but now 
including LDV as a 
regressor 
D.grantspc 
Being in power weighted 
for municipal vote share 
D.grantspc 
Being in power weighted 
for municipal coalition 
formation power index 
D.grantspc 
Distinguishing Ecolo 
alignment per 
subsidising government 
(D.)L.grantspc     0.333 0.533** 0.733** 0.364 
     (0.347) (0.257) (0.340) (0.268) 
         
(D.)MRmungovt   26.59 -83.18 99.40 6.094 1.689 114.9 
   (21.29) (84.29) (201.3) (4.535) (1.877) (224.2) 
         
(D.)MRsubsgovt   0 -32.99 113.6* 3.146 32.24 49.19 
   (.) (40.00) (63.01) (45.21) (29.97) (170.6) 
         
(D.)MRmungovt -6.551 0.161 -26.58** 36.04 -150.2 -2.645 -0.326 -117.7 
*subsgovt (6.347) (14.78) (12.49) (46.07) (130.6) (2.495) (1.005) (130.1) 
         
(D.)CDHmungovt   -33.14 16.02 -303.2 -0.323 1.579 -214.9 
   (22.01) (83.07) (276.0) (4.782) (2.002) (227.3) 
         
(D.)CDHsubsgovt   -58.27** -75.78** -49.84 7.435 3.158 -118.8** 
   (26.05) (38.10) (56.22) (17.91) (22.77) (57.50) 
         
(D.)CDHmungovt 2.360 5.676 12.73* 2.858 123.4 2.942 0.476 112.2 
*subsgovt (5.418) (11.84) (6.399) (30.51) (106.7) (2.563) (1.168) (120.5) 
         
(D.)ECOLOmungovt   -32.97 -73.29** -202.8*** -10.75*** -0.854 -187.8*** 
   (26.36) (29.45) (64.24) (3.800) (0.889) (55.41) 
         
(D.)ECOLOsubsgovt   -17.30 -28.38 -47.82 13.88 -18.26  
   (28.71) (32.76) (64.22) (58.29) (72.38)  
         
D.ECOLOfedgovt        -87.16 
        (118.8) 
         
D.ECOLOreggovt        -113.2 
        (222.8) 
         
D.ECOLOcommgovt        -134.0 
        (163.3) 
         
(D.)ECOLOmungovt 4.669 8.959 25.33 56.65*** 95.80** 8.334*** 0.904*  
*subsgovt (11.30) (15.89) (19.89) (21.61) (44.31) (3.141) (0.542)  
         
D.ECOLOmungovt        54.14 
*fedgovt        (43.82) 
         
D.ECOLOmungovt        141.8* 
*reggovt        (76.07) 
         
D.ECOLOmungovt        111.5 
*commgovt        (608.9) 
         
(D.)PSmungovt*3 -1.387 -1.411 -2.481 13.05** 19.82 1.458* 0.676** 21.19* 
 (4.342) (4.758) (5.211) (6.398) (12.48) (0.783) (0.306) (10.62) 
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 For reasons of space, the interaction variables of table 12 only mention once –and not twice- the political party to which they are related. E.g. we note 
“MRmungovt*MRsubsgovt” as “MRmungovt*subsgovt”. 
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(continuation of table 12 from previous page) 
(D.)incomepc 0.0149 0.0149 0.0125 0.0207 0.0136 0.0272 0.00540 -0.0123 
 (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0152) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0291) (0.0307) 
         
(D.)unemployedpc 16.89 15.15 14.16 15.52 -71.83** -70.73** -61.99* -63.78* 
 (22.84) (22.86) (21.05) (19.02) (33.67) (33.11) (35.98) (34.81) 
         
(D.)under18pc 13.50 12.92 12.86 30.88** 44.27 32.89 8.621 -12.56 
 (8.063) (9.112) (8.684) (13.05) (34.88) (29.96) (26.12) (51.26) 
         
(D.)over65pc -0.255 -0.354 -0.971 4.478 -14.99 -40.95 -51.38 -59.46 
 (7.516) (7.713) (7.371) (7.211) (42.81) (33.07) (35.93) (40.65) 
         
(D.)debtpc 0.00852 0.00822 0.0111 0.0235 0.0328 0.0270 0.0640 0.0380 
 (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0188) (0.0602) (0.0571) (0.0576) (0.0604) 
         
(D.)taxrevenuepc 0.0608 0.0665 0.0496 0.104 -0.120 -0.117 -0.157 -0.0833 
 (0.0615) (0.0653) (0.0633) (0.0661) (0.130) (0.0912) (0.0994) (0.106) 
         
(D.)MRmunvote 1.932** 1.993* 1.104 3.740** -2.436 -2.561 0.632 2.878 
 (0.872) (0.957) (1.148) (1.890) (6.020) (4.738) (3.695) (2.885) 
         
(D.)CDHmunvote -1.861 -1.984* -2.176* -1.020 -4.248 2.418 2.509 2.437 
 (1.086) (1.115) (1.143) (1.468) (7.245) (2.582) (2.894) (3.347) 
         
(D.)ECOLOmunvote -4.835 -4.795 -5.761 -5.922 -15.30 4.977 -0.139 -12.60 
 (4.502) (4.376) (4.292) (4.976) (13.36) (6.880) (9.084) (12.36) 
         
(D.)PSmunvote -1.388 -1.092 -2.044 -3.109 -9.479 -3.733 1.696 -3.684 
 (0.968) (1.076) (1.226) (2.054) (9.052) (3.553) (3.576) (6.297) 
         
(D.)MRmunvote -0.556** -0.599** -0.391 -0.964* 0.185 2.411 0.137 -0.446 
*subsgovt (0.245) (0.262) (0.273) (0.509) (1.005) (2.820) (1.822) (0.600) 
         
(D.)CDHmunvote 0.480 0.510 0.396 0.614 -0.617 -2.383 -1.056 -0.586 
*subsgovt (0.375) (0.379) (0.393) (0.469) (0.866) (1.840) (2.107) (0.599) 
         
(D.)ECOLOmunvote 3.676 3.672* 3.795 4.293** 4.443 -0.377 4.756 9.112 
*subsgovt (2.126) (1.983) (2.221) (2.005) (3.685) (3.715) (4.566) (6.168) 
         
N 312 312 312 312 255 255 255 255 
Hansen J statistic (p value)    0.05 0.93 0.71 0.24 0.64 
F-test of joint significance of IVs in 1st 
stage (p values) 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Number of IVs    9 11 11 11 11 
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Clustering at the municipality-legislature level generates highly similar regression results.  
Year dummies included; municipality dummies included only in columns (1) till (4).  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Column (2): FE regression, with the alignment variables of interest as a simple count variable 
As a next step, column (2) of table 12 presents the simple OLS FE regression result of grants on 
alignment, with the alignment interaction variables of interest now modelled as count variables, which 
take the value of 1, resp. 2, resp. 3 in case of a municipality characterised by the party in question being at 
the same time in power at the municipal level and at 1, resp. 2, resp. 3 subsidising levels. Again, all 
coefficients of interest are insignificant in this specification. 
Column (3): FE regression, including the constitutive factors of the alignment interaction variable of 
interest as separate regressors 
Column (3) of table 12 then presents the simple OLS FE regression result of grants on alignment, using 
the full specification as presented in section 5.3, i.e. including the constitutive factors of the alignment 
interaction variable of interest as separate regressors. The impact of this inclusion is considerable, as 
several of our alignment coefficients now become significant or at least increase in size. 
The coefficient of the CDH variable of interest now becomes significantly positive with a p value of 0.06, 
and the Ecolo variable of interest now increases but remains insignificant with a p value of 0.22. The PS 
coefficient of course remains very small and very insignificant. Surprisingly, the coefficient of the MR 
variable of interest becomes significantly negative. It implies an average grants decrease of 26.6 real euros 
per capita and per year for every municipality in which MR is part of the coalition, whenever MR joins a 
coalition at a subsidising government level
246
. This negative association is hard to interpret. One 
possibility is that a decrease in grants to municipalities in which MR is not part of the coalition, leads to 
MR becoming part of the coalition. However, the negative sign persists also in most of our IV analysis 
below, which attempts to isolate the causal effect of partisan alignment on grants. 
A 2
nd
 possible explanation for the negative sign of the MR coefficient of interest is the one given by 
Baskaran and Hessami (2014) for their finding that rightwing state governments favour unaligned 
municipalities at the expense of aligned municipalities in the German state of Hesse. As said above, their 
explanation is that in their panel only few municipalities are aligned with rightwing state governments, 
due to which these state governments would have been compelled to “buy off” the support of unaligned 
municipalities with more discretionary grants (possibly reserving other kind of benefits than discretionary 
grants for aligned municipalities). This explanation may apply to the situation of the Brussels 
municipalities too. Table 5 above shows that MR is the only centre-right party of the 4 major Brussels 
parties, and hence may have policy preferences that diverge from the other 3 major Brussels parties
247
. 
Also, while table 4 shows that MR is the party that participated most in Brussels municipal coalitions (45 
times), the 3 major (centre-)left parties taken together unsurprisingly participated even more often in 
Brussels municipal coalitions (80 times). Moreover, MR is strongest in the richest Brussels municipalities, 
which may not need discretionary grants as much as poorer municipalities
248
, which in turn may have 
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 Or for every subsidising government level at which MR is part of the coalition, once MR joins the coalition in a 
particular municipality. 
247
 Although we are unable to detect an ideological pattern in MR’s municipal as well as subsidising government 
coalition preferences (see table 9). 
248
 This point is related to the point made by Engstrom and Vanberg (2010 p. 982) that in the US geographically 
targeted earmarks may be associated more with the Democratic party than with the Republican party because of the 
different preferences of the resp. politicians: relatively leftwing politicians may demand more earmarks than 
relatively rightwing politicians. 
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enabled MR to favour non-aligned municipalities with more discretionary grants in return for one or more 
other policy favours. 
Thirdly, the negative sign of the MR coefficient of interest may be related to the fact that MR has been a –
sometimes uneasy- alliance of 2 parties, rather than a single party, which may have weakened its 
alignment effect. Indeed, MR is the alliance that existed from 1992 until 2011 between the 2 Francophone 
Belgian parties PRL and FDF, including at the municipal level (though the name MR only dates from 
2002). In most occasions over our sample period where both PRL and FDF had campaigned on separate 
lists at the municipal level and had both obtained seats, PRL and FDF were either both part of a municipal 
government or were both in opposition. However, in particular during the first years of our sample period 
some municipal legislatures were characterised by PRL being part of the coalition and FDF being part of 
the opposition, or vice versa
249
. However, this 3
rd
 argument could be an explanation for an insignificant 
coefficient rather than for a significantly negative coefficient. 
 
A final explanation of the negative sign of the MR coefficient of interest is that it is sometimes said of 
Belgian center-right parties such as PRL and MR that they lack the organisational strength of the centre 
and centre-left parties. The degree of political professionalism seems to be higher in rather leftwing 
parties. E.g. already within PRL taken separately, there happened to be rather more internal conflicts and 
breakaway movements in several municipalities over our sample period than within the other 3 parties. 
However, again this could be an explanation for an insignificant coefficient rather than for a significantly 
negative coefficient. 
Hence, on the basis of our FE regression analysis, evidence for the partisan alignment hypothesis seems 
weak, with even a –hard to explain- significantly negative association between MR alignment and grants, 
and with –rather surprisingly- the 2 smaller parties CDH and Ecolo showing the most positive association 
between alignment and grants. 
Column (4): IV regression, with alignment after the formation of an anti-coalition and after 1
st
 ever 
Ecolo municipal coalition participation as IVs 
As a next step, we use alignment status after the formation of anti-coalition, and –for Ecolo- alignment 
status after 1st ever coalition participations as an IV in a regression of grants on overall alignment status. 
The resulting change in our coefficients of interest compared to the FE regression outcomes of column (3) 
is considerable:  
 the coefficient for the variable of interest for MR turns positive and insignificant  
 the coefficient of the CDH variable of interest remains positive, but turns insignificant  
 the coefficients of the Ecolo and PS variables of interest turn significant at the 0.01, resp. 
0.05 level with the expected sign, and their magnitudes increase considerably; However, 
the size of the Ecolo coefficient is far larger than the size of the PS coefficient, which is 
surprising given the large positive difference between PS and Ecolo municipal vote share 
as well as between the number of PS and Ecolo coalition participations at all 
municipality-subsidising levels over our sample period (also see tables 3 and 4 above) 
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 In these rare cases, we considered MR as being part of the coalition c.q. opposition if its largest component in 
terms of vote share –either PRL or FDF- was part of the coalition c.q. opposition. 
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All coefficients of interest in column (4) are larger than the FE coefficients in column (3), except the CDH 
coefficient. This is surprising, as we would expect OLS estimates to be upwardly biased, mainly because 
of simultaneity, i.e. reverse causality between grants and being in power
250
. However, the reverse causality 
bias of our above FE analysis may be rather small given the even larger variation in our independent 
variables of interest compared to the variation in our dependent variable of interest, as can be concluded 
from a comparison of their standard deviations (not shown). 
Moreover, the higher coefficients resulting from our IV regression could be explained by the nature of our 
IVs. Although alignment after an anti-coalition or because of a 1
st
 ever municipal coalition participation 
can be argued to be exogenous to previous grants received, subsidising governments may ex post 
particularly favour “anti-coalition municipalities” and “1st ever” municipalities with extra grants. 
Otherwise stated, exogeneity of our instruments does not guarantee full comparability of the observations 
on which our instruments are based. The coefficients of interest in column (4) may hence be an 
overestimation. 
The interpretation of the Ecolo (PS) coefficient of interest is now that whenever in power at one of the 
subsidising government levels, Ecolo (PS) steers extra grants to any Brussels municipality in which it is 
also in power. An alternative interpretation could however be that whenever having gained power in a 
Brussels municipality, Ecolo (PS) manages to receive extra grants from those subsidising governments at 
which level it is also in power. This estimation result hence provides support for the partisan alignment 
hypothesis rather than for the standard partisan hypothesis: as the Ecolo (PS) vote share variable has an 
insignificant or only small coefficient, it is the fact that the Ecolo (PS) party is in power at the municipal 
level that determines if the Ecolo (PS) party in power at the subsidising levels steers extra grants, rather 
than the presence of many Ecolo (PS) voters. Still otherwise stated: the presence of many Ecolo (PS) 
voters does not seem to be sufficiently reassuring for Ecolo (PS) to steer extra grants, because if the 
municipality was non-aligned in spite of many sympathetic voters, Ecolo (PS) would e.g. fear that either 
the extra grants may not reach those voters or that the party (parties) in power at the municipal level may 
claim the credit for the extra grants rather than Ecolo (PS) at the subsidising level (who caused the extra 
grants to be provided in the first place). Because our dependent variable –crucially- concerns 
intergovernmental grants, Ecolo (PS) -when in power at the subsidising level(s)- is only reassured of 
“being awarded the credit” if Ecolo (PS) is also in power in the municipality in question.  
To be able to compare with alignment effects found in the existing partisan alignment literature, we 
calculate our average effect of partisan alignment as follows: for Ecolo we take the sum of its alignment 
coefficient (as shown in column (4)) and of that same alignment coefficient multiplied by 2, after 
weighting each of these 2 terms with the relative frequency of Ecolo being in power at 1 subsidising level, 
resp. 2 subsidising levels, as over our sample period Ecolo was never in power at all 3 subsidising levels at 
the same time. This sum is: {56.7*(170/312)}+{(56.7*2)*(38/312)}. This sum amounts to 44.8 euros 
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 In their regression of discretionary grants to Canadian electoral districts on political-economy variables, also 
Milligan and Smart (2005 p. 15-16) obtain higher coefficients for their political variables of interest when 
instrumenting them. They are equally puzzled when trying to explain this result. Similarly, as said above, when 
refining the Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) paper by replacing an OLS design with a (fuzzy) RDD –which 
implies performing an IV regression-, Curto-Grau e.a. (2012) find an even stronger positive effect of party-political 
alignment on grants received by municipal governments than in their 2008 study. Also Knight’s (2005 p. 1650) 
effect of US Congress Committee representation on pork barrel spending increases after instrumenting Committee 
representation, although its significance decreases. 
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(with a standard deviation of 17.4 euros and a p value of 0.01), or 20.7% of the annual per capita grant 
amount of 216.7 real euros of an average municipality. For PS the average alignment effect is obviously 
13.1 euros, or 6.0% of the annual average per capita grant amount of 216.7 real euros. 
However, we should draw a different conclusion from the PS coefficient of interest obtained in column 
(4), because we are not able to distinguish any subsidising-level-induced effect of a change in PS 
alignment. Indeed, over our sample period, PS has always been in power at every single of the 3 
subsidising government levels. Firstly, for PS the conclusion should perhaps simply be that municipalities 
that include PS in their coalition obtain more grants, whether PS is also in power at the subsidising 
level(s) or not. This could be because PS could simply (be able to) attract staff at the municipal level that 
is particularly able to obtain grants from the various subsidising levels, or particularly motivated to do so 
because of the preferences of its voters. In other words: the PS coefficient of interest may not be a correct 
measure of the effect of partisan alignment, but rather a measure of a different kind of politicisation of 
grant allocation
251
. Secondly, we should perhaps even refrain from deriving any interpretation at all from 
the PS coefficient, as Brambor e.a. (2005 p. 79) show that omitting the constitutive factors of an 
interaction variable as separate regressors –as we are forced to do in the case of PS- may either 
overestimate or underestimate the coefficient of the interaction variable. 
Importantly, also the “mungovt” component of our MR, CDH, and Ecolo “mungovt” – “subsgovt” 
interaction variables
 
included as a separate regressor can be interpreted. The coefficient of the “mungovt” 
variables for those 3 parties shows the effect of entering into a municipal coalition on grants in cases 
where there is no alignment at all with the subsidising levels. The expectation is that the “mungovt” 
coefficients be negative, as a party in power at a subsidising level seems to have an incentive to direct 
grants away from municipalities in which it is not in power. Hence the “mungovt” coefficients measure 
some kind of reverse alignment effect. The expectation of a negative coefficient is confirmed by most 
coefficients concerned in table 12 except for MR. 
However, the “ECOLOmungovt” coefficients in the resp. columns of table 12 are the only “mungovt” 
coefficients that are significantly negative in almost every column from column (4) onwards. The size of 
the “ECOLOmungovt” coefficients is even larger than the size of the Ecolo alignment coefficients252. It 
implies that when a municipality takes Ecolo into its coalition while Ecolo is not in power at any of the 
subsidising levels, it receives significantly less grants. This effect can be interpreted as some sort of 
“punishment” of municipalities in which Ecolo is in power by subsidising levels that are “not friendly 
with Ecolo”. One explanation of such “punishment” could be that of our 4 parties Ecolo is the youngest 
political party and is perceived the “non-traditional” party of the 4 parties considered. The 3 other political 
parties may view Ecolo as an “intruder”, that threatens their “share of the market for votes”, and against 
which a decrease in discretionary grants may be meant as a “barrier to entry”. Alternatively, the 
significantly negative “ECOLOmungovt” coefficient can be interpreted as lower Ecolo skills or 
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 Alternatively, one could argue that it would precisely be the constant hold on power of PS in any subsidising 
government since 1988 that would cause the significantly positive PS coefficient of interest in column (4). This 
coefficient could mean that PS has gained strong knowledge with respect to the tactical –i.e. partisan- allocation of 
discretionary grants to municipalities. 
252
 The punishment of municipalities where Ecolo is in power may have contributed to Ecolo’s loss of vote share 
between the 2000 and the 2006 municipal elections from on average 17.7 to 13.3%. 
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motivation to attract grants when in municipal power, possibly due to Ecolo’s inexperience253. Both 
explanations may be accentuated by the fact that we instrument Ecolo municipal coalition participations 
with first ever Ecolo municipal coalition participations only. 
Remarkably, there does not seem to exist any political economy or political science literature on the effect 
of being (in)experienced/new as a political party in power on grants received. With respect to the 
significantly positive alignment coefficient for Ecolo, there does exist a considerable literature on the –
positive- effect of being inexperienced/new as an individual politician in power on grants received. An 
example is Milligan and Smart (2005 p. 11), who find that electoral districts of Canadian ministers receive 
more grants the less parliamentary experience these ministers have, as Canadian political parties 
particularly wish to electorally support their inexperienced ministers. Similarly, Engstrom and Vanberg 
(2010) find that districts of freshmen members of the US Congress get allotted more earmarks. With 
respect to the significantly negative “mungovt” coefficient for Ecolo, i.a. Ryan (2008) finds that districts 
receive less federal funding if they are represented by a US member of Congress who has shorter tenure.  
Additionally, the “mungovt” variables enable us to calculate –rather than the average alignment effect in 
isolation- the average effect of “a municipality taking a particular party into its coalition” in general on 
grants received. The calculation of this effect is shown in table 13, and follows the method suggested by 
Brambor e.a. (2005 p. 72-74). In column (0) we simply repeat the average effect of alignment as such as 
calculated above. In column (1) we simply repeat the regression results for the “ECOLOmungovt” 
coefficient in column (2) of table 12. In columns (2) and (3) of table 13 we calculate the average effect of 
taking Ecolo in one’s municipal coalition if -in contrast to column (1)- Ecolo is also present in 1 resp. 2 
subsidising government(s). This latter effect is the sum of the “ECOLOmungovt” and “ECOLOsubsgovt* 
mungovt” coefficients of column (4) in table 12 –with the “ECOLOsubsgovt*mungovt” coefficients 
multiplied by 2 in column (3) of table 13. Finally, we obtain the average effect of a municipality “taking 
Ecolo into its coalition” on grants received in column (4), by summing up the coefficients of columns (1) 
until (3) after weighting each term by its sample share (bottom row in table 13). The conclusion is that this 
average effect is negative but insignificant, so that “on a net basis” municipalities in which Ecolo is in 
power do not receive more or less grants. This is because the subsidising level(s) at which Ecolo is in 
power manage(s) to compensate for the loss of grants Ecolo municipalities experience whenever Ecolo is 
not in power at any of the subsidising levels, and/or vice versa. 
Table 13: Average effect of a municipality taking Ecolo into its coalition on discretionary grants 
received (in euro per capita) over our sample period 
  
(0)  
average alignment 
effect in isolation 
(1) total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 0 
(2) total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 1 
(3) total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 2 
(4) average 
total effect 
coefficient 44.8 -73.29 -14.1 42.7 -26.2 
standard error 17.4 29.45 29.6 39 29.4 
p value 0.01 0.04 0.63 0.27 0.37 
sample share 312/312 104/312 170/312 38/312 312/312 
 
Source: own calculations 
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 Another possible explanation could be different ethical standards of Ecolo politicians, as Ecolo has also been 
known for striving towards “a more clean political culture”. 
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At first sight, also the coefficients of the separate “subsgovt” component of our MR, CDH, and Ecolo 
“mungovt” – “subsgovt” interaction variables included as a separate regressor seem fit for interpretation. 
These coefficients seem to show the effect of a particular party entering a coalition at some subsidising 
government level on grants to municipalities in which this party is not part of the coalition. I.e. at first 
sight these coefficients seem to be an indicator of parties’ ability or willingness to “punish” non-aligned 
municipalities with less grants. However, our 3 “subsgovt” count variables are collinear with one or more 
of our year dummies included into our regression specification
254
. This is because –evidently- all of our 
“subgovt” count variables only vary over time –i.e. they do not vary at all between municipalities-, 
similarly to our time dummies. Hence, the 3 “subsgovt” count variables may pick up other influences on 
grants apart from the effect of a change in coalition participation of a particular party at the subsidising 
levels. However, the fact that we cannot interpret the coefficients of our “subsgovt” variables should not 
prevent us from interpreting the coefficients of our actual variables of interest, i.e. of the alignment 
interaction variables, as these interaction variables do consist of a variable that varies between 
municipalities (i.e. our “mungovt” variable). 
All our instruments are relevant. This is noticeable from the 1
st
 stage of the IV regression –not shown in 
table 12- in which the p values of their (positive) coefficients are 0.000, as well as the p values of the F-
tests of joint significance of the IVs -shown at the bottom of table 12. However, the Hansen J test does not 
allow us to reject the hypothesis that our instruments are endogenous, with a p value of 0.05
255
. Because of 
the latter result, we will run an alternative IV regression in column (5) of table 12, including a lagged 
dependent variable (LDV). This will be our preferred specification, as the Hansen J test it produces does 
allow us to reject the hypothesis that our instruments are endogenous. 
Column (5): IV regression, but now including the lagged dependent variable (LDV) as a regressor 
Table 6 shows that our dependent variable evolves over time in a rather erratic way for several 
municipalities. Indeed, intergovernmental special purpose grants to a particular municipality can be 
expected to be characterised by a smaller degree of persistence than the formula-based general purpose 
intergovernmental grants of the Municipality Fund of the Brussels Region. Nevertheless, we generally 
may suspect even discretionary intergovernmental grants to be characterised by an important extent of 
persistence/stickiness. Being (in)eligible as a municipality or (un)skillful as a political party in power in a 
municipality with respect to obtaining discretionary grants in year t may be explained to an important 
extent by being (in)eligible or (un)skillful with respect to obtaining discretionary grants in year t-1. Table 
6 indeed shows that our dependent variable evolves over time in a rather smooth way for several other 
municipalities. Also, when we conduct the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of error terms in panel 
data, we have to strongly reject that there would not be first order autocorrelation in the error term (p 
value 0.00). However, municipal eligibility or party-specific skill with respect to obtaining grants should 
be expected to be a rather time-invariant unobservable. Therefore it should be captured by the 
municipality dummies we have included so far into our regression specifications. 
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 Because of multicollinearity with year dummies, the “MRsubsgovt” variable drops out altogether in column (3) of 
table 12. 
255
 We can calculate the Hansen J statistic because the regression behind column (4) uses more instruments than that 
there are instrumented variables. This is because we additionally include the “anticoalition” dummies as instruments, 
as shown in the full regression equation in section 5.3 above. 
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Still, adding an LDV as a regressor may make sense, because including an LDV takes into account the 
possibility that a past increase (decrease) in grants may cause a current increase (decrease) in grants. I.e. 
it may capture a possible trend in grants received not captured by municipality dummies. Therefore, as an 
alternative to the IV regression without an LDV, we now include the LDV into our IV regression. 
However, as is well known that the LDV is endogenous, we need to instrument it. We instrument the LDV 
with its 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 lag, as is common practice. However, as is also well known, for those 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 lags 
expressed in levels to be valid instruments, we should first express the original regression specification in 
first differences rather than including municipality dummies (the latter being equivalent to conducting a 
FE estimation). Therefore, before conducting an IV regression including the LDV, we conduct a First 
Difference transformation (shown in table 12 by “D.”). 
As opposed to our IV regression without an LDV in column (4), the Hansen J test now does allow us to 
reject the hypothesis that our instruments would be endogenous, with a p value well over 0.1. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the coefficient of the LDV is insignificant. The fact that our dependent variable 
“discretionary grants” appears to evolve quite erratically over time for some municipalities may explain 
that the coefficient of our LDV is insignificant. However, when (1) including this LDV, (2) instrumenting 
it -which makes us lose 3 years of observations
256
-, as well as (3) conducting the First Difference 
transformation rather than adding municipality dummies, the sign, size and significance of our variables of 
interest change remarkably compared to column (4):  
 the MR coefficient changes from positive and insignificant to negative and insignificant 
 the CDH coefficient becomes large but remains insignificant  
 the Ecolo coefficient of interest stays positive and significant and increases in size; 
However, the coefficient of the “mungovt” dummy for Ecolo increases even more in 
size
257
; the significance and sign of the Ecolo “mungovt” and the Ecolo alignment 
coefficients are robust against excluding any single municipality from our sample, except 
that the p value of the Ecolo alignment coefficient increases to 0.16 if we omit the 
municipality of Sint-Agatha-Berchem 
 the PS coefficient increases in size but changes from significant to just not significant 
anymore (p value 0.11) 
An overall increase in size of our coefficients of interest compared to the IV regression without an LDV is 
surprising, because our coefficients of interest now only measure the short-term effect of a change in 
alignment, as opposed to column (4). It is also puzzling that the increase in coefficients appears to be 
caused even more by the First Difference transformation than by the addition of the LDV.  
Similarly to column (4), to be able to compare with alignment effects found in the partisan alignment 
literature, we calculate our average effect of partisan alignment over our sample. For Ecolo this average 
effect amounts to 92.4 euros –i.e. {95.8*(170/255)}+{(95.8*2)*(38/255)}- (with a standard deviation of 
42.7 euros and a p value of 0.03). In words: 92.4 euros is the sum of 95.8 –the coefficient of the Ecolo 
alignment variable in column (5)- weighted for the relative frequency of Ecolo being in power at 1 
subsidising level- and 95.8*2 –double the coefficient of the Ecolo alignment variable in column (5)- 
weighted for the relative frequency of Ecolo simultaneously being in power at 2 subsidising levels. The 
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 I.e. 57 (=3*19) observations. 
257
 The coefficient of the Ecolo “mungovt” dummy even becomes very large when compared to the average per 
capita discretionary grant amount of 216.7 euros that a Brussels municipality annually receives. 
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average amount of 92.4 euros is about twice the effect of 44.8 euros of column (4) and is no less than 
42.6% of the annual per capita grant amount of 216.7 real euros of an average municipality. For PS the 
average alignment effect is obviously 19.8 euros (though just not significant at the 0.1 level), or 9.1% of 
the annual average per capita grant amount of 216.7 real euros
258
. 
 
Similarly to the coefficients of column (4), the coefficients of column (5) enable us to calculate the 
average effect of a municipality taking Ecolo into its coalition on grants received. The calculation of this 
effect is shown in table 14, and is fully analogous to the calculation in table 13. The conclusion from table 
14 –in contrast to the conclusion from table 13- is that in the short run the extra grants received thanks to 
Ecolo alignment by far do not seem to suffice to compensate for the decrease in grants due to non-aligned 
municipal coalition participation of Ecolo. “On a net basis” municipalities in which Ecolo is in power as 
a consequence receive 110.4 euros less grants. 
Table 14: Average short-term effect of a municipality taking Ecolo into its coalition on discretionary 
grants (in euro per capita) received over our sample period, regression with LDV 
  
(0)  
average alignment effect in 
isolation 
(1)  
total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 0 
(2)  
total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 1 
(3)  
total effect if 
"ECOLOsubsgovt" = 2 
(4)  
average total 
effect 
coefficient 92.4 -202.8 -107.0 -11.2 -110.4 
standard 
error 42.7 64.24 55.2 76.7 54.9 
p value 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.88 0.04 
sample 
share 255/255 47/255 170/255 38/255 255/255 
 
Source: own calculations 
Column (5) is our preferred regression specification, not only because it shows that the instruments used 
are valid and relevant, but also because it is the most general specification, including an LDV. 
Column (6): IV regression, with municipal coalition participation weighted for vote share 
The specification behind column (6) is an attempt to explain the positively significant and large coefficient 
of interest in particular for Ecolo in columns (4) and (5) , as it has been demonstrated that in some cases 
small parties are able to obtain extra “spoils of office” (see Browne and Franklin 1973). We cannot 
directly measure if the Ecolo alignment effect that we have found is due to the small size of Ecolo, as 
Ecolo is smallest party in every municipal and subsidising coalition of which it was part over our sample 
period, except one. However, we can indirectly measure the effect of smallness on the partisan allocation 
of grants in general by attaching more weight to the municipal coalition participation of large parties in the 
IV regression behind column (5). This is to check if grants are more strongly associated with small 
coalition parties than with large coalition parties. In the specification behind column (6) we have therefore 
multiplied the municipal coalition participation dummies with the respective municipal vote shares. 
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 Again keeping in mind that we should perhaps even refrain from deriving any interpretation at all from the PS 
coefficient, as we are not able to include the constitutive factors of the PS alignment variable as separate regressors. 
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Of course when multiplying our variables of interest with the municipal vote share concerned (expressed 
as a percentage), our coefficients of interest become much smaller, and it is hard to compare their sizes to 
the sizes of our coefficients of interest in the preceding columns. Our coefficients of interest now measure 
the grants increase in euro for every percentage point increase in the municipal vote share of a party that 
both participates in the municipal coalition and in one or more coalitions at the subsidising levels. The 
effect of this multiplication is that the PS coefficient again turns significant at the 0.1 level, and that the 
Ecolo coefficient is now significant again at the 0.01 level. The conclusion hence is that large rather than 
small coalition parties cause aligned municipalities to receive more grants, which does not allow us to 
explain the strongly positive Ecolo alignment effect on grants received with the small size of Ecolo. 
We obtain a similar result when multiplying coalition participation at the subsidising level(s) with a 
party’s vote share at the subsidising level(s) (not shown in table 12) – rather than multiplying municipal 
coalition participation with the municipal vote share. Considering party size at the subsidising level rather 
than at the municipal level may be relevant if one believes that it is the former level rather than the latter 
level that is the main actor with respect to partisan allocation of grants. In effect, Rodden and Wilkinson 
(2004) and Khemani (2007) find that Indian parties that are small resp. dominant at the central level -i.e. 
at the subsidising level– obtain more grants for “their” state in case of partisan alignment. However, 
similarly to weighting for municipal vote share, weighting for subsidising level vote share renders those 
coefficients of interest that are (close to) significant in column (5) –i.e. those related to Ecolo and PS- only 
more significant (not shown in table 12). This suggests that neither Ecolo’s smallness when in power at 
the subsidising level(s) explains the significantly positive Ecolo alignment effect of column (5). 
Column (7): IV regression, but with municipal coalition participation weighted for coalition formation 
power index 
As said above, the political economics literature points at yet another reason why small parties may be 
associated more strongly than large parties with the partisan allocation of grants. It is the uncertainty 
argument of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-351): the more a governing party is uncertain that it will 
still be in power after the next elections, the more it will overspend in the current legislature by means of 
running a budget deficit. Hence we hypothesise that governing parties at the municipal level that are less 
certain of remaining in power will try to increase spending in terms of lobbying for an increase in grants 
allocated by friendly governments. 
As said above, it is hard to distinguish preferences for certain coalitions at the Brussels municipal level 
over our sample period. This lack of preference patterns induces us to operationalise the degree of a 
particular party’s certainty of remaining in power after the next elections not simply by means of the 
number of years during which a particular party was previously in power
259
, but instead by means of its 
current Banzhaf power index (or coalition formation power index). As said above, the latter is the number 
of coalitions in which a particular party is decisive for a majority (given the most recent election results) -
i.e. in which this party is needed- expressed as a share of all possible coalitions that command a majority 
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 E.g. if like in the 20
th
 century at the federal level, both liberals and socialists showed a clear preference to form a 
coalition with the Christian-democrats, the latter’s certainty of remaining in power could be operationalised as the 
number of years the Christian-democrats had previously been in power. 
In his study on Swedish municipalities, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) operationalises certainty of remaining in power as 
a dummy measuring if the party in question remained in power ex post, but Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) acknowledges 
various problems with this operationalisation, which induce him to develop a complex IV approach. 
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of the votes (Banzhaf 1968). We hence assume that the less a party that is part of a municipal coalition is 
currently needed for a municipal coalition to command a majority of the votes, the less this party is certain 
to remain in power after the next elections
260
, and therefore the more this party will (try to) receive grants 
if it is also in power at one of the subsidising levels. Table 15 shows average municipal power indices for 
the 4 parties in question that we calculated per municipality and legislature. It -unsurprisingly- reveals that 
Ecolo on average has the lowest power index (but that CDH’s power index is almost as low).  
Table 15: Municipal power indices (in cases in which parties are part of a municipal coalition) 
    MR PS CDH Ecolo 
Power index Mean 72.4 54.6 31.7 31.6 
  Standard deviation 36.5 40.4 40.0 25.6 
 
Sources: http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html, http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ, own calculations. 
In column (7) of table 12 we test the possibility that the rather strong impact of Ecolo alignment on grants 
may be due to a low Ecolo power index –and therefore a high uncertainty of remaining in power. To this 
effect, we replace the municipal vote shares in column (6) as weights with the municipal power indices. 
The coefficients of interest in column (7) show that the regression specification with weighting for 
coalition formation power fits less well the partisan alignment hypothesis for Ecolo but fits this hypothesis 
better for PS, compared to the unweighted specification in column (5) and the specification in column (6) 
weighted for vote share
261
. We are hence not able to conclude the existence of any causal relationship 
between coalition formation power and certainty of remaining in power on the one hand and aligned 
allocation of grants on the other hand
262
. Such inconclusiveness may imply that a high power index may 
measure –rather than or next to high certainty of remaining in power, and hence less need of receiving 
extra grants- strong power in terms of lobbying aligned subsidising levels for extra grants. Such 
inconclusiveness may also be due to the strong correlation between a party’s power index and a party’s 
vote share. Effectively, table 16 –unsurprisingly- points at the strong positive correlation between vote 
shares and power indices, with Ecolo showing the weakest correlation
263
. In column (6) of table 12, we 
had already noted a positive association between a party’s municipal vote share and grants provided by the 
aligned subsidising level. 
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 We hence assume that a party in power measures its certainty of remaining in power by its current power index. 
261
 As with column (6), we cannot readily compare the size of the coefficients between columns (5) and (7), because 
of our multiplication with the power indices. The Banzhaf power index takes a value between 0 and 100%. 
262
 When instead weighting being in power at the subsidising level(s) with the respective power indices at the 
subsidising level(s) (regression results not shown), none of the coefficients of interest remains significant. 
263
 Unsurprisingly, table 16 shows that for all parties the average power index (and its standard deviation) is about 
twice as high as their average vote share (and its standard deviation). This is because a party may well be decisive in 
100% of all possible coalitions even when having collected less than 50% -but still a very high share- of the vote. 
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Table 16: Relationship between municipal vote shares and municipal power indices (in cases in 
which parties are part of a municipal coalition) 
    MR PS CDH Ecolo 
Vote share Mean 37.6 26.6 12.9 16.0 
 
Standard deviation 15.6 14.3 9.6 5.4 
Power index Mean 72.4 54.6 31.7 31.6 
  Standard deviation 36.5 40.4 40.0 25.6 
Correlation   0.83 0.91 0.83 0.37 
 
Sources: http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/main.html, http://www.bisa.irisnet.be/themas/verkiezingen#.UqXcgDsjJsQ, own calculations. 
Column (8): IV regression, distinguishing between municipalities aligned with Ecolo at the Federal 
level and municipalities aligned with Ecolo at the Brussels Regional level 
Finally we explore if any of the different subsidising levels is the “driving force” behind the Ecolo 
alignment effect. We can check this more easily for Ecolo because over our sample period Ecolo’s 
participations to the various subsidising governments have overlapped less than other parties’ 
participations (see table 7). To this effect, we consecutively interact the Ecolo municipal coalition 
participation dummy with 3 dummies, each taking the value of 1 only when Ecolo participates in the 
coalition at the Federal, Brussels Regional resp. French Community level, as shown in column (8)
264
. 
It appears that it is Ecolo’s participation to the Brussels Regional government coalition that drives the 
effects, as the only Ecolo alignment interaction that shows a significantly positive coefficient (with a p 
value of 0.06) in column (8) is the one for the Brussels Regional government. This does not surprise: 
 as we suspect that it is the Brussels Regional government that provides most of the grants to 
Brussels municipalities,  
 as Ecolo is stronger in the Brussels Region than in the whole of Francophone Belgium, 
 as the Brussels Regional government is the most intertwined one with Brussels municipalities, 
 and as Ecolo’s participations to the Brussels Regional government coalitions over our sample 
period were its 2
nd
 and its 3
rd
 at a subsidising level, so it may have undergone a learning effect 
The above finding that the Ecolo participation to the Brussels Regional government from 2004 onwards 
may drive the Ecolo alignment effect additionally suggests that Ecolo when in power at the subsidising 
level(s) may well have deliberately attempted to compensate for Ecolo municipalities having been 
punished with less grants whenever Ecolo was not in power at any of the subsidising levels. This is 
because Ecolo’s participation in the Brussels Regional government succeeds all of Ecolo’s participation in 
municipal coalitions without Ecolo being in power at any of the subsidising levels. 
However, the differences of the coefficients of the 3 Ecolo alignment interactions are not statistically 
significant. 
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 When we also interact the MR and CDH municipal coalition participation dummies with 3 dummies, each taking 
the value of 1 only when MR resp. CDH participate in the coalition at the Federal, Brussels Regional resp. French 
Community level, none of the interacted variables is statistically significant. 
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8. Conclusion 
The conclusion from this paper is that the subsidising levels of Brussels municipalities do not favour those 
municipalities with extra grants where voters are aligned with the subsidising levels –as predicted by the 
standard partisan hypothesis-, but rather favour those municipalities with extra grants where political 
parties in power are aligned with the subsidising levels – as predicted by the partisan alignment 
hypothesis. Hence grants are not so much politicised in that they are directly oriented to sympathetic 
voters, but in that they at most are only indirectly oriented to sympathetic voters, via the favouring of 
sympathetic municipal governments.  
We find that a number of individual parties that are part of the governing coalition at the subsidising 
level(s) are able and willing to steer grants to municipal governments that are aligned with those 
individual parties. This finding implies that individual parties within a municipal coalition would be able 
to claim the credit for (the public goods provided thanks to) grants received by a municipality. However, 
we find that this conclusion only holds for 2 out of the 4 major political parties active at the Brussels 
municipal level (Ecolo and PS), and that for 1 of those 2 political parties (PS) the effect is rather small. 
The above conclusion assumes that the subsidising levels rather than the municipal levels are the “acting” 
levels within “the game of aligned allocation of grants”. However, as argued already above, the 
municipalities themselves could be the major player, rather than the subsidising governments, while we 
failed to provide evidence in favour of one or of the other of these 2 possibilities.  
A major difference between most of the empirical literature on the partisan alignment of grants and our 
research is not only that our paper investigates –and in a number of cases finds- alignment effects of 
individual political parties rather than of party blocks, but also that our paper investigates alignment 
effects for junior coalition partners compared to dominant coalition partners. In contrast, the RDD used by 
the current literature on partisan alignment only allows to investigate alignment effects of the dominant 
party in the coalition or of the coalition as a whole.  
We find rather surprisingly that partisan alignment of municipalities with the smaller party Ecolo at their 
subsidising levels generates more discretionary grants than alignment with respect to the larger parties MR 
and PS. While asymmetric effects have been found in other countries too, the consistently significant and 
positive Ecolo alignment effect is surprising for 2 reasons: 1) Ecolo is the smallest of our 4 parties studied, 
and also the party that has been least in power over our sample period; 2) most Ecolo coalition 
participations at the municipal as well as at the various subsidising levels over our sample period were 
Ecolo’s 1st ever, i.e. inexperienced ones.  
Again in contrast to several other studies on the effect of partisan alignment on grants, we have obtained 
suggestive evidence about the reason why alignment of a municipality with a particular party –in our case 
Ecolo- generates more grants than with another party. An important motivation for Ecolo to request extra 
grants may have been that municipalities governed by Ecolo while Ecolo is not governing at any of the 
subsidising levels were punished with less grants by its competitor parties at the subsidising levels. 
Indeed, we find that municipalities in which Ecolo participates in the coalition received significantly less 
grants whenever Ecolo was not part of any of the subsidising government coalitions. In this way, the 
established parties may have tried to build a “barrier of entry” against a relative newcomer such as Ecolo 
on the “political market”. Hence the positive Ecolo alignment effect on grants we find could merely be an 
158 
 
attempt to compensate for an initial negative Ecolo alignment effect on grants, i.e. for the decrease in 
grants that municipalities governed by Ecolo experience if Ecolo is not in power at any of the subsidising 
levels. We even find that the positive Ecolo alignment effect on grants does not suffice to cancel out the 
negative effect of Ecolo participating in municipal government without it participating in a subsidising 
government. We were able to come to this result because –in contrast to most other studies- we have 
modelled our alignment variable as an interaction variable, consisting of the multiplication of a dummy 
variable measuring municipal power and a count variable measuring power at the subsidising level. 
We have also explored a number of other possible explanations why of our 4 parties alignment of a 
municipality with Ecolo generates the most extra discretionary grants. Firstly, we have explored whether 
the “Ecolo bonus” could be due to the sheer smallness of Ecolo, as it has been demonstrated elsewhere 
that large parties find it relatively easier to compensate small parties with extra “spoils of office” (see 
Browne and Franklin 1973). From this perspective, the strong relationship we find between Ecolo 
alignment and discretionary grants would be an indicator of potential weakness of Ecolo, i.e. of the 
possibility that discretionary grants would be one of the few “levers of power” on which it has to rely, and 
which Ecolo therefore was obliged to use particularly efficiently
265
. Conversely, a larger party may derive 
other –perhaps more important but less visible- benefits than extra discretionary grants from holding 
office, such as a more exclusive control over public policy in general
266
. However, we have not found 
empirical evidence for the “smallness bonus” explanation, neither when considering party size at the 
municipal level nor when considering party size at the subsidising level(s). 
 
A 2
nd
 explanation relates to the well-known uncertainty argument of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-
351): the more a governing party is uncertain of its hold on power after the next elections, the more it will 
overspend in the current legislature. Table 4 above shows that Ecolo’s municipal coalition participation 
was the least frequent and the most volatile of the 4 largest Brussels parties over our sample period. This 
infrequency and volatility may have provided ex ante an extra motivation for Ecolo to bargain for extra 
grants to municipalities in which it was in power, once it was also in power at one of the subsidising 
levels. We measured uncertainty of remaining in power with the Banzhaf power index, which measures 
the number of coalitions in which a party is needed with a view to obtaining a majority (as a share of total 
possible coalitions). This power index appears on average not particularly high for Ecolo in cases in which 
it was part of a municipal coalition
267
. Moreover, when weighting our municipal coalition participation 
dummies for the respective parties’ power indices, our Ecolo coefficients of interest become less instead 
of more significant.  
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 This is reminiscent of Browne and Franklin (1973 p. 468)’s finding that small coalition parties that receive “bonus 
ministries” also happen to receive a disproportionate quantity of less valued ministries.  
266
 We were able to find the following grants-related example of such more general advantages of holding office at 
the Brussels Regional level: PS has been a major coalition party in the government of the Brussels Region ever since 
the establishment of the Brussels Region in 1989. In 1994, i.e. during the 1
st
 ever legislature of the Brussels Region 
government (1989-1995), PS reformed the Brussels Municipality Fund. At that time PS was the largest governing 
party at the Brussels Region level and provided the prime minister, who was also in charge of local government, 
while PRL, the main component of MR, did not take part in this government and opposed the reform. PS changed the 
allocation formula of the Municipality Fund so that poorer municipalities –concentrated in the west and the centre of 
the Brussels Region and traditionally dominated by PS- benefited more from it, at the expense of the richer, south-
eastern and MR dominated municipalities. See also De Bock (2010). 
267
 This is not surprising as Ecolo was a junior coalition partner in most cases in which it was part of a coalition. 
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A 3
rd
 and most promising explanation for the strong Ecolo effect may be an inverse –and non-linear- 
experience effect. Paradoxically, it may precisely be because over our entire sample period Ecolo was 
relatively new in power –most cases of Ecolo coalition participation being its 1st or 2nd ever both at the 
municipal and at the subsidising level-, and hence because Ecolo was relatively inexperienced, that it 
initially obtained less grants as a municipal coalition partner, notably when it was not also governing at 
one of the subsidising levels, and that it subsequently managed to obtain more grants once it obtained 
power both at the municipal and the subsidising levels. I.e. its inexperience may have meant that it was 
particularly motivated to lobby -either within the subsidising coalition, within the municipal coalition, or 
from the municipal to the subsidising level- for extra grants to municipalities in which it was in power, 
possibly to compensate the initial reduction in grants it had suffered. Of course we have not been able to 
test this possibility as Ecolo was relatively new in power in municipal as well as subsidising governments 
concerned over our entire sample period. 
We end our conclusion with 2 lines of caution against the results we obtained. Firstly, with respect to PS a 
complication is that we are not sure if we can ascribe the effect we have found to alignment, as there is no 
variation in PS coalition participation at the subsidising levels over our sample period. The only PS 
variation is in coalition participation at the municipal level. Hence the PS effect could be attributable to 
skill, experience and/or motivation of local PS politicians to obtain more grants. We should perhaps even 
refrain from deriving any interpretation at all from the PS coefficient, as we were forced to omit the 
constitutive factors of an PS alignment variable as separate regressors from our regression equation. 
However, because of the little variation in PS alignment, it could be rather surprising that we have still 
found a PS effect in some of our specifications in the first place. Should we have been able to exploit 
variation in PS coalition participation at the subsidising level(s), we perhaps would have found a larger 
and more significant effect of alignment with respect to PS than the effect we have found in this paper.  
A 2
nd
 handicap our analysis had to deal with from the start is that our data are not conducive to ascribing 
the alignment effects found to a particular subsidising level. This is because we had to face the important 
disadvantage -compared to e.g. the similar study for Spain by Curto-Grau e.a. (2012)- that our data 
generally do not allow us to distinguish between Federal, Regional, and Community grants to the Brussels 
municipalities. 
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Chapter 5: A test of the Law of 1/n for the supra-local governments of 
Belgium: does “more politicians” mean “more public spending” or “a larger 
budget deficit”?268 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate if a more populous or fragmented executive or legislative increases public spending and/or 
the budget deficit, an effect known as the Law of 1/n. We test this relationship for the supra-local 
governments of Belgium. We find few indications that more politicians or more fragmented governments 
–either in terms of a larger or more fragmented executive or in terms of a larger or more fragmented 
legislative- lead to an increase in overall public expenditures or in the budget deficit. The exception is that 
we find a significantly positive effect of a change in the size of the executive, more in particular of the 
number of ministers composing the governing coalition, on the budget deficit. Indeed, politicians may not 
only try and favour their constituency with targeted extra spending but also with targeted tax cuts, in turn 
increasing the budget deficit.  
Our identification is based on an IV regression approach, instrumenting the number of ministers overall 
with their resp. number in governments in charge of a decentralisation round. Belgian governments in 
charge of a decentralisation round are constitutionally obliged to rely on broad parliamentary support, and 
therefore tend to be larger.  
Keywords: distributive politics; public expenditures; politicians; political institutions  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1981, Weingast e.a. predicted in a seminal theoretical paper that government spending would increase 
in the number of electoral districts. Weingast e.a. (1981) demonstrated that the smaller the share of a 
single electoral district in total tax revenue raised, the less a politician elected in that district would 
internalise the cost of taxation, hence increasing his perceived net benefit of government spending in his 
district. The share of a single electoral district in total tax revenue is 1/n, assuming that there are n districts 
of equal size. Additional assumptions made by Weingast e.a. (1981) are that the parliament and only the 
parliament decides on expenditure, and that each district elects only one politician, i.e. that the electoral 
system is not a proportional but a majoritarian one. Moreover, the more powerful each single district is 
within the decision making process, the worse the common pool problem becomes. In the extreme, each 
district is a “veto player”, i.e. each district’s consent is needed for legislation to pass. Weingast e.a. 
(1981)’s prediction has since then been known as the the Law of 1/n, and as the common pool problem. 
However, Primo and Snyder (2008 p. 477) point out that since the publication of Weingast e.a.’s seminal 
paper, the Law of 1/n has typically been interpreted as linking the number of decision makers in general to 
public spending: “The logic is powerful and can be used to understand many political phenomena beyond 
the impact of legislature size on total spending, including why multiparty governments might be expected 
to spend more than single-party governments, and related, why proportional-representation electoral 
systems might lead to more spending than majoritarian systems. The idea of a ‘‘common pool’’ problem 
worsening as the number of decision makers increases permeates many questions in political science, so 
much so that the result is often stated as a given in the literature.” 
In what follows, we will develop a test according to such a more general interpretation of the Law of 1/n, 
based on data collected with respect to Belgian supra-local governments. Our contribution to the literature 
will be that we will not only interpret “n” according to its narrow, literal meaning –i.e. the number of 
geographic electoral districts, typically in a majoritarian electoral system-, but rather more generally as the 
number of decision-makers involved in fiscal policy, both within the legislative and within the executive, 
and irrespective of the electoral system. Moreover, we will interpret “n” both in terms of geographically 
based interest groups (“electoral districts”) and in terms of interest groups with a social or bureaucratic 
basis (“constituencies”)269. This is also because most Belgian politicians not only have a geographic 
constituency but also a social or bureaucratic constituency. That most Belgian politicians do not seem to 
focus their re-election efforts exclusively on their geographic constituency is partly due to Belgium’s 
proportional electoral system, in which any electoral district elects more than one politician
270
, and in 
which credit claiming for geographically targeted spending is hence rather difficult.  
In what follows, we will even give more attention to the executive than to the legislative. This is because 
our hypothesis is that any positive effect of the size of the executive on overall expenditure and/or on the 
                                                          
269 One could however imagine other reasons than re-election for a politician to increase expenditures. Referring to 
Niskanen (1971), politicians seem to share characteristics with civil servants, in that both seem to have an interest in 
expenditure maximisation as such. Public spending would also seem to be the “natural behaviour” even of any 
benevolent, non-reelection driven politician, as public spending seems to be a politician’s natural reaction to social 
problems. 
270
 E.g. since the 2002 Federal electoral districts merger, the smallest Federal electoral district (Luxembourg) elects 4 
members of the House of Representatives. 
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budget deficit will likely be larger than any positive effect of the size of the legislative on overall 
expenditure and/or on the budget deficit, as in Belgium the executive is known to be more powerful than 
the legislative
271
. In a nutshell, this is because the career prospects of individual members of parliament 
(MPs) are largely determined by the political party they belong to, and because the most powerful 
politicians of any political party have as their major career ambition to be appointed as a minister by the 
president of their party
272
. For these –as well as for other- reasons273 Belgium is labeled a “party-cracy”. 
For the dominance of the executive and of political parties in Belgium, see e.g. Timmermans (1994) and 
Dewachter (2001). 
In our regression analysis below, we will find few indications that more politicians or more fragmented 
governments lead to an increase in overall public expenditures or in the budget deficit. The exception is 
that we will find a statistically positive effect of a change in the size of the executive, more in particular of 
the number of ministers composing the governing coalition, on the budget deficit. The budget deficit may 
make sense as an alternative dependent variable instead of total spending, because politicians may not 
only try and favour their constituency with targeted extra spending but also with targeted tax cuts, in turn 
increasing the budget deficit
274
. We will also find that there is no effect of a change in the size or 
fragmentation of the legislative on public spending nor on the budget deficit. 
The remainder of the paper comprises a motivation of our research, a presentation of the 9 supra-local 
governments of Belgium, a literature overview, a discussion of our dataset, an outline of our empirical 
strategy, a report of our regression results, and a conclusion. 
  
                                                          
271
 Jennes (2014a) and Jennes and Persyn (2015) are examples of empirical demonstrations that players within 
Belgian government executives are able to steer extra spending to their “constituencies”: Jennes (2014a) 
demonstrates that political parties in power at government levels that subsidise municipalities of the Brussels Region 
are able to favour party-politically aligned municipalities. Jennes and Persyn (2015) demonstrate that Federal 
ministers manage to favour inhabitants of their electoral district with more social spending and/or less taxation. 
272
 Or to become the president of their party themselves (or both at the same time). 
273
 Another reason is that also several senior civil servants are appointed by the political parties in power (according 
to an informal quota system). 
274
 However, of the 9 supra-local governments that we consider, only 4 have substantial competencies over tax 
policy: the Federal government and the 3 Regional governments. The latter only have substantial tax competencies 
since the “state reform” of 2001. Because 8 of the 9 supra-local governments rely on grants from the Federal 
government for most of their financing, one could even argue that an increase in “n” for those 8 governments may be 
expected to lead to an increase –rather than a decrease- in revenue. This is because those 8 governments have an 
interest in lobbying for an increase in grants allocated by the Federal government. The problem with this lobbying 
argument is that an increase in Federal grants means less revenue remaining for the Federal government, and that this 
increase in grants can only be implemented by means of a “state reform” voted by the Federal government. Over our 
sample period, only Federal grants to the 3 Community governments have been increased, i.e. on the occasion of the 
1993 and 2001 “state reforms”. 
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2. Motivation of the research question 
 
For several reasons, Belgium seems an interesting case to test the Law of 1/n at levels of government 
above the local –i.e. provincial and municipal- level: 
1) The supra-local level in Belgium accounts for the bulk of public expenditure. At the OECD 
website
275
, we find that local public expenditure in Belgium amounted to 6.3 and 7.1% of GDP in 
resp. 1995 and 2013
276
, while supra-local public expenditure in Belgium amounted to 45.7 and 
47.4% of GDP in resp. 1995 and 2013, with considerably more variation in the amount of supra-
local public expenditure over this time period than in the amount of local public expenditure
277
.  
2) Our sample period 1982-2012 covers a time period during which considerable changes took place 
in the “n” meant by the Law of 1/n –changes which are conducive to statistical analysis. These 
changes were mainly due to the “state reforms” –i.e. decentralisation rounds- of 1988-89, 1993, 
and 2001. Not only have new governments been established over that time period
278
 –i.e. the 4 
Brussels governments have been created in 1989- but also have existing governments obtained 
more political autonomy –i.e. the Flemish Region/Community, the Walloon Region, and the 
French Community in 1993- and more expenditure responsibilities –i.e. the then existing Regions 
and Communities in 1988-89 and 2001.  
These changes have led to changes in the “n” meant by the Law of 1/n. The various institutional 
changes provoked by the “state reforms” included in our sample period are not only changes in 
the number of electoral districts per individual supra-local government, but also changes in the 
number of seats in individual supra-local government’s parliaments.  
Additionally, we will use the opportunity to also understand “n” as: 
 the number of ministers per individual supra-local government’s governing coalition,  
 the number of parties included in each individual supra-local government’s governing 
coalition (the 2 latter measures are measures of government fragmentation rather than 
measures of the number of “districts”),  
 the number of ministers’ “second jobs” per individual supra-local government,  
 and the number of parties per individual supra-local government that obtained at least one 
parliamentary seat (see data section for more detail on these meanings of “n”) 
                                                          
275
 See OECD fiscal federalism network database: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/federalism/oecdfiscaldecentralisationdatabase.htm#C_3 
276
 Resp. the first and the most recent year for which the OECD provides data. 
277
 However, as shown by table 2 below some of the Belgian supra-local governments account for much more 
expenditures than others. Despite successive decentralisation rounds, the by far largest Belgian government remains 
the Federal government. At the OECD website, we find that Federal government expenditures in Belgium amounted 
to 34.9 and 34.1% of GDP in resp. 1995 and 2013, while expenditures by the Belgian Regions and Communities 
taken together amounted to only 10.9 and 13.3% of GDP in resp. 1995 and 2013.  
278
 The creation of new governments as such is a change in “n” that may impact on the amount of public 
expenditures and/or on the size of the budget deficit. Of course our panel regression analysis of Belgium is not suited 
to investigate this impact (because of the absence of a counterfactual). 
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The Belgian supra-local level provides us with an opportunity to understand “n” in many more 
ways than the local level
279. Our understanding of “n” in a multitude of ways distinguishes our 
paper from the existing literature on the Law of 1/n. 
3) Belgium is generally thought of as a country characterised by both high (supra-local) public 
expenditure and a high number of (supra-local) politicians. Taking the first and the most recent 
year available in OECD statistics, total public expenditure in Belgium amounted to 51.1 and 
54.4% in 1997 resp. 2013, being the 6
th
 highest amount of all 31 OECD countries in both years
280
. 
But conventional wisdom in Belgium has it that it is the Belgian decentralisation process –having 
led to an increase in the number of (supra-local) governments since the 1
st
 “state reform” of 1970- 
that (at least partly) explains both the high level of public expenditures and the high number of 
politicians. Contrarily to conventional wisdom, our hypothesis is that it is the (high) number of 
politicians as such –and not (or not only) the decentralisation process that has led to the existing 
(high) number of politicians-, that partly explains the high level of public expenditure in Belgium. 
Otherwise stated: our hypothesis is that it is the way in which Belgium has been decentralised that 
partly explains the high level of public expenditures in Belgium
281
, i.e.: 
 by creating an entire new level of government –the Regions and Communities- rather 
than making existing lower level governments –the provinces and the municipalities- 
more autonomous  
 without considerably downsizing or abolishing any other level of government –e.g. ever 
since the 1
st
 “state reform” of 1970, municipalities nor provinces have been downsized in 
a noteworthy way
282
 
Although we will test the Law of 1/n according to various of its possible meanings, a potentially important 
meaning of “n” of which we choose not to test the impact is the number of civil servants. Reminding of 
Niskanen (1971), Pettersson-Lidbom (2012a) states that civil servants of Swedish local governments are 
powerful and autonomous enough to influence the size of public expenditures. We see 3 differences 
between the Swedish and the Belgian context in this respect. Firstly, in contrast to Sweden, Belgium is 
generally assumed to be a “party-cracy”, rather than a “bureau-cracy”, with in particular the most 
powerful civil servants being appointed by political parties. Secondly, as in other countries there are many 
                                                          
279
 As opposed to e.g. Baskaran (2013), we hence will understand “n” not only in terms of the executive but also in 
terms of the legislative. Baskaran (2013 p. 357 and 368) motivates his understanding of “n” for the German states as 
limited to the executive with the argument that the number of political parties represented in the legislative has no 
impact on the amount of expenditures as opposed to the executive, because of which Baskaran only tests the impact 
of the size of the executive on the amount of expenditures. One could argue that this lack of impact is however not 
the case with respect to the number of MPs: while opposition MPs may not be able to influence the amount of 
expenditures, MPs supporting the government may well be able to, as the latter may have privileged access to 
ministers, to be able to plead in favour of more expenditures to their constituency, be it their “geographical 
constituency” or their “social constituency”. Likewise, the number of electoral districts from which a parliament is 
elected may then also influence total expenditures made. 
280
 See www.oecd.org. 
281
 Another difference with conventional wisdom in Belgium is that our investigation focuses on the indirect 
expenditure consequences of the number of politicians. I.e. because of their incentive to get re-elected they seem to 
have an incentive to create extra expenditures, to be channelled to their electoral district. Conventional wisdom has it 
that politicians mostly directly cause public expenditures, i.e. because of their wage bill, their offices and other 
operating expenditures, and their cabinet of private advisors. 
282
 Except for the major merger of municipalities conducted in 1976, but this operation should not be linked to the 
Belgian decentralisation process. Besides, in 1976, local government oversight was still 100% a central government 
competence. 
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more civil servants in Belgium than politicians (in the different meanings of “n”), and the public sector 
wage bill makes up a large part of total public spending. Therefore, much more for civil servants than for 
politicians
283
, an increase in public expenditures could simply measure the direct cost of an increase in 
civil servants, rather than their indirect cost
284
. Thirdly, the number of and expenditures on civil servants 
may be argued to be endogenous to total public expenditure: a government wishing to increase 
expenditure may need an increase in the number of civil servants to this effect, or may aim at an increase 
in the number of civil servants –or in the public sector wage bill- as a component of the expenditure 
increase aimed at. 
3. Institutional setting: the 9 supra-local governments of Belgium 
 
Belgium is a federal country consisting of a Federal government, 3 Regional governments and 3 
Community governments. Additional governments above the provincial and municipal level
285
 are the 
VGC and the COCOF
286
, which resp. provide public goods related to Community competencies for the 
Flemish resp. Francophone inhabitants of the Brussels Region
287
, and the GGC
288
, which provides public 
goods related to Community competencies concerning all inhabitants of the Brussels Region (i.e. care for 
children, handicapped, and elderly). Hence in Belgium there exist 9 governments above the local level 
(and not 10 as one might conclude, because immediately after the creation of the Regions and 
Communities in 1980, the Flemish Community and Regional government merged into one). Table 1 gives 
an overview of the 9 supra-local Belgian governments and their competencies. In parallel, chart 1 
visualises the geographic reach of those 9 governments.  
  
                                                          
283
 We presume that the direct costs of politicians are too small compared to overall public expenditures to be 
“picked up” by a regression analysis of overall public expenditures on the resp. meanings of “n”. 
284
 Moreover, we were not able to calculate public expenditures net of wage expenditures over our sample period. 
This is because we were able to obtain data on spending on public sector wages by each of the 9 governments only 
from the year 2000 onwards –data provided by the Federal Ministry of the Budget. (The exception is the Federal 
government, for which the “Conjunctuurnota” of the Federal Ministry of Finance provides data on the public sector 
wage bill from 1980 onwards.) 
285
 In Belgium, provincial governments hardly have any competencies, as opposed to municipal governments. 
286
 In full: “Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie” and “Commission de la Communauté française”. 
287
 As an extra complicating factor, VGC and COCOF do not exactly mirror each other in terms of competencies. I.e. 
the Flemish government has “contracted out” more competencies to VGC than the French Community government 
has “contracted out” to COCOF. E.g. COCOF is not in charge of expenditures in the field of Francophone education 
on Brussels territory while VGC does have the competency over Dutch-speaking education in Brussels. This partly 
explains the strongly diverging average VGC and COCOF expenditure amounts shown in table 2 below. 
Additionally, the Flemish government traditionally aims at providing “person-related” public goods to no less than 
1/3 of the Brussels population, although the number of Dutch-speaking inhabitants of Brussels is estimated to have 
continuously decreased over our sample period. E.g. in the 2006 Brussels municipal elections, Flemish parties 
campaigning on a separate list obtained less than 10% of the total vote (de Coorebyter 2007 p. 20).  
288
 In full: “Gemeenschappelijke Gemeenschapscommissie”. 
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Table 1: Competencies of supra-local governments of Belgium 
Supra-local government 
  
Competencies 
      
Federal government 
   
Social security, justice, police, 
defense, … 
    
Communities (Flemish, French, German Speaking) 
"Personal" affairs (education, culture, care of children, elderly, and 
handicapped, …) 
Regions (Flemish, Walloon, Brussels) 
 
"Territorial" affairs (infrastructure, industrial policy, 
…) 
  Community Commissions (VGC, 
COCOF, GGC) 
 
"Personal" affairs within the Brussels Region 
    
It should be understood that, because those governments that are called “states” in other Federal countries 
consist in Belgium both of Regional and Community governments
289
, these 2 types of government 
considerably overlap each other territorially in Belgium. Firstly, the Flemish Community government 
caters to the entire territory of the Flemish Region (but this does not matter as the Flemish Community 
government and the Flemish Regional government have been merged from the onset), while the French 
Community government caters to the entire territory of the Walloon Region except the territory taken care 
of by the German Speaking Community government. Secondly, both the Flemish (Community) 
government and the French Community government are active on the territory of the Brussels Region, 
“directly” as well as “indirectly”. They are “indirectly” active because they fund VGC resp. COCOF. 
VGC, COCOF, and GGC, which are all 3 active on the entire territory of the Brussels Region –and only 
on its territory- and which are only exerting Community competencies, should be considered as 
governments distinct from both the Brussels Regional government as well as from other Belgian supra-
local governments. While VGC and COCOF are financed by the Flemish government resp. the French 
Community government (as well as by the Brussels Regional government) (see Algoed 2009 p. 7-8 for 
more detail), VGC and COCOF are governed by ministers and MPs that do not belong to the Flemish 
government nor to the French Community government. Instead they are governed by Flemish resp. 
Francophone ministers and MPs of the Brussels Regional government and parliament. Likewise for GGC: 
while it is financed by both the Federal and the Brussels Regional governments, and while it is only in 
charge of certain Community –as opposed to Regional- competencies on the territory of the Brussels 
Region, it is governed by those same ministers and MPs who govern the Brussels Region. 
  
                                                          
289
 Decentralisation of Belgium along Community lines has always been a Flemish demand, as Flanders wished to 
preserve the right to offer –“person-related”- public goods to Dutch-speaking Belgians on the territory of the 
Brussels Region. 
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Chart 1: Territory of supra-local governments of Belgium 
 
Legend:  
 Green: Flemish (Regional) government 
 Red + blue: Walloon Regional government 
 Blue: German Speaking Community government 
 Hatched: Brussels Regional government, GGC, VGC and COCOF 
 Green + hatched: Flemish (Community) government 
 Red + hatched: French Community government 
Source: Kneiphof and Bjørklid (2010),  
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABelgische_gewesten_en_gemeenschappen.png 
However, in contrast to partial overlap with respect to politicians and territory, expenditures and revenues 
–i.e. competencies- of the 9 supra-local governments largely do not overlap. In other words: all 9 supra-
local governments are full-fledged governments with generally speaking distinguishable competencies, 
revenues and expenditures.  
Table 2 compares the sizes of the 9 supra-local governments of Belgium. The variation in size is very 
large, both in terms of population covered and in terms of expenditures, expressed either in absolute terms 
or per capita. Over our sample period –which is 1989-2012, except for the Federal government, for which 
171 
 
it is 1982-2012
290
-, the Federal government was by far the largest Belgian government, population- and 
expenditure-wise, mainly because social security was an exclusively Federal competency over our sample 
period. By far the 2
nd
 largest government is the Flemish government, not only because inhabitants of the 
Flemish Region account for about 60% of total Belgian population, but also because it is the merger of the 
Flemish Regional and Community governments (since 1980). In Francophone Belgium, the French 
Community government is larger than the Walloon Regional government mainly because the former 
additionally caters to Francophone inhabitants of the Brussels Region. Because there are no “language 
counts” in Belgium, there are no data on the number of Francophone resp. Dutch speaking inhabitants of 
the Brussels Region. Based on the language of the political party in favour of which votes were cast 
during elections in the Brussels Region, and for reasons of simplicity, we assumed throughout our entire 
sample period that Francophone and Dutch speaking inhabitants made up 90 resp. 10% of total inhabitants 
of the Brussels Region
291
. It appears that 4 of the 9 governments –GGC, VGC, COCOF, and German 
speaking Community government- are much smaller –either population- or expenditure-wise- than the 
other 5 governments, a fact that we will take into account in our regression analysis (see below).  
Table 2: Sizes of the supra-local governments of Belgium, in terms of mean population and mean 
(primary) expenditures per government over our sample period 
government population 
expenditures  
(in 1000 real euros of 2012) 
expenditures per capita  
(in real euros of 2012) 
Federal government 10,279,561 90,876,130 8,840 
Flemish government 6,009,862 20,461,750 3,405 
French Community  4,282,560 8,170,165 1,908 
Walloon Region 3,378,689 6,088,054 1,802 
Brussels Region 1,004,301 2,218,665 2,209 
GGC 1,004,301 68,921 69 
COCOF 903,871 308,779 342 
VGC 100,430 121,429 1,209 
German Speaking Community 71,515 160,251 2,241 
 
Sources: Statistics Belgium, “Conjunctuurnota” of the Ministry of Finance, website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD 
B&B” (http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx). 
However, what the 9 governments have in common is that they –and only they- are Belgian supra-local 
governments, with supra-local competencies, elected parliaments, and governments consisting of ministers 
and –in some cases- junior ministers. What they also have in common is the Belgian context: there is an 
important overlap with respect to the political culture that provides the context for the functioning of these 
governments: they share the electoral system, the system of party funding, and the culture of large 
ministerial private cabinets, of a large class of career politicians, and of the partisan appointment of 
                                                          
290
 Indeed, the panel dataset we have been able to establish is unbalanced: the Federal government was unable to 
provide us with expenditure and revenue data with respect to individual “lower-level” supra-local governments that 
pre-date the year 1989. Hence for the 1982-1988 period the only supra-local government for which we have 
expenditure and revenue data available is the Federal government (see below). 
291
 As said above, e.g. in the 2006 Brussels municipal elections, Flemish parties campaigning on a separate list 
obtained less than 10% of the total vote (de Coorebyter 2007 p. 20). 
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several senior positions within the civil service. In spite of the large differences between the 9 
governments –in terms of size, competencies, and set of political parties governing them292-, an advantage 
of limiting our test of the Law of 1/n to these 9 Belgian governments is that we avoid to some extent the 
problem of omitted unobserved variables that explains between-government heterogeneity in a multi-
country study. We will stress this advantage when discussing our empirical strategy. 
4. (Non-exhaustive) literature overview 
 
The theoretical foundation for the Law of 1/n was already laid in 1981, when Weingast e.a. (1981) 
demonstrated mathematically that if taxation is country-wide and to the extent that expenditures can be 
targeted locally, an increase in the number of electoral districts increases the incentive of politicians to 
overspend on their district, as they only internalise a fraction of the tax cost of these expenditures. 
Weingast e.a. (1981)’s theory is to be situated in the US context. The US is characterised by a House of 
Representatives that is powerful in fiscal terms as well as by a majoritarian electoral system resulting in 
only 1 House member per electoral district. A consequence of the US context is that the number of 
electoral districts equals the size of the legislative (i.e. of the parliament). More districts hence means 
larger legislatives, while in a proportional system it would well be possible to e.g. reduce the number of 
districts while keeping constant –or even increasing- the number of MPs. The majoritarian US context 
seems to pose a bigger common pool problem than a proportional system resulting in more than one 
elected politicians per district. However, we hypothesise that also politicians elected in a proportional 
system would be subject to the common pool problem. This is a.o. things because, as Schaltegger and Feld 
(2009 p. 36) suggest, not only fragmentation in the legislative but also fragmentation in the executive or in 
the number of interest groups lobbying politicians may increase spending.  
 
Interestingly however, Primo and Snyder (2008) demonstrate theoretically that a “reverse Law of 1/n” 
often holds for the US context: expenditures decrease in the number of electoral districts.  
4.1. “Direct” empirical investigations of the Law of 1/n 
 
A number of empirical investigations of the Law of 1/n can be considered as ”direct” investigations of the 
Law of 1/n, because they give a purely legislative meaning to “n”. I.e. these studies understand “n” either 
as the number of MPs or as the number of electoral districts. Moreover, as far as we know, only 1 of these 
investigations (Aid and Shvets 2012; see below) concerns the supra-local level
293. Almost all “direct” 
empirical tests of the Law of 1/n concern US cities
294
. However, those that were conducted before 2008 do 
                                                          
292
 In the 1970s all major Belgian parties “communitised” into separate Francophone and Flemish wings, due to 
which since then virtually all parties represented in the Belgian parliaments collect votes only in one of the 3 Belgian 
Communities. The exception is the federal electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, straddling the Brussels 
Region and the Flemish Region, and hence also straddling the French Community and the Flemish Community. 
293
 However, some countries are so decentralised that the distinction between the supra-local and the local level 
becomes less relevant. An example is the sizeable expenditure responsibility, tax autonomy and political autonomy 
of Swedish municipalities. 
294
 Interestingly, with respect to the US federal government, Inman and Fitts (1990) already provided some tentative 
evidence on the positive effect of the “size” of US Congress on expenditures (as well as on its negative effect on 
allocative efficiency). Inman and Rubinfeld (1997 p. 51-52) argue that the US Congress is a legislative characterised 
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not include fixed effects to control for unobserved causes of differences between states or cities, let alone 
a proper Instrumental Variables (IV) approach or Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to take into 
account endogeneity of the independent variable of interest. A notable case in point is Baqir (2002). 
MacDonald (2008) is the first “direct” study of the Law of 1/n that acknowledges the importance of city or 
state fixed effects and it finds that the positive relationship between city council size and expenditures 
disappears once including such fixed effects.  
 
In contrast, Brooks e.a. (2011) find that larger council sizes lead US cities to turn a higher share of the 
Federal grants they receive into expenditures (as opposed to turning a part of those grants into tax cuts). 
The study by Brooks e.a. (2011) hence combines the empirical flypaper literature with the empirical Law 
of 1/n literature. Interestingly, Brooks e.a. (2011) find a way around the fact that there are no within 
changes in council sizes over their sample period, by interacting council size with grants, as the amounts 
of the latter do change over their sample period. However, apart from including city fixed effects, Brooks 
e.a. do not develop an empirical strategy that deals with the possible endogeneity of council size
295
 as well 
as of grants. Another variation to the empirical Law of 1/n literature is the study by Aidt and Shvets 
(2012), who find for 7 US states that legislators bring less “pork” to their district when they cannot seek 
re-election anymore –i.e. once being faced with a term limit-, but that this reduction is smaller in states 
with many electoral districts and hence larger legislatives. However, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012a) criticises 
the Aidt and Shvets study for not clustering standard errors at the electoral district level
296
, finding that the 
latter would increase standard errors by 50%. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012a) also criticises the Aidt and 
Shvets study for not including electoral district fixed effects, as a consequence of which their 
identification is largely based on between district variation. The latter may of course suffer from 
correlation with unobservables
297
. 
 
Egger and Köthenbürger (2010) bring a considerable methodological improvement to the Law of 1/n 
literature, as they are the first to make use of an RDD to demonstrate a positive effect of council size on 
government spending for municipalities in the German state of Bavaria. In particular, this study exploits 
discontinuities in the legal rule that relates population size of a municipality to council size
298
 to identify a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
by a norm of “universalism” –or “deference”- as opposed to a norm of “a minimal winning coalition”: as all US 
Congress’s members have agenda-setting power, the result is nearly unanimous approval of legislative proposals. 
(“You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.”) “N” can be argued to be larger in “universalistic” legislatives than in 
“minimal winning coalition” legislatives. (In the latter, typically only a limited subset of members have agenda-
setting powers.) US Congress’s “universalism” is the context in which Weingast e.a. (1981) proved their Law of 1/n 
theoretically. 
295
 However, council sizes of US cities may not be endogenous to spending anyway. Baskaran (2013 p. 365) points 
out that the problem of endogeneity of size and fragmentation of the government (“n”) is smaller in studies of the 
municipal level than in studies of the supra-local level, as the political autonomy of municipalities is evidently 
generally much smaller than that of the supra-local level. An illustration of the lack of autonomy of the municipal 
level over its size of government are the discontinuities that Pettersson-Lidbom (2012a) uses for identification in his 
investigation of the Law of 1/n for Swedish and Finnish municipalities. These are the demographic thresholds that –
once surpassed- legally force the Finnish and Swedish municipalities in question to increase the size of their 
municipal council. 
296
 A similar critique applies to Baqir (2002). 
297
 Additionally Aidt and Shvets (2012) do not make use of an IV approach or RDD to take into account endogeneity 
of their independent variable of interest. 
298
 As in Sweden and Finland, the Bavarian inhabitants-per-municipality thresholds legally force –once surpassed, 
even if by 1 inhabitant- the municipality in question to increase the size of its municipal council.  
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causal relationship between council size and public spending. Moreover, the authors show that 
municipalities primarily adjust current expenditure in response to a rise in council size. However, Ade and 
Freier (2011) demonstrate the population thresholds used by Egger and Köthenbürger (2010) to be 
endogenous, as they appear prone to manipulation and as they are thresholds at which a number of other 
variables apart from council size change.  
 
Using the same methodology
 
and similar thresholds as Egger and Köthenbürger (2010), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012b) is one of the few studies that we are aware of that finds empirical evidence for a “reverse 
Law of 1/n” in the spirit of Primo and Snyder (2008). In effect, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012b) finds a 
negative causal relationship between council sizes of Swedish and Finnish municipalities –which are 
uniquely determined by population thresholds- and public expenditures. Pettersson-Lidbom’s explanation 
is that civil servants –by definition not up for re-election- at the fiscally very important municipal levels of 
Sweden and Finland show more spending restraint if controlled by more local politicians –by definition up 
for re-election.  
4.2. “Indirect” empirical investigations of the Law of 1/n 
 
Apart from that it is inspired by the “direct” empirical investigations of the Law of 1/n reviewed above, 
i.e. investigations that give a purely legislative meaning to “n”, our research is also related to the -
generally less recent- investigations of the effect of fragmentation of the executive on the budget balance, 
rather than on public expenditures as such. Indeed, it seems to make sense to define the common pool 
problem either in terms of overall expenditures or in terms of the overall budget balance: individual 
politicians could favour their constituency either with extra expenditures or with a lower tax burden or 
with both. 
 
The studies on government fragmentation can be considered a rather “indirect” test of the Law of 1/n, as 
“n” interpreted broadly may also relate to the number of interest groups / veto players represented in the 
executive. Another difference with “direct” empirical investigations of the Law of 1/n is that “indirect” 
studies are mostly cross-country, as most of them study fragmentation of central governments, while most 
“direct” studies investigate fragmentation of local governments. A 3rd major difference is that the 
“indirect” studies stand a higher chance of finding a statistically significant effect, as of course 
fragmentation of the executive –either in terms of number of ministers or in terms of number of coalition 
parties- is a more time-variant variable than “n” in its strict meaning, i.e. number of electoral districts or 
number of MPs. E.g. in the case of Belgium, changes in the latter mostly only happened in the wake of or 
in parallel with a change of the constitution over our sample period
299
. The final, and perhaps major, 
difference between the “government fragmentation” literature and “direct” empirical investigations is that 
in the former the use of country fixed effects as well as IV estimation appear even less standard, making 
its results even more vulnerable to criticisms related to omitted variable bias and reverse causality.   
                                                          
299
 Of course, “n” in the legislative sense and “n” in the executive sense are not wholly independent from each other. 
If smaller electoral districts mean less political parties represented in parliament, they also mean that the governing 
coalition stands a higher chance of being composed of less parties. E.g. the Flemish parliament in 2003 reduced its 
number of electoral districts from 17 to 6, i.a. motivated by the fact that smaller (and hence more) electoral districts 
put smaller political parties at a disadvantage during elections, also given the D’hondt system of translating vote 
shares into seat shares. (It was a small party (Spirit) that was the major promoter of the decrease in Flemish districts.)  
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The negative consequences of fragmentation of the executive on the budget balance have been 
theoretically established by Alesina and Tabellini (1992), Alesina and Perotti (1994), Velasco (1997), and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000). The same negative consequences have been empirically analysed for the 
first time by Roubini and Sachs (1989). Roubini and Sachs (1989) in particular demonstrate that large, 
short-lived and uncohesive coalition governments lead to large budget deficits
300
. Roubini and Sachs view 
avoiding deficits within one and the same government as a prisoner’s dilemma: all parties may prefer a 
balanced budget, but in the absence of strong coordination between them to achieve such a cooperative 
outcome, each party may have an incentive to protect and expand “its” part of the budget. Additionally, 
while cooperation of all coalition partners may be needed to avoid a deficit, non-cooperation by one of 
them may suffice to cause a deficit. Spolaore (1993) comes to an empirical finding that is similar to the 
one of Roubini and Sachs (1989): the higher the number of parties in a coalition, the larger the deficit in 
response to a negative economic shock.  
 
In the same vein, but limiting their sample to US states, Alt and Lowry (1994) find deficits more likely 
under divided government –i.e. with the governor, the House of Representatives’ majority, and the 
Senate’s majority not all 3 belonging to the same party. However, it is unclear why Alt and Lowry split 
their sample of state – legislature observations in subsamples according to the degree of division of state 
governments –which in some cases reduces their number of observations to only 59-, rather than to make 
use of interaction terms within one and the same sample. Not clear either is the extent to which Alt and 
Lowry include state fixed effects into their regression analysis. Also Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and 
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) make the finding of Roubini and Sachs more specific, by providing 
empirical evidence that the number of ministers cause the budget deficit to increase more strongly and 
significantly than the number of parties in a coalition per se. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002 p. 213-214) 
find that the number of ministers and the number of parties are an even stronger determinant of the budget 
deficit in times of economic crisis (“difficult times”)301.  
 
More recent are a number of within-country empirical studies of the Law of 1/n with respect to the 
executive. Ashworth e.a. (2005) find for Flemish municipalities that governments comprised of more 
parties, as well as of ideologically more heterogeneous parties, lead to larger debts, hence to larger 
deficits. Schaltegger and Feld (2009) find for the Swiss cantons that public expenditures increase with the 
number of ministers –rather than with the number of political parties in the governing coalition- per 
canton. However, because Schaltegger and Feld’s independent variables of interest do not vary much 
within individual cantons, their identification is largely based on between-variation, rendering their 
finding vulnerable to omitted variable bias. Schaltegger and Feld do not explicitly tackle the problem of 
reverse causality either.  
 
Most recently, Baskaran (2013) finds for German states that neither the number of ministers nor the 
number of parties of which the states’ executives are comprised affect total spending, either in terms of 
statistical or in terms of economic significance. Interestingly, Baskaran’s identification of the effect of the 
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 However, de Haan and Sturm (1997) replicated Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) research, and failed to find a 
relationship between government fragmentation and budget deficits. 
301
 However, as pointed out by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012a), Perotti and Kontopoulos do not account for serial 
correlation in their panel data regressions. 
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number of coalition parties on expenditures is based on an IV approach that is in turn based on the 
German system of an electoral threshold of 5% of the vote, holding in any state parliament. This threshold 
creates exogenous variation in the number of parties represented in state parliaments –in that in some 
cases some parties happen just to pass the electoral threshold and that in some other cases some parties 
happen just to fail to pass the electoral threshold, in turn influencing the probability that the largest party 
either forms a single-party or a coalition government
302
. However, while Baskaran finds an interesting 
solution for the endogeneity of his political variable of interest “number of parties in the coalition”, he 
assumes that his alternative measurement of fragmentation, i.e. “number of ministers in the government”, 
is exogenous to public spending. In contrast to Baskaran, we will assume that also the number of ministers 
may be endogenous to public spending and we will develop an IV strategy to solve this problem. 
 
Finally, while Baskaran does not find a Law of 1/n to hold with respect to the executive, 2 studies even 
find an executive-related “reverse Law of 1/n” to hold. Exploiting a legal discontinuity faced by parties 
governing Bavarian municipalities, Freier and Odendahl (2012) show in RDD-type estimations that one 
party governments spend more -not less- than coalition governments, in particular with respect to 
investment spending. Freier and Odendahl find weak evidence that such governments also increase the 
deficit. They use a new method to detect close election outcomes in multi-party systems, as a result of 
which they are able to isolate exogenous variation in the type of government. Another “reverse Law of 
1/n” study with respect to the executive is the one by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), who show that 
better-paid mayors reduce spending. I.e. higher wages attract more competent and educated candidates 
into politics and once elected, those candidates “size down the government machinery by improving 
efficiency”. Hence, the meaning of “n” in the case of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) is not the number 
of politicians but their direct budgetary cost in terms of their salary. Similarly to Freier and Odendahl 
(2012), the study on Italy makes use of an RDD, as the wages of Italian mayors depend on population size 
and sharply rise at different thresholds. 
 
The studies by Ashworth e.a. (2005), Schaltegger and Feld (2009), Freier and Odendahl (2012), 
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), and Baskaran (2013), as well as the much older one by Alt and Lowry 
(1994), stand out from the empirical government fragmentation literature because they focus on one single 
country, thereby running a lower risk of running into the problem of unobserved time-variant 
heterogeneity that typically plagues cross-country studies of the fiscal effects of government 
fragmentation. Additionally, the studies by Ashworth e.a. (2005), Freier and Odendahl (2012), 
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), and Baskaran (2013) explicitly acknowledge the possible endogeneity 
of their independent variable of interest even within the context of one and the same country, and adapt 
their empirical strategy to this problem. 
 
Table 3 summarises the empirical literature on the Law of 1/n that we overviewed above, according to the 
major criteria on the basis of which we can distinguish between the respective contributions to this 
                                                          
302
 For the case of Belgium, this IV approach cannot be used. Firstly, in Belgium an electoral threshold holds only 
since the 2003 Federal elections and since the 2004 Regional elections. Secondly, in Belgium a party just passing or 
just not passing the electoral threshold does not affect the probability of a single party government being possible. 
Over our sample period, no single party came even close to obtaining 50% of the seats in any supra-local parliament 
and over our sample period often even 3 parties were needed to form a government supported by a parliamentary 
majority, in contrast to Germany. 
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literature: definition of “n” (the independent variable), the dependent variable, the approach to 
endogeneity of “n”, the level of government studied, and the finding. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the empirical literature on the Law of 1/n 
 
Definition of "n" Dependent variable 
Endogeneity 
approach Level of government Finding 
Size of legislative (# of 
electoral districts, # of 
MPs, ...) Expenditures None 
Central level (multi-
country) No effect 
     
Size of executive (# of 
parties, # of ministers, 
…) Budget deficit Fixed effects 
Supra-local level 
(within country) Positive effect 
     
  
IV 
Local level (within 
country) Negative effect 
     
  
RDD 
  
5. Data 
 
We obtained data on expenditures per individual supra-local government –our dependent variable-, as well 
as government revenue data –split up between grants and own taxes raised- from 1989 onwards from the 
“Conjunctuurnota”. The “Conjunctuurnota” is a publication of the Federal Ministry of Finance (which in 
Belgium is a separate ministry from the Federal Ministry of the Budget). Remarkably, we have not found 
expenditure and revenue data per supra-local government for earlier years
303
. The exception is the Federal 
government, for which the “Conjunctuurnota” allows us to collect expenditure data from 1982 onwards. 
Another exception is VGC, for which we have not found expenditure data in the “Conjunctuurnota”. We 
had to make use of the Ministry of the Budget’s “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B”304, although this 
source only shows expenditures for VGC from 2002 onwards. 
Graph 1 shows the evolution of our dependent variable, i.e. annual expenditures per capita per individual 
government considered over our sample period (in real euros of 2012) (as opposed to average total 
expenditures per government over time, shown in table 2). The expenditure variable we consider is net of 
interest expenditures for all governments, because we assume that the latter are not under the control of 
the government, and moreover cannot be directed to a politician’s electoral district or constituency305. The 
                                                          
303
 The Federal Ministry of the Budget, to which the Federal Ministry of Finance referred us to for more detailed data 
for more years, replied to us that the earliest data on supra-local expenditures and revenues it had available concern 
the year 1997. We have not been able either to obtain expenditure data pre-1989 from the National Audit Office 
(“Rekenhof”), which is in charge of budget execution reporting / ex post auditing with respect to all supra-local 
Belgian governments. Various sources that we consulted at the level of the individual governments of the Regions 
and Communities themselves ultimately referred us to the individual annual budget laws of the 1980s. We have not 
found the time yet to consult individual budget law per budget law. 
304
 http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx 
305
 Evidently, the expenditures of the Federal government we consider are also net of grants to the other supra-local 
governments, all of which were mainly grants-financed over our sample period. Not only do we avoid to “count 
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considerable between variation with respect to expenditures was already clear from table 2 above. Here 
we briefly discuss within variation.  
 
Most striking is once again the evolution of Federal expenditures. Their gradual decrease in the 1980s is a 
reflection of the expenditure reducing efforts by the “turnaround” government that came to power end of 
1981, and that was reelected in 1985. These efforts were in turn motivated by the snowballing interest 
expenditures of the 1980s, which in turn stemmed from the very large deficits incurred during the end of 
the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. In contrast, the steep decline in Federal spending between 1988 
and 1989 is due to the 3
rd
 “state reform”. This was the largest “state reform” in Belgian history fiscally 
speaking, in that important expenditure responsibilities such as education were devolved to the 
Communities and other important expenditure responsibilities such as industrial policy and infrastructure 
were devolved to the Regions. Another Federal expenditure shock happened in 2005, as the then Federal 
government had to revise its original accounting for the 2005 expenditures considerably upwardly after 
the European Commission obliged the Federal government to include its takeover of debt from the public 
railways in 2005 into the budget. In contrast, expenditures of the other 8 supra-local governments evolved 
more smoothly, though most of them steadily increasing over time. The general picture is therefore one of 
overall primary public expenditure in Belgium steadily increasing over time
306
. Graph 1 also shows that 
our panel is unbalanced not only because the Federal government is the only one for which we obtained 
expenditure data concerning the 1980s, but also because the first years for which we obtained expenditure 
data concerning COCOF, VGC and GGC are even more recent than 1989, the year in which they came 
into existence
307
. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
some expenditures twice” in so doing. But also we hence consider the size of those grants as independent from the 
size (“n”) of the Federal government. Indeed, those Federal grants are formula-based, and can only be changed by 
means of a “state reform”. Of course the executive may consist of many parties precisely with a view to 
implementing a state reform. This is because “state reforms” need approval of 2/3 of Federal MPs, as well as of both 
a (simple) majority of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking MPs. We will control for “state reforms” in our 
regression analysis below. 
306
 This picture remains when expressing expenditures as a share of GDP, so that the increase shown in graph 1 is not 
just due to economic growth. As said above, taking the first and the most recent year available in OECD statistics, 
total public expenditure in Belgium increased from 51.1% in 1997 to 54.4% of GDP in 2013. 
307
 Most striking is the VGC, for which we only obtained expenditure data from 2002 onwards. The VGC invited us 
to their paper archives to collect expenditure data for years preceding 2002, but we have not yet found the time to go 
and visit these archives. 
179 
 
Graph 1: (Primary) expenditures per capita per government (1982-2012) (in real euros of 2012) 
 
 
 
Note: red vertical bars indicate Federal election years; green vertical bars indicate concurrent Federal and Regional 
election years; black vertical bars indicate non-concurrent Regional election years  
 
Sources: “Conjunctuurnota” of the Ministry of Finance; website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B” 
(http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx) 
Because we will not only investigate the Law of 1/n for Belgium with respect to (primary) expenditures 
but also with respect to the (primary) deficit, graph 2 shows the (primary) budget deficit (+ for deficit; - 
for surplus) per capita per individual government considered over our sample period (in real euros of 
2012).  
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Graph 2: (Primary) budget deficit per capita per government (1982-2012) (in real euros of 2012) 
 
 
 
Note: red vertical bars indicate Federal election years; green vertical bars indicate concurrent Federal and Regional 
election years; black vertical bars indicate non-concurrent Regional election years  
 
Sources: “Conjunctuurnota” of the Ministry of Finance; website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B” 
(http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx) 
Most striking from graph 2 is once again the evolution of the Federal (primary) deficit. Also, exception 
made for the Federal government, between variation with respect to the deficit is much smaller than 
between variation with respect to expenditures
308
. This is because traditionally an implicit fiscal pact 
between the supra-local governments stipulates that Regions and Communities would run a balanced 
budget, and because the Federal government prevented looming Regional and/or Community budget 
deficits in the past with –implicit, partial, and ex ante- bailouts (i.e. on the occasion of the 1993, 2001, and 
2013 “state reforms” (see Jennes 2014b for more detail)). These bailouts keep down variation in Belgian 
budget deficits. Together with the grants-based rather than tax-based financing of 8 of the 9 supra-local 
governments, these bailouts seem to make the deficit variable somewhat less promising with a view to 
explaining it with the number of politicians and their fragmentation.  
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 Also for this reason, the scaling of the Y axis differs between graphs 1 and 2. 
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Data on a number of demographic and economic control variables per geographic part of Belgium in 
which a particular supra-local government is active were provided by Statistics Belgium: the number of 
under 18 years’ old, the number of over 59 years’ old, total population, and gross private income per 
capita. Again, remarkably, the demographic control data appear only to exist from 1989 onwards, except 
for total population covered per individual government and except for the Federal government. 
Unemployment data were provided by the Federal Ministry of Employment for years from 1982 onwards, 
and by the Employment Agency of the German Speaking Community of Belgium for the German 
Speaking Community for years from 1990 onwards. As Pettersson-Lidbom (2006 p. 13) writes, such 
control data are often used in the public finance, fiscal federalism and political economics literature, to 
capture either costs and benefits of government spending (under 18, over 59), economies of scale in public 
service provision (total population), fiscal capacity (gross private income per capita), or economic shocks 
(unemployment) (all assumed to be time-varying). 
 
We obtained the raw data on our political variables of interest from the websites of the individual Belgian 
parliaments, from the website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior
309
, from Cumuleo
310
 -a non-
governmental website collecting i.a. data on the number of “second jobs” of supra-local politicians in 
Belgium and their remuneration-, and from the website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B”311. 
We used them to construct 11 political variables of interest, each measuring a different meaning of “n”:  
 number of ministers per government,  
 number of “cabinet members” per government,  
 number of political parties making up the governing coalition per government,  
 the Herfindahl index312 of this coalition (after weighting each party according to its share of the 
parliamentary seats),  
 number of ministers’ “second jobs” per government,  
 number of MPs per parliament,  
 number of MPs supporting the government per parliament,  
 number of electoral districts per parliament,  
 number of political parties that obtained parliamentary representation per parliament313,  
 the Herfindahl index of this parliamentary composition (after weighting each party according to 
its share of the parliamentary seats),  
 and the direct cost of politicians per government.  
 
“Cabinet members” differ from ministers in that they also comprise so called “secretaries of state” and 
“government commissioners”, i.e. junior ministers who only characterise the Federal and the Brussels 
Regional governments, and who are distributed over coalition parties essentially to better translate election 
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 http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/search.php?type=year 
310
 http://www.cumuleo.be 
311
 http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx 
312
 As is well-known, a Herfindahl index of 0 shows maximum fragmentation of power, while a Herfindahl index of 
1 shows maximum concentration of power. 
313
 Although for Germany, Baskaran (2013 p. 357) does not a priori see any direct effect of the number of parties in 
parliament on spending. 
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results into the distribution of cabinet posts (and also to circumvent the constitutional rule that Federal 
ministers should be distributed evenly over Flemish and Francophone coalition parties)314.  
 
During election years, we use as the value for the political variable concerned the one characterising the 
outgoing –rather than the incoming government-, as elections never took place earlier in the calendar year 
than May over our sample period, and as negotiations preceding the establishment of a new government 
regularly took several months over our sample period. 
 
Table 4a and 4b provide data –when available- on the evolution of the number of “n”, i.e. on the number 
of politicians and their direct cost but also on the number of electoral districts in Belgium between 1982 
and 2012. 1982 is the first year of our sample and 2012 is the most recent year for which we were able to 
collect data with respect to all meanings of “n”, i.e. including the direct costs of politicians. Additionally, 
we show numbers –if available- for 1990 and 1996, as these are the relevant years right after the 
implementation of the “state reforms” of 1988-1989 and 1993315, which obviously had considerable 
consequences for “n” in Belgium316. Table 4a provides numbers in absolute terms and table 4b provides 
numbers in relative terms.  
The number of ministers was particularly high around the year 1990, with the Brussels Regional 
government just created in 1989, and the then Federal government (1988-1991) consisting of several extra 
ministers in charge of implementing the 1988-89 “state reform”, which was the largest decentralisation 
round so far in Belgian history (at least fiscally speaking). Remarkably, the 1993 state reform, which 
essentially comprised the direct election of members of the Regional and Community parliaments, did not 
cause an increase in ministers. A similar evolution emerges when we consider “cabinet members” as a 
whole.  
Additionally, we obtained data on the number of remunerated “second jobs” per minister, thanks to the 
Cumuleo website, which in turn is based on data published by the Belgian National Audit Office 
(“Rekenhof”). All Belgian “cabinet members” as well as MPs have to report their –remunerated as well as 
non-remunerated- “second jobs” to the National Audit Office, which may be either private or public sector 
employments
317
. Our hypothesis behind considering the number of ministers’ “second jobs” as another 
meaning of “n” is that public expenditure and/or the budget deficit would increase with the number of 
ministers’ “second jobs”, as each “second job” may mean an extra “constituency” for a minister. We 
choose to focus on ministers’ “second jobs”, rather than on “cabinet members”’ or MPs’ “second jobs”, 
because –as said above- in Belgium ministers are considered more powerful than non-ministerial “cabinet 
members” and more powerful than MPs. We choose to focus on remunerated “second jobs” rather than on 
non-remunerated “second jobs”, because we hypothesise that the former provide more important 
                                                          
314
 We use the term “cabinet members” for senior and junior ministers taken together, but we put it between 
quotation marks as we are not 100% satisfied with this term “cabinet members” as a way to distinguish ministers and 
junior ministers taken together from (senior) ministers considered separately from junior ministers. This is because 
junior ministers precisely are not allowed to take part in the weekly meeting of ministers (called the “council of 
ministers” in Belgium, but called the “cabinet meeting” in other countries). 
315
 The 1993 “state reform” only generated consequences for “n” in 1996, i.e. after the elections of 1995. 
316
 In contrast, the 2001 “state reform” did not have such considerable consequences, except increasing the number 
of MPs for the Brussels parliaments. 
317
 Most frequently, Belgian supra-local politicians have a “second job” as a councillor, alderman, or mayor in their 
municipality of residence. But many supra-local politicians have more than one “second job”. 
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“constituencies” for a minister than the latter. Unfortunately, Cumuleo only contains data for years from 
2004 onwards
318
. Because it is easier to think of “second jobs” in terms of “second jobs” per minister, 
ministers’ “second jobs” is the only variable in table 4a that we express in a relative way, i.e. per minister. 
In 2012, a Belgian minister held on average 1.9 “second jobs”. (This number increases to 4.8, if we also 
consider non-remunerated “second jobs”.) 
In contrast to the total number of ministers and “cabinet members”, the total number of MPs does show a 
continued increase of our sample period. It increases in 1990 due to the establishment of the parliament of 
the Brussels Region in 1989, and it further increases in 1996, right after the first direct election of the 
other Regional and Community parliaments in Belgium in 1995
319
. Before 1995, these other Regional and 
Community parliaments simply consisted of the Walloon, Francophone, resp. Flemish MPs of the Federal 
parliament, a phenomenon that was known as the “double mandate”, and which hence effectively kept the 
number of MPs down until the Regional and Community elections of 1995. (Note that there was no such 
overlap between the resp. executives of the Federal and the Regional and Community governments over 
our sample period.) The number of Belgian MPs also increased after the 2001 state reform, which 
comprised an increase in the number of MPs of the Brussels Regional parliament, in an attempt to keep 
guaranteeing parliamentary representation of the –over our sample period continuously diminishing- 
Dutch-speaking inhabitants of the Brussels Region. 
As for the number of electoral districts, this number evidently increased with the increase in the directly 
elected Regional and Community MPs in 1995, as the absence of such direct election for a number of 
supra-local governments before 1995 causes us to consider the number of electoral districts for these 
governments pre-1995 to be zero. However, the increase in number of electoral districts shown in table 4a 
between 1990 and 1996 remained rather limited, and even turned into a decrease after 1996, as: 
 the 1993 “state reform” also included a –complementary and rather large- reduction of the number 
of Federal electoral districts, both for elections of the House of Representatives and for elections 
of the Senate, 
 in 2002 the Federal government once again decided to considerably reduce the number of 
electoral districts of the House of Representatives,  
 and in 2003 also the Flemish government reduced its number of electoral districts 
 
As should be clear from the last column of table 4a, we unfortunately did not succeed in collecting a large 
enough panel dataset with respect to the direct financial costs of politicians to include this variable into 
our regression analysis below
320
. We define direct financial costs of politicians as comprising expenditures 
made for the financing of Belgian parliaments, for the financing of Belgian “cabinets” of private advisors 
                                                          
318
 As 2004 was the 1
st
 year in which a law came into effect that had already been voted in 1995 and that obliges 
supra-local politicians to report their “second jobs” to the National Audit Office. 
319
 Exception made for the parliament of the German Speaking Community, which has been directly elected over our 
entire sample period, more in particular ever since its creation in 1974. 
320
 As opposed to e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom (2006 p. 11) for his panel regression of governing parties’ vote share on 
specific expenditure categories for Swedish municipalities. 
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of ministers
321
, and for the financing of Belgian political parties. By means of illustration, we show that in 
2012, those direct financial costs amounted to 738 million euros
322
. We did not succeed either in making a 
breakdown between these 3 components of “direct cost of politicians” per individual Belgian 
government
323
.  
Table 4a: Number of “n” in Belgium over our sample period 
Year Ministers 
“Cabinet 
members” 
 
“Second jobs” 
per minister MPs 
Electoral 
districts 
Direct cost of 
politicians* 
1982 33 43 
 
343 52 
 
1990 48 64 
 
418 53 
 
1996 43 48 
 
593 63 
 
2012 46 55 
 
 
2 607 49 738 
* in million euros of 2012 
As said above, table 4b expresses the numbers of table 4a in per capita terms. Unsurprisingly, the 
evolution of the different meanings of “n” is similar to the evolution shown in table 4a. Of course, the 
averages in table 4b are not able to show the existing considerable geographic disparity in Belgium with 
respect to number of politicians and electoral districts: e.g. the number of politicians per capita in the 
Brussels Region is much higher than the number of politicians per capita in the Flemish Region. This is 
because no less than 7 of the 9 Belgian supra-local governments are active on the territory of the Brussels 
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 These “cabinets” of private advisors are not to be confused with the cabinet of ministers –called the “council of 
ministers” in Belgium- as such. Compared internationally, these “cabinets” of private advisors seem large. Their total 
cost is estimated to be larger than the total cost of parliaments. They are sometimes dubbed “parallel civil service”. 
322
 Calculated from “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B”; 
http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx 
323
 In particular data about the public financing of political parties appear hard to find (see e.g. Smulders e.a. 2014). 
This is also because Belgian political parties are partly financed indirectly, i.e. via the financing of the Belgian 
parliaments. 
The amount of 738 million euros includes pension payments to former politicians. Over our sample period, Belgian 
MPs were entitled to a full parliamentary pension after a total of 20 years’ membership of a Belgian parliament and 
from the age of 55. However, not included in the amount of 738 million euros is the extra income many supra-local 
politicians in Belgium receive thanks to their “second jobs” in the Belgian (local or supra-local) public sector, for 
lack of data. (Information on the number of individual politicians’ “second jobs” is however available at 
http://www.cumuleo.be/.) Nor does it include the salaries of the “political appointees” in the civil services and state-
owned enterprises overseen by the Belgian supra-local governments, equally for lack of data. Informally though not 
formally, several senior postings in ministries and state-owned enterprises –extending to the central bank, the 
judiciary, embassies, as well as watchdogs in the field of fiscal policy, competition, and banking- are divided up 
among the parties that are part of the several coalitions governing the Belgian supra-local governments. These 
political appointments are used to reward –temporary- advisors in ministerial “cabinets” with a –permanent- position 
within the government bureaucracy, as well as to maintain the political party in question’s influence over the public 
sector. The press has even reported on senior public sector positions having been newly created to enable ministers to 
reward private advisors. The system of political appointments is a well-known manifestation of the Belgian “party-
cracy”. 
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Region
324
 (the exceptions are the Walloon Region and the German Speaking Community governments) 
but only 2 of them are active on the territory of the Flemish Region only (the Federal government and the 
Flemish government). 
Table 4b: Number of “n” in Belgium over our sample period, expressed in per capita terms 
Year 
Population 
per minister 
Population 
per “cabinet 
member” 
 
Population 
per 
minister’s 
“second job” 
Population 
per MP 
Population 
per electoral 
district 
Direct cost of 
politicians 
per capita* 
Population of 
Belgium 
1982 298,444 229,038 
 
28,713 189,397 
 
9,848,647 
1990 208,062 156,046 
 
23,892 188,433 
 
9,986,975 
1996 236,517 211,880 
 
17,150 161,432 
 
10,170,226 
2012 239,912 200,654 
 
 
 
126,076 18,181 225,223 67 11,035,948 
* in euros of 2012 
Sources for tables 4a and b: websites of the parliaments of Belgium; website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/search.php?type=year); Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B 
(http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx); http://www.cumuleo.be; Statistics Belgium 
 
Table 5 provides the summary statistics for our political variables of interest. The difference with table 4 
is that while table 4 shows totals for the 9 governments taken together
325
, table 5 shows averages and 
standard deviations per individual government. It should be noted that we have much less observations 
available for the “ministers’ second jobs” and “direct cost of politicians” variables. Together with the fact 
that the amounts on the website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B”326 with respect to “direct 
costs of politicians” for some governments show extreme variation over time, this scarcity of observations 
makes us exclude the “direct cost of politicians” variable from our regression analysis below.  
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 Including the politicians active at the level of the 19 Brussels municipalities, this has led some to label the 
Brussels Region as the area with the most politicians per capita in the world. 
325
 Except for “second jobs”, for which we wish to show the number of “second jobs” per minister. 
326
 http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx 
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Table 5: Summary statistics for our political variables of interest 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Political variables with respect to the executive 
Ministers overall 6.92 4.10 2.00 19.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
4.04 2.00 15.19 n =       9 
 
within 
 
0.96 4.73 10.73 
 "Cabinet members" overall 8.83 6.14 3.00 32.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
5.68 3.00 22.00 n =       9 
 
within 
 
2.00 2.83 18.83 
 Executive's Herfindahl overall 0.39 0.12 0.16 0.62 N =     201 
 between  0.09 0.24 0.53 n =       9 
 within  0.08 0.26 0.59  
Parties in the coalition overall 3.54 1.42 2.00 7.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
1.31 2.16 5.42 n =       9 
 
within 
 
0.67 2.12 5.88 
 Government friendly MPs overall 67.49 47.25 5.00 225.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
44.51 8.42 157.88 n =       9 
 
within 
 
18.18 30.42 152.04 
 “Second jobs” per minister overall 2.30 0.61 1 4.75 N =     81 
 between  0.27 1.63 2.60 n =       9 
 within  0.55 1.46 4.77  
Political variables with respect to the legislative 
Electoral districts overall 11.33 13.53 1.00 51.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
11.28 1.00 32.44 n =       9 
 
within 
 
7.55 -7.11 29.89 
 MPs overall 107.60 76.26 12.00 318.00 N =     201 
 between  73.37 15.75 263.44 n =       9 
 within  22.60 65.16 162.16  
Legislative's Herfindahl overall 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.35 N =     201 
 
between 
 
0.05 0.13 0.30 n =       9 
 
within 
 
0.02 0.15 0.27 
 Parties in parliament overall 7.50 2.88 4.00 13.00 N =     201 
 
between 
 
2.85 4.75 11.53 n =       9 
 
within 
 
0.70 5.97 8.97 
 Political variables with respect to the executive + legislative 
Direct cost of politicians overall 96.40 131.00 2.50 443.00 N =      68 
(millions of euros of 2012) between 
 
149.00 3.73 389.00 n =       9 
 
within 
 
21.60 22.60 160.00 
 
Sources: websites of the parliaments of Belgium; website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/nl/search.php?type=year); website of the “Algemene Gegevensbank FOD B&B” 
(http://www.budgetFederal.be/NL/figures/Pages/databank.aspx); http://www.cumuleo.be  
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It is not surprising that for almost all variables shown in table 5, the between standard deviation is (far) 
larger than the within standard deviation. The large between standard deviations are of course mainly due 
to the large difference in size between the 9 governments considered (see table 2), but they also could be 
due to time-invariant or time-variant unobserved factors. The small within standard deviations are of 
course mainly due to the fact that our political variables are at the same time the manifestation of 
institutions, institutions that mostly do not vary much over time. The small within standard deviations will 
pose a challenge to our Fixed Effects estimation strategy below. In particular within variation with respect 
to number of MPs and number of electoral districts is almost exclusively due to changes following “state 
reforms” (and hence changes of the constitution). 
 
As an elaboration of table 5, annex 2 graphically shows between and within variation for our political 
variable of interest of which the coefficient will prove rather consistently significant in the regression 
analysis below, i.e. the number of ministers.  
6. Empirical strategy 
 
As said above, an advantage of limiting our test of the Law of 1/n to Belgian governments is that we avoid 
to some extent the problem of omitted unobserved variables that explain between-government 
heterogeneity in a multi-country study. However, we still need to take into account the possibility of -
time-invariant and time-variant- unobservables explaining heterogeneity of our variables of interest 
between the Belgian supra-local governments considered. It is true that all 9 governments considered are 
“parliamentary” (as opposed to “presidential”) regimes with a proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) 
electoral system, and that all 9 are the result of the Belgian state that came into existence in 1830, and of 
the Belgian state’s history since then. However, the Francophone dominated governments (Francophone 
Community, Walloon Region, Brussels Region, and COCOF), the Flemish dominated governments 
(Flemish government and VGC), as well as the German Speaking Community government may be argued 
to be affected by idiosyncratic cultural and political factors. This holds true in particular since the 1930s, 
when Dutch became the only official language in Flanders and when Brussels became officially bi-lingual, 
and even more since the 1960s, when German became the only official language in the German speaking 
part of Wallonia. Another argument in favour of the importance of idiosyncratic cultural and political 
factors is that in the 1970s all major parties “communitised” into separate Francophone and Flemish 
wings, due to which since then virtually all parties represented in the Belgian parliaments collect votes 
only in one of the 3 Belgian Communities
327
.  
Moreover, among the 9 governments considered, the Federal government is “in a league of its own”. It 
remains by far the largest of the 9 supra-local Belgian governments, and it is still being prioritised by 
Belgian political parties. It is by far the only supra-local Belgian government that is fully tax-autonomous, 
and traditionally it also incurs the largest budget deficits while in contrast the threat of considerable 
deficits of the Regional and Community governments has repeatedly been answered by the Federal 
government with an increase in grants (at the occasion of the 1993, the 2001 and –outside our sample 
period- the 2013 state reforms). Moreover social security was an exclusively Federal responsibility over 
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 As said above, with the exception of the federal electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, straddling the 
Brussels and the Flemish Region, and hence the French Community and the Flemish Community. 
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our sample period, the entitlement nature of which arguably renders the Federal budget to be the least 
“flexible” of all governments considered. Because of its full tax autonomy and its monopoly over social 
security, the Federal government is also the Belgian government that is by far the most exposed to the 
international economic cycle
328
, sometimes to its benefit, sometimes to its detriment. Other institutional 
reasons for which the Federal government stands out are the facts that it is by far the eldest of the 9 
governments –actually the only government pre-dating 1970-, that the Federal parliament is the only 
bicameral parliament in Belgium, and that –together with the Brussels Regional parliament and 
government- the Federal parliament and government are the only ones of the 9 parliaments and 
governments that are organised “confederally”, i.e. into Francophone and Dutch language groups, with as 
a side-effect that the Federal and Brussels government are the only governments with junior ministers. 
Finally, it is the only of the 9 governments that has seen its expenditure responsibility and tax raising 
power being reduced over our sample period, to the benefit of the other 8 supra-local governments. 
For all these heterogeneity reasons, we will implement our regression analysis while including 
government Fixed Effects (FE)329. FE take care of the problem of omitted time-constant drivers of 
expenditures and/or the budget deficit that may also be correlated with our political variables of interest. 
But another problem with respect to our research aim may be reverse causality: e.g. a government that has 
set itself an expenditure increase (reduction) as a goal may precisely consist of many (few) ministers 
and/or parties –either as a way of signaling or committing itself to its intentions or because expenditure 
increases (decreases) are more feasible with many (few) ministers and/or parties
330
. (see also Schaltegger 
and Feld 2009 p. 39 and Pettersson-Lidbom 2012a p. 269) Therefore, our identification is based on an IV 
regression approach, instrumenting our political variables of interest with our same political variables of 
interest but only observed in periods of “state reform”. A “state reform” is a Belgian decentralisation 
round for which the constitution requires that a 2/3 majority in the Federal parliament be collected, a 
majority for which politicians mostly find it convenient to lay the foundations by inviting many parties to 
the governing coalition, in turn increasing the number of ministers and junior ministers. “State reforms” 
can therefore be argued to cause exogenous changes in a number of the meanings of “n”. Additionally, 
“state reforms” have led to changes in “n” in its legislative meaning: e.g. the 1993 “state reform” was the 
“political” side of the coin of the “fiscal” 1988 “state reform”: the 1993 reform reduced the number of 
Federal electoral districts and Federal MPs hand in hand with the creation of “own” electoral districts and 
MPs of a number of important Regions and Communities, as well as in response to the strongly 
diminished expenditure responsibilities of the Federal government decided during the 1988 “state reform”.  
 
Changes in “n” understood in its various executive and even legislative meanings –such as changing the 
number of electoral districts- are in general –and also in the Belgian case- impossible without the 
agreement of the incumbent government, which is also in charge of the level of public spending and of the 
size of the budget deficit. This poses a simultaneity problem that was already pointed out by Baqir (2002 
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 Variation in the Federal government’s tax revenues due to the international economic cycle appears larger than 
variation in the other supra-local governments’ grants receipts due to the same international economic cycle. 
329
 Perhaps for these same heterogeneity reasons, all empirical studies of the Law of 1/n that we are aware of do not 
include governments belonging to different levels into the same sample. 
330
 As said above, Baskaran (2013 p. 365) points out that the problem of endogeneity of size and fragmentation of the 
government (“n”) is larger in studies of the supra-local level than in studies of the municipal level, as the political 
autonomy of the supra-local level is considerably larger. E.g. in Belgium the supra-local level is fully autonomous to 
change the size of its executives as well as of its legislatives, albeit that changes in the size of the legislative mostly 
have to be approved by a larger majority than a 50%+1 majority. 
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p. 1324). As an exception to this rule, the changes in “n” caused by a “state reform” are not incumbent-
driven but constitutionally driven and hence exogenous to public spending and to the budget deficit. 
However, one could counter-argue that Belgian “state reforms” as such may have been strongly related to 
expenditure issues, and therefore to budget balance issues: 
 Expenditure responsibilities of course changed following most Belgian “state reforms”. 
 There is empirical evidence available that fiscal decentralisation impacts overall public spending: 
upwardly when fiscal decentralisation is grants-based (like in Belgium), and downwardly when 
fiscal decentralisation is tax autonomy based. (See e.g. Inman (2008) and Eyraud and Lusinyan 
(2011).) 
 A number of Belgian “state reforms” have been examples of logrolling or vote-trading: Flemish 
parties typically demanded more competencies for the Flemish government level, while 
Francophone parties typically demanded more funding. However, this extra funding mostly took 
the form of more Federal grants to the Regions and/or Community governments, while we take 
care to include revenues (including Federal grants for all governments considered except for the 
Federal government) as a control variable and while we take care (with respect to the Federal 
government) to exclude Federal grants to the other supra-local governments from Federal 
expenditures considered.  
 Spending may have particularly gotten out of hand during Belgian “state reform” governments, as 
“state reforms” may have distracted governments –in particular the Federal government331- from 
conducting a strict fiscal policy. E.g. conventional wisdom in Belgium has it that there is a 
relationship between the very poor fiscal policy of the –many and short-lived- Federal 
governments during the 2
nd
 half of the 1970s and the repeated –but failed- attempts of these 
governments to agree on and implement a “state reform”. Also with respect to our sample period, 
both the Federal government in charge of the 1988-89 “state reform” and the one in charge of the 
2001 “state reform” were known for fiscal expansion. However, the 1988-91 fiscal expansion is 
generally ascribed to the coalition switch that happened: the Christian-democrats exchanged the –
at least at the time- more fiscally conservative liberals for the –at least at the time- more fiscally 
expansionist socialists. Similarly, the 1999-2003 fiscal expansion is generally ascribed not to the 
2001 “state reform” but to Belgium having secured membership of the Eurozone in 1998-99.  
 Conversely, Belgian public spending as well as the budget balance having gotten out of control 
since the 1970s may well have been one of the causes of demands for expenditure decentralisation 
(instead of having been one of its consequences), in particular on behalf of Flemish politicians.  
For all these reasons that “state reforms” could be directly related to spending and the budget balance, and 
not only by means of their relation to “n”, we will attempt to control for this direct effect of “state 
reforms” both in our FE and in our IV regression analysis (see below). I.e. we will include dummies that 
each attempt to capture the effect of one of the 3 “state reforms” over our sample period, i.e. taking the 
value of 1 starting with the 1
st
 year in which each “state reform” took effect, i.e. resp. from 1989, 1996, 
and 2002 onwards. 
 
Also, an IV regression strategy is hoped to take care of the problem of multicollinearity between our 
several political variables of interest. Indeed, a problem for our regression analysis below is the in some 
cases strong correlation between our 9 individual political variables of interest, as shown by the 
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 But possibly also the other supra-local governments, as those were governed by coalitions that were 
“symmetrical” to the Federal government coalition over most of our sample period. 
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correlation matrix in annex 1
332
. Those strong correlations make that if we regress government spending 
and/or the budget deficit on several of these political variables at the same time, we risk facing 
multicollinearity problems. Therefore we will not simultaneously include political variables that are 
obviously strongly correlated, such as number of parties in the coalition and the executive’s Herfindahl 
index, or number of parties in parliament and the legislative’s Herfindahl index. Additionally, our strategy 
will be to reduce multicollinearity by instrumenting individual political variables of interest. 
 
Our regression equation estimated in the regression tables below may hence be summarised as follows: 
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 / 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑡 
=   𝛼1 "𝑛"𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
With “n” our political variable of interest, with 𝑋𝑖𝑡  a set of financial, demographic, economic, and political 
(i.e. state reform) control variables, with 𝛼𝑡 a year fixed effect, and with 𝛼𝑖 a government fixed effect.
 
Regression results for our empirical strategy are shown in a stepwise way in the tables below.  
7. Results of the regression analysis 
7.1. Fixed Effects (FE) regression analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the simple FE regression analysis. Note that we have 201 observations at 
our availability (1 government * 31 years; 4 governments * 24 years; 1 government * 23 years; 1 
government * 19 years; and 1 government * 11 years). In line with the recent empirical literature on the 
Law of 1/n (e.g. Schaltegger and Feld (2009), Brooks e.a. (2011), Aidt and Shvets (2012), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2012b), and Baskaran (2013)), we opt to express our political variables of interest in absolute 
terms, and our dependent variable as well as our financial, economic and demographic control variables in 
relative terms, i.e. divided by population, to take into account the varying weights of the 9 governments 
relative to the population they “cater to”. As announced above, our strategy is to add government fixed 
effects to all regression specifications, so as to control for relevant time-constant unobservables.  
Column (1) shows results for a regression only including our number of ministers variable and (not 
shown) a set of year dummies, showing the unexpected sign for the minister coefficient, which is 
moreover significant at the 0.1 level. We start with only including the ministers variable as our variable of 
interest, as arguably ministers (and their “cabinets” of private advisors) are the most powerful actors of the 
executive and the legislative considered together (see e.g. Timmermans (1994) and Dewachter (2001)).  
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 Obviously some correlations between our variables measuring “n” are (strongly) negative, as both Herfindahl 
indices decrease with “n” (be it parties in the coalition or parties in the parliament) increasing. 
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Table 6: FE regression of (primary) expenditures / deficit per capita on political variables measuring “n” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc deficit pc spending pc deficit pc spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc 
ministers -173.3* -61.74 -34.19 44.44* 55.46*       30.67 39.02 
 (89.24) (49.03) (32.83) (19.73) (25.09)       (44.16) (35.52) 
              
“cabinet      27.31*** 17.65***       
members”      (3.972) (2.589)       
              
parties in         -3.277    -2.399  
government        (14.35)    (20.81)  
              
executive’s          -137.4    -278.2 
Herfindahl         (177.6)    (304.3) 
              
govt friendly          0.875  0.304 -1.185 
MPs          (1.031)  (2.671) (2.037) 
              
ministers’           -3.225   
“second jobs”           (5.057)   
              
electoral            -29.59* -33.72 
districts            (15.63) (20.62) 
              
MPs            6.095 7.241 
            (4.484) (5.561) 
              
parties in             -2.311  
parliament            (57.18)  
              
legislative’s             1804.2 
Herfindahl             (1748.5) 
              
revenues pc  0.651*** 0.469 -0.0692  -0.0484  -0.0874 -0.0963 -0.0906 0.0475 -0.0545 -0.0513 
  (0.147) (0.254) (0.115)  (0.120)  (0.121) (0.120) (0.128) (0.173) (0.110) (0.120) 
              
unemployed pc  13.52 84.96 207.8** 16.88 182.5*** -24.61 161.2** 176.9*** 161.1** 503.1 248.1*** 265.7*** 
  (93.50) (79.02) (62.42) (170.0) (48.20) (163.8) (52.14) (49.11) (49.59) (370.4) (67.03) (55.56) 
              
under18 pc  -5.312 10.61 -48.14 -67.09 -49.87 -71.08 -54.35 -45.48 -54.19 81.33 -28.07 -21.94 
  (21.79) (21.78) (29.78) (39.17) (29.89) (43.95) (34.33) (32.69) (34.80) (124.2) (18.36) (21.33) 
              
over59 pc  17.21 35.89 162.7 159.4 130.9 98.50 96.32 97.43 90.99 72.45 161.8 114.6 
  (32.68) (42.14) (105.2) (160.2) (96.72) (139.3) (109.7) (104.5) (109.4) (52.68) (134.8) (138.6) 
              
grossincome pc  0.133 0.119 0.115* 0.105 0.0957 0.0607 0.0614 0.0806 0.0711 -0.0903 0.140** 0.133** 
  (0.104) (0.0757) (0.0567) (0.112) (0.0611) (0.127) (0.0741) (0.0741) (0.0670) (0.554) (0.0484) (0.0449) 
              
state reform 
dummies 
  X X X X X X X X X X X 
              
govt - year trend     X X X X X X X X X X 
              
N 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 81 201 201 
Robust standard errors clustered at the government level in parentheses. Year and government dummies and (from column (4) onwards) government-year trends included, as well as (from column (3) onwards) dummies for the 3 “state reforms” over our 
sample period, taking effect in resp. 1989, 1996, and 2002, and the interaction of these “state reform” dummies with a Federal government dummy. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Column (2) shows the results of a specification additionally including a set of financial, economic and 
demographic control variables, expressed in per capita terms. Revenues
333
 and gross income are expressed 
in euros per capita, while the number of unemployed, under 18, and over 59 variables are expressed as 
population shares (%) taking a value between 0 and 100. Hence the different magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the former variables compared to the latter variables. One could imagine that these controls 
are both correlated with public spending and with our political variables of interest: e.g. if gross income 
per capita decreases or if the unemployment rate or the population share of the old increases, demand for 
public spending may increase and a newly elected government may wish to respond to this increased 
demand not only by effectively increasing spending but also by increasing the number of politicians in 
charge of such increased spending. In most specifications shown in table 6, the coefficient on the share of 
the number of under 18 years’ old shows an unexpected sign, but this variable could as well account for 
the size of the population at working age (i.e. the parents of the under 18 years’ old). This is a part of the 
population that may be less dependent on public spending than other parts of the population. Also the 
coefficient on revenues shows the unexpected sign in most specifications, although where negative the 
revenues coefficient is insignificant and very small
334
. One reason could be that revenue may be correlated 
with gross income per capita, as both of them may measure to some extent the impact of the economic 
cycle. It is also surprising that among our control variables, only the share of the unemployed shows a 
significant (and large) coefficient. Once again, a reason could be that gross income per capita may be 
correlated with the share of the unemployed, as both of them may measure to some extent the impact of 
the economic cycle. However, surprising about the large and significant coefficient on the number of 
unemployed is that, as said above, a priori only the Federal government’s spending is expected strongly to 
respond to the economic cycle, as social security spending –including unemployment benefits- was the 
exclusive competency of the Federal government over our sample period. 
The specifications behind column (3) and following additionally include dummies that attempt to capture 
the effect of the 3 “state reforms” –i.e. decentralisation rounds-, i.e. 3 dummies taking the value of 1 resp. 
starting with the 1
st
 year in which each “state reform” took effect, i.e. 1989, 1996, and 2002335. 
Additionally, we include (not shown) the interaction of these dummies with the Federal government 
dummy, as each of the 3 “state reforms” increased the expenditure responsibilities of the other 8 
governments -hence reducing Federal expenditure responsibilities-, as well as increasing the Federal 
grants meant to finance them -hence reducing revenues available for Federal expenditures. Moreover, the 
possibility that public spending would have particularly gotten out of hand during Belgian “state reform” 
governments, as “state reforms” may have distracted governments from conducting a strict fiscal policy, 
seems to have applied in particular to the Federal government. It was always the Federal government that 
was in charge of agreeing on and implementing the “state reform” in case. Hence the fiscal effect of the 3 
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 Surprisingly, most of the empirical literature on the Law of 1/n that we reviewed above does not include 
government revenue as a control. An exception is Baskaran (2013), who finds a significantly positive association 
between expenditures and revenues. 
Our “revenues” variable consists of (formula-based) grants allocated by the Federal government for all supra-local 
governments except of course for the Federal government itself. Only from the “state reform” of 2001 onwards the 
revenues of the Flemish government, the Brussels Regional government, and the Walloon government have 
consisted of own tax revenue to a non-negligible extent.  
334
 The coefficients on our variables of interest are however not sensitive to including or omitting government 
revenues as a control variable. 
335
 While the resp. “state reforms” had been voted into law in resp. 1988, 1993 and 2001. 
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“state reforms” on the Federal government arguably contrasted for several reasons with the effect on the 
other 8 governments.  
Controlling for “state reforms” is important not only because each “state reform” changed expenditures. It 
is also important because several “state reforms” changed the size (“n”) of several executives (temporarily: 
several executives consisted of more ministers and more parties at the time of the 1988 and 2001 state 
reforms, so as to more easily achieve a 2/3 majority in parliament in favour of the “state reform” in 
question) as well as of several legislatives (permanently: several legislatives experienced a change in their 
electoral districts and/or number of MPs on the occasion of the 1993 and 2001 state reform).  
Of course the way we define our “state reform” dummies assumes that each “state reform” has a similar –
i.e. permanent- effect in each year starting from its starting year, compared to the year before the starting 
year. Such a similar fiscal effect is suggested in graph 1 for e.g. the Federal government after the 1988 
“state reform” (which was the largest in Belgian history fiscally speaking): Federal expenditures decreased 
considerably between 1988 and 1989, after which they start increasing again (from a considerably lower 
starting point), but only gradually. However, “state reform” effects may well not be constant. E.g. the 
implicit bailouts of the Community governments included in the 1993 and 2001 “state reforms” had an 
increasing effect over time. But we hope that our year dummies -as well as the trend variable that we 
include from column (4) onwards- control for such possible non-constant effects of state reforms.  
As expected, in most specifications from column (3) onwards the coefficients on our 3 “state reform” 
dummies (not shown) are large and significantly positive, while when interacted with a Federal 
government dummy, the coefficient turns large and significantly negative (as expected). The exception is 
the coefficient on the interaction of the 2001 “state reform” dummy with the Federal government dummy, 
which is small and insignificant in most of our specifications. (The latter is not very surprising as the 
consequences of the 2001 “state reform” on expenditure responsibilities were minor.) Another exception 
is the non-interacted 1988 “state reform” dummy, which drops out of all our specifications because of 
multicollinearity
336
. 
However, when additionally including a trend for every government –to take into account time-variant 
unobservables that evolve smoothly over time- as shown by column (4), the coefficient on our ministers 
variable turns positive and significant (p value = 0.05). It shows that an extra minister is on average 
associated with an increase in expenditures of 44 euros per capita
337
. As the within standard deviation of 
the number of ministers over sample period is 0.99, the typical variation in public spending per capita 
associated with variations in ministers over time also equals about 44 euros, with a p value of 0.05. This 
seems a rather large amount considering average expenditures per capita shown in graph 1 above. Average 
expenditures amount to 2,809 euros over our sample period, but to no less than 8,819 euros for the Federal 
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 In columns (12) and (13), all “state reform” dummies as well as most year dummies drop out because of 
multicollinearity. 
337
 When we not only include the contemporaneous ministers variable but also a number of lagged ministers 
variables, the coefficients on one or more of these lags are significant, showing a delayed association between public 
spending and ministers. This result suggests that only with a delay an increase in ministers is associated with an 
increase in spending. A similar result holds when we replace the number of ministers with the number of “cabinet 
members” as the independent variable (see columns (6) and (7)). Including lags of our ministers variable into our IV 
regression (see table 7 below) produces the similar result that an increase in the number of ministers only causes the 
deficit to increase with a delay. 
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government only. Indeed, whenever we omit the Federal government from our regression analysis in 
column (4) and following, our coefficient of interest considerably reduces in size.   
 
In column (5) we replace our dependent variable “(primary) spending” with the (primary) budget deficit, 
as the Law of 1/n can be argued –as done above- to hold even more with respect to the deficit than with 
respect to spending. Indeed, politicians may also have an interest in favouring their constituency(ies) with 
targeted tax reductions, apart from targeted spending increases
338
. (Of course in column (5) we no longer 
control for revenue as our dependent variable itself is the difference between revenue and (primary) 
spending.) The coefficient on ministers remains of similar size and significance. Surprisingly however, 
this coefficient represents a very large amount compared to average (primary) deficits per capita –23 euros 
over our sample period (and 543 euros for the Federal government only)- shown in graph 2 above
339
.  
 
When we replace our ministers variable with a “cabinet members” variable, which also includes the 
number of junior ministers per government apart from the number of senior ministers, as in column (6), 
our coefficient of interest becomes very significant (p value = 0.00) but smaller in size
340
. However, as the 
within standard deviation of the number of “cabinet members” over sample period is 1.92, the typical 
variation in public spending per capita associated with variations in “cabinet members” over time equals 
about 52 euros (1.92 times 27 euros), with a p value of 0.00. The larger association between spending and 
“cabinet members” than between spending and ministers is surprising as in Belgium junior ministers are 
not allowed to participate in the weekly “council of ministers” where government-wide decisions are 
taken, in particular those with a fiscal impact. Additionally, junior ministers are in charge of less important 
competencies than “full” ministers are (because of which they are “attached” to a particular “full” minister 
who has to represent them in the “council of ministers”). Finally junior ministers only have half the budget 
of a “full” minister at their availability to hire private advisors. 
When we once again –similarly to what we did in column (5)- replace our dependent variable “(primary) 
spending” with the (primary) budget deficit, the coefficient on “cabinet members” remains of similar size 
and significance, as shown in column (7). 
Columns (8) to (11) show regression results of specifications where we again replace our ministers 
variable with 3 other political variables measuring the size of the executive: the number of parties in the 
government coalition (column (8)), the Herfindahl index measuring fragmentation of the executive 
(column (9)), the number of MPs supporting the coalition in power (column (10)), and the number of 
ministers’ –remunerated- “second jobs” (column (11)). All 4 coefficients of interest are insignificant and 
the “number of parties in the coalition” and “number of ministers’ second jobs” coefficients even show the 
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 Such favouring is i.a. suggested by the finding of Jennes and Persyn (2015) that Belgian federal ministers favour 
inhabitants of their electoral districts with more net formula-based fiscal transfers, i.e. with more social allowances 
and/or with less social security contributions and/or less income tax payments. 
339
 Another reason why the large coefficient on ministers in column (5) is surprising is that –as said above- only 4 of 
the 9 Belgian supra-local governments enjoyed considerable revenue autonomy over our sample period. These are 
the Federal government, and –since the 2001 “state reform”- the 3 Regional governments. 
340
 When we not only include the contemporaneous “cabinet members” variable but also a number of lagged “cabinet 
members” variables, the coefficients on a number of these lags are significant, showing a delayed association 
between public spending and “cabinet members”. This result suggests that an increase in “cabinet members” is not 
immediately associated with an increase in spending, similarly to our result for the ministers variable. 
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unexpected –negative- sign341. The latter negative coefficient could be due to “second jobs” possibly 
distracting a minister from increasing overall expenditures or from increasing expenditures (or from 
implementing targeted tax cuts) with respect to his competency (competencies). It should also be kept in 
mind that our number of observations for ministers’ “second jobs” is limited, and that a few ministers only 
may explain the bulk of year-to-year variation as for the number of “second jobs”342. (In contrast, the sign 
of the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is as expected, as the lower the Herfindahl index, the higher the 
executive’s fragmentation, and hence the larger expenditures and/or the deficit are expected to be.) All 4 
coefficients of interest are also insignificant when we replace –not shown in table 6- the dependent 
variable “total spending” with the (primary) budget deficit, as we did in columns (5) and (7). 
In table 6 we do not show regression results of specifications where we replace our ministers variable one 
after one with any of our political variables measuring the size of the legislative. This is for reasons of 
space and because we hypothesised that any positive effect of the size of the legislative on overall 
expenditure and/or on the budget deficit will likely be smaller than any positive effect of the size of the 
executive. Indeed, none of the coefficients on our separate variables measuring the size of the legislative 
(not shown) is significant. 
As is shown by annex 1, many of our political variables of interest are correlated, which is a reason why 
all coefficients on our successive variables of interest as shown by columns (1) until (11) may be biased. 
Therefore, in column (12) we show the regression results of a specification in which we include all –
executive related as well as legislative related- of our political variables of interest
343
. Because both the 
number of parties in the coalition and the executive’s Herfindahl index, and the number of parties 
represented in parliament and the legislative’s Herfindahl index are substitutes, we take care not to include 
them simultaneously in one and the same specification. Therefore, column (13) shows regression results 
after replacing both simple “number of parties” variables –used in column (12)- with both “more refined” 
Herfindahl indices. As a result coefficients on a number of our variables of interest in columns (12) and 
(13) show the unexpected sign and one of those –the “number of electoral districts” variable- is even 
significant in column (12). While in columns (12) and (13) we have reduced the risk of omitted variable 
bias that we run using the specifications behind columns (4) to (11), we in contrast have increased the risk 
of multicollinearity, so that none of our specifications shown in table 6 is satisfying. 
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 The sign remains negative and insignificant when replacing the number of ministers’ remunerated “second jobs” 
with the number of ministers’ remunerated and non-remunerated “second jobs”, and when replacing it with the 
number of “cabinet members”’ “second jobs”. 
342
 Effectively, when inspecting the “second jobs” data, typically a few ministers hold a large number of “second 
jobs”, while most ministers hold only a limited number of “second jobs”. Entrance (disappearance) of a minister 
holding a large number of “second jobs” into (from) a particular government hence typically has a large impact on 
the total number of “second jobs” per government. 
343
 Except “number of second jobs” and “direct cost of politicians”, as including one or both of these variables would 
make us lose more than half of our observations. 
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7.2. Instrumental Variables (IV) regression analysis 
 
The results of an attempt to avoid at the same time the problems of omitted variable bias and 
multicollinearity are shown in table 7. It presents the results of an IV regression analysis, instrumenting 
one endogenous political variable with a subset of that same variable deemed exogenous
344
. In so doing, 
we additionally attempt to avoid the possible problem of reverse causality, i.e. a government elected on a 
platform of expenditure increases may precisely be composed of more ministers, “cabinet members”, 
and/or political parties, to be able to more easily implement those expenditure increases
345
. Alternatively, 
a government that has seen its expenditure responsibilities increase because of a “state reform” may as a 
consequence increase its number of ministers. The IV we use is the extra number of “n” that characterised 
“state reform” governments. Because a “state reform” has to be approved by a 2/3 majority in the Federal 
parliament, governments implementing a “state reform” are typically larger, i.e. relying on more 
parliamentary seats, for constitutional reasons rather than for expenditure related reasons, i.e. so as to 
secure already within the executive itself most of the 2/3 parliamentary majority needed. Therefore “state 
reform” governments typically consist of more ministers346 and more parties, and are –as a consequence of 
consisting of more parties- characterised by a smaller Herfindahl index. 
The Federal, Flemish, and French Community governments of the 1988-91 legislature were characterised 
of more ministers, more parties and a smaller Herfindahl index than their predecessor and/or successor 
governments
347
. This was precisely because the 1988-91 Federal government prepared and implemented 
during this legislature the largest “state reform” in Belgian history. Because at that time there were still 
only Federal elections (except for the Brussels Regional and the German speaking Community 
parliament), this larger size of the Federal government was reflected in a larger size of the Flemish and the 
French Community governments, in terms of ministers. I.e. absence of proper Regional elections 
facilitated the simultaneous establishment of “symmetrical” –i.e. identical- government coalitions at the 
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 Unsurprisingly the F-test of significance of our IV –shown at the bottom of table 7- is favourable to the relevance 
of all of our “subset IVs”.  
Because in all specifications reported in table 7 we instrument the endogenous variable of interest in question with 
only one IV, we cannot implement nor report the Hansen J test of exogeneity of our IV. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to instrument the “number of ministers’ second jobs” variable, as it is only observed 
from 2004 onwards, a time period in which only one government –the 2008-10 Federal government- was larger than 
usual with a view to implementing a “state reform”. 
345
 E.g. it is conventional wisdom in Belgium that the largest government in terms of number of parties within our 
sample, i.e. the Federal government that came to power after the 1999 elections, intended to increase public 
expenditures from the start, as Belgian politicians had suffered from fiscal consolidation already since the 1991-95 
legislature, securing Belgian membership of the Eurozone end of 1998 / beginning of 1999.   
346
 As shown by graph 3 in annex 2 below, the exceptions are the governments that agreed on and implemented the 
1993, resp. the 2011 “state reforms”. They were composed of as many ministers as, resp. even less ministers than the 
previous governments. Our IV therefore takes the value of zero for the governments in power during the years 1992-
1995 and 2011-2012. Twice both Green parties –Flemish and Francophone Belgian- provided the parliamentary 
support the government needed to achieve 2/3 of the parliamentary vote, without those Green parties in return being 
invited into the government. 
347
 Graph 3 does not enable us to compare the number of ministers of the 1988-91 Flemish and French Community 
governments with their predecessor governments, as it only shows the evolution of the number of ministers for the 
time period for which we have found expenditure and revenue data. However, the number of ministers of the 1988-
91 Flemish and French Community governments was well higher than those of their predecessor governments. 
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Federal and the Regional level. Unsurprisingly, political parties in power prefer the Belgian Federal and 
Regional and Community government levels to be party-politically aligned.  
Similarly, also the negotiations preceding the formation of the 1999-2003 Federal government included a 
“state reform”. This was one of the reasons that also this government was larger –at least in terms of 
number of parties, which also results in a smaller Herfindahl index- than its predecessor and successor. 
Similarly to the 1988-91 legislature, the 1999-2003 Flemish, French Community, and Walloon Regional 
governments shared these characteristics. Indeed, at that time, Federal and Regional elections were still 
concurrent, with as a side-result largely similar election results, facilitating the formation of 
“symmetrical” governing coalitions at the Federal and the Regional and Community levels. As said, such 
“symmetrical” governments are preferred by parties in power. The larger size of the 1999-2003 Federal 
government was not reflected in more ministers at the Federal level but it was well reflected in more 
ministers making up the French Community and Walloon Region governments. Finally, also the 2007-10 
Federal government consisted of more parties than their predecessor and/or successor governments. Note 
that the latter government failed to implement a state reform, which however was firmly the intention of 
this government
348. Instead, a “state reform” was agreed and implemented only by the 2011-2014 Federal 
government. 
Column (1) of table 7 shows the regression results of instrumenting the number of ministers variable for 
all 9 governments with the extra number of ministers in those governments during legislatures in which a 
“state reform” is prepared and implemented. As a consequence, our IV only takes a value different from 
zero during “state reform” legislatures, and even then for only some of the 9 governments. The coefficient 
on ministers in column (1) amounts to 53 euros per capita but fails to be significant with a p value of 0.14. 
It compares to a coefficient of 44 euros per capita that is significant with a p value of 0.06 on ministers as 
a result of the FE regression in table 6. This result is not very surprising, as IV regression analysis 
generally tends to result in larger coefficients and lower significance. 
In column (2) we replace our dependent variable “(primary) spending” with the (primary) budget deficit, 
as we did for the specifications in table 6 above in which the coefficient on our variable of interest was 
significant with the expected sign. Now the coefficient on ministers turns very large and very significant, 
which is surprising because as said average deficits over our sample period are of course much smaller 
than average expenditures.    
 
Columns (3) and (4) show regression results when replacing the number of ministers with the number of 
“cabinet members”, and analogously instrumenting it with the number of extra “cabinet members” in 
governments during legislatures in which a “state reform” is prepared. The 1988-91 and the 1999-2003 
“state reform” Federal governments both comprised more junior ministers than their predecessors and 
successors. In contrast to the regression result shown in columns (6) and (7) of table 6, the coefficients on 
“cabinet members” in columns (3) and (4) of table 7 are insignificant.  
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 This firm intention showed as after 6 months of fruitless government formation negotiations in 2007, the then 
government-to-be enlarged its majority by inviting the then largest but one Francophone Belgian political party to 
the coalition, which was not needed for a simple 50%+1 parliamentary majority. The result was that the government 
was supported by no less than 94 out of 150 MPs in the Federal House of Representatives. 
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Table 7: IV regression of (primary) expenditures / deficit per capita on political variables measuring “n” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 spending pc deficit pc spending pc deficit pc spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc spending pc 
ministers 53.21 91.87***      70.67 84.30* 
 (36.40) (26.01)      (59.50) (49.53) 
          
“cabinet   2.634 -19.28      
members”   (4.907) (21.42)      
          
parties in     -6.218   6.607  
government     (16.27)   (19.02)  
          
executive’s       -75.28   -707.5* 
Herfindahl      (305.7)   (374.4) 
          
government       0.169 -3.074 -5.258** 
friendly MPs       (1.301) (2.732) (2.095) 
          
electoral         -1.692 -4.251 
districts        (20.97) (63.42) 
          
MPs        2.171 3.548 
        (6.709) (14.94) 
          
parties in        -21.46  
parliament        (48.75)  
          
legislative’s Herfindahl         2767.9* 
         (1553.8) 
          
revenues pc -0.0652  -0.0853  -0.0852 -0.0928 -0.0893 -0.0591 -0.0581 
 (0.0897)  (0.104)  (0.109) (0.108) (0.105) (0.0849) (0.105) 
          
unemployed pc 215.9*** 57.57 166.6*** -65.38 160.9*** 170.7*** 164.5*** 242.8*** 276.8*** 
 (64.08) (102.0) (44.07) (138.6) (49.51) (63.20) (41.83) (56.79) (60.22) 
          
under18 pc -46.37* -64.71 -55.06** -76.22 -57.85* -49.56 -55.02** -40.95*** -25.74* 
 (24.23) (39.89) (27.03) (47.46) (30.72) (35.38) (27.52) (15.77) (14.20) 
          
over59 pc 172.7 220.3** 106.7 47.57 104.8 98.40 101.2 184.9 126.0 
 (105.4) (90.89) (86.95) (132.2) (99.33) (90.30) (86.77) (123.5) (121.6) 
          
grossincome pc 0.123** 0.151 0.0709 0.0158 0.0656 0.0740 0.0681 0.124** 0.143** 
 (0.0521) (0.0967) (0.0589) (0.137) (0.0626) (0.0551) (0.0544) (0.0531) (0.0661) 
          
state reform dummies X X X X X X X X X 
          
govt – year trend X X X X X X X X X 
          
N 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 
F-test of joint 
significance of IVs in 1st 
stage (p value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Robust standard errors clustered at the government level in parentheses. Year dummies, government dummies, and government-year trends included, as well as dummies for the 3 “state reforms” over 
our sample period, taking effect in resp. 1989, 1996, and 2002, and the interaction of these “state reform” dummies with a Federal government dummy. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Columns (5) to (7) consecutively repeat the IV regression analysis for 3 of our remaining variables of 
interest related to the executive – the number of parties in the governing coalition, the executive’s 
Herfindahl, and the number of government friendly MPs-, as also for these 3 variables we argue to have a 
valid and relevant IV available: in each case it is the change induced to them by “state reform” 
governments or by the “state reforms” themselves. None of the coefficients on the instrumented variables 
of interest is significant, and 1 of them even has the unexpected sign. Finally, and analogously to the last 2 
columns of table 6, we simultaneously include all our political variables of interest
349
 –while taking care 
not to include the 2 Herfindahl indices simultaneously with their less refined measures of fragmentation. 
As a result of this exercise, the coefficients on a number of our variables of interest turn out to be 
significant, but some of them show the unexpected sign. However, similarly to our discussion of table 6, 
we should note that several of our IVs are strongly correlated (similarly to the many strong correlations 
between the original endogenous variables shown in table 6). 
 
Hence, the results in columns (1) and (2) of table 7 are the closest we get to a statistically significant 
causal relationship between the number of politicians –in our case ministers- and public finance outcomes. 
We have tested the sensitivity of these 2 IV results to a large number of changes to our regression 
specification: 
 The result in column (1) is robust against omitting the revenues variable from the regression 
equation. Note that the revenues variable is possibly endogenous to expenditures. E.g. the French 
Community and the Brussels Region governments have succeeded a number of times since 1989 
in obtaining additional grants by increasing their deficits. 
 The coefficient on ministers in column (1) becomes significant (52 euros per capita with a p value 
of 0.09) and the coefficient on ministers in column (2) remains significant (89 euros per capita 
with a p value of 0.01) after filtering social security –both spending and revenues- out of Federal 
spending and revenue data
350
. The motivation for filtering out social security is that in Belgium, as 
in several other countries, the fiscal power of the Federal government over social security 
revenues and expenditures is limited
351
. This is because social security is to an important extent 
managed by labour unions and employers’ organisations, and because the bulk of social security 
spending constitutes “permanent legislation” as Marcel (2012 p. 25-26) calls it, almost similar to 
interest payments on the Federal debt
352
.  
 When we do not include a trend variable per government in columns (1) and (2), which is a 
demanding addition given our limited number of observations, our p values improve to 0.02 resp. 
0.00 and our coefficients of interest increase to 87 euros per capita resp. decrease to 49 euros per 
capita.  
                                                          
349
 Due to lack of IVs, we do not instrument the 2 variables measuring parliamentary fragmentation, i.e. the number 
of parties represented in parliament nor the legislative’s Herfindahl index. 
350
 Over our sample period, social security was the exclusive competency of the Federal government, and it 
constituted the bulk of its primary spending. 
351
 Notwithstanding the finding of Jennes and Persyn (2015) that Belgian federal ministers appear –marginally- able 
to favour inhabitants of their electoral districts with more net formula-based fiscal transfers, including with more 
social allowances and/or with less social security contributions. 
352
 Also the public sector wage bill could to an important extent be considered a case of permanent legislation. 
However, as said above, we were not able to calculate public expenditures net of wage expenditures over our sample 
period. 
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 When we exclude one by one each of the 9 governments from our sample, the significance of the 
coefficient on ministers in column (1) decreases, except that the p value of the coefficient on 
ministers decreases until below the 0.1 threshold when we exclude the Brussels Regional 
government (which does not show any variation in the number of ministers over our sample 
period). In contrast, the coefficient on ministers in column (2) remains significant when we 
exclude one by one each of the 9 governments from our sample. The exceptions are that the p 
value of the coefficient on ministers increases until above the 0.1 threshold when we exclude the 
Flemish government or the Walloon Regional government. 
 What makes the p value in column (1) also improve slightly is the omission from our sample of by 
far the 4 smallest supra-local governments, i.e. German speaking Community, COCOF, VGC and 
GGC (see table 2), although this omission reduces our sample to 126 observations only. This 
omission however makes the p value of our coefficient of interest in column (2) increase above 
the 0.1 threshold. 
 Limiting our sample to post-1995 years –as from then on there was no “double mandate” 
anymore, and as from then on each supra-local government of Belgium was directly elected- 
weakens the causal relationship suggested by columns (1) and (2): the coefficient on ministers 
reduces to 28 euros per capita, with a p value of 0.27, resp. to 90 euros per capita, with a p value 
of 0.17
353
. This weakening makes us suspect that it could have been the signature of the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992 on the criteria for accession to the Eurozone that may have caused the 
Federal government –as well as the simultaneous Regional and Community governments that 
were “symmetrical” in the partisan sense- to get a grip again on their expenditures and/or their 
budget balance, rather than the considerable reduction in Federal and Flemish government 
ministers after the 1991 elections (as shown by graph 4). Indeed, the Maastricht treaty was signed 
in February 1992, while the post-1991 elections Federal government was sworn in only in March 
1992
354
. So perhaps the reduction in ministers happened not so much because the 1988 “state 
reform” had been implemented already. Indeed, another “state reform”, be it of much smaller 
size, was voted during the 1992-95 legislature, thanks to the then Federal government having 
found parliamentary support for it outside the governing coalition. Hence perhaps the reduction in 
ministers rather happened because the 1992-1995 government precisely wished to get control of 
expenditures.  
 In contrast to most of the existing empirical literature, we also repeated the regressions in table 7 
while expressing not only our political variables but also all our other variables in absolute terms 
(and of course adding population as an extra control variable)
355
. Regression analysis then leads to 
the coefficient on ministers in columns (1) and (2) of table 7 to be positive and highly significant. 
This result is moreover robust to excluding the Federal government from our sample
356
. Also in 
contrast to most of the literature
357
, we repeated the above regressions while expressing all our 
variables in per capita terms, i.e. while also expressing our political variables in per capita terms. 
The results then are that the coefficients on ministers in columns (1) and (2) become less 
                                                          
353
 In contrast, limiting our sample to the post-1988 years –the period for which we found expenditure data for most 
of the 9 supra-local governments- does not weaken the causal relationship suggested by columns (1) and (2). 
354
 However, in contrast, the reduction in ministers of the Flemish government already took place in January 1992. 
355
 An exception is Brooks e.a. (2011), who also conduct this sensitivity analysis. 
356
 As well as to excluding every single government in a row from our sample, and to excluding the 4 smallest 
governments by far from our sample. 
357
 An exception is Schaltegger and Feld (2009 p. 41). 
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significant. A similar result emerges if we express all our variables in logarithms, except our 
political variable of interest and our dummy variables.  
 We have also considered whole legislatures as our time dimension, rather than individual years, as 
almost all our political variables of interest only change (i.e. are only decided upon) –if at all- 
right after elections. Only considering legislatures reduces our number of observations to 53, and 
makes the significance of the coefficients on the ministers variable diminish considerably
358
. 
 As another alternative, we also considered as exogenous the extra number of ministers and 
“cabinet members” in legislatures that succeeded “state reform” legislatures in case these numbers 
did not decrease in the succeeding legislature. In effect, in a limited number of occasions
359
, the 
extra number of ministers and “cabinet members” due to “state reform” governments did not or 
not fully disappear when the next –non-“state reform”- government(s) came into power. See also 
graph 3 in annex 2. This may have been due to “habit formation”/inertia. When using these 
slightly different IVs for conducting our regressions in table 7, regression results are very much 
the same. 
 As a final alternative, we expressed our variables in First Differences (FD) rather than to include 
government Fixed Effects (FE). Although FE is generally considered more efficient than FD, and 
although FE avoids losing one year of observations due to taking FD, Wooldridge (2009 p. 487) 
recommends FD over FE when the number of cross-sections is not very large (in our case only 9 
governments), and when the number of time-units is large (in our case 23 years or more for most 
governments). Remarkably, when using FD instead of FE in table 7, the coefficients of interest in 
column (1) and (2) both become very insignificant
360
. This may be due to the fact that the FD 
transformation reduces variation in our data more than the FE transformation. 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate if a more populous or fragmented executive or a more populous or fragmented 
legislative increases government spending and/or the budget deficit, an effect known as the Law of 1/n 
(Weingast e.a. 1981). We test this for the supra-local governments of Belgium, i.e. the Belgian Federal 
government and the Belgian Regional and Community governments, as these are in charge of the bulk of 
public spending in Belgium. Possibly because our dataset is limited (as well as the number of Belgian 
supra-local governments as such), and because our identification relies on variation over time in the 
composition of the executive and the legislative of the various supra-local governments of Belgium, we do 
not find a significantly positive association between the sizes of the executive and the legislative on the 
                                                          
358
 Somewhat surprisingly, the entire surveyed empirical literature on the Law of 1/n makes only use of yearly data, 
with the exception of MacDonald (2008). 
359
 With respect to ministers as well as “cabinet members”: the Walloon Regional and the French Community 
government after the 1999-2004 “state reform” legislature. With respect to “cabinet members”: the Federal 
government after the 1999-2003 “state reform” legislature. 
360
 The FD transformation also allows us to include the lagged dependent variable (LDV) as a regressor, as 
expressing this –endogenous- variable in First Differences allows us to instrument it with its 2nd and 3rd lags in levels. 
However, when including the LDV in columns (4) and (5) of table 6 without instrumenting it, the ministers variable 
remains significant. 
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one hand and public expenditures on the other hand, nor between the sizes of the executive and the 
legislative on the one hand and the budget deficit on the other hand.  
The exception relates to the size of the executive: we find a positive association between the number of 
ministers and public expenditures / the budget deficit. But we can only interpret the association between 
the number of ministers and the budget deficit in a causal way, as only our IV regression of the budget 
deficit on the number of ministers produces a coefficient that is statistically significant.  
Our identification is based on an IV regression approach, instrumenting the number of ministers with their 
resp. extra number in governments in charge of a “state reform”. A “state reform” is a Belgian 
decentralisation round for which the support of a 2/3 majority in the Federal parliament is constitutionally 
required. This is a majority for which Belgian politicians mostly find it convenient to lay the foundations 
by inviting many parties to the governing coalition, in turn increasing the number of ministers and junior 
ministers.  
We also find that a change in the size or fragmentation of the legislative has no effect on public spending, 
nor on the budget deficit. This is not very surprising as changes over time in the size of the legislative are 
less frequent than changes over time in the size of the executive, as in Belgium the executive is believed to 
dominate the legislative in terms of “fiscal power”, and as Belgian MPs are elected under a proportional 
system, which seems to reduce the incentive to overspend on their electoral district compared to a system 
of single-MP districts.  
Our investigation is most closely related to the one by Baskaran (2013) for German states. Not only do 
both studies focus on (1) supra-local governments only (2) within one and the same country. But also 
methodologically the studies are related, as they make an attempt at remedying the possible endogeneity 
of political variables. They therefore only rely on within variation for identification and moreover deploy 
an IV estimation approach. Also in terms of findings, both our and Baskaran’s study find little evidence of 
a Law of 1/n holding for our sample. A difference between the 2 studies is unsurprisingly that Baskaran is 
able to make use of much more observations (16 states * 35 years). 
Our overall conclusion should hence be that on the basis of our dataset –including rather few “cross-
sections” as well as rather few changes in “n” over time- we find few indications that an increase in the 
number of politicians increases overall public expenditures (of course apart from increasing the direct 
expenditures on politicians) or that such an increase would increase the budget deficit. Reasons for this 
result could be our limited dataset, which is i.a. lacking time series on the number of and on the 
expenditures on private ministerial advisors in a political system of which it is believed that the executive 
strongly dominates the legislative, as well as the limited variation in the remaining political variables of 
interest. A possible contents-wise explanation of the overall lack of an effect goes back to Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962, quoted in MacDonald 2008). They argue that decision making costs increase with group 
size. Logrolling may become more difficult once a “group” has crossed a certain threshold with respect to 
its size. Apart from having increased the sheer number of politicians, the Belgian process of political 
decentralisation and fragmentation may have made the number of de facto “veto players” within the 
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Belgian political system so large that in a number of important respects the vote trading so typical in 
“veto” environments for legislation to pass may have become impossible361.  
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Annex 1: Correlation between the 9 political variables of interest after demeaning  
 
The correlations below are calculated after subtracting both the within and between averages of all our political variables, as the variation 
contained in these twice demeaned variables comes close to the variation in political variables we use for identification while including Fixed 
Effects as well as year dummies in our regression specifications in tables 6 and 7 above. 
 
 
Ministers 
“Cabinet 
members” 
Parties in 
the coalition 
Executive’s 
Herfindahl 
Govt 
friendly 
MPs 
Ministers’ 
“second 
jobs” 
Electoral 
districts MPs 
Parties in 
parliament 
Legislative's 
Herfindahl 
           Ministers 1 
         “Cabinet 
members” 0.9780 1 
        Parties in the 
coalition -0.1074 -0.0738 1 
       Executive’s 
Herfindahl 0.0234 0.0261 -0.7407 1 
      Government 
friendly MPs 0.3101 0.2950 0.4998 -0.4503 1 
     Ministers’ 
“second jobs” 0.1579 0.1382 -0.0554 -0.0281 0.0536 1 
    Electoral 
districts 0.3130 0.3326 0.4014 -0.2374 0.5568 0.0019 1 
   MPs 0.1651 0.1845 0.4893 -0.3197 0.5820 -0.0028 0.9674 1 
  Parties in 
parliament -0.0123 0.0446 -0.3631 0.3659 -0.4944 0.0482 0.1180 0.0581 1 
 Legislative's 
Herfindahl -0.0050 -0.0430 -0.0921 0.2957 0.1976 -0.0142 -0.1524 -0.1980 -0.5908 1 
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Annex 2: The evolution of the number of ministers shown graphically 
 
Graph 3 shows between and within variation for our number of ministers variable. It does not show its 
evolution during years for which we have no expenditure data available, as the observations concerned 
are obviously dropped from our regression analysis. Note that by definition values taken by the 
number of ministers variable are the same for the Brussels Regional government and the GGC, as the 
GGC is governed by exactly the same politicians as the Brussels Regional government, as explained 
above. 
 
The Federal government is governed by far by the highest number of ministers. Graph 3 shows that –
while the number of ministers is rather stable over time for most governments- 5 governments out of 9 
experience some within variation over our sample period. However, unlike expenditures per capita as 
shown by graph 1, the number of ministers per government does not show a clear increase over time 
(as was already suggested by table 4a above). The hump in Federal ministers characterising the 1988-
1991 legislature was related to the major “state reform” that took place during this legislature. 
Although the number of ministers in charge of “state reform” during this legislature did not differ from 
the previous nor from the subsequent legislature, the large number of ministers is to be understood as a 
consequence of the very large government coalition that was –painstakingly- established after the 
1987 elections with a view to being able to rely on the 2/3 majority in the federal parliament that is 
constitutionally needed for a “state reform” in Belgium. The 1988-91 Federal government coalition 
was supported by 150 out of 212 members of the House of Representatives. 
 
Graph 3: Ministers per government (1982-2012)  
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Overall conclusion 
 
In most of what preceded, we have analysed the extent to which the geographic distribution of fiscal 
transfers in Belgium matches the geographic distribution of political power and of government 
popularity. Only in chapter 5 we analysed the extent to which overall public spending matches overall 
political representation. 4 of our 5 chapters have in common that they are an attempt to deal with a 
number of constraints imposed on panel data analysis that are typical to several studies on supra-local 
governments in general, and typical to several studies on a rather small country like Belgium in 
particular. With respect to Belgium being a rather small country, a consequence of it is that Belgium 
has rather few geographic regions (and rather few supra-local governments) and hence “few cross-
sections” to base a panel data analysis on. Hence in most of the chapters a challenge has been to 
collect sufficient variation at the “cross-sectional level” to base a panel data analysis on. In the 1st 
chapter we have focused on the electoral district level for “cross-sectional” variation, in the 3rd chapter 
on the administrative district level, in the 4
th
 chapter on the municipal level, and in the 5
th
 chapter on 
the supra-local government level.  
The 4 panel data analyses have also in common that all of them are an attempt to deal with a number 
of constraints that are typical to the empirical analysis of the effect of political economy factors in 
general. With respect to this 2
nd
 type of constraint, the major challenge is that those political economy 
factors are generally speaking endogenous. Effectively, the fact that a particular electoral district is 
assigned a Federal government minister (chapter 1), the fact that in a particular municipality a political 
party is in power (chapter 4), the fact that a particular Belgian supra-local government is composed of 
more ministers than average (chapter 5), and the fact that a particular administrative district receives a 
particular amount of fiscal transfers (chapter 3) may all be endogenous. While a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) would have been the preferable approach to dealing with such 
endogeneity, the Belgian setting combined with our particular research questions each time prevented 
us from identifying a “useful” discontinuity, either because we simply found such a discontinuity 
lacking or because we observed too few data points situated in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity 
in question.  
Therefore in each of the abovementioned chapters we resorted to a more traditional Instrumental 
Variables (IV) estimation. This empirical strategy forced us in each chapter to come up with credible 
instruments, which in our view also happened to be original instruments against the background of the 
existing literature: ministers “lost” by a district following a conflict over policy or a political “scandal” 
and ministers “obtained” by a district following an electoral district reform (chapter 1), Brussels 
municipal coalitions that are “anti-coalitions” formed against the traditionally dominant party, or that 
comprise a party that had never before been in power (chapter 4), governing coalitions that were 
extended because of the Belgian constitutional requirement to assemble a 2/3 majority in the federal 
parliament to be able to implement a “state reform” (chapter 5), and an increase in fiscal transfers that 
was the result of the downsizing of a company or of the 2008 worldwide economic crisis (chapter 3). 
Using (types of) instruments that had not been used before in the literature may be considered as a way 
of usefully extending the existing political economics literature concerned also from a methodological 
point of view
362
. 
                                                          
362
 As is recommended by Besley and Case (2003 p. 34). 
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A final constraint we had to cope with is that in Belgium geographically disaggregated data on taxing 
and spending that are publicly available are rare
363
. For our 1
st
 and 3
rd
 chapter we have gratefully 
exploited the geographic disaggregation of important federal taxing and spending categories down to 
the district level that are made publicly available by the annually published “Regional accounts” of the 
NBB. In contrast, for the 4
th
 chapter we had to exploit non-published intergovernmental grants data 
per municipality that had been kindly made available by a source outside government. For the 5
th
 
chapter we had to manually copy the aggregate expenditure data per Belgian supra-local government 
from the federal Ministry of Finance’s “Conjunctuurnota”, as the Federal government appeared unable 
to provide us with these data electronically, and as our enquiry addressed at every single Belgian 
supra-local government had not provided us with aggregate expenditure data that go back to an earlier 
year than 1989. 
The fact that until now, the effect of political economy factors on supra-local taxing and spending in 
Belgium had never been investigated may seem surprising, given the salience of political economy 
factors in Belgium. Indeed, its size of government, its size of public debt, its number of politicians, 
and its political, cultural and economic heterogeneity and even divergence may be considered large 
from an international perspective. However, the methodological challenges that we have encountered 
make this scarcity less surprising. What may remain surprising is that in most of our chapters we find 
either evidence that is only strong in a limited number of specifications, or strong evidence of a rather 
limited economic significance with respect to any causal link between the geographic distribution of 
political power and the geographic distribution of fiscal transfers in Belgium.  
While we find strong evidence that the average federal minister steers net formula-based fiscal 
transfers to citizens of his/her electoral district, we find not as strong evidence that public spending 
and the budget deficit of a Belgian supra-local government increase with its number of ministers. We 
also find that only some political parties –as opposed to other political parties- in power at a Belgian 
supra-local level tactically favour those municipalities where they are also in power with extra 
discretionary transfers. Finally we only find weak evidence that an increase in net fiscal transfers to 
citizens would make Flemish citizens vote less in favour of the incumbent Federal government than 
Francophone Belgian citizens, given that the burden of any debt increase following such a net fiscal 
transfers increase would be disproportionately borne by Flemish citizens.  
However, one could also take the viewpoint that the evidence found is surprisingly strong, given our 
limited number of observations, given that we only identify on –in a number of cases limited- within 
variation (while excluding between variation as a basis for identification), and given that we 
consistently use IV estimation to isolate a causal relationship between our respective independent 
variables of interest and our dependent variables. Therefore also, it is a matter of further research if the 
limited evidence we find is due to lack of data, the limited number of observations available, our 
exclusive identification on within variation in our variables of interest,  a yet insufficiently innovative 
empirical approach, or an effectively rather weak impact of the political economy factors concerned. 
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 And that in case they are available, they are mostly only available over a rather short time period. 
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